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# **At the Heart of Loyalty**

## **A Comparative Analysis of Military Loyalty in the Armies of Greek City-States and Hellenistic Kingdoms**

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**Ph.D.**

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### **Signed Declaration**

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# Abstract

This thesis is a comparative analysis of the concept of military loyalty in the armies of Greek city-states and Hellenistic kingdoms, combining ancient evidence with the use of modern theories of organisational structures and combat motivation. It presents a basic contrast between Polis armies, which displayed high levels of loyalty, and Royal armies, which suffered from frequent cases of non-compliance and disloyalty, and argues that this contrast is a consequence of two fundamentally different ways of generating compliance and loyalty. Polis armies, it will be shown, predominantly exercised normative power, i.e. they relied on a combination of symbolic incentives and rewards, and a civic ideology of sacrifice for the common good; correspondingly, the soldiers, over whom this power was exercised, predominantly displayed moral involvement with their army, that is they complied voluntarily, out of a belief in the righteousness of their cause and in the alignment of their own benefit with that of their organisation. Royal armies, on the other hand, primarily utilised remunerative power, i.e. the allocation and manipulation of material rewards, which in turn was met by predominantly calculative involvement from the soldiers, i.e. a utilitarian assessment of risk and reward. These two compliance relationships – normative-moral and remunerative-calculative – lay at the heart of the different levels of loyalty we find in Polis and Royal armies. Nevertheless, at times this distinction broke down, revealing areas of overlap and a complex layering of motivations and types of power. The argument will be developed over the course of five chapters.

Chapter 1 provides the theoretical framework. It explains Amitai Etzioni's Compliance Theory, detailing the three congruent compliance models organisations may use. These models are based on the type of power the organisational elites (generals and officers) apply, and the type of involvement present in the lower participants (soldiers): normative power and moral involvement, remunerative power and calculative involvement, and lastly, coercive power and alienative

involvement. I will also stress the importance of the socio-political system over that of primary groups for the generation of compliance and loyalty. Chapter 2 presents the evidence for the different levels of loyalty in Polis and Royal armies, showing how citizen forces were robustly cohesive in the field, whereas the armies of the Successors and Hellenistic kings frequently succumbed to treachery, non-compliance, and disloyalty. I argue that one of the main reasons for this contrast lay in the powerful socio-political system that enveloped Polis armies, allowing them to develop a normative-moral compliance relationship. At the same time, however, it caused intense political infighting. Chapter 3 will explore one feature of the socio-political system: funerary practices. We shall analyse how armies and societies commemorated their soldiers, and witness the effects of civic ideology on the expressive content in soldiers' epitaphs. The evidence suggests strong normative elements for Polis armies, but does not allow us to draw firm conclusions regarding Royal armies. Chapter 4 will discuss the third type of congruent compliance relationship, i.e. coercive-alienative. I describe how neither army had access to, or need of, an effective coercive apparatus, as both had found other ways to create and maintain compliance. Chapter 5 will analyse the reward structures of Polis and Royal armies, and I will draw attention to the overall symbolic nature of rewards in citizen armies, and the largely material aspects of Royal army rewards, while pointing out ways in which Royal army elites strove to exert normative power through settling soldiers. This reflects the predominant types of power and involvement that characterised these organisations. Finally, a concluding section highlights the contrasts that were revealed in this thesis, but also discusses areas of convergence where the 'Polis army vs. Royal army' dichotomy broke down: creating and maintaining loyalty is a complex task, and military organisations employ more than one way to achieve it.

# Lay Summary

This thesis is a comparative analysis of military loyalty in the armies of ancient Greek city-states on the one hand, and of the Hellenistic kingdoms that emerged after the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC on the other. I combine ancient evidence and modern theories of organisational structures and combat motivation. It presents a contrast between city-state (or *Polis*) armies, which displayed high levels of loyalty, and the armies of the kingdoms (or *Royal* armies), which suffered from frequent cases of disloyalty, and argues that this contrast is a consequence of two fundamentally different ways of fostering loyalty. *Polis* armies, it will be shown, mainly relied on a combination of symbolic incentives and rewards, and an ideology of sacrifice for the common good. Consequently, the soldiers followed orders more or less voluntarily, out of a belief in the righteousness of their cause. *Royal* armies, on the other hand, primarily relied on material rewards and incentives, which meant that soldiers generally followed orders out of a calculated assessment of risk and reward. The argument will be developed over the course of five chapters.

Chapter 1 provides the theoretical framework. It explains Compliance Theory, detailing the three compliance models organisations use, based on the type of power the organisational elites (generals and officers) apply, and the type of involvement present in the lower participants (soldiers): normative-moral, remunerative-calculative, and coercive-alienative. Chapter 2 then presents the evidence for disloyalty in *Polis* and *Royal* armies, showing how city-state forces were generally loyal, whereas the armies of the Hellenistic warlords frequently experienced treachery. I argue that one of the main reasons for this contrast lay in the powerful socio-political system that enveloped *Polis* armies. Chapter 3 will explore one feature of the socio-political system: funerary practices. I analyse how armies and societies commemorated their soldiers, and what effects civic ideology had on the inscriptions on soldiers' tombs. Chapter 4 will discuss the role of coercion and punishment in *Polis* and *Royal* armies. I describe how neither army relied on



coercion, as both had found other ways to create loyalty. Chapter 5 will analyse the reward structures of Polis and Royal armies, and highlight the overall symbolic nature of rewards in Polis armies, and the largely material aspects of rewards Royal armies. This reflects the predominant types of power and involvement that characterised these organisations. Finally, a concluding section highlights the contrasts that were revealed in this thesis, but also discusses areas of convergence where the 'Polis army vs. Royal army' dichotomy broke down: creating and maintaining loyalty was a complex task, and military organisations employed more than one way to achieve it.

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# Abbreviations

As far as possible, the names of ancient authors and their works have been cited following the abbreviation system of the fourth edition of the *OCD*; journal abbreviations follow the style of the *APh*. Throughout this thesis, all dates are BC unless otherwise stated.

<i>APh</i>	<i>L'Année Philologique</i>
Austin	Austin, M. (2006) <i>The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest: A Selection of Ancient Sources in Translation</i> . 2 <sup>nd</sup> edn. Cambridge.
Bagnall & Derow	Bagnall, R. S., and Derow, P. (eds.) (2004) <i>The Hellenistic Period: Historical Sources in Translation</i> . 2 <sup>nd</sup> edn. Malden, MA.
<i>CT</i>	Hornblower, S. (1991-2008) <i>A Commentary on Thucydides</i> . Vol. I (1991), II (1996), and III (2008). Oxford.
<i>EAH</i>	Bagnall, R. S., Brodersen, K., Champion, C. B., Erskine, A., and Huebner, S. R. (eds.) (2013) <i>The Encyclopedia of Ancient History</i> . 13 vols. Malden, MA.
<i>FGrH</i>	Jacoby, F. (1923-) <i>Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker</i> . Berlin.
Fornara	Fornara, C. W. (1983) <i>Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War</i> . 2 <sup>nd</sup> edn. Cambridge.
<i>GHI</i>	Rhodes, P. J., and Osborne, R. (2003) <i>Greek Historical Inscriptions, 404-323 BC</i> . Oxford.
<i>GVI</i>	Peek, W. (1955) <i>Griechische Vers-Inschriften, Band I: Grab-Epigramme</i> . Berlin.
Harding	Harding, P. (1985) <i>From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus</i> . Cambridge.
<i>HCP</i>	Walbank, F. W. (1957-79) <i>A Historical Commentary on Polybius</i> . 3 vols. Oxford.
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
<i>IGBulg</i>	Mihailov, G. (ed.) (1958-1997) <i>Inscriptiones Graecae in Bulgaria Repertae</i> . 5 vols. Sofia.

ISE	Moretti, L. (1967-75) <i>Iscrizioni Storiche Ellenistiche</i> . 2 vols. Florence.
OCD	Hornblower, S., Spawforth, A., and Eidinow, E. (eds.) (2012) <i>The Oxford Classical Dictionary</i> . 4 <sup>th</sup> edn. Oxford.
OGIS	Dittenberger, W. (ed.) (1903-5) <i>Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae</i> . 2 vols. Leipzig.
P.Cair.Zen.	Edgar, C. C. (ed.) (1925-40) <i>Zenon Papyri, Catalogue Général des Antiquités Égyptiennes du Musée du Caire</i> . 5 vols. Cairo.
Pfuhl-Möbius	Pfuhl, E., and Möbius, H. (1977-79) <i>Die Ostgriechischen Grabreliefs</i> . 2 vols. Mainz.
SEG	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i>
SGO	Merkelbach, R., and Stauber, J. (2002) <i>Steinepigramme aus dem Griechischen Osten</i> . Munich.
Syll. <sup>3</sup>	Dittenberger, W. (ed.) (1914-24) <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> . 4 vols. 3 <sup>rd</sup> edn. Berlin.
West	West, M. L. (1989) <i>Iambi et Elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum Cantati, Vol. I</i> . 2 <sup>nd</sup> edn. Oxford.
YWH	Yardley, J. C., Wheatley, P., and Heckel, W. (2011) <i>Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus. Volume II: Books 13–15: The Successors to Alexander the Great</i> . Oxford.

# Introduction

## *Why Military Loyalty?*



### 1. Research Questions

Two episodes, one pertaining to a Hellenistic Royal army, the other to a Classical Polis army, will help to illuminate the issues this thesis aims to explore. First, the revolt of the Greek military settlers in 323: soon after Alexander's death, some 23,000 settlers in the Upper Satrapies (roughly Sogdiana, Bactria, Aria) rose up in rebellion with the desire to make their way back to the Greek homeland. The regent Perdikkas dispatched a force of Macedonian troops under Peithon, son of Krateuas, to deal with the rebels.<sup>1</sup> Diodoros, basing his account on Hieronymos of Kardia, informs us that Peithon took up the command eagerly, as he was in fact planning to win over the rebels and carve out a dominion of his own. Suspecting this, Perdikkas apparently ordered him to wipe out the rebel Greek army and then to distribute the spoils of war among his Macedonians.<sup>2</sup> Peithon went east and began by bribing some three thousand of the Greeks to join his side; their defection put the rebels to flight and ensured Peithon's victory.<sup>3</sup> But instead of following Perdikkas' orders to execute the Greeks, he struck a deal with them: in return for pledges of safe conduct, the rebels agreed to return to their settlements. Peithon's Macedonians, who had

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<sup>1</sup> His original force contained only 3,000 Macedonian infantry and 800 horse (Diod. Sic. 18.7.3), with an additional 10,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry to be supplied by the local satraps (Anson 2004, 239 with n. 25).

<sup>2</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.7.4-5.

<sup>3</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.7.5-6.



been promised the plunder left by the dead Greeks, felt short-changed, and secretly made plans that led to the killings of hundreds, perhaps thousands of the Greek settlers; their possessions the Macedonians claimed for themselves.<sup>4</sup>

The representation of the Macedonians was influenced by the anti-Macedonian slant of Diodoros' source and negative stereotypes of mercenary behaviour.<sup>5</sup> The problems with Diodoros' own account notwithstanding, the episode contains several elements we will be dealing with throughout this thesis.<sup>6</sup> At their heart are two questions: where did the Macedonian soldiers' loyalties lie, and how did their generals try to motivate them to obey? Perdikkas promised the troops the plunder from their defeated foes, and it appears that they were not above acting against the wishes of Peithon to obtain them. Peithon himself used bribery to cause the betrayal of parts of the Greek army. It appears that material rewards played a significant role in determining the loyalties of these soldiers, and that their generals exploited this dynamic to great effect. We may contrast this case with an episode preserved by Xenophon.

In 408, the Athenians were besieging Byzantion, which was being held and defended by Peloponnesian troops under Spartan command. Some of the citizens of Byzantion, however, managed to betray the city to the Athenians, who entered at night and forced the garrison to surrender. For his part in the betrayal, Anaxilaos, one of the conspirators, was later brought to trial at Sparta. Surprisingly, he was acquitted, on the grounds that he was a citizen of Byzantion, and not of Sparta, and therefore under moral obligation to act for the benefit of his polis. He had accepted no money, and had been motivated by a desire to save his fellow citizens from starvation, not to harm Sparta.<sup>7</sup> The logic of his case is clear: 'As a citizen of Byzantion, he should be judged by what he had done for his community, not for the Spartans'.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.7.9.

<sup>5</sup> Schober 1981, 35.

<sup>6</sup> See Schober 1981, 27-37, and Holt 1989, 87-91 for a more realistic interpretation of the events.

<sup>7</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.14-22, cf. Diod. Sic. 13.66-67 and Roberts 2017, 257-59.

<sup>8</sup> Harris 2013, 274-75.

Once more, this case contains concepts that are of central importance for this thesis: civic loyalty belonged to one's own polis, regardless of the military circumstances. This imperative to act for the good of one's community could even be respected by one's enemies. Furthermore, Anaxilaos defended himself by claiming that he had not been bribed, suggesting that the addition of material elements would corrupt his otherwise purely moral reasons for betraying the city. Polybios expressed a very similar idea in his definition of treachery: those who act with their polis' best interests at heart, and not for personal gain, should not be called traitors.<sup>9</sup>

These episodes illustrate two very different concepts of loyalty; in the actions of the Macedonians, personal material advantage appears to have been the deciding factor: their allegiance was to themselves first, and the direction of their loyalty was determined primarily by calculative considerations. In the case of Anaxilaos, we were presented with a loyalty that was directed at the abstract idea of the polis itself, necessitated by the moral obligation to act for the good of one's community, whatever the circumstances. This helps to frame the questions posed by this study: what processes governed the dynamics of loyalty in ancient socio-military organisations? How can we define loyalty in the context of a polis, where betraying one's city can be cast as acting in its best interests? Are these two cases representative of a wider reality, in which material gain determined the loyalties of Royal army soldiers, and moral considerations those of a polis' citizens? Finally, how did those in power attempt to generate compliance from their soldiers? To answer these questions, and to prepare the ground for the analysis that is to follow, we will begin with two preliminary definitions.

Firstly, this thesis will deal primarily with two types of military organisation, referred to henceforth as Royal armies on the one hand, and Polis armies on the other. This distinction is to a degree modelled on John Ma's separation of 'Big War' and 'Small War': the former being the warfare carried out by the large Hellenistic kingdoms on an 'international' scale, and the latter the warfare conducted by

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<sup>9</sup> Polyb. 18.13-15.

individual *poleis* on a smaller and more local scale.<sup>10</sup> Royal armies, then, are those forces commanded by the kings and warlords of the Hellenistic period, such as the Successor armies and those serving the various kingdoms during the centuries after Alexander's death. For simplicity's sake, these will be called 'Royal' even if the commanding general was not, or not yet, a king. This is done to distinguish them more easily from the second type of army, the Polis army: these are the forces fighting for individual *poleis*, composed primarily of citizen troops under the direct authority of the polis government. Furthermore, while the opposition between the two types of military organisation is based largely on their economic and socio-political dimensions, it is not based on chronology: the differentiation is not between Classical and Hellenistic, but between polis-based and kingdom-based armies.

The second point that needs clarification is the concept of loyalty itself, and its relation to compliance (for a fuller account of which, see Chapter 1). Throughout this thesis, loyalty will refer to the willingness to act for the benefit of the object of one's loyalty out of a moral conviction that it is the right thing to do. In contrast, compliance is the willingness to follow a specific directive, regardless of any personal, moral, or emotional connotations. Generating compliance, thus, is not the same as generating loyalty: compliance means obedience, whereas loyalty means obedience with an added moral dimension. For a military organisation, compliance is ideally always underpinned by loyalty: as will become clear, the utilitarian considerations that lead to compliance can just as easily cause noncompliance, whereas loyalty tends to reinforce itself and produces higher levels of compliance. Now that we have set out the broad parameters of this analysis, we can look at how the concept of loyalty has been treated in previous scholarship.

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<sup>10</sup> Ma 2000.

## 2. Current Scholarship

Military loyalty (or disloyalty) in the ancient world has not been dealt with in any comprehensive manner. As part of wider Greek military history, individual aspects of loyalty, and symptoms of disloyalty (such as betrayal, mutiny, or desertion) have been the subject of various articles. Winnicki 1992 dealt with the reward structures in the Ptolemaic army, investigating how the authorities used remuneration to increase participation in campaigns. Overall, however, his work dealt more with compliance than with loyalty, as he traced the lengths to which some Ptolemaic rulers had to go in order to ensure the obedience of their troops. Elizabeth Carney's study of discipline in the Macedonian army is similarly preoccupied with compliance, although she recognised its connection to loyalty by observing the growing importance of personal bonds between soldiers and generals as armies grew more complex in social and ethnic terms.<sup>11</sup> This bond, and the loyalty it could create, she placed at the heart of the compliance structure of Alexander's army. Her work is important because it attempts to identify the underlying causes of certain behaviour by soldiers: what others had labelled as mutinies, she interpreted as a breach of the trust between troops and general, by analysing what it was that motivated them to comply in the first place. This approach is also at the centre of the present investigation. Peter Mittag adopted a similar method in his short article on the loyalty of the Seleukid army: he concluded that 'money was the most important factor of loyalty' in the case of mercenaries, and that military settlers, or *katoikoi*, acted out of allegiance to the legitimate representatives of the Seleukid royal house.<sup>12</sup> This contrast between mercenaries and *katoikoi*, however, goes against the evidence for the revolt of Molon, as it does not explain why the *katoikoi* of Asia Minor at first joined Molon's rebellion against Antiochos III, their rightful king. It appears that we require a more nuanced picture of the complex motivations that drove mercenaries and Seleukid military settlers.

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<sup>11</sup> Carney 1996, 30.

<sup>12</sup> Mittag 2008, 49.

Sandra Scheuble-Reiter, who analysed the epigraphic material pertaining to Egyptian garrison commanders (phrourarchs), arrived at the same simplistic conclusion regarding Hellenistic mercenaries: 'Das einzige Band zwischen diesen Söldnern und der Krone stellte der Sold dar'.<sup>13</sup> She based this on evidence from Polybios, who recounts how the courtier Sosibios attempted to buy the allegiance of the Ptolemaic mercenaries after the death of Ptolemy IV in 203, and set about hiring new ones, hoping they would be loyal to him personally, as he was the one paying them.<sup>14</sup> Here the distinction between loyalty and compliance is especially important: in her argument, Scheuble-Reiter talks about the loyalties of mercenaries, when she probably means compliance. For while it might be true that their compliance was up for sale, their loyalties were not: she seems to have ignored that Sosibios desired to hire new troops precisely because he was unsure of the existing mercenaries' loyalties, which he suspected were to the legacy of the dead king and his murdered wife Arsinoe III. This suggests once more that the notion that mercenaries were motivated by money alone, and 'state' troops by loyalties to legitimate rulers, needs revision.

A more nuanced approach is necessary, which makes no previous assumptions about the motivations of soldiers, be they mercenaries or not, but rather focuses on what actually determined a soldier's loyalty in the first place. As an example of such an approach we can take John Hyland's article on the desertion of a group of soldiers recorded in Xenophon's *Anabasis*. While he does not develop a general picture of loyalty in the army of the Ten Thousand, he goes into great detail in trying to identify the individual motivations of some twenty soldiers who deserted the Greek side at the beginning of the march back. He rejects Xenophon's one-dimensional explanation that they had been bribed or corrupted by the Persians, and offers instead a combination of shock in the aftermath of the massacre of the Greek commanders, fear of an imminent Persian attack, the lack of any overall command, and the absence of any coercive measures to prevent desertion (discussed in section

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<sup>13</sup> Scheuble 2009, 35.

<sup>14</sup> Polyb. 15.25.16-18, cf. 15.25.20, 29-31, 15.26.1-9.

2.4).<sup>15</sup> Such a close examination allows us to suggest that their desertion was not necessarily a case of disloyalty to the Greek cause, but rather an isolated instance of noncompliance, based on a calculative mindset: weighing up all the relevant factors, the men decided that staying with the Greek army would be detrimental to their survival, causing them to desert – they even carried along one of their wounded comrades. This offers us a glimpse of the underlying motivations of some of these mercenaries: not simply money and adventure, but group cohesion and personal safety. Abstract considerations of loyalty did not seem to have been a central part of the equation.

All of these works, however, share a relatively narrow focus, and none of them developed a systematic approach to studying military loyalty. This thesis addresses this issue. By making use of modern theoretical models to aid us in understanding the organisational structures of ancient militaries, we will investigate how these organisations went about securing compliance and loyalty from their members. As stated previously, the subjects of this study will be the Polis armies of the Classical and Hellenistic periods, and the Royal armies of the early Successors and the emergent Hellenistic kingdoms. Including the armies of Philip II and Alexander III is beyond the scope of this thesis; another reason behind the choice of focus is the vacuum of power that Alexander's death created, as it is fertile ground for a structural study of military loyalty. It provided all the major players, soldiers and generals alike, with ample scope to act, and because of the intense and frequent military activity that took place we are also relatively well informed about this period.

In opposition to the scholarship discussed above, which focused on one group of soldiers, or a few isolated incidents of noncompliance, the present study will adopt a broad perspective: it spans the world of the Greek *poleis* as well as that of the Hellenistic kingdoms, roughly covering a period of four hundred years in its goal to overcome the largely artificial separation between 'Classical' and 'Hellenistic' that besets so many works on Greek warfare. Necessarily, this breadth will come at

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<sup>15</sup> Hyland 2010, 247-48.

the cost of some depth. The aim is to identify the fundamental elements contained in the compliance structures of Polis and Royal armies, and to highlight areas of contrast and overlap. The nature of the available evidence is a further limiting factor, and favours a broader approach over a series of case studies.

### 3. Evidence

The ancient evidence used in this thesis falls mainly into two categories: literary and epigraphic, with the former representing the bulk of the material. This is largely a consequence of necessity: most of the discussion will be concerned with acts of treachery, noncompliance, and disloyalty, and such cases are more often mentioned in historiography, court speeches, or political and military treatises. Inscriptions, both public and private, rarely mention military betrayal or any underlying reasons or motivations. For the Classical period, the narratives of Herodotos, Thucydides, and Xenophon are indispensable, as they preserve the basic military history and naturally deal with the actions and motivations of armies and individuals. This can be supplemented with the material from the Attic orators, which can contain details of a more personal nature and allow us a glimpse of everyday military life and the concerns of those who served in citizen armies. Other works, such as the military treatises of Aineias Taktikos (fourth century BC) or Polyainos (second century AD), offer valuable, albeit episodic, insights into the natures of Polis and Royal armies and preserve a number of cases that shed light on the behaviour of individual soldiers and commanders.<sup>16</sup> Their relevance also lies in shifting the focus from Athens to other, less well-known communities.

For the era of the Successors, books 18-20 of Diodoros' universal history, written in the first century BC, remain essential, being the most substantial narrative of the military history after Alexander's death. He also displayed a useful interest in

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<sup>16</sup> On Polyainos, see generally the volume edited by Brodersen (2010), and in particular the contributions by Wheeler (7-54, on stratagem collections and the military dimensions of Polyainos' work) and Geus (55-68, on Polyainos' life).

the material aspects of warfare, such as payment and plunder, which is vital to our understanding of the reward structures in Royal armies. His account can be combined with the history of the *diadochoi* written by Arrian in the second century AD, which survives in a few fragments, and Justin's epitome of the *Historiae Philippicae* originally composed by Pompeius Trogus in the Augustan era.<sup>17</sup> Pompeius, who covered the entire Hellenistic period, becomes more important for events after 301, which is the point from which Diodorus' narrative survives only in fragments. After a dearth of narrative history for most of the third century, the second-century BC historian Polybios becomes our main source for the events of the late third century and beyond.

Naturally, there is a danger that we are being presented with stereotypical depictions of the behaviour of Macedonian or Greek soldiers and their commanders. Further, it is unclear whether this reflects the bias of the surviving author or of the sources he used. Diodoros in particular could be seen as providing a largely derivative account, seen by some as mindlessly following the stereotypes and *topoi* he found in his sources.<sup>18</sup> For our purposes this might be a particular problem, as it is believed he based much of his account of the period of the Successors on the writings of Hieronymos of Kardia, who might have been hostile to some of the Macedonians he wrote about, but favourable to the Antigonids, at whose court he lived after the death of Eumenes.<sup>19</sup> Ultimately, we have no way of knowing to what degree Diodoros interacted with his sources.<sup>20</sup> What is more, the supposed reliance on Hieronymos as the main source for books 18-20 has recently been questioned in favour of a more diversified method on Diodoros' part.<sup>21</sup> We should also note that

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<sup>17</sup> For the possible dates of Justin, see Yardley 1994, 3-4.

<sup>18</sup> See appendix six in Morton 2012 for a critical discussion of the tradition that Diodoros was merely 'a slavish copyist'. On the composition of the *Bibliothèque* and Diodoros' historiographical method, see Green 2006, 7-34, and Morton 2013 for an in-depth analysis of Diodoros' portrayal of Eunos and the Sicilian slave wars of the second century.

<sup>19</sup> Schober 1981, 35.

<sup>20</sup> The conclusion in Rathmann 2014, 52 is sobering: 'Schaut man auf die belastbaren Ergebnisse von gut 150 Jahren quellenkritischer Forschung zu Diodor, so ist das Resultat ernüchternd. Im Prinzip sind alle denkbaren Autoren als potentielle Vorlagen für jedes einzelne Buch genannt worden'.

<sup>21</sup> Rathmann 2014, 80-94. For the view that Hieronymos was the chief source for these books, see Roisman 2010, who also highlights Hieronymos' heavy focus on great individuals and his usually



there are only nineteen extant fragments of Hieronymos, rendering hazardous any general assumptions as to his overall aims and agendas.<sup>22</sup> To avoid a discussion of the possible combinations of sources for each passage from Diodoros, we will focus instead on the actions of the soldiers he described, and arrive at our own conclusions as to their motivations. After all, it is unlikely that Hieronymos could simply invent the mass defection of thousands of troops during a battle, regardless of how he then chose to characterise the troops. What is more, the picture we find in Diodoros is neither isolated nor idiosyncratic: it is corroborated by the material from Polybios, Plutarch, Justin, Curtius, Arrian, Polyainos, in addition to epigraphic material that sheds light on the power structures of Royal armies.

This brings us to the second category of evidence used in this thesis. While our literary sources provide us with the grand perspective of the themes under discussion, they rarely reliably reported the individual motivations that prompted soldiers or commanders to act. Indeed, in the case of the ancient world, such information is near impossible to come by at all: we lack any meaningful data pertaining to the personal opinions, values, and considerations that caused men to comply, or promoted feelings of loyalty. Modern studies of combat motivation usually rely on surveys, often taken in the immediate aftermath of actual combat. For Polis and Royal armies, unsurprisingly, no such approach is possible, which is another reason the present study takes a broader view of compliance and loyalty.

Epigraphy, on the other hand, allows at least a modicum of insight into the minds and motivations of ancient men and women. How communities and individuals chose to portray military service, what they professed to have fought and died for, and how they commemorated and honoured past sacrifices can all tell us a great deal about perceptions of war, courage, and loyalty. Hence a whole chapter of this thesis is dedicated to the funerary practices of soldiers and armies, the evidence for which is largely inscriptional. No claim can be made of its comprehensiveness:

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negative representation of the troops under their command. On the history of Hieronymos, see Hornblower 1981.

<sup>22</sup> Rathmann 2014, 57. On the reliability and biases of Hieronymos, see chapter 1 in Roisman 2012. For the fragments, see *FGrH* 154.

the material is too vast and varied to be dealt with in sufficient detail in a single chapter; a study of the funerary epitaphs of citizen soldiers alone would easily offer enough material for a separate dissertation. The evidence presented here is not supposed to be read in isolation, rather it is intended to provide an illustration of certain themes that will also be encountered in other parts of the discussion.

#### **4. Outline of Thesis**

This thesis deals with the dynamics of loyalty in the armies of Greek *poleis* and Hellenistic kingdoms. It seeks to explain the reasons behind two very different pictures: Polis armies appear to have displayed high levels of loyalty, whereas Royal armies suffered from frequent cases of noncompliance and disloyalty. The overall argument shall be that these two types of military organisation utilised two fundamentally different methods of generating loyalty and compliance. At the same time, I will highlight the complex nature of these methods and areas of convergence between Royal and Polis armies. To aid us in understanding the internal structures of these organisations, we shall employ theoretical models that deal with the application and reception of power.

Chapter 1 will outline Amitai Etzioni's compliance theory, the concepts of the primary group and military cohesion, and the socio-political system. Compliance theory holds that all complex organisations operate under a certain compliance relationship, which is a combination of the type of power exerted by the organisational elites, and the type of involvement expressed by an organisation's lower participants. There are three congruent compliance relationships, or power-involvement combinations, defined by the predominant types of power and involvement present in them: normative-moral, remunerative-calculative, and coercive-alienative. I argue that Polis armies utilised a normative-moral compliance relationship, and Royal armies a remunerative-calculative one, while neither army contained significant coercive-alienative elements. The second theoretical model,

i.e. primary groups and cohesion, deals with the internal structures of small groups of individuals and the processes that lead to more or less cohesion. I will argue that cohesion is of secondary importance when considered next to involvement: the crucial distinction between social cohesion and task cohesion reveals that the willingness to carry out a certain task generates compliance and loyalty more effectively than high levels of social cohesiveness. Lastly, the importance of the socio-political system: a strong socio-political ideology, identity, and the perceived effectiveness of the system contribute greatly to the creation of moral involvement. Military organisations that are embedded into a strong socio-political system will thus benefit from higher levels of cohesion and loyalty.

Chapter 2 presents the contrasting images of disloyalty we find in our sources. I shall begin by discussing Polis armies, showing that citizen forces displayed high levels of task cohesion while on campaign. There are no clear-cut cases of a citizen army fracturing in the field and turning on itself, which at first glance seems to be at odds with the evidence for fierce internal divisions and *stasis* that caused regular outbreaks of civil war. This double-nature, it will be argued, has its origin in the intense socio-political interactions that marked civic life in the socio-political system of a polis, and was at the same time a source of military loyalty in the field and a cause for internal political strife at home. Underlying this complex pattern, however, was a moral involvement with the polis, which points to the existence of a normative-moral compliance relationship in Polis armies. Following on, we shall analyse the evidence for Royal armies. Disloyalty and noncompliance were a regular occurrence: armies often fractured, with contingents or whole forces changing sides during a battle or a campaign. Bribery and treachery were common among both the organisational elites (generals and officers) and the lower participants (soldiers). At the core of these issues usually lay some form of material reward: military pay, plunder, or the soldiers' possessions. This points towards a remunerative-calculative compliance relationship. The last segment of the chapter treats desertion, and argues that Polis armies generally suffered from this much less than Royal armies: in the former, it was a symptom of social and ethnic

differentiation, whereas in the latter it was a reflection of the highly calculative involvement of the lower participants.

Chapter 3 discusses how the private and public burials of soldiers reflected the compliance relationships of Polis and Royal armies. It demonstrates how a strong socio-political system has a direct impact on the type of power a military organisation applies, and reveals the type of involvement with which such power was met. In the case of Polis armies, I will trace how the civic continuum, or the concept of a shared past, present, and future, helped to shape the expressive elements of funerary practices. Public burial contained powerful emotional and exhortative elements, connecting the sacrifice of the fallen soldiers with the actions of their forefathers and the rest of the community. This public expression of normative power – inspiring its citizens to strive for the benefit of the community, was mirrored in private burial practices: funerary epigrams reveal a strong symbolic bond between citizen and community, and present loyal military service as a moral obligation of the citizen, as a way to bring glory to his family and his *πάτρα*, the land of his fathers. In the case of Royal armies, the evidence is less clear: beginning by identifying the existence of a tangible remunerative element in the funerary practices in the army of Alexander the Great, the discussion will then trace how soldiers were at the risk of losing their connection to a greater socio-political system by dying on campaign and being buried far from home, if at all. These soldiers' epitaphs on the whole do not express a bond to a *πάτρα*, or a more abstract motivation for fighting, as do the epitaphs for citizen-soldiers. In terms of compliance theory, I will argue that the funerary practices of Polis armies actively supported a normative-moral compliance relationship, whereas Royal armies could not as readily benefit from the normative influence of a socio-political system.

Chapter 4 deals with the application of coercive power, in the form of physical coercion and corporal punishment, in Polis and Royal armies. I shall argue that neither type of army had need of a powerful or sophisticated coercive apparatus. Corporal punishments were not part of the compliance model in Polis and Royal armies, and were indeed met with strong alienative reactions when they were

enforced. The reason lies in the fact that they relied on other types of power to generate compliance and loyalty. Consequently, if coercive power was not the predominant type that sustained either compliance relationship, these armies must have relied on remunerative or normative power instead.

Chapter 5 analyses the reward structures for Polis and Royal armies. Civic armies relied primarily on symbolic rewards to motivate their soldiers to comply and to generate lasting loyalties among the troops. These rewards were embedded into the socio-political system, reinforcing and reflecting the core norms and values each community decided to promote. Common themes were sacrifice for the ancestral land, and individual and communal glory. Only rarely did Polis armies hand out primarily monetary rewards. Nor did inter-polis warfare provide the opportunities for individual enrichment of the average soldier. Spoils were not usually on a large scale, and any plunder that was acquired became public property, reinforcing once more the central role of the socio-political system of the polis: loyalty was not a response to material rewards, but an expression of the connection between individual and society. Polis armies, then, relied primarily on normative power to support their compliance relationship. Royal armies, on the other hand, depended on the application of remunerative power: the warfare of the Hellenistic warlords and kings offered ample scope for the acquisition of plunder. Soldiers expected rewards and payments, and service with in a Royal army could provide a short-cut to wealth. Generals responded by using material rewards as incentives for compliance and as supports for loyalty. Because plunder represented such an important source of power in these armies, its distribution was usually regulated and overseen by the king himself. The last section of the chapter covers the settlement of soldiers, and views this practice from the perspective of bridging the gap between moral and calculative involvement. Royal army generals were aware of the drawbacks of remunerative power, as it reinforced a cycle of betrayal and disloyalty; settling soldiers and thus providing them with quasi-polis structures could lead to the development of moral involvement, and positively affect the compliance relationship: if soldiers were motivated not only by the prospects of plunder, but also

by a desire to protect and advance the interests of their kingdom, loyalty was set on a firmer footing.

A concluding section will form a picture of contrast and complexity: Polis and Royal armies used different compliance relationships, but there were several areas of overlap. While the normative-moral elements in a Polis army predominate, there was also remuneration in the form of cash rewards, and coercion in the form of capital punishment. In Royal armies, the remunerative-calculative relationship was combined with strong personal bonds between the commanders and their troops, and normative expressions of legitimacy that resonated with soldiers who preferred fighting for the legitimate king, rather than a usurper, regardless of the depth of his pockets.



# Chapter One

## *The Theoretical Framework*



### 1.1 Introduction

The study of ancient Greek warfare has in the recent past been revitalised by an interest that goes beyond strategy and tactics, or equipment, and focuses instead on the individuals who did the actual fighting. This so-called 'Face of Battle' approach (after John Keegan's famous book) has yielded stimulating results, and fuelled a fierce debate about the reality of combat in the Classical period. At the heart of the issue lie the mechanics of phalanx warfare – unfortunately, most other combat contexts have been relegated to a position of secondary importance, regardless of their ubiquity. The polarisation is usually between the 'orthodox' view, proposing a physical interpretation of what some ancient sources call *othismos* and imagining a shoving match between two opposing phalanxes, and the 'heretic' view, which suggests a more metaphorical interpretation and allows much more scope for individual fighting, skill-at-arms, and a greater fluidity of combat.<sup>23</sup> No clear answer to the question is in sight, but in the course of the discussion there has been an influx of new evidence drawn from contemporary combat situations, or based on modern approaches to combat theory. Adam Schwartz' *Reinstating the Hoplite*, for example,

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<sup>23</sup> For the 'orthodox' concept of the *othismos* as the decisive part in phalanx fighting, e.g. Cartledge 1977, 16: 'fighting consisted chiefly of a concerted shoving (*ōthismos*) akin to the tight scrummaging of modern rugby football'. See further Holladay 1982, 94-7, and Luginbill 1994. A good overview of the traditional arguments in favour of the *othismos*-theory can be found in Schwartz 2009, 183-200. Against this view see Krentz 1985, Cawkwell 1989, Goldsworthy 1997, and Matthew 2009. The discussion in Lendon 2010, 307-13 is balanced but largely in favour of the orthodox view.



made use of modern riot police to find parallels for the use of shields in close quarter combat, and Jason Crowley has used various theories of combat motivation, such as primary group and unit cohesion, to gain insights into the psychology of Athenian hoplites.<sup>24</sup> Invariably, however, the focus has remained fixed on the phalanx.

In the sense that the present work employs modern theories of combat and organisational structures, it can be seen as a continuation of this trend; a great debt is owed especially to the works of Jason Crowley and Stephen Wesbrook, whose study of military disintegration in turn provided the basis for Crowley's analysis.<sup>25</sup> But at the same time it moves away from the iconic phalanx and the questions of how exactly it worked, to investigate a relatively unexplored issue: that of military loyalty. Utilising similar theories as those employed by Crowley to analyse the Athenian military system, this study intends to zoom out and consider not one army in particular, but rather two different military systems: Polis armies on the one hand, and Royal armies on the other. This chapter's aim is to explain the two main theoretical models that will be used. Firstly (section 1.2), Amitai Etzioni's theories on the structures of complex organisations and compliance, which also formed the basic framework for both Crowley and Wesbrook, will help to classify and analyse both Polis and Royal armies in organisational terms; secondly (section 1.3), modern theories of combat motivation will aid us in understanding the nature of the military personnel under discussion, both at the lower and upper ends of the spectrum of military hierarchy.

## **1.2 Involvement and Power: Amitai Etzioni's Compliance Theory**

In the broadest sense, any army is an organisation. It usually has a hierarchy, fixed internal structures, and certain goals it aims to achieve with the means at its disposal. Such a general characterisation is obviously of little analytical use, but once

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<sup>24</sup> Schwartz 2009, and Crowley 2012.

<sup>25</sup> Wesbrook 1980.

an organisation has been further classified regarding its dominant structural features and means of attaining its goals, it becomes possible to compare it to other organisations, which in turn serves the purpose to highlight parameters such as internal cohesion, personnel, or organisational effectiveness. It is precisely this comparative aspect that makes classification important, and justifies the use of a theoretical framework in order to describe the organisations to be discussed in this thesis, namely Polis and Royal armies of the Classical and Hellenistic periods.

Our approach will be based on what is known as compliance theory, developed over the course of several publications in the latter half of the twentieth century by sociologist Amitai Etzioni.<sup>26</sup> In its simplest terms, the theory states that most organisations are made up of two basic elements: lower participants on the one side, and the organisational elites on the other. The lower participants are those over whom power and control is exercised, while the organisational elites are those exercising that power and control. Etzioni identifies three forms such power can take: coercive, remunerative, and normative.

*Coercive* power rests on the application, or the threat of application, of physical sanctions [...]. *Remunerative* power is based on control over material resources and rewards through allocation of salaries and wages, commissions and contributions [...]. *Normative* power rests on the allocation and manipulation of symbolic rewards and deprivations through employment of leaders, manipulation of mass media, allocation of esteem and prestige symbols, administration of ritual [...].  
(Etzioni 1975, 5)

To take examples from the modern world: coercive power would be applied by a prison to its inmates, restricting their movement and contact with the outside world, and regulating their daily lives; breaking the rules might lead to an extension of the sentence or other sanctions of a coercive nature. Remunerative power is applied by a factory to its employees, who receive a wage, along with financial incentives such as bonuses for meeting organisational targets or prospects of promotion. Infringements of protocol can be penalised by disciplinary actions, by the blocking

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<sup>26</sup> The fullest treatment can be found in Etzioni 1975; see also Etzioni 1964 and 1969. For a critical (and overall favourable) appraisal of the theory, see Drummond 1993.

of career advancement, or in extreme cases, by sacking the employee. Lastly, normative power is applied by a charitable institution to its volunteers, whose commitment has to be managed mainly by symbolic means and the use of information and inspirational leadership to maintain their belief in the cause and thus their willingness to comply; there would be little need of any coercive apparatus, as by definition the volunteers would not normally allow themselves to be forced to work.

In turn, the lower participants of each organisation are defined according to their *involvement* with the organisation. Involvement depends on the orientation of the lower participants, which is defined by two parameters: intensity and direction. In terms of intensity, orientation ranges from high to low, and in terms of direction, from positive to negative.<sup>27</sup> Combining intensity and direction, then, gives us several types of orientation, and just as with the power applied by the organisation, involvement tends to take one of three forms: alienative, calculative, or moral.

Alienative involvement designates an intense negative orientation [...]. Calculative involvement designates either a negative or a positive orientation of low intensity. [...] Moral involvement designates a positive orientation of high intensity.  
(Etzioni 1975, 10)

Generally speaking, a positive orientation results in commitment to the organisation and its goals, whereas a negative orientation results in alienation or hostility. Coercive power tends to create more alienation than remunerative power, and in turn remunerative power more than normative power. To go back to our modern examples: a prison inmate who is exposed to coercive power from his organisation (the prison) would usually have an intensely negative orientation to it, hence we would call his involvement alienative. This type of involvement is marked by mistrust and hostility towards the organisation and its elites, very low commitment, and patterns of noncompliance that can only be dealt with by the use of physical

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<sup>27</sup> Etzioni 1975, 8-9; he describes involvement as 'the cathectic-evaluative orientation of an actor to an object'. See also Drummond 1993, 27: 'a psychological attachment evidenced by the willingness of participants to devote energy and loyalty to the organization'.

coercion. A factory worker who experiences the application of remunerative power by his organisation might have a positive or negative orientation of relatively low intensity, and so his involvement would be calculative. This type of involvement often rests on the lower participant's assessment of risk and reward, where commitment and compliance are based on utilitarian values and self-interest. Lastly, a volunteer in a charitable organisation which applies normative power would usually have a highly positive orientation towards his organisation and a very low level of alienation, hence his involvement would be moral. This type of involvement is carried by personal conviction, and displays high commitment and belief in the organisation and its goals; compliance is voluntary and not dependent on material rewards or fear of sanctions.<sup>28</sup>

There are, then, three types of power that may be applied by the organisational elites, i.e. coercive, remunerative, and normative, and three types of involvement from the lower participants, i.e. alienative, calculative, and moral. Taken together, this yields a total of nine possible combinations of power and involvement under which an organisation can operate. The combination of power on the one hand, and involvement on the other, is known as the 'compliance relationship' (hence the designation compliance theory), as it is this combination which largely determines an organisation's effectiveness in generating compliance in order to achieve its goals. However, it is crucial to note that not all combinations are equally effective at generating compliance. In fact, there are three types of compliance relationship that are the most functional: *a*) coercive power and alienative involvement, *b*) remunerative power and calculative involvement, and *c*) normative power and moral involvement. These three types are called *congruent* compliance relationships, and they are the most common simply because they are the most effective, as the power employed corresponds to and reinforces the involvement of the lower participants, and vice versa (see Fig. 1). Organisations that run on other combinations will usually attempt to move towards one of the three congruent ones to increase effectiveness; this can be achieved either by changing

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<sup>28</sup> Etzioni 1964, 60.

the type of power applied, or by changing the orientation and thus the involvement of the lower participants, e.g. by different methods of recruitment (usually increased selectivity) or socialisation.<sup>29</sup>

Most complex organisations, however, do not rely exclusively on one type of power, but at times makes use of two or even all three. Nevertheless, one type will normally predominate, as often the application of two different means of control leads to neutralisation, where the two types cancel each other out (one might imagine a prison relying equally on coercive and normative power).<sup>30</sup> In terms of classification, then, organisations will be defined according to the type of power they rely on primarily. Equally, lower participants are not limited to only one type of involvement; acting out of a strong belief and a sense of moral commitment to an organisation's goals on the one hand, and being influenced by financial incentives on the other, do not have to be mutually exclusive. Equally, if a lower participant is morally involved with an organisation, he or she can still feel alienation towards certain aspects of that organisation, such as its means of achieving its goals, or a particular style of leadership. Just as with types of power, there is usually a predominant or primary type of involvement. Equally, there are combinations that might not be as common, effective, or sustainable as others (e.g. a strong alienative involvement at the same time as a moral one).

	Coercive power	Remunerative power	Normative power
Alienative involvement	✓	✗	✗
Calculative involvement	✗	✓	✗
Moral involvement	✗	✗	✓

*Fig. 1: Possible compliance relationships, highlighting the three congruent combinations*

<sup>29</sup> Etzioni 1975, 12-14, Westbrook 1980, 247-8.

<sup>30</sup> Etzioni 1975, 6-8, 23: most organisations operate with parts of all three compliance relationships.

Now that we have sketched the outline of compliance theory, our purpose requires that we apply it to military organisations in general, and to the Greek Polis and Royal armies of the ancient Mediterranean in particular.<sup>31</sup> As we have noted earlier, every army is an organisation, and as such we can identify both the predominant types of power exercised by the organisational elites (kings, warlords, generals, officers, and magistrates), and the types of involvement on the parts of the lower participants (the soldiers). It might be helpful to consider briefly some relatively modern examples before moving on to the armies of the ancient past.

To illustrate an organisation of the coercive-alienative type, we might turn to the armies of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe, such as those of the British Empire or Frederick the Great: these were marked by forced recruitment, frequent physical sanctions (flogging, executions), and the use of force to ensure compliance on the battlefield. The tactics of the time reflect this approach, as columns, lines, and squares of men moving and acting in unison, wearing bright colours and gathered around prominent standards, are more easily controlled and coerced by their sergeants and commanding officers. On the soldiers' parts, alienation was relatively high, and compliance a result not of conviction, but of compulsion; this is supported by comparatively high rates of desertion.<sup>32</sup> A more recent illustration of this dynamic can be found in interviews conducted with captured members of the Iraqi army that fought the coalition forces during the 2003 operation *Iraqi Freedom*: the prisoners of war indicated that their main motivator was coercion through fear.<sup>33</sup> Next, the mercenary armies of Renaissance Europe can serve as an example of the remunerative-calculative type: the *condottieri* attracted followers with promises of wages, plunder, and ransom money, and compliance in such organisations was stable as long as the rewards justified the risk. Once the danger no longer seemed worth the remuneration, or once the money had run out,

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<sup>31</sup> For a detailed application of Etzioni's theory to modern western armies, see Westbrook 1980; Crowley 2012 used Westbrook's model as a basis for his analysis of the Classical Athenian hoplite.

<sup>32</sup> Westbrook 1980, 249. Another example where coercion led to high desertion rates was the German army in Western Europe during World War II: the highest proportion of deserters was found among those forced into military service (Shils & Janowitz 1948, 285).

<sup>33</sup> Wong et al. 2003, 6-9; the study does not indicate how representative such responses were.

disintegration was swift: the men either deserted or switched sides, often turning to brigandage and looting (cf. the sack of Rome in 1527).<sup>34</sup> Finally, most modern armies of the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries can be described as belonging to the normative-moral type. In most developed societies, it is no longer viable to attract soldiers on a mass-scale simply with promises of pay and adventure alone, as the dangers and depredations of war are such as to deter most people. In addition, for a calculative mindset, peacetime endeavours offer many other safer and more lucrative options. Equally, the coercive-alienative model is problematic nowadays, as societies generally hold the belief that it is wrong to force men and women to fight; moreover, the realities of the dispersed modern battlefields are extremely ill-suited to effectively controlling the behaviour of one's combatants through physical coercion.<sup>35</sup> This makes recourse to normative power the most effective option to attract volunteers and to ensure their continued commitment to the army's goals throughout their careers as professional soldiers.

Turning to the Greek armies of the ancient Mediterranean, this study will argue that Polis armies operated on a predominantly normative-moral compliance relationship, and that Royal armies operated on a predominantly remunerative-calculative one. In other words, to generate compliance with their demands, Polis armies relied primarily on the moral involvement of their citizen soldiers, which was mainly reinforced by the application of normative power. Soldiers in Royal armies, on the other hand, were predominantly calculatively involved, a situation which was reinforced by the exertion of remunerative power. This fundamental difference can help to explain the various degrees of loyalty and commitment we find in the respective organisations: in Polis armies, men complied because they believed it was the right thing to do and in response to symbolic expressions of normative power, such as the civic ideology of sacrifice for one's native land. This ensured relatively

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<sup>34</sup> Wesbrook 1980, 249. See Mallett & Shaw 2012, 209-11 for several examples and a discussion of the importance of payment in the armies of the Italian Wars. Nevertheless, there are also instances of extreme loyalty of mercenaries to their *condottiere*, as in the case of the murdered Boldrino de Panicale: his men carried his remains with them for two years in their quest for revenge (Mallett 1974, 59-60). On *condottieri* generally, see Trease 1970.

<sup>35</sup> Wesbrook 1980, 250-1.

high levels of loyalty. In Royal armies, compliance was secured by the provision of material rewards in response to the soldiers' demands for payment and plunder. This led to relatively frequent occurrences of disloyalty and noncompliance. These are of course highly simplified concepts, and the remaining chapters will make clear that often there was considerable overlap between the two models: citizen soldiers were just as amenable to the prospects of wealth, and those serving in Royal armies could develop strong personal ties of loyalty to their generals or kings.

To help us understand these complex motivations of the lower participants, and how the nature of the interactions between them and the organisational elites impacted on their organisation's effectiveness, we will need to employ further theoretical methods. These will be focused on the individuals themselves, the groups they formed, and the wider socio-political system they inhabited. This will allow us to set the analysis of the organisational structures against the background of the social, cultural, and political world these soldiers lived in.

### **1.3 Small Groups, Big Ideas: Combat Motivation and the Socio-Political System**

Analysing the reasons behind men's and women's willingness to enter combat and kill their enemies is a daunting task. What motivates people to go to war is a highly complex and multidimensional web of emotions, ideals, and beliefs, combined with external factors, that seems impossible to disentangle satisfactorily. This holds true for our own age, and even more so for a period in history dating back some two and a half millennia, when completely different social, cultural, and religious attitudes dominated the ways people perceived violence, death, and war itself. It is important to keep these limitations in mind, and to realise that any investigation will be inherently limited and fail to cover every single contributing factor that played its part in ancient soldiers' combat motivation and willingness to comply.

One particular danger is to use too narrow an approach and focus on only one aspect of combat motivation; this does an injustice to the multiplicity of reasons that



underlie the willingness to fight: a 'holistic approach, combining individual, organizational, and social factors with situational ones, offers a more complete explanation of combat motivation'.<sup>36</sup> Following this piece of advice, we will use several paths of inquiry to arrive at a more balanced picture of combat motivation in the ancient world. The 'individual' and 'social' factors will be addressed in the following sections on group cohesion and the socio-political system, while the 'organisational' part we have already dealt with using Etzioni's model of analysing organisational compliance patterns. Lastly, we will discuss the 'situational' elements throughout our discussion of Polis and Royal armies in the remaining chapters of this study.

The term 'primary group' was probably first used in 1909.<sup>37</sup> In its simplest form, in a military context it denotes a small group of individuals whose interdependence and affiliation provide them with the physical and psychological support needed to be effective in combat and to sustain their efforts to fight the enemy. Group standards are upheld through the internal allocation of non-material rewards such as recognition and approval (or contempt and disapproval, depending on the situation), whereas the mutual support members can offer each other enables them to sustain combat and continue to function as members of their organisation.<sup>38</sup> At its heart, a primary group is a relatively small number of individuals that share a bond of dependence and emotional attachment. This can be based on friendship or love, or on respect and admiration, or on a set of shared values and beliefs, or on various combinations of these elements. This affiliation creates a sense of security, loyalty, duty, and obligation to work for the benefit and success of the group, and most importantly, to protect it against outside attacks. One soldier has likened these effects to familial ties: 'It is just like a big family. Nothing can come to you without going through them first. It is kind of comforting'. Another spoke about the strong emotional bonds of trust and obligation he felt towards a member of his primary

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<sup>36</sup> Kellett 1982, 333, cf. 97.

<sup>37</sup> Kellett 1982, 41, cf. Crowley 2012, 7. For a succinct review of the post-World War II literature on cohesion, see Wong et al. 2003, 1-5.

<sup>38</sup> What follows is only an overview; for more detail see Wesbrook 1980, 251-2, Kellett 1982, 97-101, and more recently the discussion in Crowley 2012, 5-15.

group: 'That person means more to you than anybody. You will die if he dies. That is why I think we protect each other in any situation. I know that if he dies and it was my fault, it would be worse than death to me'.<sup>39</sup>

The basic foundation of primary group cohesion is tripartite: it is built on interpersonal attraction, interdependence, and normative integration.<sup>40</sup> The first of these, interpersonal attraction, simply means that the group members like each other, responding positively to each other's characters and displaying a willingness to invest energy on each other's behalf. The exact relationship between cohesion and interpersonal attraction, however, is not entirely clear; research in social psychology indicates that attraction develops in any group, simply because being a member of a group leads to a positive inclination towards other members of the same group. It is therefore possible that attraction is a result, and not a cause of group membership and identity.<sup>41</sup> The second element, interdependence (also known as functional or structural integration), means that the group is held together and strengthened by the necessity, willingness, or compulsion to perform various tasks that are seen to be beneficial to the group itself. The third element, normative integration, describes the existence of commonly held values and goals in the group, which can be worked towards and can define the basic outlook of the group as a whole. Taken together, the interplay between these three basic components largely determines the strength of the bonds that hold together the group and affect the levels of interaction; different combinations of the components will yield groups of varying strength and cohesion.

The concept of cohesion itself needs to be further refined. Cohesion can be divided into two aspects, social cohesion, and task cohesion:

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<sup>39</sup> Wong et al. 2003, 10-11, 13. It is important to note the limitations of this type of material: self-reporting and anecdotal or impressionistic evidence is of questionable value for establishing causality (MacCoun et al. 2005, 4-5); it can also be highly unrepresentative and is often difficult to verify scientifically (MacCoun 1993, 285).

<sup>40</sup> Westbrook 1980, 251-2, Kier 1998, 20.

<sup>41</sup> Kier 1998, 20-21.

*Social cohesion* refers to the nature and quality of the emotional bonds of friendship, liking, caring, and closeness among group members. A group is socially cohesive to the extent that its members like each other, prefer to spend their social time together, enjoy each other's company, and feel emotionally close to one another.

*Task cohesion* refers to the shared commitment among members to achieving a goal that requires the collective efforts of the group. A group with high task cohesion is composed of members who share a common goal and who are motivated to coordinate their efforts as a team to achieve that goal.

(MacCoun 1993, 291)

There is only limited evidence for a connection between social cohesion and effectiveness, whereas it appears that task cohesion is closely bound up with good performance.<sup>42</sup> Put differently, how well individuals in a group like each other is not the deciding factor for how well they perform the tasks set for the group. What matters most is the degree to which each member of the group believes in the value of achieving a certain goal. Some studies have even shown that strong social cohesion can be detrimental to performance.<sup>43</sup> The task for any (military) organisation, then, lies in generating high levels of task cohesion, i.e. a strong commitment in each individual to the overall goals and wellbeing of their organisation. How well ancient Greek Polis and Royal armies managed this remains to be discussed.

There are several other factors that play an important role in creating and maintaining the strength of primary groups, namely personnel stability, homogeneity, exposure, success, and communication.<sup>44</sup> We will briefly discuss each of them in turn.

Personnel stability is an important requirement for the formation of social cohesion. Only if the makeup of a group remains essentially the same is there scope for the development of interpersonal attraction and the process of normative integration. Constant changes, like the frequent extraction or repeated short-term

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<sup>42</sup> MacCoun 1993, 292-93.

<sup>43</sup> Kier 1998, 17: 'the most efficient groups are often those that indulge in the least social activity'.

<sup>44</sup> Westbrook 1980, 266-8.

inclusion of individual members (which is known as 'turbulence'), have a negative impact on group cohesiveness and can lead to alienation and isolation within a group.<sup>45</sup> Put simply, the more time the members have to get know each other, the more potential there is for the formation of bonds of loyalty, affection, and a sense of mutual obligation.

This factor is closely related to homogeneity. Generally speaking, the existence of similarities within a group can have a strong positive effect on normative integration as well interpersonal attraction, as they often go hand in hand with similar values and outlooks. This usually includes race and ethnicity, social and geographical background, gender, age, and occupation. A homogenous group is more likely to develop higher levels of social cohesion. It should be noted that the positive homogeneity-cohesion correlation does not seem to affect task cohesion (and thus performance) in a significant way.<sup>46</sup> The abovementioned study of the Iraqi army revealed that there was very little cohesion of any type among groups that were composed of men from a variety of ethnicities, tribes, and regions; the emotional ties that existed were almost exclusively to members of the same tribal or regional background. Soldiers consequently reported relatively low levels of commitment and obligation to their comrades, which made itself felt in high rates of desertion and surrender.<sup>47</sup> The importance of homogeneity has been challenged on the grounds that modern armies 'take pride in bringing together disparate individuals, submerging individual identities, and creating a group identity'.<sup>48</sup> This argument, however, easily eliminates itself: where a group identity already exists because of homogeneity, there is no need to artificially create it.

The third factor, exposure, refers to the group's exposure to stress and external threats, which especially aids the creation of interpersonal attraction or social cohesion. Furthermore, if the group can imagine a successful coordinated

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<sup>45</sup> This was a critical problem for the US forces during the 1970s, who operated a system that replaced individuals rather than entire units. The implementation of a new Unit Manning System in 1981 that rotated whole units was eventually judged to have failed (MacCoun 1993, 300-1, Kier 1998, 10-11).

<sup>46</sup> MacCoun 1993, 306-7.

<sup>47</sup> Wong et al. 2003, 8.

<sup>48</sup> Kier 1998, 22.

effort that would remove the threat, task cohesion can also increase.<sup>49</sup> Sharing the experience of a dangerous or intensely stressful situation can help to fuse individuals together through the cultivation of mutual trust and dependence. The more the group has endured together, the more likely it will be to possess strong personal links within, which in turn makes it more likely to meet future challenges successfully.

This factor is bound up with the next one, success: while exposure to certain situations has the effect of strengthening interpersonal attraction regardless of the situation's outcome, sharing in the successful completion of a dangerous task not only improves interpersonal attraction, it also greatly boosts functional integration and task cohesion. The group learns who is dependable, the members receive respect and appreciation for their skill in fulfilling various tasks, and together they amass a repository of experience based on success that can boost morale, loyalty, and confidence for future operations. This is supported by several studies that not only identify a correlation between success and cohesion, but also postulate a causal relationship between the two, where success leads to increased cohesion – rather than the other way around.<sup>50</sup>

Lastly, communication: regular and intensive communication within the group has a positive effect on all of the preceding elements that help to foster group cohesion. It helps the members to learn about each other, facilitates the absorption of new members and ideas, limits the potential for friction and conflict, aids in efficiently fulfilling tasks, and acts as a channel through which the group sets and communicates its standards and expectations.

It should be evident by now that the circumstances leading to the formation of strong primary groups among soldiers are manifold and difficult to measure; some form of cohesion manifests itself almost automatically wherever men and women are thrown together, but there are several variables that affect the resultant intensity, scope, and longevity of such cohesion, and indeed the speed at which it

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<sup>49</sup> MacCoun 1993, 304-5, with fig. 10-1.

<sup>50</sup> MacCoun 1993, 294, 303-4 (indicating that both social and task cohesion can be affected), and Kier 1998, 13. Also Shils & Janowitz 1948, 287-88, who highlight the interrelatedness of communal experience, success, and personnel stability.

forms.<sup>51</sup> Nevertheless, powerful primary groups and the comprehensive support and protection they can provide to their members are still seen to play a crucial role in determining a soldier's will to fight (although this *willingness* must not be confused with *effectiveness*).<sup>52</sup>

There are, however, serious problems inherent in the theory of the importance of primary groups. As these have been discussed in detail elsewhere, for our purposes it suffices to deal with the most striking one: the transformation of a primary group into a so-called defensive group.<sup>53</sup>

Seen from the eyes of an army's organisational elites, it is, ironically, the very strength of the primary group itself that poses the greatest threat to its compliance relationship. Under the right circumstances, social cohesion, or the psychological bonds of loyalty and friendship that hold a group together and enable it to sustain combat can be turned against the military organisation it is supposed to be serving. If the soldiers view the demands placed on them by their superiors as threatening the survival of their group, it is precisely the close attachment and sense of mutual obligation to protect each other that can lead them to act in opposition to the organisation of which they are a part. The authority that puts the group in danger might be seen as disruptive, illegitimate, coercive, or even murderous, and as such it poses a threat to its continuous existence. This can spell havoc for compliance patterns, as the group might begin to resist orders, passively or actively.<sup>54</sup> Socially cohesive primary groups can even discourage zealous soldiering: members who

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<sup>51</sup> Cf. Kier 1998, 8.

<sup>52</sup> As argued by Wong et al. in their 2003 study of combat motivation among US soldiers deployed in operation *Iraqi Freedom*. The analysis concluded that cohesion was a critical factor in determining the soldiers' willingness to fight. The work has been challenged by MacCoun et al. 2005, although they misrepresent the study's purpose in claiming that it seeks to explain combat effectiveness, when in reality it is concerned with combat motivation (cf. the response in Wong 2006).

<sup>53</sup> Crowley 2012, 11-15, Strachan 2006, 211-13. One issue is the rapid erosion of primary groups in sustained combat; there are several examples of units continuing to fight long after the original primary groups have been largely depleted, which suggests there are other, equally important factors at work in maintaining combat motivation. See also Kier 1998, 11-19, arguing that there is no significant correlation between cohesion and performance.

<sup>54</sup> Westbrook 1980, 256-9, Fennell 2014, 804, Strachan 2006, 213. An extreme form of such refusal is 'fragging' – the assassination of fellow soldiers (usually superior or non-commissioned officers). This phenomenon was particularly frequent during the Vietnam War, with almost 800 incidents (Kier 1998, 15-17, Wong et al. 2003, 3: 'cohesion between soldiers without the proper norms can work against organizational goals').

display a strong desire for action, or who tend to go beyond what could be called the normal requirements of duty, can also be seen as a threat to the group's survival.<sup>55</sup> Intensive in-group communication can also have a negative effect, by legitimising and enabling behaviour such as individual or collective desertion.<sup>56</sup> In such a situation, the affiliated members have turned into a defensive group, which can no longer be relied upon to carry out its orders to achieve the organisational goals.

Primary groups, then, are a double-edged sword. The key to their strength lies in their overall cohesion, but it is this cohesion that may cause noncompliance. When loyalties are tested and a choice has to be made between protecting the group's interests and carrying out orders that threaten them, individuals might choose the group over the organisation. It is in this context that Etzioni's concept of power and involvement becomes essential. So far, we have looked at primary groups in a one-dimensional manner by only discussing their types of cohesion. An equally important factor, however, is the type of a group's involvement with its organisation: alienative, calculative, or normative. This will largely determine whether the social cohesion that fuels the group's efforts will also lead to task cohesion, and thus to compliance with organisational aims.

It is vital to understand that social cohesion alone does not automatically make for effective combat performance or loyal soldiers; it merely ensures that any action taken by the group will be more effective, but it does not determine the nature of the action.<sup>57</sup> 'Cohesion is like a pipe through which any kind of normative content may flow. The higher the peer cohesion, the better the flow, but the substance communicated is not determined thereby'.<sup>58</sup> It is easy to see how the different types of involvement could impact on the behaviour of a cohesive primary group: one that is alienated from its organisation will actively or passively resist it and look primarily to its own interest. A group that is calculatively involved might go either way, depending on the exact situation and the weighing up of risk, reward,

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<sup>55</sup> Kellett 1982, 101-4.

<sup>56</sup> As reported by German deserters who stated they only felt able to desert after talking the step over with their comrades and receiving approval or acquiescence (Shils & Janowitz 1948, 286).

<sup>57</sup> Kier 1998, 8.

<sup>58</sup> Etzioni 1975, 283.

and the potential for success. A group that is morally involved, however, might be able to comply in spite of the dangers to itself: as moral involvement rests on strong commitment and a positive orientation to the organisation, compliance would be desired if it is seen to contribute to securing organisational goals – the benefit of the group and that of the organisation are equated.<sup>59</sup> Moral commitment, consequently, comes closest to generating task cohesion. The type of involvement that is present in an organisation's lower participants is thus of crucial importance: hence this study combines models of compliance theory and combat motivation. If cohesion is the weapon, involvement is the hand that wields it.

There are of course other forces besides primary groups that form part of the complex structure of combat motivation and loyalty. And not all of them are to be found within the military organisation itself. Some, like the socio-political system into which most armies are embedded, exert their influence in ways less direct, but at least equally important. As Wesbrook has argued, the existence of moral commitment to a socio-political system can sustain the combat motivation of troops who might otherwise lack the support of a primary group.<sup>60</sup> In other words, forces with the ability to influence the type of involvement in an organisation's lower participants can have the greatest impact on their compliance patterns. To understand this, we must look in more detail at the concept of the socio-political system itself, as throughout this study it will be shown to play the most fundamental role in a Polis army's compliance relationship.

The basic proposition of this theory is that the more involved soldiers are with their socio-political system, the more effectively they will perform in combat. To borrow an image from Crowley, the socio-political system forms a layer surrounding not only the soldier, but also his primary group.<sup>61</sup> It fulfils similar normative functions to the primary group, albeit on a larger scale and further removed from the individual. And in contrast to the small group, which is based entirely on one's immediate human surroundings, the socio-political system operates almost

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<sup>59</sup> Wesbrook 1980, 251.

<sup>60</sup> Wesbrook 1980, 260.

<sup>61</sup> Crowley 2012, 18, fig. 3.



exclusively on the abstract level. Its presence on the battlefield is limited to the inside of a soldier's mind.<sup>62</sup>

Three main components characterise a socio-political system: socio-political identity, socio-political ideology, and the system's effectiveness as viewed by its members.<sup>63</sup> The first aspect depends on the strength of the community and its ability to build and maintain a sense of shared identity and belonging to a larger whole that transcends yet contains a soldier's group. This process is stimulated by high levels of social interaction and political participation, as well as the existence of stable societal parameters that define the system's members in opposition to the outside world. The second aspect, ideology, is closely connected to the first one; national, or socio-political identity can be reinforced by the cultivation of an ideology that supports and amplifies the salient elements that are contained within the identity itself. This usually means 'a shared set of values, beliefs, and practices concerned with social and political life that define what is right and proper'.<sup>64</sup> The third aspect depends on whether or not the system is perceived to be effective in meeting the needs of its members, be they social, religious, or political. A positive perception augments commitment to and belief in both the shared identity and ideology, and results in a stronger moral involvement with the entire socio-political system. A negative perception, on the other hand, can create alienation, and distances the members from the system; in extreme cases this can lead to rejection, and ultimately to attempts to subvert and change the system.

To illustrate this in terms of the ancient world, a polis represents a prime example of a socio-political system: it is usually marked by intense social and political interaction; it cultivates a civic identity in opposition to members of other political units; it promotes a civic ideology (e.g. of unity and sacrifice for the common good); it is usually perceived as effective by the majority of its citizens, leading to high levels of moral involvement, and thus to increased loyalty to the polis itself. However, should the socio-political system's effectiveness ever be viewed negatively by the

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<sup>62</sup> Crowley 2012, 80.

<sup>63</sup> Wesbrook 1980, 253-4.

<sup>64</sup> Wesbrook 1980, 253-4.

majority of the citizens, or by a group powerful enough to oppose the majority, attempts at subversion, most commonly in the form of political infighting (*stasis*), will be the consequence.

In an ideal case, however, the socio-political system imbues its members with a strong moral commitment to work for its benefit and that of its other members. For a morally committed individual, noncompliance with the system's demands would constitute a psychological break with it and with the ties that bind together the community, both in physical and in abstract terms. For the military in particular, this moral involvement is of the highest importance: if the military organisation is seen as an extension of the socio-political system, morally involved soldiers will perceive their orders and the origin of their authority as legitimate, usually resulting in compliance.<sup>65</sup> A strong socio-political system, then, is essential in guiding the type of involvement of its lower participants to ensure an alignment between their goals and those of their organisation.

#### **1.4 Conclusion**

It should be evident that cohesion alone does not make for loyal soldiers. To be sure, socially cohesive groups will be effective in performing certain tasks, but it is ultimately up to the group to decide whether the tasks it performs work for or against its organisation. Task cohesion, or the degree to which the group believes in the effectiveness and righteousness of achieving a certain objective by performing a certain task, can be seen to be of much higher importance: it determines to what degree the goals and benefit of the individual and his or her group overlap with those of the organisation. Military loyalty, as a consequence, is largely determined by the soldiers' willingness to comply with the demands of their organisational elites, regardless of the social dimension of any particular situation. What is more, this

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<sup>65</sup> Wesbrook 1980, 254.

broad picture seems to be confirmed by the material to be discussed in the later chapters.

For Polis armies, there was certainly intense socialisation that occurred in the forms of living and growing up as part of a clearly defined socio-political group, and frequent and intense socio-political, religious, and cultural interactions. In Royal armies, where we also find high levels of social cohesion owing to the fact that groups of soldiers campaigned together for years or decades, or ended up settling in the same military colonies, acts of disloyalty were relatively frequent. Yet in terms of loyalty, these two types of armies displayed rather different realities: citizen armies appear to have been robustly loyal to their polis, whereas in Royal armies acts of disloyalty were relatively frequent. The main difference, then, might lie in different levels of task cohesion, and here the role of the socio-political system is paramount. In its most developed form, it contributed to the moral involvement of citizen soldiers, who could thus identify the benefit of the polis with their own. Royal armies, on the other hand, had to make do with a much-reduced version: the socio-political system of these armies was removed and dispersed, geographically and psychologically, while the main component was the military one, socio-political aspects playing only a secondary role.

Yet it would be dangerous to insist on too strong a separation between the two models: as we shall see, each army had to overcome its own inherent obstacles in generating and maintaining loyalty, and at times they chose similar approaches to do so. The ensuing complexities and tensions that characterised the compliance relationships of Polis and Royal armies will be explored in the course of this study. First, however, it is necessary to present the evidence for the differing levels of loyalty in these military organisations.

# Chapter Two

## *Disloyalty: Treachery, Bribery, and Desertion*



### 2.1 Introduction

Now that the theoretical background has been set, this chapter will open up the investigation proper, by presenting the basic premise that underlies the approach adopted by this study: armies composed of citizens from a polis benefited from a much higher degree of loyalty than the armies of the Hellenistic warlords and kings. Or, to put it the other way around, Royal armies suffered from acts of disloyalty much more frequently than Polis armies. As stated in the introduction, the aim is not to create a clear-cut dichotomy between Hellenistic and Classical armies: the phenomenon under discussion pertains to Polis armies generally, irrespective of the evidence falling before or after the death of a young Macedonian king in 323; as a point of contrast I have chosen the Royal armies of the Successor kingdoms, but whether other Royal armies fall into the same pattern is beyond the scope of this study.

To demonstrate this basic premise, we will diachronically analyse several instances of disloyalty, such as treachery on the battlefield, bribery, and desertion. The emerging patterns should make it clear that we are dealing with fundamentally different military organisations. The precise reasons for these differences, however, have yet to be fully explored. To this end, we will probe how much explanatory power can be derived from the application of modern theoretical models to the behaviour of ancient soldiers as we find it presented in our sources. Whenever possible, we will

try to gain a deeper understanding of people's motivations by analysing their behaviour using the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 1: the primary group, levels of cohesion, the importance of the socio-political system, and the predominant compliance relationships.

Beginning with Polis armies, we will note the relative absence of battlefield betrayal, a circumstance that went hand in hand with frequent occurrences of treachery during *stasis*. This double-nature of civic armies points to a complex layering of motivations and will have to be carefully examined. As we will see, the robust cohesion militia forces displayed while on campaign came at the price of fierce internal competition that often spilled over into violent civil war. In contrast, the discussion of Royal armies will reveal how common disloyalty was in these forces, and how both soldiers and generals exploited this dynamic to the full. Lastly, desertion and its implications for our assessment of Royal and Polis armies will be treated at the end of the chapter. Ultimately, we will draw conclusions as to what the predominant compliance relationships in the respective organisations might have been, and how this could help us to understand and interpret the behaviour of ancient soldiers. For Polis armies, the evidence suggests a normative-moral compliance relationship, where acts of disloyalty were rare as they would usually harm the interests of both lower participants (the soldiers) and organisational elites (officers and generals). For Royal armies, the evidence points towards a remunerative-calculative compliance relationship, where disloyalty was a frequent occurrence – owing to the unreliable nature of this compliance model, where the interests of the elites and lower participants often opposed each other.

## **2.2 United We Stand, Divided We Open the Gates: Disloyalty in Polis Armies**

Investigating the levels of loyalty within an ancient Greek polis is a complicated matter. There seems to be an apparent paradox confronting us: on the one hand, we have the image of the unified polis, represented by its citizen body, its

institutions, and its civic and religious culture. This image is projected in various sources, such as civic oaths that had to be taken by young (male) members of society on the verge of becoming adults, or speeches of various contexts, attesting to the united spirit of the polis and the unanimity that pervades the citizen body.<sup>66</sup>

I shall not disgrace the sacred weapons that I bear nor shall I desert the comrade at my side [...], I shall not hand down a lessened fatherland, but one that is increased in size [...], and I shall be obedient to those who on any occasion are governing prudently [...], and I shall honour the sacred rites that are ancestral.  
(Athenian ephebic oath, *GHI* 88, 1-16)

The emphasis is on civic cohesion and loyalty in the face of the enemy, and on obedience to the authorities. The oath does not make explicit why the young citizens should swear to fight for their fatherland (πάτρη) and uphold its laws, or what they might receive in return: the righteousness of their loyalty is taken for granted, their oath simply reaffirming a natural state of mind. We see here a proud declaration of moral commitment, where compliance is valued as a good in its own right, not as a service in exchange for rewards: the young Athenians were expected to fight and obey because it was the right thing to do. Their commitment was supposed to transcend blind obedience. Ideally, their involvement should lead them to obey only those who governed *ἐμψρόνως*, or reasonably: this assumes an ideal form of polis and government that all citizens should envision and adhere to, enabling them to oppose those who subverted it. Compliance and unity go hand in hand.

In contrast, there is the image of the divided polis, where civic strife, disloyalty, treachery, and bloody violence are presented as common occurrences. We find this situation at its most obvious in the many examples of increasingly violent *stasis* recorded in historiographical works such as Thucydides, but it also pervades Aineias Taktikos' fourth-century military manual on surviving a siege, where most of his advice revolved around the need to prevent disloyal elements

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<sup>66</sup> Another example of this overt unanimity is the democratic decision-making process itself, which according to Canevaro 2018a (forthcoming) was based on creating consensus, and not simply on majority rule: as evidence, he points out that Hellenistic inscriptions containing actual numbers on the deliberative process all record unanimous, or nearly unanimous, results.

within the city from starting a revolution or making contact with the enemy.<sup>67</sup> This double nature, of unity on the one hand and division on the other, will be the focus of this section. First, we will demonstrate that Polis armies practically never fractured internally when on campaign or deployed for battle; methodologically, this will be achieved by pointing to the absence of evidence: our sources simply do not record any significant events of such a nature. The fallacy of 'absence of evidence is not evidence of absence' will be avoided by discussing those episodes that seem to reveal treachery in Polis armies: looked at more closely, however, each of them can be shown to fit into the pattern of cohesive citizen armies. Secondly, we will discuss the flip side: *stasis* and its effects on civic loyalty. The aim is not to present both realities as mutually exclusive, but to connect them as two sides of the same coin: citizens' deep involvement with their socio-political system was a main cause both for the maintenance of military loyalty when a polis was under effective government, but also for the breakdown of civic cohesion once political battle-lines had been drawn.<sup>68</sup>

To begin with Herodotos: he preserves several episodes of potential treachery on the battlefield, but all of them can be explained by understanding their political background. We learn, for example, that in 506 the Peloponnesian army led by the Spartan kings Demaratos and Kleomenes disintegrated before giving battle because the Corinthians refused to comply, followed quickly by the departure of Demaratos himself.<sup>69</sup> Each citizen force maintained its internal cohesion, and while the Corinthians' decision to desert the allied army could be seen as disloyalty to the Spartans, it nevertheless reflects a unified citizen body (even if not every single Corinthian soldier opposed the campaign). Moreover, the breaking up of the Spartan army was not treachery, but a political move by Demaratos to discredit his colleague: the two were bitter rivals.<sup>70</sup> Another example of a Greek coalition force breaking

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<sup>67</sup> Examples of this 'Janus-motif' (Whitehead 2001, 25): Aen. Tact. 1.3, 1.6-7, 2.1, 2.7-8, 3.3, 9.2 (cf. 23.3), 10.3, 10.5-6, 10.7, 10.15, 10.20, 10.23-25, 10.25-26, 17.1-5, 18.2, 22.4-10, 22.12-13, 22.19, 23.6-11, 30.1.

<sup>68</sup> On this dynamic and the inherent tensions at the heart of civic ideology and norms, see chapter 5 in Gray 2015.

<sup>69</sup> Hdt. 5.75.1.

<sup>70</sup> Hdt. 6.51, 64-65.

apart dates to the battle of Salamis during the Ionian Revolt in 498: the Cretan allied army fell apart after first the Kourians and their king left the battle, and then the Salaminians and their chariots followed suit, enabling the Persians to gain victory.<sup>71</sup> Once more we see that individual polis contingents act together, and the fissures in the allied army ran along clearly defined lines, with each polis acting as one.

Herodotos recounts another instance from the Ionian revolt: at the naval engagement at Lade in 494, the Samians decided to abandon the Ionian alliance after witnessing the unwillingness of the Ionians to train and considering the odds stacked against them. Their ships sailed away just as the battle commenced, resulting in a quick rout. However, eleven of the Samian trierarchs decided to stay and fight, and were later awarded a stele in the Samian agora to commemorate their bravery.<sup>72</sup> The Persians, for their part, rewarded the Samians for their treachery (in Herodotos' words, διὰ τὴν ἑκλείψιν τῶν νεῶν, an unusual way to describe desertion) by sparing their temples; they still supported the return of the tyrant Aiakes, which prompted many of the aristocrats who opposed him to emigrate.<sup>73</sup> This might help to explain the motivation of the eleven trierarchs: they would have been part of the elite, and were probably among Aiakes' political opponents. Their behaviour then, might have been caused by political opposition to Aiakes and the Persians, both of whom threatened their own power at home. Defeating the Persians in battle was their best chance at winning their independence. Together with the voluntary exile of some aristocrats to escape Aiakes, this points to deep political tensions at the time of the battle, which is not surprising given that it occurred during a wide-spread rebellion from the Persian Empire that could easily polarise factional politics.

Herodotos also preserves the story of the shield signal that was supposedly sent to the Persians by the Alkmaionidai after the battle of Marathon in 490, but refuted it decidedly; despite much scholarly discussion, nothing could ever be

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<sup>71</sup> Hdt. 5.113.

<sup>72</sup> Hdt. 6.13-14.

<sup>73</sup> Hdt. 6.22, 25.



proven.<sup>74</sup> At any rate, this episode, if historical at all, did not occur in battle or on campaign, and should be treated as a political manoeuvre, not military betrayal. Yet Greek terminology makes no such clear distinction between military or political disloyalty: *προδίδωμι* is used to describe the betrayal of a city as well as the acceptance of earth and water from the Persians.<sup>75</sup> Herodotos offers two more examples of treachery during a battle: as the fight at Thermopylai was drawing to its close, the Thebans quickly surrendered to the Persians, professing to have been forced along against their own wishes.<sup>76</sup> Again, we can see a polis force acting as one: the coalition was broken, but not its individual components. Lastly, we are told that after the battle of Mykale, the Milesians betrayed and attacked the fleeing Persians; in this case, the division ran along ethnic and political lines, with the Milesian soldiers seemingly united in the desire to turn on their erstwhile masters.<sup>77</sup> Herodotos, then, offers no clear example of a citizen army fracturing and turning on itself or joining the enemy. As we now turn to the evidence from Thucydides, the close connection between polis politics and army loyalty will be equally apparent.

Thucydides records only three relevant episodes involving treachery – apart from simply being extremely rare, considering the length of his historiographical work, this is even more significant as he was dealing with what was arguably the most fractious period of inter-polis politics and warfare, which ‘led to acts of unusual brutality and cruelty, desecration of religious sites and rituals, and overall disregard for the genuinely Hellenic customs, codes of morality and civic loyalty’.<sup>78</sup>

At the Battle of Tanagra in 457, a Spartan-led force of Peloponnesians and Boiotians fought against an Athenian coalition, including their allies the Thessalians, who sent a contingent of horsemen. At some point the Thessalian cavalry defected

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<sup>74</sup> Hdt. 6.115, 121-24; for an overview of the debate, see Gillis 1969, arguing that the Alkmaionidai were certainly the most likely to medise; for a discussion of the persistence of their supposed treachery, see Athanassaki 2013.

<sup>75</sup> Hdt. 8.128.1-2, 6.49.3.

<sup>76</sup> Hdt. 7.233.

<sup>77</sup> Hdt. 9.104.

<sup>78</sup> Price 2004, 4.

to the Spartans, who subsequently won the battle.<sup>79</sup> Thucydides uses the verb *μεθίστημι* to describe the defection, while Diodoros has *μεταβάλλω*. There seems to have been no specific term for defection during a battle; instead we find generic terms for 'changing sides/place' or 'turning around' – below we will see a similarly general approach to terminology when it comes to desertion. The motivations for this betrayal are obscure; Thessaly had been successfully allied with Athens in the past, and there was deep-seated hostility between Sparta and Thessaly.<sup>80</sup> Whatever the precise cause, we should note that it involved two separate political entities, i.e. Athens (and her allies) and Thessaly: yet again the rupture is not within one Polis army, but between separate citizen militias, each representing their own political organisation. The internal cohesion of the Thessalian cavalry is attested by their united defection.

In the context of Tanagra, we should also mention Plutarch's biography of Kimon: he adds the detail that Kimon, recently exiled, offered to fight alongside his deme Oineis, but the generals were instructed by the council not to accept his aid, fearing that he might secretly join the Spartans and lead them against Athens.<sup>81</sup> Taking into account that Plutarch in this chapter was concerned with making a point about how in the olden days the common good overrode personal enmity, we can still make two observations: one, even as an exile, Kimon offered to fight alongside his demesmen, which hints at the personal bonds and feelings of affiliation that existed between them. Secondly, the story implies that it was possible to imagine Kimon and his supporters turning traitors on the battlefield, routing the remaining Athenians, and then returning to Athens backed by the Spartans. A Polis army

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<sup>79</sup> Thuc. 1.102.4, 107.2-7, cf. Hdt. 9.35.2 and Diod. Sic. 11.79.5-80.2, who is our only source for the Thessalian cavalry attack on an unsuspecting Athenian supply convoy (Green 2006, 158 n. 324; for the problems of Diodoros' use of Ephoros as a source for books 11-15, see Andrewes 1985). The sequence of the battle is not entirely clear, but possibly it involved an indecisive initial engagement followed by an evening meal; the Thessalians ate early and managed to surprise the Athenian convoy who assumed they were still their allies. A second encounter then took place which was ended by nightfall. For more details, see Reece 1950, Walters 1978 (on a second battle at Tanagra), Roisman 1993 (esp. 84 n. 46 for bibliography), and Plant 1994 (arguing that the Spartans were not brought to battle by accident).

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Morrison 1942, 59-62: 'Spartan hostility to Thessaly is a permanent factor in Greek history for the [fifth] century'.

<sup>81</sup> Plut. *Cim.* 17.2-6.

turning on itself might not have been as inconceivable as the absence of evidence for it occurring might at first suggest, and the reason is the usual: internal political division.

In fact, the detrimental effects of political infighting can be witnessed in another instance recorded by Thucydides: during the *stasis* at Corcyra in 427, the democrats managed to secure a victory that led to an uneasy settlement enforced by the Athenians; eventually a Peloponnesian fleet arrived, and the ensuing naval engagement commenced with the desertion of two Corcyraean ships to the Peloponnesians, while other vessels were rendered ineffective owing to division among the crews.<sup>82</sup> Here we seem to have an example of citizens of the same polis (Corcyra) facing a foreign enemy (the Peloponnesians) betraying each other and defecting to the opposing side during an engagement. This battle occurred a mere seven days after the two factions in the *stasis* were fighting each other; the democrats came out on top, but further bloodshed was only prevented by the arrival of the Athenian general Nikostratos.<sup>83</sup> The effects of this violent clash were still simmering, then, when the Peloponnesian ships arrived.<sup>84</sup> It seems that *stasis* was a prime factor in any treachery among polis forces.

The last example from Thucydides is slightly cryptic: he informs us that in 424/3, Brasidas, *en route* to Amphipolis, was able to overcome a small force guarding a bridge over the Strymon owing to stormy weather, surprise, and treachery in their ranks.<sup>85</sup> The Greek text is unclear: the word used by Thucydides is προδοσία (a cognate of προδίδωμι), generically meaning 'treachery' or 'betrayal'. He also tells us that the neighbouring polis of Argilos desired control of Amphipolis. Hence they colluded with compatriots in Amphipolis and arranged to betray the city from within and admit Brasidas' force.<sup>86</sup> This makes it probable that the treachery among the troops at the bridge was carried out by accomplices of Argilos, either metics (i.e. citizens of Argilos) who lived in Amphipolis, or individuals who had joined the colony

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<sup>82</sup> Thuc. 3.75-77.2.

<sup>83</sup> Thuc. 3.75.4.

<sup>84</sup> Rawlings III 1978, 135 n. 7.

<sup>85</sup> Thuc. 4.103.5.

<sup>86</sup> Thuc. 4.103.1-4.

at its founding under Hagnon some thirteen years earlier, in 437/6, relinquishing their citizenship from Argilos to adopt that of the new polis.<sup>87</sup> Thus, if the traitors were outsiders, most likely from Argilos, we are not faced with the soldiers of one polis betraying each other, but with an act of betrayal between two separate socio-political entities – Argilos and Amphipolis. In addition, if the traitors were indeed citizens of Amphipolis who had been enfranchised at the polis' foundation, the story suggests that thirteen years were not enough to erode the affiliations these individuals had with the polis into which they had been born. This would fit well with the general point we have made about the importance of the intense socialisation that occurs in the socio-political context of polis life. Nothing more on treachery, however, is to be gained from Thucydides: based on his evidence, we would have to conclude that during the Peloponnesian War, citizen armies in the field were extremely robust, maintaining their loyalty to their states and commanders at least until the return to the political arena at home.

The evidence from Xenophon is equally sparse. In 409, the colonists of Herakleia Trachinia were arrayed against their enemies the Oitaian when they were somehow betrayed by the Achaian of Phthiotis, resulting in the deaths of some seven hundred Herakleians and the Spartan garrison commander.<sup>88</sup> No further details are provided, and once more the Greek word for the betrayal, *προδίδωμι*, allows no insight into how or why it took place; but we know that there was long-standing enmity between the colonists and the Achaian of Phthiotis: the latter were first excluded from joining the (re-)foundation in 426, and in 413 king Agis had extorted hostages from them.<sup>89</sup> They did not betray their own army, but an old enemy and rival: this points to the cohesion among both communities and a sense of shared memory, history and honour that informed their actions.

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<sup>87</sup> Thucydides (4.103.4) used the ambiguous term *τοὺς ἐμπολιτεύοντας* to describe those in Amphipolis who collaborated with Argilos. See *CT* ad loc. for discussion. It is also possible that an Athenian citizen was killed in the betrayal at the bridge: the casualty list *IG* I<sup>2</sup> 949 (= *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 1184, cf. Bradeen & Lewis 1979, 244) has been dated to 423 based on the appearance of one casualty from Amphipolis (Bradeen 1969, 155-56): *ἐμ' Ἀμφιπόλει | Φιλόφρον* (44-45).

<sup>88</sup> *Xen. Hell.* 1.2.18.

<sup>89</sup> *Thuc.* 3.92.5, 8.3.1

So far, then, we have seen that betrayal in Polis armies always had a political dimension, and there are no examples of citizens troops defecting during a battle to fight against their own side. This is precisely what we would expect if the predominant type of involvement among the lower participants was indeed moral: compliance was seen as a good in its own right, was normally voluntary, and rested on the belief that one's own goals were aligned with those of the military organisation one fought for. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the wars of the Classical period contain no blatant examples of noncompliance in Polis armies.

Going beyond our primary historiographical sources for polis warfare, we might expect to find evidence for citizens betraying each other on the battlefield in Polyainos' collection of military stratagems, which is replete with deception and surprises. But again we are disappointed: the closest we get is the story of the Thespians who were unwilling to fight at Leuktra in 371, for which reason Epameinondas let them withdraw before the battle.<sup>90</sup> According to Pausanias, the Theban general feared the Thespians might desert during the battle, and thus allowed them to leave (followed by other Boiotian contingents).<sup>91</sup> However, there was a century-old hostility between Thebes and Thespiiai: the Thebans had informed the Persian army of Thespiiai's refusal to medise, upon which Xerxes ordered the city burned to the ground; moreover, the Thespians had died alongside the Spartans at Thermopylai, and Theban envy eventually led them to tear down the walls of Thespiiai after the city was left defenceless by its high losses at the battle of Delion in 424.<sup>92</sup> After the battle of Nemea, Thespiiai allied with Sparta; little wonder, therefore, that they were reluctant to follow Theban orders at Leuktra.<sup>93</sup> This is evidence for the longevity of political rivalries between various *poleis*, but not for disloyalty among a citizen army.

In another stratagem, we learn that the Spartan Kleandridas tricked the Terinaians who were arrayed against him into believing they had traitors in their

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<sup>90</sup> Polyainus, *Strat.* 2.3.3.

<sup>91</sup> Paus. 9.13.8.

<sup>92</sup> Hdt. 7.202, 8.50; Thuc. 4.96.3, 133.1.

<sup>93</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.10.

army, which prompted them to retreat to defend their nearby city.<sup>94</sup> For this to have worked, it must at least have been a possibility that part of the Terinaian army would turn on the rest, to be joined by the Spartans. In this case, the word προδότης would then refer to actual traitors on the battlefield, just as it could refer to the betrayal of all Greece when applied to those who joined the Persians during Xerxes' invasion.<sup>95</sup> But the fact that they are reported as immediately retreating back to defend their city implies that the treachery was expected to take place in the city itself, perhaps in the form of a coup, or someone opening the gates during a siege. Indeed, Kleandridas also managed to dupe the Tegean oligarchs into betraying their polis to him by similar trickery: exploiting the political tension inside the city, he spared the elite's property outside the city, which made the *demos* suspicious, and caused the oligarchs to betray the city to save themselves.<sup>96</sup> Once more the close connection between internal politics and treason is manifest.

Epigraphic evidence pertaining to Hellenistic *poleis* seems to support the general impression that citizen armies were relatively resistant to betrayal from within, but with this type of evidence we again encounter the problem of the double nature of civic cohesion: public inscriptions are more likely to project an image of unity and cohesion than list the instances of betrayal. For example, an honorific inscription from Apollonia Pontike, dated to the first half of the second century, records a war with the neighbouring city of Mesembria, in which it was aided by allies from Istros and elsewhere; the conflict ended in Apollonia's favour, hence the honorific inscription for Hegesagoras, the general sent from Istros.<sup>97</sup> The text presents each civic army as a loyal and cohesive force, and Hegesagoras as a courageous and competent general, but provides only the roughest outline of the campaign. On the face of it this fits well with the evidence from the Classical period, but it is important to bear in mind the possibility that acts of treachery might have been omitted to preserve the outward image of a united polis. A perhaps more

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<sup>94</sup> Polyaeus, *Strat.* 2.10.1

<sup>95</sup> Hdt. 8.30.2.

<sup>96</sup> Polyaeus, *Strat.* 2.10.3.

<sup>97</sup> *IGBulg* 1<sup>2</sup> 388(2); for a translation and the historical background of the conflict, see Chamoux 2002, 169-73.

realistic picture is offered by an inscription from Dreros on Crete, dated to c. 220: it records a civic oath to be taken during a war with Lyttos. The citizens have to swear not to betray (προδωσέιν) the city, forts, or inhabitants of Dreros or its ally Knossos.<sup>98</sup> We might dismiss this fear of betrayal as owing to the immediate dangers of an ongoing war, but a similar oath – not to betray the city, territory, ships, citizens, or their possessions, and not to admit an enemy into their land – was sworn in Itanos, without the pressing concern of a war.<sup>99</sup>

It is apparent that treachery from within was as tangible a threat as it was during the Peloponnesian War, and the overriding concern seems to have been the same: to prevent political disloyalty that might lead to the capture of the city by opening the gates. Neither oath mentions betrayal of the army on the battlefield, but both make a powerful point of political conspiracies: the oath from Dreros invokes a painful death and a list of curses for anyone who causes *stasis*, or who forms or participates in a conspiracy (συνω<μ>οσίας), or who fails to report one; in Itanos, the citizens swear not to plan or join a conspiracy (συνωμο[σίαν]), and immediately to report any such behaviour.<sup>100</sup> This tendency to prioritise concern for political betrayal over fear of military disloyalty in the army indicates that the latter was indeed uncommon, both in Classical as well as in Hellenistic Polis armies, and that the real danger came from political factions colluding with outside forces to effect a change of government.

The overview presented so far should make it clear that disloyalty among citizen armies was not a common occurrence. No clear-cut examples survive, and when we encounter treachery, we find upon closer inspection that it involved two or more separate political entities: the individual armies acted as one without disintegrating. Polis militias, it seems, were somehow able to maintain army loyalty and unit cohesion for the duration of a campaign, regardless of any internal dissent in the army or political opposition at home, which existed in virtually every city-state.

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<sup>98</sup> Syll.<sup>3</sup> 527 (= Austin 109), 49-60: καὶ μήτε τὰμ πόλιν προδωσέιν τὰν τῶν Δρηρίων, μήτε οὐρεῖα τὰ τῶν Δρηρίων μηδὲ τὰ τῶγ Κν[ω]σίων, μηδὲ ἄνδρας τοῖς πολεμίοις προδωσέιν μήτε Δρηρίου μήτε Κνωσίου.

<sup>99</sup> Syll.<sup>3</sup> 526 (= Austin 108, dated to the beginning of the third century), 9-16.

<sup>100</sup> Syll.<sup>3</sup> 527, 6off. (Dreros); Syll.<sup>3</sup> 526, 16-21 (Itanos).

It is extremely important to stress that the absence of such overt disloyalty does not mean that all citizens were permanently of one mind, or that every soldier agreed with the goals of the campaign, his government at home, or the individuals in command. Rather, a polis' socio-political organisation appears to have been of such a nature as to prevent disloyalty and disintegration of its army while on campaign, containing any misgivings and channelling its members' energies into achieving the task at hand. This points towards relatively high levels of task cohesion among citizen armies: regardless of social cohesion – which might be strong or weak depending on the various political and social constellations – Polis armies generally managed to act as one in attempting to achieve the goals set by their organisation. This is even more noteworthy – not to say paradoxical – considering that we have extensive evidence of how little cohesion of any kind there was at times: *poleis* regularly fell into violent *stasis* that saw members of the same state betraying and killing each other in order to secure control of the city.

Moreover, there are countless examples of besieged cities being betrayed to an outside enemy by a group of conspirators within, usually comprised of citizens desiring a change of government.<sup>101</sup> Clearly, members of a single polis were more than able to turn on each other for personal gain, and it is difficult to uphold the image of a unified citizen body composed of loyal individuals who believed in, and acted for, the common good when faced with the many scenes of treachery, assassination, murder, and open conflict that so often plagued polis communities caught in *stasis*. More than that, *stasis* could even resemble open war, akin to the conflict between two separate city-states.<sup>102</sup> Based on the evidence for betrayal during a siege and *stasis* alone, one would be more than justified in expecting Greek armies on the march to exhibit equally fractious and treacherous behaviour. After all, the ultimate aim of betraying a city to the enemy – to ensure that with the

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<sup>101</sup> To cite a selection: Hdt. 6.88, 6.101, 8.128; Thuc. 1.55.1, 4.7, 4.49.1, 4.52.3, 4.66-68, 4.76.1-4 and 89, 4.103, 4.110-12, 4.121.2, 5.3.5, 5.116.3, 6.74.1, 7.48.2, 8.60.1; Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.16-20, 3.2.27-29; Aen. Tact. 4.1-4, 11.3-6, 11.7-10, 28.5; Diod. Sic. 14.15.1-2, 16.53.2-3; for examples from the Hellenistic period, e.g. Polyb. 2.55.2-3 (cf. Plut. *Cleom.* 23-35), 2.57.2-3 (cf. 2.58.4), 5.92.4, 5.96.4-8.

<sup>102</sup> Gehrke 1985, 245. Probably the most famous description of *stasis* is Thucydides' analysis of the conflict in Corcyra (Thuc. 3.81-85), which according to Price 2004, 13 is a foil for other cases of *stasis*.



besiegers' help, the traitorous faction could be placed in charge of the city and henceforth be loyal to its former enemies (usually after purging the city of political opponents, either by execution or exile) – could just as easily be achieved by turning traitor on the battlefield and joining the opposing army. The evidence relating to the *stasis* in Corcyra in 427 shows that several hundred citizens had been in league with the oligarchs; the sudden defection of so large a force certainly could have been able to turn the tide in a battle.<sup>103</sup> After defeating the 'loyalist' force, the traitors could be installed as rulers and left to govern the city in accordance with any negotiations held between them and the attackers; foreign involvement in *stasis* was not unusual: in more than two thirds of our cases another polis was implicated in one way or another.<sup>104</sup> It is obvious that there were disloyal elements within probably every polis community, and equally obvious that these elements were willing to use armed violence against their fellow citizens or admit/invite an enemy to the city – yet there remains the question as to why citizen armies were seemingly unaffected by this factionalism and able to avoid disintegration, as they suffered no significant acts of disloyalty.<sup>105</sup>

One possible explanation is that it could have been too difficult to defect on campaign or during a battle. It might be no coincidence that the two clearest cases of betrayal, Lade and Corcyra, occurred in naval engagements, where it might have been less problematic to organise defection than on land: individual ships were more isolated, self-contained, and autonomous – physically and psychologically – than groups of men in a large army on firm ground; moreover, there was no equivalent of cavalry that could quickly bear down on those trying to defect. Consequently, betrayal at sea might have been easier to organise than on land. But in both cases,

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<sup>103</sup> The democratic leaders were enrolling the suspicious citizens on triremes to be sent away with the Athenians, upon which they sought sanctuary at the temple of the Dioskouroi; some four hundred more took refuge at the Temple of Hera (Thuc. 3.75.5: these men were almost certainly different from those who were to be enrolled on the ships: *CT ad loc.*). Later, five hundred exiles are mentioned as those who managed to flee the city (Thuc. 3.85.1-2, cf. Price 2004, 7 n. 2.). For the large scale of most *staseis*, see Gehrke 1985, 242 with n. 13.

<sup>104</sup> Gehrke 1985, 268.

<sup>105</sup> According to Price 2004, 25, Thucydides' understanding of war included individuals' changing perceptions of what was acceptable: warfare transformed the rules, resulting in behaviour that would have been unimaginable in peacetime.

the enemy had to be informed beforehand, signs had to be agreed upon, and terms negotiated; all this under the watchful eyes of one's fellow soldiers. However, very similar organisational difficulties faced those who wanted to betray their city to the enemy from within: how to get messages in and out, where and how to hold secret meetings, how to identify the conspirators to the enemy, how and when to use force, how to procure arms and armour, and so on. The betrayal of Siphai to the Athenian general Demosthenes failed because of miscommunication, confusion about exact dates, and someone turning informer on the plotters.<sup>106</sup> In fact, being on the march might have made the entire enterprise easier, as the plotters had obvious reasons for bearing arms, could camp together, and exploit such things as night watches to get messages to the enemy (just as traitorous city guards were one of the main weak spots of a city's defences, at least according to Aineias Taktikos).<sup>107</sup>

It appears equally unlikely that switching sides during a battle was generally regarded as too dangerous to be attempted, as overall battlefield confusion, nerves, bad timing, a last-minute change of plan, or an uninformed enemy could all lead to failure or worse – the Thebans who defected at Thermopylai were at first cut down by the Persians before it emerged they were attempting to change sides.<sup>108</sup> Yet such risks did not stop conspirators from betraying their city to the enemy, either. The dangers of plotting to hand over a city could be just as life-threatening: the conspirators in Sicilian Messana, planning to open the gates to the Athenians, were given away by Alkibiades, seized by their fellow citizens and immediately put to death.<sup>109</sup> Difficulties of this nature alone, therefore, cannot account for the contrasting behaviour of would-be traitors within a citizen community.

Rather, the answer lies in the very nature of a polis' political and military organisation. We have already noted that those cases that came closest to bringing citizens to betray each other involved a powerful political element. Where there was strong political tension or outright conflict, the willingness to act disloyally was

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<sup>106</sup> In 424/3: Thuc. 4.76.1-4, 89.

<sup>107</sup> E.g. Aen. Tact. 3.3; he often implicitly assumes the guards to be mercenaries, but in cases like this one he is referring directly to citizens posted on the walls.

<sup>108</sup> Hdt. 7.233.2.

<sup>109</sup> Thuc. 6.74.1.

greater; it is no coincidence that our only clear case of defection during a battle (the two Corcyraean crews) occurred but a few days after a bloody civil war. Conversely, this would mean that a city at relative peace with itself could be reasonably confident that its troops were less likely to act disloyally.<sup>110</sup> In other words, a polis which has functioning governing bodies and an intact and effective military organisation would be able to send out an army whose loyalty among itself and towards the government would not be in question, as there was no *stasis* and therefore no open division. Only where there was factional political infighting would parts of the army consider joining the enemy to defeat their rivals and assume power at home. However, as a city torn apart by violent internal division would be generally unable to send out armies in the first place, we hardly ever hear about citizen armies fracturing while on campaign.

It seems that we are dealing with two types of disloyalty: on the one hand military disloyalty, which was extremely rare, and on the other hand political disloyalty, which found frequent expression in the many cases of betrayal during a siege or violence in a civil war or *coup d'état*. Conversely, we can imagine two types of loyalty: one, a military loyalty, where the army represented a socio-political unit that had to be protected regardless of one's personal feelings towards its current internal organisation; the other, a political loyalty, directed not at the state as a whole, but at one's own vision of what that state should be. Betraying the army could then be viewed as wrong no matter what, whereas betrayal of the state could be justified by portraying one's fellow-citizens as traitors themselves, as they held a fundamentally different view regarding the ideal organisation of communal life.<sup>111</sup>

Thus, the absence of military disloyalty represents a polis as a functioning socio-political system that can draw on the benefits of its predominant compliance relationship to prevent any socio-political oppositions from spilling over into open

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<sup>110</sup> The ideal opposite to a city in the grip of *stasis* would be one ruled by *homonoia* (Price 2004: 62). Even Aineias Taktikos could imagine such a state (Aen. Tact. 22.21).

<sup>111</sup> This double-nature conceptualisation of loyalty helps explain the cases of political betrayal of one's city, rather than a strict class-based divide, as suggested by Herman 1987, 156-61, who argued for the importance of aristocratic alliances, where the elites from all cities worked together and betrayed their 'inferiors' (the *demos*), as they fell outside the concept of *xenia*-relationships.

conflict. The latter represents the temporary breakdown of this system, caused by the political factionalism that was itself the result of the intensely competitive political interaction and participation characteristic of polis life. Ironically, however, it was this very aspect of polis life that was one of the most important factors in maintaining the normative-moral compliance relationship that was the hallmark of a polis' organisational structure. The intense socialisation that took place within a polis community was at the same time the reason for its cohesion and disintegration: either side in a civic conflict could see itself as the legitimate embodiment of its city and not as a traitorous faction. An example of how betrayal and an attempt at revolution could be depicted as a loyal act to save a society from itself can be found in the Thebans' justification for their attack on Plataia in 431, in which they had help from the inside; Thucydides has them argue that the conspirators risked their lives for the common good and the freedom of Plataia – hence there was no crime or betrayal at all, as their intentions were not mercenary or aimed at personal gain, but of a moral nature: after all, they were only trying to save their homeland.<sup>112</sup> In this case, the moral involvement that citizens felt towards their socio-political system was used as a justification for trying to subvert it. In addition, citizens who had been exiled during *stasis* were still able to portray their cause as that of the true state, whereas their opposition back home was viewed as alien and hostile – and therefore a legitimate target of disruption and violence, carried out if necessary in collusion with a former enemy.<sup>113</sup>

We can see that civic loyalty and cohesion formed a double-edged sword: if a polis was run effectively and did not suffer from disruption owing to *stasis*, it was able to send out an army that would not betray the city or turn on itself. However, if the latent political fissures grew too destabilising, disloyal acts ranging from assassinations and betraying the city to an enemy, to the eruption of outright civil war, became common. This brings us back to the important distinction between task cohesion and social cohesion: on a macro-level, a militia army in the field was united

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<sup>112</sup> Thuc. 3.65; cf. Price 2004, 116, 123.

<sup>113</sup> Gehrke 1985, 224–27. On *stasis* see further Seibert 1979, Lintott 1982, Loraux 1997, Kalimtzis 2000, Wolpert 2002, Forsdyke 2005, Gray 2015.

mainly by task cohesion: they had been sent out as a group to achieve a certain goal to advance the interests of their state. However, groups within such an army would also be united and separated by social cohesion and political affiliations, but these divisions did not normally prevent the army from operating effectively (regardless of eventual success or failure). Political factionalism and *stasis*, however, were governed more by social cohesion than by task cohesion: joining one side or the other depended primarily on the various familial, social, religious, and political microcosms that bound groups of citizens to each other. This situation is akin to the formation of defensive primary groups in modern armies: strong social cohesion can lead to opposition to a group's organisation if that organisation is perceived as no longer serving, or indeed as harming, the interests of the group – at this point the group might refuse compliance or actively seek to work against the organisation's structure. Ultimately, this leads to the breakdown of an effective compliance relationship, which in turn threatens the entire organisation. A relatively reliable way to prevent the formation of defensive groups is to ensure that social cohesion is governed by task cohesion: the willingness to achieve the organisation's goals has to override individual opposition and division among the lower participants. As has been discussed in Chapter 1, a normative-moral compliance relationship is best suited to this task: moral involvement includes an effort to equate the organisation's benefit with one's own benefit, and a willingness to accept personal sacrifice to further any goals set by the organisation; both factors lead to higher levels of task cohesion.

A citizen army on the march, as the military embodiment of a functioning state with an effective normative-moral compliance relationship, would consequently benefit from higher levels of task cohesion and thus reduce the risk of disloyalty and noncompliance. Conversely, once the compliance relationship had been sufficiently weakened by internal division to cause a breakdown, social cohesion came to the fore, and the moral involvement that had previously been present gave way to considerations of a more calculative nature, often aimed at a (violent) restructuring of the organisation itself: political revolution. *Stasis*, then,

means that a polis could no longer benefit from the cohesion that moral involvement brought, as its members had grouped together to advance the goals of their faction, not those of the community as a whole: we have already noted that any side in such a conflict could claim to act for the common good, which makes identification and classification of civic disloyalty even more hazardous. Nevertheless, we could categorise a betrayal on the battlefield as military disloyalty, and opening the gates to the enemy to effect a change of government as political disloyalty. As we have seen, military disloyalty was extremely rare in Polis armies, while political disloyalty was comparatively common in the city itself. As long as the predominant compliance relationship was intact, soldiers remained loyal and displayed high levels of task cohesion, even if there were divisions or strong misgivings about the present situation or the task at hand. For an illustration of this double-edged dynamic we might look at the Athenian Sicilian Expedition: even though the soldiers desired to return to Athens after their circumstances had worsened significantly, they continued to comply with their generals' orders and even under the most intense pressure the army did not disintegrate until the very end; had Nikias given in to the men and sailed home, however, they might have presented him as a corrupt traitor who had been bribed to withdraw.<sup>114</sup>

Bribery is another area where we have relatively little evidence for Polis armies. Partly this will be because a successful bribe would have been a well-guarded secret; but its rarity compared to Hellenistic Royal armies might also point to structural causes. Moreover, the cases we know of tend to involve bribery on a political level, and never do we find citizens bribed to change sides and join the enemy. For example, in 424 three Athenian generals were convicted of bribery for coming to terms with the Sicilians instead of gaining control over them: two were banished and one was fined.<sup>115</sup> It was not uncommon for Athenians to discipline generals with whom they were dissatisfied: Perikles himself was fined, and

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<sup>114</sup> Thuc. 7.48. Nikias himself went on the campaign entirely unwilling to lead it in the first place – but noncompliance in the face of a functioning government and a more or less unified *demos* would have been unacceptable. For his opposition to the campaign, see Thuc. 6.9-14, 21-25. See also Hamel 1998, 19-21.

<sup>115</sup> Thuc. 4.65.3.

Thucydides was another general who was exiled for perceived incompetence; there was also the notorious execution of several generals after the battle of Arginousai.<sup>116</sup> It is unclear if there even was a specific legal procedure for dealing with military bribery. By c. 330, the Athenians had an *eisangelia* procedure to prosecute treasonous acts in general, which included betraying a city, a ship, or a military force (Hyp. 4.8: ἢ ἕάν τις πόλιν τινὰ προδῶ ἢ ναῦς ἢ πεζὴν ἢ ναυτικὴν στρατιάν).<sup>117</sup> Also covered were the forming of political clubs or secret meetings aimed at subverting the democracy, or taking bribes to give bad advice to the *demos*, which implies that such cases of treachery were usually of a political nature (and carried out by politicians or *rhetores*). The law included a clause against bribery, but it applied only to public speakers.<sup>118</sup> Pollux preserved the detail that the procedure was also aimed at those 'who go to the enemy without having been sent', which might refer to desertion, but could also refer to political initiatives carried out by private individuals without the state's approval.<sup>119</sup> As an example, we might look to Thuc. 8.98, which relates how the Athenian Aristarchos tricked the (also Athenian) garrison at Oinoe into surrender by pretending to speak on behalf of the Athenian *demos*. It appears that the *eisangelia* was not aimed primarily at troops who turned traitors on the battlefield, but at individuals whose (political) actions were perceived as harming the interests of the state. One case we know of appears to have involved the betrayal of ships: the admiral Leosthenes was condemned to death *in absentia* for letting himself be ambushed by Alexander of Pherai in 362/1, resulting in the loss of five ships and the capture of 600 Athenians.<sup>120</sup> This is hardly military betrayal in any real sense: Leosthenes did not choose to join the enemy or sacrifice his soldiers; much like Thucydides, he was punished simply for perceived incompetence.

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<sup>116</sup> Thuc. 2.65.3, 5.26.5, Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.

<sup>117</sup> For a detailed discussion of the law, see Hansen 1975, 12-20.

<sup>118</sup> Harris 2013, 190: 'The law does not define the term 'public speaker,' but the Athenians in the fourth century made a general distinction between 'public speakers' (*rhetores*) and 'private citizens' (*idiotai*). In general, private citizens were those who were not active in politics'.

<sup>119</sup> Poll. *Onom.* 8.52. Harris 2013, 234 also mentions a sentence from the *Lexicon Cantabrigiense* which states that the *eisangelia* applied also to those who served in enemy armies, which again points to desertion.

<sup>120</sup> Diod. Sic. 15.95.1-3, cf. Hyp. 4.1, Aeschin. 2.21, 124, and Polyaeus, *Strat.* 6.2.1.

The situation in Sparta was similar: although there are several cases that involve Spartans taking bribes, they usually revolve around kings and their failure to carry through an attack. We do not hear of Spartan generals or troops betraying their own city or fellow soldiers on campaign. Thus, Pleistoanax (or one of his senior advisors) was apparently bribed by Perikles to halt his invasion of Attika in 446/5; Leotychidas was exiled for being bribed not to subdue Thessaly, and was eventually handed to the Aiginetans in recompense for hostages he had taken from them; after the victory at Sepeia in 494, Kleomenes was prosecuted for accepting bribes not to attack Argos, but managed to defend himself; there was also the rumour that Sphodrias was bribed by the Thebans to invade Attika in 378 (although this might have happened with Kleombrotos' approval).<sup>121</sup> None of these instances reflect a significant departure from a normative-moral compliance relationship: greed and personal advantage were clearly motivating factors, which points to the existence of a calculative mindset on the part of those who were bribed (hence we must always emphasise that we are interested in the *predominant* compliance relationship), but it appears that the moral involvement was still strong enough at each point to prevent any direct damage to their own polis. Moral orientation towards one's organisation, then, could be seen to act as a safety mechanism: it drew a line (protection of one's city), beyond which one could operate with more or less freedom (pursuit of personal gain), but we do not see such a pursuit ever becoming a serious threat to the city itself.

Finally, a few preliminary conclusions: applying the model of a normative-moral compliance relationship onto civic armies and analysing their behaviour in terms of social and task cohesion has yielded the strong impression that Polis armies tended to be robustly cohesive and generally loyal to the state and their commanders – at least until returning home. However, the intensely competitive political climate that existed in most *poleis* was able to disrupt this pattern by redirecting the compliance relationship and allowing political considerations to

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<sup>121</sup> Pleistoanax: Thuc. 2.21.1, Plut. *Per.* 22; Leotychidas: Hdt. 6.72, 85; Kleomenes: Hdt. 6.82; Sphodrias: Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.20, 30, Diod. Sic. 15.29.5.



override the moral orientation that most citizens had towards their city-state. In the next section, we will turn our attention to the Royal armies of the Hellenistic period, which appear to have exhibited behaviour and motivations of a very different kind. Again, we will attempt to employ compliance theory to make sense of these contrasts, and highlight the role of the socio-political system – or its absence – in determining individuals' orientations.

### **2.3 Baggage, Betrayal, and Bloodshed: Disloyalty in Royal Armies**

Among its many consequences, the death of Alexander the Great in June 323 left his empire's entire military organisation without a single leading figure. The personal bond that the king had shared with his men and commanders and that had in many ways governed the layers of loyalty within his army was torn, but not severed: it survived Alexander himself and continued to influence the allegiances of his generals and soldiers to no small degree, primarily as a legitimising factor for those who sought to lay claim to some of the power left behind by Alexander. But during his lifetime Alexander had become the fulcrum for his army's loyalties, and the history of the subsequent years shows clearly that at the time of his death there was no suitable candidate who could command the same levels of authority and loyalty. In the face of this power vacuum, old allegiances were re-shuffled, and the succeeding decades were marked by an extremely unstable climate in terms of military hierarchy and compliance. Furthermore, the relationship that prevailed between generals and their men during the period of the Successors also had a profound impact on the various Hellenistic kingdoms that emerged from the ruins of Alexander's empire. The following discussion, therefore, aims to identify the parameters that governed this relationship; beyond simply pointing out instances of betrayal, the aim will be to connect and compare these instances and assess, if possible, the structural dynamics of Royal army loyalty.

Probably the most notorious case of disloyalty that occurred during the period of the Successors was the betrayal of Eumenes of Kardia by a Macedonian unit of his own men, the veteran *argyraspides*, or Silver Shields.<sup>122</sup> At the battle of Gabiene in 316, during which Eumenes' veteran Macedonian infantry had bested their opponents while his cavalry had been driven back, the enemy commander Antigonos managed to capture the baggage of Eumenes' Macedonian troops.<sup>123</sup> According to Polyainos, the baggage contained 'their wives and children and concubines, their slaves and gold and silver, and whatever else they had acquired during the campaign with Alexander'.<sup>124</sup> This reminds us that the usual translation of ἀποσκευή as 'baggage' is somewhat misleading; it contained everything a soldier possessed, from plunder amassed over years or decades of war, to trinkets and equipment, memories of fallen comrades, household items, and of course any wives and children a soldier might have acquired during his service. In short, 'baggage' was a soldier's world.<sup>125</sup>

Capturing it, therefore, was crucial: the Macedonians, apparently led by Teutamos, one of the commanders of the Silver Shields, opposed Eumenes' plans for another engagement, and began secret negotiations with the enemy. Eventually they seized their own general and handed him over to Antigonos, in return for their possessions and pledges of safety; then as a whole they joined the enemy army. The fate of Eumenes is well known – he was executed. Our sources are unanimous in describing the motivations of the troops: the veterans feared for their baggage, which as we have seen included their wives and children, in addition to the spoils of many decades of campaigning. The desire to secure these overrode any sense of

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<sup>122</sup> These were originally Alexander's elite Macedonian hypaspists, 3,000 strong; Arrian mentions the name only once, when he describes Alexander's plans to elevate Asian military units, among them ἀργυρασπίδων τάξις Περσική (Arr. *Anab.* 7.11.3). At what point the name originated is unclear, but most likely it was awarded during the Indian campaign (Roisman 2012, 177); see further Roisman 2012, chapters 7 and 8 for a historical account of their service with Eumenes, and for hypaspists generally, Sekunda 2007, 330-39, Sekunda 2010, 454-56, and Bar-Kochva 1967, 54-67.

<sup>123</sup> For the course of the battle and its aftermath, see Diod. Sic. 19.41-43, Polyainos, *Strat.* 4.6.14, Plut. *Eum.* 16-17, Nep. *Eum.* 10, Just. *Epit.* 14.3-4.

<sup>124</sup> Polyainos, *Strat.* 4.6.13.

<sup>125</sup> We are told that Lysimachos once slaughtered some 5,000 Autariatai after they had lost their baggage – he feared they might mutiny or desert, being without possessions and barbarians, too (Polyainos, *Strat.* 4.12.1). On baggage and mercenaries, see Loman 2005.

loyalty the men might have felt towards Eumenes, and from an organisational point of view it triggered a catastrophic case of noncompliance that led to the death of the general and the complete disintegration of his army; in addition, his troops had pledged allegiance to the enemy. As far as we know, such an extreme case of disloyalty has no equivalent in the armies of the Greek city-states – and this was by no means an isolated episode.

Eumenes of Kardia was in fact at the centre of several cases of disloyalty, as were the Silver Shields themselves. Both Antigonos and Ptolemy had already tried earlier to induce them to betray Eumenes; probably in 318, Ptolemy unsuccessfully attempted to lure away the commanders of the *argyraspides*, exploiting the fact that Eumenes had been condemned to death.<sup>126</sup> Similarly, Antigonos had promised Antigenes and Teutamos bribes and positions if they managed to lead their troops in a betrayal of Eumenes: he sent men who had personal connections among the troops to bribe them, trusting in the effects of social cohesion and the receptiveness of a calculative mindset on the part of the Silver Shields. At first it seemed he would be successful, as Teutamos was won over; Antigenes, however, managed to convince his colleague to remain loyal – and his arguments as reported by Diodoros reveal an extremely calculative orientation:

...for he demonstrated that it would be better for him if Eumenes lived, rather than Antigonos. The latter, if he grew more powerful, would take away their satrapies and install others of his friends instead; Eumenes, on the other hand, being a foreigner, would never dare to pursue his own interests, but, being a general, he would treat them as his friends and protect their satrapies if they assisted him, and perhaps give them others, too.

(Diod. Sic. 18.62.6-7)

Of course, to what degree this corresponds to Antigenes' actual views is uncertain, and ignorance of the source of this information means caution is advised when interpreting it. It might be tempting to dismiss such passages as mere adherence to some literary *topos* of the treacherous mercenary soldier or the greedy Macedonian

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<sup>126</sup> Diod Sic. 18.62.1-2; Eumenes had been condemned in the wake of Perdikkas' murder (18.37.1-2).

veteran; but we are not dealing with an isolated case found only in one author. While the reliability of the details found in passages such as this might be doubted (and subjected to the vagaries of a search for the ever-elusive agenda of the original source), the cumulative impression gained from our material is too pervasive to be a literary construct that bore little resemblance to reality. As it stands, the passage is a good example of a purely calculative statement: all things considered, loyalty to Eumenes was more advantageous in the long run as it brought a higher chance of protecting their current status and possessions and of receiving more in the future. The passage also presents Antigonos and the military organisation he embodies as one that relies primarily on remunerative power: Antigenes and Teutamos are portrayed as making their compliance hinge on the prospective rewards they might receive. There was also an element of coercive power in Antigonos' advances: his letters contained the threat of punishment and war if the Macedonians did not hand over Eumenes.<sup>127</sup> It seems that in this case, Antigonos relied predominantly on remuneration, followed by coercion, to achieve his aims. However, there was no trace of a question of legitimacy or personal loyalty, factors that might more often be of importance in a normative-moral compliance relationship. Nevertheless, Diodoros (or his source) might have encapsulated accurately the prevalent dynamic of loyalty of the time: we shall obtain a clearer picture by examining other instances of disloyalty, with an eye on the potential explanatory power different compliance models can offer.

Eumenes' relationship with the Silver Shields and their leaders was indeed fraught with mistrust from the start: he was in charge of the Macedonian troops and officers who had condemned him to death after the murder of Perdikkas in 321/0.<sup>128</sup> Their initial unwillingness to comply was only overcome after Eumenes' authority had been buttressed by letters from Polyperchon and Olympias herself, and it further took the stratagem of holding military council meetings in the presence of Alexander's spirit to secure his command.<sup>129</sup> Still, in 319, his enemies sought to

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<sup>127</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.63.

<sup>128</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.37.1-2, 18.59.4.

<sup>129</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.58-59, Plut. *Eum.* 13.2, Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.8.2, Nep. *Eum.* 7.1.

capitalise on this tension by offering a reward of one hundred talents along with other honours for Eumenes' murder.<sup>130</sup> Earlier that same year, at the battle of Orkynia, the commander of Eumenes' cavalry had been bribed by Antigonos to defect and join his side during the battle, costing Eumenes the victory.<sup>131</sup> It has been suggested that Eumenes' own lack of funds moved the cavalry to treachery, an explanation which assumes predominantly calculative orientations among the cavalrymen; at any rate, this is a clear example of an army fracturing and turning on itself during an engagement.<sup>132</sup> In this passage we find the most common Greek words for 'treason' (προδοσία) and 'defecting' (αὐτομολέω): ἔπεισε προδότην γενέσθαι καὶ κατὰ τὴν μάχην αὐτομολῆσαι; the meaning of these seems not to have changed much since the time of Herodotos and Thucydides (see section 2.2), suggesting that the definition of military betrayal remained more or less static. This in turn makes it unlikely that we are simply dealing with a new phenomenon that later authors were more willing to comment upon: the different levels of loyalty in Polis and Royal armies are not a linguistic illusion, but a structural reality.

After his first unsuccessful attempt, Antigonos again tried to bribe Eumenes' Macedonian troops in 317, promising not to appoint new satraps, and to provide rich gifts of land and rank for those who wanted them, but gifts and safe passage home for those who desired to return. It appears he did not employ any normative arguments on the basis of legitimacy, justice, or vengeance (for the death of Krateros at Eumenes' hands, for example) – rather he relied solely on remunerative power to entice the troops to join him. Nevertheless, Antigonos' offers fell on deaf ears, and apparently Eumenes commended his men for their foresight: Antigonos would only keep his word for as long as he had to – once he was in control of the army, its leaders would be executed.<sup>133</sup> This last element points to a crucial weakness in any framework of military loyalty that is based on a remunerative-calculative

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<sup>130</sup> Plut. *Eum.* 8.6, cf. Just. *Epit.* 14.1.9-14.

<sup>131</sup> His name was Apollonides: Diod. Sic. 18.40.5, Plut. *Eum.* 9.2 (who preserves that fact that Eumenes still managed to capture and hang Apollonides for his betrayal; this is slightly at odds with Diodoros' account; see Roisman 2012, 163-64 with n. 45).

<sup>132</sup> Griffith 1935, 44.

<sup>133</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.25.2-7.

compliance relationship: the lack of trust. Where the personal fortunes and even the lives of thousands are at stake, the erosion of lasting loyalties through repeated betrayal can create such an unstable environment that one act of treachery will be answered by another. The Silver Shields are a perfect example of this dynamic: their betrayal of Eumenes was felt keenly even by Antigonos, who not long after the battle had the unit broken up and dispatched to Arachosia where they were to find their deaths in dangerous operations.<sup>134</sup> As for Antigenes, his reward was equally final: he was thrown into a pit and burned alive.<sup>135</sup> Antigonos might have recalled Antigenes' involvement in the murder of Perdikkas – for which he was rewarded with a satrapy – and thus rightly feared a similar fate should he find himself in equally dire straits as did the regent after his series of defeats in Egypt.<sup>136</sup> This is by no means a damning judgement of Antigenes or his intentions – which may have been honourable – but rather an illustration of the inherent dangers of a calculative mindset, especially in a military context.<sup>137</sup>

The betrayal of Eumenes could of course be explained as an anomaly and attributed to his 'Greekness', which might have made it easier for the Macedonians under his command to justify and rationalise their treachery.<sup>138</sup> But it was by no means the only time that soldiers of Hellenistic Royal armies abandoned their commander or switched sides to join a former enemy: hence his perceived otherness is an insufficient explanation of the high levels of disloyalty that surrounded him – as

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<sup>134</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.48.3-4; Plut. *Eum.* 19.2; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.6.15; Just. *Epit.* 14.4.14.

<sup>135</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.44.1. Compare the fate of Andragathos, who betrayed Amphipolis to Lysimachos, but instead of receiving the promised riches he was himself betrayed and executed (Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.12.2, Lund 1992, 99-100). Equally, the pirates who helped betray Ephesos to Lysimachos by turning on the garrison were quickly removed by the new garrison commander, who deemed them untrustworthy owing to their recent treachery (Polyaeus, *Strat.* 5.19, cf. Polyb. 18.15.9).

<sup>136</sup> Arr. *Succ.* 1.35, Diod. Sic. 18.39.5-6; cf. Landucci Gattinoni 2014, 43. Seleukos received Babylonia, Antigenes Susiane (Diod. Sic. 18.39.6, Arr. *Succ.* 1.35).

<sup>137</sup> See Heckel 2006, 291 n. 65 for an assessment of Antigenes' overall loyalties: he suggests that Antigenes might have remained faithful to Eumenes after all, explaining his harsh execution (cf. his refusal to be won over in 317: Diod. Sic. 19.12.2-3). Teutamios, whose final fate is unknown, appears to have led the negotiations to surrender Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 17.1, cf. Just. *Epit.* 14.3.11), but Plut. *Eum.* 16.1-2 tells us that Antigenes was part of the plot to murder Eumenes after the battle against Antigonos.

<sup>138</sup> On this, see Anson 2014, who concludes that ethnicity was not a major handicap for Eumenes.

we will see, the reasons were more structural in nature, and depended ultimately on the predominant compliance relationship that Royal armies were cultivating.

Eumenes himself acquired a large part of his Macedonian infantry after the treachery of Neoptolemos: the latter had planned to join the side of Antipater along with the Macedonians under his command, but his plot was discovered; Eumenes defeated him and convinced the remaining troops to join his side.<sup>139</sup> Similarly, after later defeating Krateros and Neoptolemos in battle, the Macedonians who had opposed him were spared and swore an oath to fight for him, only to break it during the night and withdraw to re-join Antipater.<sup>140</sup> This instance contains disloyalty in oath-breaking, but the soldiers' decision to return to Antipater can also be seen as 'an example of loyalty rather remarkable in the time of the Diadochs'.<sup>141</sup> Whether the soldiers were motivated by personal loyalty to Antipater or perhaps an unwillingness to serve under the killer of the popular Krateros remains unknown; the episode does, however, remind us that motivations are not one-dimensional: elements of a moral orientation are visible, and coexisted and at times competed with any calculative ones. Another example of this can be found in the behaviour of the Macedonians who abandoned Philip III Arrhidaios' wife, Eurydike Adeia, when they met with the forces of Polyperchon, who was acting on behalf of Alexander's mother Olympias: as the two armies were drawn up opposite each other, the Macedonians under Philip III transferred their allegiance to Polyperchon, resulting in the capture of the king and his wife, and ultimately in their execution.<sup>142</sup> This change of heart was apparently prompted by respect for Olympias on the one hand, and remembrance of the many benefits the men had received from Alexander on the other. This might reflect well the complex nature of military loyalty at the time: there were many layers to an individual's loyalties, and many forces pulling in different directions. Eurydike herself had only managed to win over the leading Macedonians

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<sup>139</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.29.4-5 (c. 321).

<sup>140</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.32.2-3.

<sup>141</sup> Roisman 2012, 17. He further states that 'Eumenes surrounded Craterus's defeated Macedonians and exacted from them a pledge to join him'. Diodoros says no such thing: rather, he records that Eumenes sent a messenger to them after burying his own dead.

<sup>142</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.11.1-7.

with promises of future rewards.<sup>143</sup> How unreliable such an arrangement was in the face of the shifting sands of Hellenistic loyalties she found out when her army refused to fight for her.

Soldiers changing sides was a common occurrence, but there were ways of securing more lasting loyalty. After the defeat of Alketas, the brother of Perdikkas, at the hands of Antigonos in 319, almost all of his soldiers joined the victorious army. The ones who remained faithful were his force of 6,000 Pisidians, whose loyalty he had previously cultivated by especially honouring them during his campaigns and allocating to them half of all the plunder taken, in addition to regular gifts and special attention.<sup>144</sup> Hence they promised not to desert (ἐγκαταλείπειν) him. This is a clear case of remunerative power being applied to great effect: the Pisidians chose to protect and defend Alketas even if it meant facing the might of Antigonos again, rather than reaping the rewards that might have been theirs had they joined him instead. We are told that the younger soldiers among the Pisidians would not give in, for which reason the older men, motivated by a desire to save their country and prevent unnecessary bloodshed, secretly betrayed Alketas and drove him to commit suicide. The younger men eventually retrieved Alketas' body (after it had been mistreated for days) and provided him with proper burial. Their devotion to Alketas went beyond what we might normally expect from soldiers who had been secured by money alone. It appears that their commitment underwent a shift of balance from calculative to moral: they continued to fight and die for Alketas even with no hope of reward or payment.<sup>145</sup> Remuneration was clearly not everything: compliance relationships are merely approximations of a complex and nuanced web of motivations and emotions, and it is important not to impose too strict an opposition between Royal and Polis armies, or between remunerative and normative power. The reality was more layered, and the case of the Pisidian soldiers reveals that Royal armies, too, could generate and benefit from moral commitment in their troops.

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<sup>143</sup> Dios. Sic. 19.11.1.

<sup>144</sup> For the whole affair see Diod. Sic. 18.45-47; cf. Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.6.7.

<sup>145</sup> It is not quite clear why the divide in loyalty seems to have run neatly along age lines; Chaniotis 2005, 44-46 and 55 suggests youthful vigour and a martial spirit engendered by training, the importance of oaths, and militaristic culture.



Normally, however, soldiers saw no problems in changing sides as circumstances dictated; often this would happen after a defeat in battle. Thus, Antigonos simply enrolled the troops he captured upon taking Joppa and Gaza in c. 315 in his own army, and Demetrios Poliorketes incorporated some 16,000 men into his and his father's army after defeating Ptolemy and capturing his ships and garrisons.<sup>146</sup> In 313, after Lysimachos had defeated an army under the command of Pausanias – sent against him by Antigonos – some of the defeated soldiers were ransomed, while the rest joined his side.<sup>147</sup> In another case, we learn that Antigonos allowed the Ptolemaic garrison of Tyre to depart before accepting the capitulation of the city.<sup>148</sup> In these cases it is not entirely clear how the choices came about. It is entirely possible that the garrison preferred rejoining their 'baggage' in Egypt, rather than go over to Antigonos.

Similarly, after Eumenes' defeat at Orkynia (where Antigonos had bribed the latter's cavalry to defect during the battle), Antigonos captured his entire baggage train, whereupon his dismayed soldiers deserted him in large numbers to join the enemy: of his original army of 25,000, only some 600 loyal followers accompanied Eumenes to take refuge in Nora.<sup>149</sup> The powerful influence that their 'possessions' had on the loyalties of Royal army soldiers is once more apparent: the wish to keep and protect one's baggage usually outweighed feelings of loyalty to a particular military organisation.

This is not intended as a damning judgement of the soldiers who abandoned Eumenes, but part of this study's effort to properly understand these men's combat motivations and their involvement with their fellow soldiers and commanders, without making prior assumptions. In his analysis of this episode, Roisman concludes about those who remained with Eumenes in Nora: 'Their loyalty in spite of the devastating defeat and loss of their baggage should puzzle only those who regard all

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<sup>146</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.59.2 (Antigonos) and 20.52.6-53.1 (Demetrios); cf. Plut. *Demetr.* 16.2-3. As Roisman 2012, 168 says, Demetrios probably also possessed their baggage, which would have made changing sides a lot more compelling.

<sup>147</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.73.10. cf. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 657 (= Austin 54), 16-23 for defeated soldiers enrolling with the victorious army after Ipsos in 301.

<sup>148</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.61.5.

<sup>149</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.40-41, cf. the more favourable tradition reflected in Plut. *Eum.* 10.1.

the veterans as slaves to personal gain and to the satisfaction of simple needs'.<sup>150</sup> Such a statement is problematic on two accounts: firstly, it does not work well with his overall point that Eumenes managed to create lasting loyalties between himself and his men. We do not know exactly how many Macedonian veterans Eumenes possessed at the battle, but the total of c. 600 individuals that afterwards remained by his side cannot have included many. The evidence points the other way: the vast majority of his men decided to abandon him regardless of his efforts 'to bind them to him by winning battles, by giving them distinctions, honors, and material rewards, and by keeping them close to him as his bodyguards'.<sup>151</sup>

Secondly, and more importantly, Roisman seems to imply that those who chose their baggage over their general were 'slaves to personal gain and to the satisfaction of simple needs'. This would be a gross simplification of their connection to their possessions: after all, we have already underlined that baggage included not only gold and silver, but potentially also relatives, lovers, wives, children, slaves, trophies, souvenirs, ashes of friends, and other items of personal and sentimental value to their owners. Bound up in all these were the memories of years of service, proof of participation, valour, and success.<sup>152</sup> It is not surprising that soldiers would feel an intense bond and responsibility for them: as a whole, they would form a large part of their very self-definition (perhaps especially for those who had been absent from their homeland for a long time). This attachment was of course not lost on their commanders, who at times exploited it. In a way, baggage was to a Royal army soldier what the polis was to a citizen-soldier: home, identity, and above all, something worth fighting for.<sup>153</sup> These are the same ingredients that made up a large part of the moral involvement Polis army soldiers seem to have expressed; little wonder, then, that the Silver Shields gave up Eumenes, or indeed that most men would choose to protect everything they had, rather than risk losing it forever by following a doomed commander out of a sense of loyalty and obligation.

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<sup>150</sup> Roisman 2012, 164.

<sup>151</sup> Roisman 2012, 164.

<sup>152</sup> In the words of Anson 2004, 255 baggage was 'the ultimate bribe'.

<sup>153</sup> The fates of relatives who were captured along with the 'baggage' in warfare could be harsh, and included being sold into slavery and exposure to sexual violence (Plut. *Eum.* 9.6).

The Macedonians, in fact, quickly developed a reputation for changing sides to suit their own needs, so much so that Griffith equated them to mercenaries in behaviour if not in name, judging by their post-323 performance.<sup>154</sup> When Polyperchon and his army arrived in Macedonia to reinstate the teenage Herakles, son of Alexander and Barsine, Kassander met him with his own army, but apparently was reluctant to force the issue, fearing that his Macedonians would defect, as switching sides was in their nature.<sup>155</sup> We do not know exactly whose opinion is being expressed here – that of Kassander, Diodoros, or his source – but expressed it was, and that already points to a perceived pattern. Later in the third century this was still the case: in 288, Pyrrhos had been elevated to share the kingship of Macedon with Lysimachos only after the Macedonians of Demetrios had spontaneously defected to him (Plutarch uses μεταβάλλω). Ironically, this was the result of Demetrios' efforts to avoid facing Lysimachos precisely because he knew that his troops were likely to defect.<sup>156</sup> Similarly, during Pyrrhos' invasion of Macedon in the 270s, he was at first joined by some 2,000 Macedonian infantry who had defected from Antigonos Gonatas, and at a later battle, the rest of Gonatas' Macedonians decided to join Pyrrhos, while his Gallic mercenaries died fighting.<sup>157</sup>

Gonatas' Macedonians chose to abandon him after witnessing their allied Gallic mercenaries disintegrate under the onslaught of Pyrrhos' troops; this points to another important factor that can impact soldiers' combat motivation and considerations of loyalties. Success or defeat could be decisive in tipping the balance towards compliance or noncompliance, depending on the specific circumstances and of course the pre-existing orientations among troops and commanders. Studies of modern warfare have shown that defeats – and even a continued absence of success – can have extremely detrimental effects on troop morale in general, and

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<sup>154</sup> Griffith 1935, 39-40.

<sup>155</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.28.1-3: δέισας ὁ Κάσανδρος μήποτε φύσει πρὸς μεταβολὴν ὄντες ὁξεῖς οἱ Μακεδόνες.

<sup>156</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 11.3-6, for a historical overview see Adams 2010, 218-22.

<sup>157</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26.3-4, Just. *Epit.* 25.3.5, Diod. Sic. 22.11.1, Paus. 1.13.2. Cf. Griffith 1935, 63: 'Antigonos' Gauls, perhaps new to the game, fought bravely and were massacred, while his "infantry" (which can only mean the Macedonians themselves) deserted to Pyrrhus'. The exact location of the battle is uncertain; see further Hammond & Walbank 1988, 260-62.

erode trust in an army's leadership in particular.<sup>158</sup> It is this last aspect that is of special interest to this study, as it concerns the relationship between troops and generals. As an example, we might turn to the regent Perdikkas' invasion of Egypt in 321: it is a prime example of a weak compliance relationship buckling under the weight of repeated failure.<sup>159</sup> At the outset, we learn that Perdikkas was unpopular owing to his harsh and autocratic style of command, which alienated his captains and troops alike.<sup>160</sup> Such a power dynamic resembles a coercive-alienative arrangement, and it is not entirely surprising that it only took a reversal at the hands of nature – in the form of a flood that caused a setback in clearing a canal – to move some of his *philoí* to desert him for Ptolemy.<sup>161</sup> Perdikkas had to secure his remaining commanders' compliance by remunerative power, i.e. gifts and promises, but we are also told that he applied coercive power by severely punishing those whom he suspected of plotting to join Ptolemy.<sup>162</sup> Nevertheless, the disaffection among his troops continued to simmer after Ptolemy inflicted a defeat upon Perdikkas at the Fort of Camels, and it finally boiled over after the botched attempt at crossing the Nile, a disastrous enterprise that cost Perdikkas some 2,000 casualties, the allegiance of his men as their loyalties shifted towards Ptolemy, and ultimately, his life.<sup>163</sup> His murder at the hands of his own men was the result of the collapse of the shaky compliance relationship that had hitherto underpinned his command. We have seen him apply elements of coercive and remunerative power in response to his men's orientations, which in turn were more likely to be alienative and calculative. Once we add a string of costly defeats to the mix, the eventual betrayal and assassination by his troops is relatively easy to understand.<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> Kellett 1982, 260.

<sup>159</sup> On the whole campaign, see Roisman 2014.

<sup>160</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.33.3.

<sup>161</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.33.2: πολλοὶ τῶν φίλων ἐγκαταλιπόντες ἀπεχώρησαν πρὸς τὸν Πτολεμαῖον.

<sup>162</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.33.5, Arr. *Succ.* 1.28.

<sup>163</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.33.6-34.5 (Fort of Camels); for the crossing of the Nile, see Diod. Sic. 18.34.6-36.5, Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.19, Strabo 17.1.8, Frontin. *Str.* 4.7.20, Paus. 1.6.3. The crossing was made worse by adverse terrain; the negative effects on morale of difficult terrain and harsh climates are discussed in Kellett 1982, 242-5.

<sup>164</sup> Cf. Roisman 2012, 102. He adds that the Macedonian veterans would be relatively unused to defeat. Also Chaniotis 2005, 60: 'military failure was the beginning of many a ruler's end'. Other examples of adverse consequences of defeats: Diod. Sic. 18.74.1, 19.18-20.

This episode suggests that the soldiers of Perdikkas operated with a predominantly calculative involvement: compliance was not the right thing to do in and of itself, but depended on the distribution of rewards, and the continued success of their organisation. Once neither of these conditions was being fulfilled, compliance rapidly broke down, resulting in a violent removal of those in charge of their organisation – reminiscent of the ‘fragging’ that occurred during the Vietnam War. In his analysis of Perdikkas’ invasion of Egypt, Roisman posits without much explanation that the invasion, and by extension, the war in general, required ‘moral or ideological justification’ for the Macedonian troops, an element which is normally a hallmark of moral involvement.<sup>165</sup> However, such a statement carries little analytical weight without considering what actually motivated the troops in the first place. Whether or not a soldier expects his superiors to provide morally and/or ideologically sound reasons for a campaign depends entirely on that soldier’s involvement; if morally committed, he might indeed require such justification, but a calculative mindset might make compliance dependent on any number of other reasons, none of which need be moral or ideological in nature. At any rate, we need only look to the actual behaviour of the Macedonians: even after deciding that Ptolemy had given a good account of himself in the face of the charges that Perdikkas brought against him, they still decided to meet him in battle; thus their compliance cannot have rested on their campaign being morally justified.<sup>166</sup> We must not take the motivations of Royal army soldiers for granted; a theoretical approach to combat motivation and organisational effectiveness, combined with an analysis of the actual behaviour reported in our sources, can help to provide a more accurate assessment of these men’s motivations.

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<sup>165</sup> Roisman 2014, 457, and 2012, 94.

<sup>166</sup> The apparent incongruence of desiring moral justification and fighting against Ptolemy is acknowledged in Roisman 2014, 460–61. For the event see Arr. *Succ.* 1.28. There is some debate about how and where any such meeting between Ptolemy and Perdikkas might have taken place; Roisman 2012, 95–97 with n. 26 assumes there was a meeting, which is not stated as such in our sources. It is possible that this exchange was part of a propaganda war; after Perdikkas’ murder, Ptolemy entered his camp, publicly justified his acts and distributed supplies and gifts (Diod. Sic. 18.36.6, cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1.29 and Paus. 1.6.3), which suggests that he had not spoken directly to Perdikkas’ forces before this.

So far we have seen soldiers changing sides in battles mainly out of fear, resentment, desperation, convenience, or feelings of guilt and obligation. More common, however, was the addition of a specific incentive to increase the likelihood of betrayal. Bribery was wide-spread in this period, and we find that both lower participants and organisational elites were relatively receptive to this type of influence. Our sources do not tell us exactly why the above-mentioned *philoi* deserted Perdikkas after the failure at the canal; for Roisman the connection between this setback and the desertions is only a 'weak causal link', and he suggests instead that Diodoros knew this as well, which is why he offered the contrasting leadership styles of Perdikkas and Ptolemy as explanations.<sup>167</sup> Such an assumption is unnecessary: we have just discussed the detrimental effects of defeats and reversals in conjunction with a fragile compliance relationship, and seen that the shift in loyalty was congruent with the specific situation. However, Roisman's own guess as to why the men deserted might be closer to the mark: he suggests that Ptolemy bribed them with promises of future wealth and power.<sup>168</sup> This is entirely plausible: it corresponds to the prevalent compliance dynamic we have observed so far, and from later evidence we know that bribery was certainly an important tool in Ptolemy's box.<sup>169</sup> In 312 he tried but failed to bribe Antigonos' garrison commander at Tyre, Andronikos, to join his side.<sup>170</sup> He was more successful during Antigonos' invasion of Egypt in 306: he sent men on small boats to proclaim to Antigonos' troops on the shore that Ptolemy would pay a premium to any who defected to join his army – two *minai* for soldiers, and a talent for commanders, not inconsiderable sums. Antigonos' men – mainly mercenaries – began to take up the offer and leave him, and the exodus could only be stopped by attacking the bribery boats and capturing and torturing some of the deserters as an example to others.<sup>171</sup> We do not know how

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<sup>167</sup> Roisman 2012, 97.

<sup>168</sup> Roisman 2012, 98: 'In this period it was common practice to encourage enemy troops and their immediate commanders to desert or betray their generals'.

<sup>169</sup> Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 17-19 suggests that deserters were in fact an important component in the early composition of the Ptolemaic army.

<sup>170</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.86.1-2.

<sup>171</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.75.1-3. We are also told that prior to the invasion, Ptolemy placed trustworthy garrisons (20.75.1: ἀσφαλέσι φυλακαῖς) in key strategic locations, which suggests he was himself

many men deserted in this way, but apparently Ptolemy later wrote to Seleukos, Lysimachos, and Kassander, informing them of his victory over Antigonos and making special mention of the large number of men who had come over to him.<sup>172</sup> Again we see the positive effect remunerative power had on these soldiers, and the coercive measures that were designed to put an end to it. It seems that Ptolemy's incentive-based approach was also adopted by some of his commanders: one Philokles is reported to have bribed the grain controllers of Kaunos to create an opening which he swiftly exploited to capture the city.<sup>173</sup>

A situation similar to Ptolemy's waterborne invitations to join his side is preserved in Plutarch and Polyainos: during an engagement between Seleukos and Demetrios, Seleukos managed to convince a sizeable part of the enemy army to change sides during a battle by appearing without his helmet and promising them actual rewards from him rather than potential ones from Demetrios; the defection caused Demetrios to flee the battlefield.<sup>174</sup> Other examples of bribery in this period include Kassander sending his captain Kallas to prevent Polyperchon from aiding Olympias who was being besieged in Pydna; Kallas bribed most of Polyperchon's soldiers to defect.<sup>175</sup> Peithon, son of Krateuas, paid with his life for his later attempts to bribe parts of his army to revolt against Antigonos.<sup>176</sup> With promises of land, power, Macedonian soldiers, and wealth, Kassander turned Polyperchon towards murdering the teenage Herakles.<sup>177</sup> During the siege of Rhodes in 304, Demetrios' men attempted to bribe Athenagoras, a mercenary captain sent to the Rhodians by Ptolemy – he agreed, but then informed the Rhodians of the plot, leading to the

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aware of the danger posed by bribery-induced treachery. Cf. the case of Strombichos, commander of Demetrios Poliorketes' garrison in Athens, who joined them in their revolt and received an honorific decree for his services (in 289/8, see *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 666, 8-14). We do not know whether he was bribed – Chaniotis 2002, 105 suggests the Athenians might not have been as grateful had he been simply bought.

<sup>172</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.76.7.

<sup>173</sup> Polyainos, *Strat.* 3.16.

<sup>174</sup> Plut. *Demetr.* 49.2, Polyainos, *Strat.* 4.9.3; the date might be c. 285 and the location possibly Kyrrhestike.

<sup>175</sup> In c. 317: Diod. Sic. 19.36.6.

<sup>176</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.46.1-4, Polyainos, *Strat.* 4.6.14.

<sup>177</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.28.2-3.

capture of one of Demetrios' high-ranking Macedonians; for this Athenagoras was greatly rewarded by the Rhodians:

They crowned Athenagoras with a golden crown, and gave him a gift of five talents of silver, hoping also to elicit loyalty to the *demos* from the other mercenaries and the foreigners.

(Diod. Sic. 20.94.5)

This case is noteworthy because it involved not two Royal armies (who might try to outbribe each other like Ptolemy and Perdikkas), but one Royal army and the forces of a polis. In addition to the purely monetary, remunerative prize of five talents of silver, the Rhodians also included a golden crown, which recalls the typically symbolic rewards citizen soldiers would receive. In fact, the Rhodians had passed a decree at the beginning of the siege promising to crown publicly the sons of those who fell for the city.<sup>178</sup> We may also note that those who were singled out for stimulation by rewards and honours were the mercenaries and foreigners – precisely those groups who were outside the civic cohesion provided by the socio-political system of a polis. The types of power exercised here thus reinforce the general impression that citizen armies operated on a different compliance relationship than did Royal armies (which would also include many mercenaries and 'foreigners').

Such was the precarious climate of motivations and loyalties that commanders could exploit the prevailing fear of betrayal to cause a rift even between apparently loyal troops and their general. When Seleukos was besieging Sardis (and its treasury), guarded by Theodotos, he proclaimed a reward of one hundred talents to whoever killed Theodotos, which created a level of distrust between the latter and his men that was sufficient to force him to surrender the city to save his life.<sup>179</sup> This illustrates an inherent weakness in any remunerative-calculative compliance relationship, and shows that Seleukos was well aware of it. We have seen several examples of soldiers acting disloyally, but captains and generals could be just as unreliable, if not more so. We already learnt of

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<sup>178</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.84.3-4.

<sup>179</sup> Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.9.4.



Neoptolemos' betrayal of Eumenes in joining the side of Antipater.<sup>180</sup> Asander, the satrap of Karia, first switched allegiance to Antigonos in c. 313 and pledged all his men to his command, but quickly changed his mind again and re-joined Ptolemy and Seleukos.<sup>181</sup> Antigonos' admiral Telesphoros, jealous of the preferred treatment received by Ptolemaios (a nephew of Antigonos), betrayed his master, hired mercenaries and established himself at Elis. This same Ptolemaios not much later also defected from Antigonos, apparently again out of a real or perceived lack of honours and rewards, and joined Kassander; afterwards, in c. 309, he once more deserted to Ptolemy, who finally distributed his soldiers among his own army.<sup>182</sup> In 302, Kassander managed to convince two of Antigonos' generals to defect: Dokimos, who handed over Synnada, and Phoinix, who aided in the conquest of Sardis (the acropolis of which was being defended by another of Antigonos' captains, who had remained loyal).<sup>183</sup>

Our evidence is limited by the availability of our literary sources, which contain records of treachery, plots, and sudden changes of fortune; epigraphic or archaeological material, on the other hand, does not always allow us to identify betrayal (although honorific inscriptions might highlight a particular act of loyalty). When the relatively rich coverage of our sources for the period of the Successors peters out towards the beginning of the third century, we are left with an impression of a highly volatile dynamic of loyalty. Once our literary sources pick up again towards the end of the third century – with Polybios – it appears that little had changed.

Before deciding to attack Seleukeia in Pieria in c. 220, Antiochos III attempted to bribe the governors of the town with gifts and cash; they refused, so he corrupted their subordinates, who pledged to deliver the town if Antiochos managed to take control of the suburb.<sup>184</sup> Soon after, in late 219, Theodotos the Aitolian decided to abandon Ptolemy IV and join Antiochos by offering him control

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<sup>180</sup> Arr. *Succ.* 1.26, Plut. *Eum.* 5.2-3.

<sup>181</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.75.1-2.

<sup>182</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.87 (Telesphoros); Diod. Sic. 20.19.2, 20-27.3.

<sup>183</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.107.4-5.

<sup>184</sup> And so it came to pass: Polyb. 5.60.

of Koile Syria; he felt inadequately rewarded for his services to the Lagid, whom he had grown to dislike.<sup>185</sup> This betrayal almost ended up costing Ptolemy his life, if we can believe Polybios, who tells us that shortly before the battle of Raphia, Theodotos, who knew the king's habits and daily routine, sneaked into the enemy camp in order to assassinate him.<sup>186</sup> After Antiochos' forces had stormed the city of Atabyrium, Keraias (one of Ptolemy's commanders) deserted to Antiochos, who treated him so well that others, too, considered the benefits of treason: soon, Hippolochos of Thessaly defected as well, along with four hundred cavalry.<sup>187</sup> We can observe once more the effects of success and defeat on a calculative mindset: as one side was seen to be weaker, the likelihood of betrayal increased. It also shows the importance for a Hellenistic king to treat those who joined him with respect and goodwill, even if they had turned traitors to their former masters, in an attempt to entice others to follow suit.<sup>188</sup> We might also mention the betrayal of Philip V of Macedonia by two of his commanders, who at one point had bribed some of Philip's troops not to press their attack on a city too vigorously at the moment they could have taken it, eventually forcing Philip to retreat.<sup>189</sup> Lastly, there is the somewhat cryptic evidence for acts of treachery among Ptolemy's generals after the battle of Raphia, which forced the king into a second campaign to put down the revolt.<sup>190</sup>

The preceding discussion is by no means exhaustive, but by now the overall impression should be clear enough: the period of the Successors was one of extremely unstable loyalties, with frequent acts of betrayal carried out both by the soldiers and their commanders. More often than not, we were able to identify calculative elements as the main driving force behind such acts, which corresponds to our overall hypothesis, i.e. that Royal armies operated predominantly on a

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<sup>185</sup> Polyb. 5.61.3-5 and 5.40.1-3 for his initial reasons; for his service under Antiochos see Polyb. 5.46.3, 79.4, and 7.16.2.

<sup>186</sup> Polyb. 5.81, cf. 3 Macc. 1.2; this episode might point to a desire on Antiochos' part to see Ptolemy dead, cf. Bar-Kochva 1976, 138. On Theodotos and the assassination attempt, see Gera 1998, 13-14.

<sup>187</sup> Polyb. 5.70.10-12; cf. 5.71.11, 79.9.

<sup>188</sup> Other traitorous commanders of the fourth Syrian War: Polyb. 5.61.8-9, 68.5, 10.29.6 (Nikolaos); 7.15-18 (Lagoras); see further Bar-Kochva 1976, 88.

<sup>189</sup> Polyb. 5.4.8-13, cf. 5.5.10, 5.7.4-5.

<sup>190</sup> Austin 276, lines 23-35; see Winnicki 2001, 139-45, who suggests there were acts of treachery among some of Ptolemy's troops and/or commanders shortly after the battle.

remunerative-calculative compliance relationship. The situation did not seem to have changed much by the end of the third century – a point to which we will return in our discussion of remunerative power in Chapter 5. At the same time, the lines between predominantly remunerative and other predominating types of power could be blurred, as seen in the case of the Pisidian soldiers who remained loyal to Alketas even after his death, or in the coercive threats used by Antigonos to force the compliance of Eumenes' soldiers. For the last section in the current chapter, we will turn to the issue of desertion, and assess its wider impact on polis and Royal armies alike. To an extent there is some overlap with the material we have already discussed, some of which pertained to desertion; to get a clearer picture of the scales involved, however, it is advantageous to analyse both sides at the same time.

## **2.4 Desperate Measures: The Problem of Desertion**

Compared to the study of modern military history, desertion in ancient Greek armies has not received much attention in its own right.<sup>191</sup> This might be owing to difficulties of definition: what constitutes an act of desertion – as opposed to defection or surrender, for example – is not always entirely clear, nor is the ancient terminology consistent.<sup>192</sup> Herodotos, as we have seen, could use *ἔκλειψις* to describe desertion during a battle.<sup>193</sup> But a much more common word is *αὐτομολέω*, which implies leaving one's own side in order to join the enemy. Alternatively, *λιποτακτέω* and its cognates could also be used to denote leaving one's ranks, without the motive to join the enemy.<sup>194</sup> It is thus unclear whether an act of desertion requires the desire

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<sup>191</sup> Christ 2006 devotes just over one page to the topic (94-95), and there is hardly any mention of desertion in Sabin, van Wees & Whitby 2007. Velho 2002 deals largely with the terminology and legal aspects of desertion. For modern literature, see e.g. Seidler 1993, or the articles in Bröckling & Sikora 1998 (covering the Thirty Years' War up to modern times); on the legal aspects surrounding desertion in international law, see Niebergall-Lackner 2016.

<sup>192</sup> For the difficulties of defining desertion in general, see Niebergall-Lackner 2016, 1-4.

<sup>193</sup> Hdt. 6.25.2.

<sup>194</sup> See Rawlings III 1978, 136 for further discussion. For the meanings inherent in *λιποταξία* see Velho 2002, 249-50.

to join the enemy (what we would normally call defection), or if the simple wish to leave one's own army is the deciding factor. In terms of compliance theory, it matters a great deal if a soldier decides to desert because he wants to return to his family, or out of fear or exhaustion, compared to a soldier who deserts to join the enemy with the expectation to fight against his former organisation in the future, all in the hope of higher rewards for his service.

This is connected to the notion that often it was not an unwillingness to fight that caused men to run: soldiers deserted for better conditions of service, more pay, or to escape coercion – hence carefully distinguishing the reasons for desertion will be important for revealing the underlying motivations of the lower participants in a given army. In addition to these considerations, we should distinguish between different types of deserters: citizen-soldiers, allied foreigners, mercenaries, and slaves all operated under different compliance relationships, and as such we must not group their behaviour together without assessing the potential impact of each compliance model on their motivations.<sup>195</sup> As we shall see, the Greeks also saw a runaway slave as a 'deserter' and employed the same terms used to describe a soldier deserting an army; this makes differentiating between various types of deserters difficult. Furthermore, different types of organisations will provide different environments in terms of primary groups and levels of cohesion, which could play important roles in one's motivation to desert. To begin with, it will be useful to provide some general insights into the phenomenon and then relate them to the subjects of this study: the compliance structures of polis and Royal armies.

Shils and Janowitz's famous study of levels of cohesion in the German army of the Second World War observed that deserters were normally those that could not be properly integrated into primary groups; the evidence pertaining to the US forces of the Vietnam War points to a similar conclusion.<sup>196</sup> For the German army, it was found that desertion rates were lowest in units with high primary group cohesion, and highest in units of mixed ethnicity with a correspondingly lower level

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<sup>195</sup> For example, Starr 1974 occasionally deals with deserters but does not address who they were or how this might have coloured their behaviour after desertion.

<sup>196</sup> Kellett 1982, 100-1.

of cohesion – this last element points to the important factor of relative homogeneity for the establishment of (social) cohesion, as was pointed out in Chapter 1. These results might lead us to assume that highly cohesive primary groups are a way of safeguarding against desertion, but this is too simplistic: the difference lies in the vital distinction between social cohesion and task cohesion.

Shils and Janowitz indicated further that families were a powerful contributing factor in soldiers' willingness to desert, and that often group discussions about families led to considerations of surrender or desertion.<sup>197</sup> We will return to the importance of families later, but for now we may note that a climate of intimacy and the sharing of personal information about relatives and loved ones could lead to higher levels of noncompliance. In other words, social cohesion without task cohesion could be detrimental to overall compliance. This fits well with a more recent study of primary groups and combat effectiveness that manages to refine the findings of Shils and Janowitz by questioning the clear causal connection they posited for primary groups and desertion: citing evidence from the Second World War and the Confederate Army of the American Civil War, it concludes that desertion was in fact more common among strong primary groups – the bonds between the individuals were used to justify and enable desertion, and often such groups would desert together (Kier 1998). Noncompliance, then, was the result of strong social cohesion without the guiding element of task cohesion: 'These actions hurt combat performance, and they occurred because primary groups did not share the goals of the larger organization – not because of the absence of primary groups'.<sup>198</sup> The importance of the type of motivation present in soldiers for the purpose of combating desertion is further underlined by the idea that desertion is most effectively controlled not by coercion, but by careful selection and socialisation; a strong compliance relationship is a much more elegant solution, whereas coercion and deterrence can be seen as symptoms of an underlying problem, rather than remedies.<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>197</sup> Shils & Janowitz 1948, 289-90.

<sup>198</sup> Kier 1998, 16.

<sup>199</sup> Kellett 1982, 137.

Consequently, the deciding factor is not the level of cohesion in a primary group, but rather the predominant type of involvement found within it, which in turn determines the goal any cohesion might be devoted to. If the predominant involvement were moral, we would expect lower rates of desertion, as the goals of the individuals and small groups would be relatively congruent with the goals of their organisation; on the other hand, if the predominant type of involvement were alienative, we would expect higher rates of desertion, as the respective goals would be opposed. In the case of calculative involvement, the degree of compliance (and rates of desertion) would depend on the extent to which the organisation is able to align the goals of its lower participants with those of the organisational elites, usually through the use of material incentives.

How are we to apply these findings to the specific historic context with which we are dealing? The ancient evidence is both limited and limiting: we have no interviews, questionnaires, or large-scale studies of ancient Greek soldiers' attitudes towards combat performance and desertion. This makes it difficult to assess individual motivations with any degree of certainty. Usually, our viewpoint is that of one individual who is often also far removed in time from the events that are described. Thus, we will have to content ourselves with identifying general trends and attempting to analyse them against the backdrop of the respective compliance relationships we might find in ancient Greek armies. More precisely, if the main hypothesis stands – i.e. that Polis armies operated with a predominantly normative-moral, and Royal armies with a predominantly remunerative-calculative compliance relationship – we should be able to predict a rough picture of desertion in those armies. In particular, we might expect desertion rates to be lower in Polis armies, and higher in Royal armies.

Generally speaking, deserters appear to have been a relatively frequent and common feature of Greek warfare; in a time of limited methods of gathering military intelligence, deserters were a prime source of information on enemy forces.<sup>200</sup> This

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<sup>200</sup> For an overview of the topic of tactical intelligence see Russell 2013, covering both Greek and Roman material.

would have been known by most would-be deserters, and might have been a contributing factor in any decision to desert: the opposing side would likely offer a warm welcome to anyone wishing to join them, not only because it was a gain in relative strength, but also – and possibly most importantly – because of the information any such individuals might hold. Such was the allure of military intelligence that fake deserters were routinely used in ruses to leak false information to the enemy. This situation is borne out by the evidence from Polyainos, whose handbook on military stratagems includes many examples of trickery involving desertion, utilised both by Polis and Royal armies.<sup>201</sup> It is important to note that such ruses derived their efficacy from the fact that desertion must have been fairly common: the number of ‘real’ deserters compared to fake ones would have had to be relatively high, otherwise we would expect kings, generals, and councils to eventually catch on and immediately suspect anyone who deserted to their side of deceit.<sup>202</sup>

For our purposes, however, the true significance of Polyainos lies in his references to real deserters, as these will give us some idea of the relative compliance levels in Royal and Polis armies. While his episodes pertaining to Royal armies are straight-forward, those pertaining to Polis armies merit closer inspection.<sup>203</sup> In none of the seven reported instances can we be sure that a citizen deserted his own army. At 1.17 we learn of helots who deserted the Spartans; at 1.43.1, three hundred Syracusan slaves desert to the Athenians; at 1.48.5 we hear of a deserter who informed Konon that the enemy would try to capture his ship, but the informant’s identity is unknown; at 2.1.15, Agesilaos struggles with high desertion rates in his army, and proceeds to hide any masterless shields to conceal the scale of the problem – but Plutarch (*Ages.* 32.7) states explicitly that these were disaffected helots and pressed *perioikoi*; at 2.3.10, we learn that Agesilaos was

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<sup>201</sup> Polis army fake deserters in Polyainos’ *Stratagemata*: 1.15, 1.20.2, 1.42.1, 1.43.2, 1.46, 1.48.1, 2.2.4, 2.26, 5.16.5, 5.33.4. Fake deserters in Royal armies: 4.2.21; 5.44.2. See also Hdt. 6.38.2 and Diod. Sic. 19.26.3-4.

<sup>202</sup> Cf. Christ 2006, 95: he assumes that desertion might have been common, but does not provide any supporting evidence.

<sup>203</sup> Royal army real deserters: Polyainus, *Strat.* 4.6.16, 4.8.2 (cf. Plut. *Demetr.* 49.1).

informed of an impending night attack by an anonymous deserter; at 2.10.1, deserters betrayed the Spartiate Kleandridas' surprise attack to the Terinaians – again they remain unknown, but it is certainly possible that these were helots; finally, at 2.25, Agesipolis is forced to post guard dogs around his camp to prevent any unwilling allies from deserting and aiding the besieged Mantineians, whom they secretly favoured. So far, the impression we get is that Polis armies appear to have suffered desertion mainly from those parts of their forces that might not have possessed the same type of predominant involvement as the citizen soldiers (moral), i.e. slaves and helots on the one hand (alienative), and allied contingents and mercenaries on the other (calculative). As it turns out, this impression is supported by other ancient evidence.

It is clear that the Greeks classified runaway slaves as deserters and placed them into the same category as any free citizens who decided to leave their army. In the armistice treaty of 423, the Spartans and the Athenians included a clause that prohibited the reception of deserters, free or slave, by either side: τοὺς δὲ αὐτομόλους μὴ δέχεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, μήτε ἐλεύθερον μήτε δοῦλον, μήτε ὕμᾱς μήτε ἡμᾶς.<sup>204</sup> Linguistically, there was no difference between a free citizen and a slave once they had committed the act. We can also safely assume that this approach was wide-spread and not an idiosyncratic use of the term by Thucydides: after all, he reported the contents of a treaty between Athens, Sparta, and their respective allies, meaning that the terms had to be clear and easy to understand by the majority of Greek communities. The main point here is that when our sources use a form of the word αὐτομολέω without specifying exactly who was deserting, we cannot be certain if they were free or slaves, and have to take our cue from the context of each situation. The second point to note is that regardless of external evidence, the terms of the treaty only make sense if we accept that free citizens also chose to desert during the war, in addition to slaves or helots. The precise scale and relative proportion of the two groups, however, are hard to assess, as we lack reliable numbers. Probably the most famous case of desertion where we have an apparently

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<sup>204</sup> Thuc. 4.118.7.



precise number is that of the Athenian slaves who deserted in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian fortification of Dekeleia during the Peloponnesian War. According to Thucydides, some 20,000 individuals managed to 'desert' (ηὑτομολήκεσαν) as a result; the number's accuracy, however, is somewhat controversial.<sup>205</sup> The exact number is of relatively little importance to this study; suffice it to say that a large number of slaves decided to desert. Thucydides makes the connection between slaves and desertion apparent several times: helots and deserters are mentioned in one breath at 5.35.7, and at 8.40.2 we learn that many Chian slaves deserted to the Athenian army in 412/1, and their intimate knowledge of the countryside proved a great boon to the Athenian cause – a further reminder of the importance of deserters for military intelligence. Thucydides also tells us that numerous slaves deserted the retreating Athenian army in Sicily in 413.<sup>206</sup> Helots, too, are reported as deserting their Spartan masters; on one occasion in 422, the Athenian general Kleon obtained intelligence on his opponent Brasidas' current whereabouts from an otherwise unknown deserter. We can infer that the deserter was probably not a Spartan citizen from our knowledge that Brasidas' force mainly contained helots and mercenaries.<sup>207</sup>

Mercenaries, in fact, are the other group that our sources present as being prone to desertion.<sup>208</sup> Aineias Taktikos, who often envisaged cities hiring mercenary forces to bolster their defences, repeatedly offers advice to guard against desertion, and generally assumes that it was a perfectly normal occurrence during a siege.<sup>209</sup> In the mercenary context, Xenophon's Ten Thousand represent an interesting case. As we have already noted in section 2.3, it was not unusual for Hellenistic soldiers, be they Macedonians or mercenaries, to simply switch sides after a battle, effectively

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<sup>205</sup> Thuc. 7.27.5. On the desertions to Dekeleia generally and for a short overview of the various attempts to deal with the number, see Hanson 1992.

<sup>206</sup> Thuc. 7.75.5, where he uses the word ἀκολούθων, which could simply mean camp follower, so we have to allow for the fact that non-slaves deserted too; I follow Hunt 1998, 167 with n. 10 that the bulk of them were slaves.

<sup>207</sup> Thuc. 5.2.3, cf. 4.80.5, 83.5-6. Helots deserting: e.g. 4.41.3, 5.14.3. Mistrust towards slaves is also expressed in Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.11 and Thuc. 6.28.1.

<sup>208</sup> E.g. Hdt. 8.26.1, Thuc. 3.73-74, Xen. *An.* 1.4.3.

<sup>209</sup> Aen. *Tact.* 22.14, 23.1 and 23.4-5, 24.16, 28.2.

exchanging one paymaster for another. The Ten Thousand, however, did not offer their services to Artaxerxes II or place themselves in his power in any way. Nor do we hear of any large-scale desertions among the Greeks.<sup>210</sup> Xenophon might of course be withholding details of any potentially dishonourable and treacherous behaviour, but the fact that he does include some detail on one group of Greek deserters makes it unlikely that he would have deliberately misinformed his audience about other significant desertions. The incident occurred after the commanders of the Ten Thousand had been betrayed and executed: the Greek army decided to force the march back home, but Xenophon tells us that some twenty soldiers under an Arkadian *lochagos* Nikarchos (who had shortly before been seriously wounded) deserted the Greek camp during the night, having been bribed to do so by the Persians.<sup>211</sup>

The event has been analysed in depth elsewhere, but we can note that if Xenophon was right and these were indeed the only Greeks who deserted, the overall cohesion of the Ten Thousand must have been relatively strong.<sup>212</sup> This was in spite of the several obstacles at the time: overall command was shattered, there was no clear goal or common purpose (i.e. low task cohesion), and the army consisted of many separate companies of mercenaries, all with their own commanders, motivations, and internal personal ties (i.e. low social cohesion).<sup>213</sup> The only real unifying factor and potential source of common identity was the army's Greekness. The importance of task cohesion is exemplified by the eventual success of the Ten Thousand: the shared goal of returning home was a main contributor to the cohesion and effectiveness of the army. Xenophon apparently made the same point when the army considered founding a city and was on the verge of breaking apart: he called for unity of purpose, and warned that if each struck out on their own, they would fail. At this point he also advised that anyone who was caught trying to

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<sup>210</sup> Some Thracian infantry and horsemen desert (Xen. *An.* 2.2.7).

<sup>211</sup> Xen. *An.* 3.3.5.

<sup>212</sup> On the episode, see Hyland 2010: he also discusses the medical circumstances of Nikarchos' survival (240-46), and suggests that bribery was unlikely to be the reason behind their desertion (247-48).

<sup>213</sup> Precisely these bonds might have been part of the reason behind the desertion of the small group under Nikarchos; cf. Hyland 2010, 246.

desert the army before they reached safety should be judged as a wrongdoer.<sup>214</sup> The word he used for desertion was not αὐτομολέω, but ἀπολείπω, which implies that he was not imagining anyone wanting to defect to the enemy: desertion in this case was simply leaving on one's own. This seems to have been what Nikarchos and his men had planned: we hear nothing more of their fate, but they might have feared the destruction of the Greek army (Nikarchos had been with the commanders when they were betrayed and killed) and decided to seek safety in quickly setting out on their own.<sup>215</sup>

Another possible contributing factor in their decision to desert might have been the absence of any punitive measures for desertion, at present or in the future; Xenophon might have been hinting at rectifying this with his suggestion to view deserters as evildoers.<sup>216</sup> In this light, the low numbers of deserters might appear even more striking. More importantly, however, Xenophon's call for harsh judgement of deserters echoes how these individuals were seen in a polis context, where desertion could be equated with a betrayal of the entire social and military structure that the polis represented.<sup>217</sup> Civic armies, it seems, managed to set individual actions of desertion into the wider context of the socio-political system: actions that damaged the army also damaged society, and Xenophon might have been trying to cast the Ten Thousand as a quasi-polis on the move, in an attempt to harness the normative power such an organisation could exercise to prevent desertion.

On the whole, then, desertion seems not to have been a significant issue even in the case of the Ten Thousand: what started as a mercenary force under a foreign employer turned into a relatively unified army, one that in its decision making process also began to resemble a polis.<sup>218</sup> Nevertheless, the case of the Ten

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<sup>214</sup> Xen. An. 5.6.33: καὶ ἐάν τις μέντοι ἀπολιπὼν ληφθῇ πρὶν ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ εἶναι πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα, κρίνεσθαι αὐτὸν ὡς ἀδικοῦντα.

<sup>215</sup> Cf. Hyland 2010, 250.

<sup>216</sup> Hyland 2010, 249.

<sup>217</sup> Velho 2002, 256: 'non seulement la désertion remet en cause les fondements de la mise en arme de la cité, mais elle constitue également une remise en cause de l'ordre de la πολιτεία - ce sur quoi les anciens Grecs insistent particulièrement'.

<sup>218</sup> On this topic see Hornblower 2004.

Thousand should not be taken as representative of Greek armies; their situation was exceptional, and in addition to the high levels of task cohesion there would have been purely practical reasons for the low rate of desertion.

Apart from slaves and mercenaries, we find references to deserters without indications as to their backgrounds, such as Thucydides' statement that the Spartans were told about the plague in Athens by deserters (τῶν αὐτομόλων), or Diodoros' assertion that Lysander had heard from some deserters (παρά τινων αὐτομόλων) that the Athenians were about to sail out of Aigospotamoi.<sup>219</sup> In such cases we can only speculate as to their identities. Another context for desertion, albeit on a larger scale, is that of allied armies. For example, when the Spartan general Derkylidas was confronted with the army of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos in 397, the Peloponnesians stood firm, but his allies from Priene, Achilleion, and other places in Ionia either dropped their weapons and ran, or made it otherwise clear they did not intend to fight.<sup>220</sup> In a similar episode set two years later, the Spartans are once more abandoned by their allies after Lysander suffered a defeat (and lost his life) at Haliartos: the Phokians and other allies departed during the night.<sup>221</sup> At the naval battle of Knidos in 394, the allied squadron on the left wing fled the battle once they realised how badly outnumbered they were.<sup>222</sup> Again, we learn little from our sources as the exact motivations that caused these cases of desertion; misgivings about a campaign, financial difficulties, political considerations, or simply fear and desperation could all be offered as explanations. Just as with the possible examples of treachery on the battlefield discussed above in section 2.2., we can observe that desertion in allied armies was carried out by national or polis contingents as a whole, preserving the internal cohesion of each force.

Individual deserters certainly existed too, but not on a scale to merit much mention in our literary sources. Additionally, we must allow for the possibility that some of our sources actively sought to downplay the roles of citizen deserters, and

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<sup>219</sup> Thuc. 2.27.1, Diod. Sic. 13.106.2.

<sup>220</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.17.

<sup>221</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.21.

<sup>222</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.12. Cf. Diod. Sic. 14.61.3: the majority of Dionysios of Syracuse's Greek allies deserted him when it was clear that he would not fight Himilkon in 396.

highlight instead acts of desertion carried out by slaves, metics, and other marginal members of polis society.<sup>223</sup> Nevertheless, there are some passages that make it relatively clear that citizens were not above deserting their own polis. During the siege of Corcyra by the Spartans in 373, hunger drove many of the Corcyraeans to desert to the Spartans. Such was their number that Mnasippos, the Spartan general, proclaimed that any who desert to him will be sold into slavery – to no avail: the deserters kept coming, and Mnasippos had to drive them back to the city by force, where the slaves were barred from re-entering and ended up starving to death outside.<sup>224</sup> This tragic episode implies that citizens were among those who deserted to the enemy, otherwise Mnasippos' threat of selling them into slavery would have been empty (unless we assume only slaves, mercenaries, and metics deserted). As so often, we lack any information as to the citizens' backgrounds, and cannot tell if these were soldiers, women, children, or the elderly. At any rate, it seems that the Spartan commander viewed them only as extra mouths to feed, and preferred them back in Corcyra where their presence would further exacerbate the food supply problem. We might expect him to retain any individuals he deemed able of fighting, which makes it less likely that there were many soldiers among the deserters. We may also note that among those who were sent back, the slaves were denied their return, while the citizens – relatives of those inside – were allowed entry. This shows once more that slaves were usually outside the socio-political system of a polis and did not benefit from any moral commitment present in the citizen body that moved them to take back those citizens who had already abandoned them.

A similar story is preserved in Lykourgos' speech *Against Leokrates*, whose namesake he was prosecuting for treason. He mentions a decree passed by the Athenians condemning to death those who had deserted to the Spartans at Dekeleia when the city was being besieged towards the end of the Peloponnesian War.<sup>225</sup>

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<sup>223</sup> On the role of slaves in ancient warfare, and our main sources' often systematic attempts to write them out of their histories, see Hunt 1998.

<sup>224</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.15.

<sup>225</sup> Lycurg. *Leoc.* 120-21; here forms of the verb μεθίστημι are used to describe the act, which can mean 'change' or 'go over', but also has connotations of revolt: e.g. Thuc. 1.35.5 (καὶ οὗτοι οὐκ ἀσθενεῖς, ἀλλ' ἱκανοὶ τοὺς μεταστάντας βλάψαι). For a good overview of the legal context of the speech, see Harris 2013, 233-41.

Again, no details are provided concerning the identities of these deserters, but the implication is that they were male citizens who had abandoned the community in times of war, and thus could potentially have been soldiers. Nothing is said of their motivations; some might have been sympathisers with a pro-Spartan mindset; others might simply have been desperate or afraid, like the starving Corcyraeans. It appears that the extreme conditions of a city under siege were sufficient to cause some citizens to break their ties to their home polis – at least temporarily: the passage also refers to some who might be caught returning to the city – an indicator that some of the deserters hoped to re-join their community once the crisis was over.<sup>226</sup> There are other, more or less conclusive sources that seem to mention citizens deserting their armies, but few allow us a meaningful degree of certainty when it comes to their identities or motivations.<sup>227</sup> Nevertheless, in one area of ancient military life, citizen desertion appears to have been a comparatively normal occurrence: naval warfare. The proclivity of rowers deserting to a different (pay)master was well-known, and citizen rowers were not immune to the lure of higher and more regular pay. When looked at closely, however, it will be evident that for citizens at the least, this did not involve joining the enemy.

On the standard Greek warship of the fifth and fourth centuries, the trireme, the complement of some 170 rowers was usually made up of a combination of citizens, foreigners or metics, and slaves.<sup>228</sup> The relative proportion of each group varied considerably, but it is clear that desertion plagued each category of rowers. According to Thucydides, Alcibiades once advised Tissaphernes to lower the pay of the Peloponnesian rowers: apparently this was normal practice at Athens, where in addition the men were paid irregularly to prevent them from deserting, as they would lose their claim on any arrears.<sup>229</sup> Similarly, Xenophon tells us that in 407

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<sup>226</sup> Which separates them from traitors as such, according to Velho 2002, 240. Whether the Greeks made a clear distinction between a soldier who fled during a battle and one that left his city during a crisis is uncertain.

<sup>227</sup> E.g. *Plut.* Phoc. 12-13, and *Men. Aspis* 24-26 for a fictional case.

<sup>228</sup> For a discussion of the terminology of pay, and the terms of pay for the crews, see Gabrielsen 1994, 110-25. For an analysis of the proportion of citizens and slaves on Athenian triremes, and the socio-military implications thereof, see Herzogenrath-Amelung 2017, 55-57.

<sup>229</sup> Thuc. 8.45.2; Gabrielsen 1994, 112-13.

Lysander advised Cyrus to pay his crews more, with the explicit aim of inducing the rowers of the Athenian fleet to desert and enlist with him.<sup>230</sup> The ideas here are simple: in the first case, the appeal is to the rowers' calculative mindset, which will prevent them from deserting as they will fear the loss of income. In the second case, the application of increased remunerative power is designed to lure the rowers away from the enemy fleet. In theory, this type of manipulation should be most effective with those individuals whose predominant type of involvement was not moral, i.e. whose primary involvement was either calculative (they desert because they want higher pay) or alienative (they desert because they want to leave their organisation – higher pay is a bonus and provides some security). In the context of ancient Greek naval warfare, we might expect that citizen rowers and resident metics would reject such power (moral involvement), and that foreigners and slaves would be more likely to respond positively to it (calculative and alienative involvement, respectively). Who, then, deserted, and why?

The evidence pertaining to Athens is, unsurprisingly, the most fruitful. A speech attributed to Demosthenes allows us a direct insight into the mechanics of naval desertion.<sup>231</sup> The speaker, Apollodoros, had taken up his trierarchy in September 362, and upon completion of his term had waited at the Hellespont for his replacement. As he had no money left to pay his rowers, many deserted his ship to either fight on land or to enlist with the navies of Thasos or Maroneia, who offered higher pay. The speaker also confirms that the other trierarchs also suffered from desertion, although not as much as his ship: the reason was that he had relied not on conscripted crews, but had attracted the most competent individuals through higher pay, hence these men had no trouble finding employment elsewhere.<sup>232</sup> It appears that most of these were in fact Athenian citizens, as Apollodoros also mentions their audacity to desert without fearing prosecution at home.<sup>233</sup> At any rate, their

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<sup>230</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.4.

<sup>231</sup> The speech, *Against Polykles*, was most likely composed by the speaker himself: Apollodoros, son of Pasion (Bers 2003, 19).

<sup>232</sup> [Dem.] 50.14-16.

<sup>233</sup> Although it might not have been within his authority to prosecute them if they were indeed volunteers; see Bers 2003, 26 n. 33.

desertion was not to the enemy: Thasos and Maroneia were allies of Athens, and thus simply offered a secure income in the face of Apollodoros' inability to continue paying their wages. This is a good example of the layered nature of motivations: the men's moral involvement prevented them from joining the enemy for higher pay, but the calculative element still made them choose noncompliance (and potential prosecution) over lack of remuneration.<sup>234</sup> These men, however, were specialists who could rely on their experience and skill; the crews of other ships were manned by citizens conscripted from the muster rolls, and Apollodoros told the judges that most of them remained with their ships in the hope of a speedy return home, which illustrates that the compliance relationship functioned for the majority of citizen rowers.

Desertion among crews was a real problem: we know that many individuals took the opportunity of putting into port at the Piraeus to leave their ship; replacements had to be hired or lured in by promises of pay and advances.<sup>235</sup> In another speech, we learn that naval deserters were liable to imprisonment.<sup>236</sup> Thucydides has Nikias write home to the Athenians that his naval strength is dwindling rapidly: the slaves are deserting in droves, together with those non-Athenians who had been pressed into service, while those who had originally volunteered in the hope of sharing in the spoils of war were also abandoning their ships.<sup>237</sup> Naturally, Nikias here might be exaggerating to make his point, and he probably deemed it unwise to mention any widespread desertions among his Athenian troops. Nevertheless, he only mentions slaves and foreigners, the two groups we had earlier identified as being more at risk of desertion than Athenian citizens. The slaves and pressed foreigners probably operated under an alienative involvement, while the volunteers were calculatively motivated; little wonder both parties chose to jump ship as the Sicilian expedition became a desperate fight for

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<sup>234</sup> [Dem.] 50.16: ἡγούμενοι τὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι εὐπορίαν κρείττω εἶναι αὐτοῖς τοῦ μέλλοντος φόβου, εἴ ποτε ληφθείησαν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ.

<sup>235</sup> [Dem.] 50.11-12.

<sup>236</sup> Dem. 51.11 (the speech is dated to 359).

<sup>237</sup> Thuc. 7.13.2.



survival.<sup>238</sup> Slaves especially would have little reason to stick it out with their masters, who represented the coercive organisation of the polis: Sicily offered ample opportunity to leave the army, and possibly even a chance of freedom for joining the right side.<sup>239</sup>

This raises an important point when considering desertion. The possibility of desertion, together with the willingness to desert, does not automatically lead to an act of desertion: 'Desertion might be as easy as going to the tavern, but to what end if there were no taverns where one was going?'.<sup>240</sup> A deserter is someone who is unhappy with his current situation, but it is vital to keep in mind the alternatives, which might be even worse. Desertion among citizens might have been relatively low, but how feasible was it to desert in the first place? One did not simply walk into a neighbouring polis and ask for citizenship and a plot of land, after all. Here we might recall the Athenians who defected to the Spartans at Dekeleia, only to return home at a later stage. The socio-political system of a polis itself was an obstacle to desertion: for most individuals, the polis embodied everything: family, friends, identity; past, present, and future.<sup>241</sup> The normative-moral compliance relationship was central to this system, and a reason for the comparatively low levels of desertion in civic armies.

In terms of opportunities to desert, the Royal armies of the Hellenistic period present a stark contrast: we have already observed that kings and commanders vied with each other to secure the loyalty of their Macedonian and mercenary troops, and that bribery and betrayal were relatively frequent occurrences. Moreover, many commanders were switching sides according to the fortunes of war, which was often mirrored by the troops themselves. In this climate, with 'taverns' everywhere, so to speak, desertion was an issue on a much larger scale: once we add a predominantly

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<sup>238</sup> Cf. Gabrielsen 1994, 122.

<sup>239</sup> Hunt 1998, 95.

<sup>240</sup> Johnston 1992, 181.

<sup>241</sup> Shame and public opinion would also have acted as a deterrent: 'Il existe donc une relation de causalité entre l'opinion publique et l'image du déserteur. Ici, le regard d'autrui est à la fois déterminant, puisqu'il impose cette appréhension péjorative et infamante, et déterminé par les traditions et les lois - ces dernières étant une normalisation des vœux et des aspirations de la communauté des citoyens' (Velho 2002, 249).

remunerative-calculative compliance relationship into the mix, it becomes easy to see why soldiers chose to use these opportunities. Some of the instances of disloyalty discussed in section 2.3 contain elements of desertion, such as Neoptolemos' attempt to join Antipater, or the mass desertion of the Macedonians under Philip III and Eurydike Adeia to Polyperchon. A few more examples will suffice to flesh out the picture.

In c. 319, one of Eumenes' Macedonian commanders deserted him with 3,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, shortly before the arrival of Antigonos' army. Here we find yet another word for 'defection' in Greek, as Diodoros uses cognates of ἀφίστημι to describe the actions of Perdikkas and the deserters. Eumenes managed to send a force after them and capture the ringleaders; the latter were executed, but the soldiers were treated kindly and distributed among the army.<sup>242</sup> Diodoros did not specify who these men were, but it is certainly possible that like their commander, Perdikkas, they were Macedonians.<sup>243</sup> We hear nothing about issues of payment, which is often the case with mercenaries, and it appears more likely that there was a problem with Eumenes' authority over Macedonians troops, which was questioned throughout his career. That he was able to simply distribute the men among his existing units also suggests they were of a common background. The 500 cavalry, however, were more likely to have been 'recruited locally'.<sup>244</sup> The only other detail, that he treated them with kindness (instead of punishment or payment), might also point towards the fact that these were Macedonians who felt uneasy under Eumenes' command, and had to be tactfully and respectfully handled to secure their compliance, something of which Eumenes was certainly capable.

Around the same time, Antigonos, too, suffered mass desertion. Some 3,000 veteran Macedonian hoplites left his army and entrenched themselves in the

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<sup>242</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.40.2-4.

<sup>243</sup> Diodoros seldom provided detail on deserters, and simply presented them as a normal element of warfare that required no further explanation, e.g. at the siege of Rhodes (Diod. Sic. 20.94.1).

<sup>244</sup> Roisman 2012, 161; he refrains from identifying them as veterans, but does not exclude the possibility. Anson 2004, 127 suggests the lure of Antigonos' wealth as a motivation to desert. Cf. Billows 1990, 74: 'the revolt was no doubt a result of Antigonos's propaganda, for during the winter he sent offers of substantial rewards to anyone who would betray Eumenes'.

mountains of Cappadocia, from where they plundered Lykaonia and Phrygia.<sup>245</sup> Antigonos responded by ostensibly dismissing one of his commanders, who then posed as a deserter himself and was accepted as the leader of the rebels. He led them to a plain where the men were surrounded by Antigonos' cavalry, and forced to surrender under the condition that they would return quietly to Macedonia.<sup>246</sup> Unfortunately, we learn nothing explicit about their motivations; according to Polyainos, Antigonos was afraid they would join one of his enemies – as we have seen, such a betrayal would have been fairly unremarkable at the time – but nothing is said about the men's own intentions. Setting up camp in the mountains and plundering the countryside seems to have been the short-term goal, which points to a strong calculative element: rather than risk their lives and fight for someone they did not believe in or felt a sense of obligation toward, it might have appeared more profitable to make their own fortunes.<sup>247</sup> That the bond of loyalty had been irreversibly shattered is suggested by Antigonos' condition that they return to Macedonia: he clearly did not trust them enough to reintegrate them into his army, and far better for them to be removed from the theatre of war where they might join one of his rivals. In fact, it appears that mass desertion was precisely what Eumenes built his hopes of victory on: the Göteborg palimpsest, which contains a fragment from Arrian's history of the Successors, preserves Eumenes' proclamation to his potential allies after he had been condemned to death by the Macedonians. He urged his fellow commanders to unite, informing them that because of the plummeting popularity of Antipater and Antigonos, their side would have a constant influx of power while their enemies would be weakened over time.<sup>248</sup> The implication here is that through large-scale desertions and defections, the balance of power would shift decisively in Eumenes' favour. For such a claim to have any traction with the commanders whose loyalties Eumenes desperately needed, the scenario must

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<sup>245</sup> Here it might be noted that the number 3,000 recurs with suspicious frequency, and should not always be taken at face value; for the period of the Successors, see Roisman 2012, 155 n. 22, and for the issue more generally, see Rubincam 2003.

<sup>246</sup> Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.6.6.

<sup>247</sup> See Roisman 2012, 154–57 for this episode: 'The most likely reason for the desertion was what the rebels are in fact reported to have done afterward, namely, plundering'.

<sup>248</sup> Lines 39–46 in Dreyer 1999, 58.

at least have been a possibility (notwithstanding Eumenes' need to present his case in the most favourable light possible); indeed, this is borne out by the evidence presented so far.

If the Macedonian troops of the early Hellenistic rulers were prone to desertion, so were the large numbers of mercenaries that were employed by them; we might recall Antigonos' attempts to prevent his soldiers from deserting to Ptolemy when offered higher pay from approaching boats. The treaty of capitulation between the Karian city of Theangela and the local dynast Eupolemos, dated to the end of the fourth century, included an amnesty for all those soldiers who had deserted to the city from Eupolemos' army, and for those slaves who deserted during war; slaves who had defected during peacetime were to be treated differently, although we are not told how.<sup>249</sup> The treaty made clear these soldiers were mercenaries, and stipulated payments of wages and donatives to some companies and their commanders, while granting land to any of the mercenaries from Theangela that wished to join Eupolemos. Chaniotis speculates that these gifts might have been a reward for forcing the city to surrender in the first place.<sup>250</sup> While the exact circumstances of the surrender, or the situation in Eupolemos' army are unknown, it appears that there were enough deserters to warrant their inclusion in the treaty; we can also observe that runaway slaves were mentioned separately, a distinction similar to what we found in the armistice treaty between Athens and Sparta of 423. In another case of mass desertion, preserved by Diodoros, we are told that in c. 302, some 2,800 mercenaries employed by Lysimachos deserted to Antigonos' camp, where they were not only given gifts by their new master, but also received the wages they were owed by Lysimachos.<sup>251</sup> Antigonos clearly was well versed in the ways of remunerative power: treating such deserters kindly might encourage other mercenary commanders (and Macedonians, too) to come over if

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<sup>249</sup> Austin 40, 10-15; the Greek word used to describe the desertion is a form of παραγίγνομαι, which might be a euphemism used in the peace treaty to gloss over the betrayal (e.g. 10-12: ὅσοι δὲ τῶν στρατιωτῶν παρεγένοντο εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐκ τῶν Εὐπολέμου ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἢ ἐν πολέμῳ εἶναι αὐτοῖς ἄδειαν).

<sup>250</sup> Chaniotis 2005, 84, cf. Griffith 1935, 314-15.

<sup>251</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.113.3.

they felt inadequately rewarded. In this period, the loss of almost 3,000 troops was a serious blow to any army, compounded if they were subsequently added to a rival army, increasing the relative power imbalance to around 6,000. Exploiting the calculative mindset of these soldiers was thus imperative for any general who wanted to ensure the long-term loyalty of his troops and also attract new ones to his cause.

The problem of desertion was by no means limited to the turbulent decades that followed Alexander's death. A century later, among the more or less established Hellenistic kingdoms, we find the same patterns of behaviour among commanders and troops of Royal armies. The revolt of Molon during the reign of the Seleukid Antiochos III, in the late third century, offers several examples. At the outset, Xenaitas, a general loyal to Antiochos and tasked with bringing the rebel Molon to heel, was camping at the river Tigris, opposite the enemy army. Polybios informs us that numerous deserters swam across the river to join the royal camp, and told Xenaitas that loyalty to Molon was faltering and that large parts of the army were ready to desert to the king (i.e. Antiochos III), as they had grown to despise Molon.<sup>252</sup> Such promises are reminiscent of the changes in loyalty we witnessed in the Macedonian veterans a hundred years earlier; in this case, they remained unfulfilled: Molon withdrew his army, either as a ruse or out of genuine fear that his men would abandon him.<sup>253</sup> Antiochos' advisors, too, were aware of the weak bond between the rebellious troops and Molon: Zeuxis urged the king to force a battle, resulting either in a decisive confrontation, or, should Molon refuse the challenge, in the mass desertion of his men.<sup>254</sup> The implication here is the same as that which had underpinned Eumenes' message to his potential allies: given enough time, the soldiers would abandon their commander, out of fear, opportunism, a personal dislike for Molon (and a perceived weakness for refusing battle), or a sense of allegiance to the rightful king. Which element carried the most weight depended on the respective compliance relationships that were at work. Not much later, the

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<sup>252</sup> Polyb. 5.46.6-8.

<sup>253</sup> Polyb. 5.47.4.

<sup>254</sup> Polyb. 5.51.10-11.

desertion of ten soldiers from Molon's army during a nightly approach caused him to call off the attack, as the operation's secrecy had most likely been compromised.<sup>255</sup> And finally, when the two armies met in battle, Molon's left wing quickly joined the royal army, causing the rapid collapse of the centre, and pushing Molon himself to commit suicide rather than be taken alive.

According to Polybios, the appearance of Antiochos triggered the betrayal of Molon's left wing.<sup>256</sup> This version has been questioned in Bar-Kochva's analysis of the battle. He attributes it to Polybios' source, which appears to have been hostile to Antiochos' advisor Hermeias, who had argued against the king's personal participation in the battle. Instead, Bar-Kochva suggests that the left wing's surrender was brought about by an encircling manoeuvre, and that it was composed of oriental troops who would not have had much personal attachment to the new king.<sup>257</sup> However, his interpretation rests on the assumption that the left wing was somehow forced to surrender in the first place, which is not mentioned in our source.<sup>258</sup> Polybios states clearly that the left wing went over and joined the king's side, not that it was encircled and/or made to surrender: τὸ δ' εὐώνυμον ἅμα τῷ συνιὸν εἰς ὅψιν ἐλθεῖν τῷ βασιλεῖ μετεβάλετο πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους (5.54.1). The verb μεταβάλλω does not designate surrender, but switching sides: Diodoros used it to describe the betrayal of the Thessalian cavalry at the battle of Tanagra in 457, and Plutarch chose it for the defection of Demetrios' Macedonians to Pyrrhos. It is entirely possible, given the unstable loyalties of the time, and considering that Molon's troops were already dissatisfied with him and deserting, that parts of his army decided to join the royal banner on the battlefield and turn on their erstwhile allies – this would also explain the rapid disintegration of Molon's centre and right wing. Furthermore, switching sides during a battle may have been difficult in practical terms, but our examples discussed previously in this chapter show that it was not unusual. It appears, then, that mass desertion in Royal armies at the end of

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<sup>255</sup> Polyb. 5.52.11-12.

<sup>256</sup> Polyb. 5.54.1-2, cf. 5.41.7-9 and 47.4-48.9 for advice by Epigenes that foreshadowed this event.

<sup>257</sup> Bar-Kochva 1976, 121-23.

<sup>258</sup> Bar-Kochva 1976, 121.

the third century BC was as much a problem as it was at the beginning of the Hellenistic period.

## 2.5 Conclusion

This chapter's overall goal was to present two contrasting pictures: one of Polis armies, and one of Hellenistic Royal armies.

For Polis armies, I have shown that military disloyalty was a relatively minor problem. There are no clear examples of civic armies on the march turning on themselves, of citizen contingents changing sides during battle to join an enemy army, or of cases of mass desertion. In the vast majority of cases, Polis armies acted as one: this could indeed lead to betrayal and disloyalty, but the targets of such acts were not the armies' own communities, but more often than not other *poleis*. Hence we found examples of allied armies fracturing along political fault lines. This cohesion, however, went hand in hand with numerous examples of internal violence. *Stasis* remained a constant threat to the political stability of a community, and often caused the various factions to take up arms against each other or to invite a foreign army into the city. This political instability was at the heart of civic disloyalty, and it was a result of the intense socialisation that occurred within the socio-political system of a polis. Thus, we were able to identify political and military disloyalty as two sides of the same coin: in a functioning polis, military disloyalty was not normally a problem; once the system buckled under the weight of internal political oppositions, however, the stake each citizen had in the outcome of a struggle was so high that civil war became the only option. Rather than undermining the basic premise that citizen armies were generally loyal, then, *stasis* represented a distinctive type of disloyalty that had its roots in the very reasons for normative civic loyalty; in Royal armies, however, disloyalty was more closely linked to the prevailing utilitarian ethos. It is vital not to mistake the absence of military disloyalty in Polis armies for the absence of divisions or mixed loyalties: rather, it points to a

compliance relationship – embedded in a powerful socio-political system – that was strong enough to contain these divisions.<sup>259</sup> I shall show that this compliance relationship was a normative-moral one, and that a polis constituted a remarkably effective socio-political system.

Hellenistic Royal armies, on the other hand, presented a rather different picture. Bribery, betrayal, and desertion were comparatively frequent occurrences. There were many examples of treachery committed both by commanders and the rank and file troops, including switching sides during a battle, turning on one's own army, or joining the enemy while on campaign. It is important to note that such acts were carried out by mercenaries and Macedonians, soldiers and generals; this suggests that it was not simply an issue of mercenary behaviour, or power struggles among commanders: rather, disloyalty seems to have been an almost structural problem in these armies, one of which everyone was aware. This led to a climate of distrust and uncertainty: loyalty was never a given, but had to be earned, bought, or enforced. As I will demonstrate, more often than not it was the latter two options, with a prevalence of remuneration to create loyalty. The prevailing dynamic led to the consolidation of a calculative mindset on every level of military organisation, and to the establishment of remuneration as the most effective way to secure and maintain the allegiance of subordinates. This compliance model stands in stark contrast to that of Polis armies, and is related to Royal armies' lack of a strong socio-political system. This became particularly clear once the soldiers' baggage was involved: the overriding motivation was personal advantage, as there was no apparent overlap between the goals of the military organisation and those of the individual. An effective socio-political system could help to align these two aspects and produce an involvement that equates the benefit of the organisation with that of the individual.

In the next chapter, we will turn towards funerary practices pertaining to Greek soldiers – an area where the socio-political system is surprisingly visible – in an attempt to refine further the contrast between Polis and Royal armies.

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<sup>259</sup> On the factionalism within polis society, see Starr 1974, 12, and Chroust 1953, 286.





# Chapter Three

## *Funerary Practices: The Socio-Political System at Work*



### 3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, a contrast was drawn between Polis armies and Royal armies, or citizen forces on the one hand, and the armies of Hellenistic warlords and kings on the other. In the course of the discussion it became apparent that there is a seemingly fundamental difference between these two types of organisations: Polis armies were embedded into the established community of the polis, an effective socio-political system, while Royal armies, unsurprisingly, were not. They did not from the outset have a clearly defined set of social, political, and moral values that directed their actions, nor a shared historical vision of the past that spanned centuries and shaped their future. It is my contention that this was one of the primary reasons for the differences in army loyalty we observed in Chapter 2, and the present chapter is an attempt at highlighting one area where the absence of a well-established socio-political system is particularly visible: the treatment of those who died in war.

The wider community of the polis played a crucial part in improving the loyalty of those who fought for it, as there were things beyond personal safety and advantage in which each soldier, as a member of that community, had a stake. The fourth century military writer Aineias Taktikos provides us with a list of these

fundamental values: 'shrines, fatherland, parents, and children, and others'.<sup>260</sup> In Hellenistic times a similar sentiment was expressed by Polybios when he described how the Megalopolitans refused to ally themselves with Kleomenes III: they 'preferred to lose their lands, their tombs, their sanctuaries, their fatherland, their property, in short, everything that is most necessary to people, for the sake of not betraying their loyalty to their allies'.<sup>261</sup> We find another example in Xenophon, who included a short speech delivered in the aftermath of a battle:

Citizens, [...] we have shared with you the most sacred sanctuaries and sacrifices and the most beautiful festivals: we have danced together, gone to school together, gone to war together [...] By the gods of our fathers and our mothers, and in the name of our common kinship, our bonds through marriage and our friendship, [...] cease from harming your fatherland.

(Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.20-21)

This appeal to common civic values and reconciliation occurs – ironically and symptomatically – in the context of the Athenian *stasis* of 403, but it should not be too difficult to imagine similar sentiments existing in most, if not all, other political communities of the Greek world. Of course, this is a special circumstance where a call for unity is entirely appropriate; we should not imagine that such professions were ever routine under more normal conditions. But the fact that this is a speech about reconciliation itself does not detract from the value of the appeal: the significance lies in the choice made by the speaker about what to focus on to foster unity – this would only have worked if there was a general agreement in the first place about what held a polis together. The efficacy of such rhetoric depends on each particular situation, and it would be naïve to think that it always corresponded to reality, but the fact remains that it could only ever be invoked effectively in a force composed of citizen-soldiers who shared in a common socio-political past, present, and future – a complex that we might call the civic continuum. For more

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<sup>260</sup> Aen. Tact. Preface 2; his treatise on siegecraft was probably written around the middle of the fourth century; see the introduction in Whitehead 2001 for a detailed discussion. Cf. Thuc. 7.69.

<sup>261</sup> Polyb. 2.61.9-10: προείλαντο στέρεσθαι χώρας, τάφων, ἱερῶν, πατρίδος, τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἀπάντων συλλήβδην τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀναγκαιοτάτων χάριν τοῦ μὴ προδοῦναι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους πίστιν.

heterogeneous armies containing elements of varying political identity, ethnicity, and military status, other arguments would have had to be made to reinforce loyalty and cohesion. In addition to blood-ties, the passage also highlights the importance of social ties among the soldiers that extend beyond the experience of shared military service. Communal social and religious events such as festivals, the theatre, processions, and education are presented as powerful unifying forces that would exert their influence for as long as an individual was a member of that society. In this chapter, we will see that the socio-political system, as invoked in its major constituent parts in the above passages from Aineias, Polybios, and Xenophon, played a vital role in informing the type of involvement of its members; conversely, its absence left room for other types to develop.

In the first part of this chapter (section 3.2), we will discuss the funerary and commemorative practices of *poleis*, in an attempt to identify if and how they bear witness to the existence of specific types of power and involvement. The significant role played by the socio-political system in these practices will become apparent, and will inform the discussion of section 3.3, where the evidence pertaining to Royal armies will be examined and contrasted with the situation in a polis.

### **3.2 For the Land of our Fathers: Funerary Practices and Commemoration in Greek *Poleis***

The importance of the socio-political system for shaping an individual's orientation has been discussed in Chapter 1. If harnessed effectively, it can create a powerful normative framework into which lower participants are embedded, encouraging them to act in ways that accord with, maintain, and perpetuate the socio-political system itself. One method used by polis communities to shape their citizens' sense of belonging and identity was commemoration, private and public. This encompasses a society's conception of history, tradition, and values of particular importance. For our purposes, it is especially the commemoration of a polis' military

past that is of interest: how were wars remembered, and how were soldiers who died in them perceived? To explore this aspect of a socio-political system's power to create normative involvement, we will now analyse commemoration in the context of funerary practices. The aim is to identify values and themes that are highlighted in order to learn more about the real or imagined motivations for fighting for one's polis. A full study of sepulchral customs, sculptures, and inscriptions, discussing all the various expressions and subjecting them to quantitative analysis, would require a thesis of its own; what follows are some examples of prevalent ideas and ideals that were articulated in Greek funerary practices in general, and that can be found on tombstones and in epigrams for Greek soldiers who died fighting (usually for their own polis).<sup>262</sup> Athens will feature heavily, because of the disproportionately large amount of evidence that pertains to it, but material from other *poleis* is equally illuminating and attests to the communality of some of the themes and practices we will identify.

How people chose to remember and present those who fell in battle can reveal their underlying attitudes towards death, war, duty, honour, or the importance of family.<sup>263</sup> Moreover, the politics of burial and memory can have a profound impact on a society in terms of generating collective and/or group identity, or reinforcing social stratification.<sup>264</sup> Especially on public monuments, ideology and a society's values can be projected, modified, and reinforced. Cultural memory in particular is shaped and preserved through communal commemoration of the dead and the wars they died in.<sup>265</sup> Thus the iconography and didactic tone of war memorials of the First World War 'have been shown to play a key role in the articulation and inculcation of common, state-sanctioned values'.<sup>266</sup> Modern

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<sup>262</sup> For an overview of the topic, see chapter 2 in Pritchett 1985, and in particular e.g. Stecher 1981 (on funerary epigrams for soldiers and athletes), Hannah 2010 (on the significance of the warrior-*loutrophoroi*), and Barbantani 2014 (on Hellenistic soldiers).

<sup>263</sup> Low 2010, 341.

<sup>264</sup> E.g. in Christian burial basilicas, collective identity was reinforced by burial based mainly on membership of a certain group, in this case, the specific church (Yasin 2005, 433).

<sup>265</sup> Chaniotis 2012, 44: 'One of the main functions of the ritualized commemoration of war through commemorative anniversaries is to transmit this 'cultural memory' to future generations, thus forging civic identity'.

<sup>266</sup> Yasin 2005, 434, with n. 8.

memorials, however, are not directly related to ancient ones, and the different religious and socio-cultural contexts they arose in impose certain limitations to the similarities we might identify.<sup>267</sup> When discussing the ancients' funerary and commemorative practices, therefore, we need to bear in mind the vastly different world to which they belonged.

More often than not, the ancients chose the medium of funerary inscriptions to relay information about the deceased. Such inscriptions might be found on a tombstone, an urn, a casualty list, or a sculpture base, but also in the form of literary epigrams; for Classical Attica some 10,000 epitaphs are attested.<sup>268</sup> Metrical funerary inscriptions are already attested for the seventh century, however, and they begin to proliferate and grow more elaborate in the Classical period, especially with the development of *polyandria*, or public war graves; eventually the latter give way to a rapidly growing number of private funerary epigrams.<sup>269</sup> In length these texts vary from just a few words to sizeable compositions. The information provided in them varies considerably. For example, compared to previous centuries, the epigrams of the fourth century were more likely to contain personal details such as age or occupation.<sup>270</sup> For our discussion, the focus will be on the Classical and Early Hellenistic periods, and on examples drawn from different regions, centuries, and socio-political backgrounds. It will become evident that there are certain themes – sacrifice for the community, honouring the dead, and exhortation – that unite many sepulchral expressions regardless of any other differences, and point to the conclusion that Greek *poleis* adopted a relatively similar approach to the commemoration of their war dead.

Two early and roughly contemporary examples from Corcyra can serve to highlight the importance of the individual context of each inscription when it came to deciding what to inscribe: the first one, *IG IX.1 868* (late seventh/early sixth century), commemorates Arniadas, a soldier who died fighting on the mainland

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<sup>267</sup> Garland 1985, 118.

<sup>268</sup> Morris 1992, 156.

<sup>269</sup> Tsagalis 2008, 3-4, Day 2007, 29-31.

<sup>270</sup> Breuer 1995, 42.

opposite the island. We learn that he fell fighting bravely among the ships, but nothing about his provenance, whom he was fighting for or why, or what family he belonged to. The second one, *IG IX.1 867* (c. 600), is an epitaph for Menekrates, who drowned at sea. Presumably because he was a foreigner, we learn that he was a *proxenos* from Oianthea in Lokris, and the names of his father and brother. We can add a sixth/fifth-century inscription from Akarnania, an area of Corinthian colonisation later noted by Thucydides for its traditionalism, honouring Prokleidas: the two verses inform us that the grave stands by a road, and that he died fighting for his own land (περὶ τᾷς αὐτῷ γᾶς θάνε βαρυνάμενος).<sup>271</sup> Accounting for such differences in detail is difficult; the background of the deceased, their social standing, the manner of their death, personal taste, and local customs all played a role. Broadly speaking, there seem to have been no rules governing funerary commemoration of citizens in general, and of soldiers in particular; the notable exception to this rule is of course Sparta, to which we will return below. Because of the high degree of variation, we are largely dependent on whatever the inscriptions actually preserve for us, and inferences or assumptions about the nature of lost material should be treated with caution. This makes it difficult to generalise, which should be borne in mind when considering the examples in the following discussion.

The above-mentioned epitaph for Prokleidas rewards closer inspection. As noted, it informs us that the tombstone stood ἐν γύρῳ ὁδοῖο (l. 2), presumably so it could be seen by as many passers-by as possible. It fulfilled its function as a memory marker, both to fellow citizens who might come to mourn, and to non-citizens such as metics, envoys, traders, and visitors.<sup>272</sup> At the most basic level, it prompts the reader to notice the death of Prokleidas and what he fought for: his own land; beyond that, it might cause the reader to reflect on the community Prokleidas belonged to, and how its members are presented as willing to die for it. If the reader was a foreigner, he or she might be imbued with respect, awe, or fear; for a fellow

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<sup>271</sup> *GVI 70* = *IG IX.1*<sup>2</sup> 2:214, 3-4. Thucydides (1.5.3) mentions that in Akarnania the custom of carrying weapons in public had not yet died out. For the development of the settlement structure in Akarnania from Classical to Roman times, see Lang 1994.

<sup>272</sup> Stecher 1981, 16: 'Das Grabdenkmal will Denk-Mal sein, ein äußeres Zeichen mit dem Zweck, [...] den Vorübergehenden zum Denken an den Toten zu veranlassen'.

citizen, on the other hand, the inscription might evoke pride, sorrow, inspiration, a sense of a shared history, and a feeling of belonging and community. For such responses it mattered little whether or not Prokleidas was actually motivated by a belief that he fought or died in the service of his country. The significance lies in the choice to present his death as a noble sacrifice for the community. The exhortative character of the inscription should also be highlighted: its last verse (*hòs perì tās autō gās tháne ba<ρ>náμενος*) evokes the opening lines of a famous poem by Tyrtaios: 'It is good for a brave man to die, having fallen in the front ranks, fighting for his fatherland'.<sup>273</sup> It appears that the appeal of the warrior ideals of Tyrtaios was not limited to Sparta. In the same vein, the choice to include only one detail about his death, that it was for his own land, elevates it to something that should be emulated by other members of the community Prokleidas fought for. As such it represents a normative expression of commitment to one's community, and implicitly encourages compliance.

The epitaph of Prokleidas, stating that it stood close to the road, connects to another feature of many inscriptions for dead warriors: that the deceased should be remembered by foreigners and fellow citizens alike. There are numerous examples of this concern. A sixth/fifth-century epitaph from Thisbe in Boiotia mentions Phanes, who died fighting in the front ranks and was 'dear to citizens and foreigners' (l. 1).<sup>274</sup> Another inscription from mid-sixth century Attica encourages *astoi* and *xenoi* to stop and mourn for the young man Tetichos, who has died in war.<sup>275</sup> A sixth/fifth century sepulchral inscription from Lokris mentions that the fallen man will be missed by his neighbours and his people.<sup>276</sup> These Archaic private burials emphasise the individual, not the community for which he fought: what mattered most was to proclaim the warrior's courage and honour, not to present him as a member of a certain socio-political group.<sup>277</sup> This should not obscure the fact that such

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<sup>273</sup> Tyrtaios F 10 West (= Lycurg. *Leoc.* 107), 1-2: τεθνάμεναι γὰρ καλὸν ἐνὶ προμάχοισι πεσόντα / ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν περὶ ἧ πατρίδι μαρνάμενον; cf. Stecher 1981, 27.

<sup>274</sup> GVI 321 = IG VII 2247, cf. SEG 43.215: ἄσστοι[ς] καὶ χσένοισι.

<sup>275</sup> IG I<sup>2</sup> 976 = IG I<sup>3</sup> 1194 *bis*; for the date see Jacoby 1944, 44, with n. 31.

<sup>276</sup> GVI 153 = IG IX.1 307.

<sup>277</sup> For an overview of Archaic burial practices, see Arrington 2015, 27-33.



glorification could only take place in a communal context, and the various allusions to *astoi* and *xenoi* already point to a clear demarcation between one's own citizens and outsiders. What is more, praise and honour could only be achieved in a context where the wider community shared those same values to begin with. Thus, these inscriptions are evidence of an individual's desire to be recognised for their virtue, and the existence of a community in which this recognition could take place and carry meaning.

Moving away from private funerary inscriptions, we can add the widely known praise for the Spartiates who died at Thermopylai: ὦ ξεῖν', ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε κείμεθα τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι.<sup>278</sup> In this case, it was the foreigner himself who was supposed to spread the news among their fellow citizens at home, notwithstanding that there were Spartiates who had survived the battle.<sup>279</sup> The funerary epigram honouring the Corinthian casualties of the battle of Salamis in 480 also addresses the stranger at the beginning.<sup>280</sup> These cases reveal the importance of spreading knowledge about the fallen soldiers: who they were, how they died, and what or whom they fought for. Disseminating such information goes beyond a simple concern for glory; in a civic context, making sure that the whole community knew about the war dead and honoured them accordingly contributed to a shared sense of identity and purpose. It strengthened the citizens' awareness of society's interdependence, and provided model behaviour to be encouraged in subsequent generations. Furthermore, sepulchral inscriptions were only one of the many ways in which this could be achieved: 'burial, lists, epigrams, sculpture, dedications, speeches, processions and games' were different ways of remembering, glorifying, and honouring a polis' dead soldiers.<sup>281</sup> Taken together they represent a powerful expression of normative power, in that they encourage service for the community and reward loyalty to the state with symbolic honours.

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<sup>278</sup> *GVI* 4, cf. *Hdt.* 7.228.2

<sup>279</sup> *Hdt.* 7.229-32. In 1997, the 700 Thespians who died alongside the Spartans at Thermopylai (*Hdt.* 7.222) also received a memorial at the site of the battle, albeit with a much simpler inscription: ΕΠΤΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ ΘΕΣΠΙΕΩΝ ΜΝΗΜΗ.

<sup>280</sup> *GVI* 7 = *IG* I<sup>2</sup> 927 = *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 1143; cf. the expanded version in *Plut. Mor.* 870E. See Petrovic 2007, 145-53 for commentary.

<sup>281</sup> Low 2010, 342.

In fact, it is especially from the context of public funerals and public commemoration of the war dead that the socio-political system of a polis derived a potent source for moral commitment in its members. The normative-moral compliance relationship that, as I am arguing, was predominant in a Polis army, was built on a society's ability to create in its citizens a strong sense of a shared identity and history, and a belief in common values. After all, this relationship rested on the soldier's conviction that the goals of his military organisation were aligned with his own, and that his compliance ensured longevity and prosperity of his socio-political system; in turn the organisation, by public and communal acts of recognition and commemoration, exercised a normative influence on its members, directing their efforts toward the preservation and welfare of their polis. Combined with private motivations such as protecting one's family and living up to communal military ideology, this went a long way towards ensuring that citizen-soldiers would not abandon or betray their city in the field. In short, an effective polis was something that a morally committed soldier deemed worth fighting, and dying, for.<sup>282</sup>

Probably the most widely-known public commemoration of war dead in Classical antiquity took place in Athens.<sup>283</sup> The whole process of public burial, the laying out of the ashes, and the funeral oration is described by Thucydides.<sup>284</sup> It is unclear when exactly the practice was established – Thucydides' statement at 2.34.5 that only the *Marathonomachoi* were buried where they fell needs to be qualified, as it was the general Greek custom of the time to bury the war dead on or near the location of the battle, a custom that probably dated back beyond 600; Jacoby places the first *logos epitaphios* in the year 464.<sup>285</sup> For our purposes of assessing how it might have impacted on Athenian compliance relationships and army loyalty, the exact date of its conception is relatively unimportant, as we are concerned with the more general effects of the ceremony once it was already established.

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<sup>282</sup> For the connection between a glorious public funeral and the concept of the 'beautiful death', see Velho 2002, 247-48.

<sup>283</sup> The literature on the topic is plentiful; see e.g. Jacoby 1944, Garland 1985, Morris 1987, Loraux 2006, Low 2012, Arrington 2015.

<sup>284</sup> Thuc. 2.34.1-7.

<sup>285</sup> See Jacoby 1944, 42-47 and 55; the date is accepted by Sehlmeier in *EAH* s. v. 'Burial, Greece'.

The Athenian public funeral is a fundamentally communal event: in opposition to the more individualistic Archaic epitaphs that went hand in hand with more sumptuous private funerary art, the funeral procession and the public speeches strongly emphasised the collective nature of the proceedings.<sup>286</sup> The citizen body was treated as a single unit, individual glory was subsumed under the achievements of the army and the society it represented.<sup>287</sup> This is an effective way to foster cohesion and a sense of unity and solidarity among the citizens. It is a celebration and commemoration of an essential civic duty, to fight for the polis, and of those that performed it: significantly, this also included foreign allies and possibly 'barbarian' auxiliaries – already hinting at the fact that the Athenian public ceremony was about much more than exclusively celebrating Athenian civic identity.<sup>288</sup> For a discussion of military loyalty, it is particularly noteworthy that it was not the successful performance of this duty that was honoured, but the performance itself. This is made explicit by Demosthenes, in a speech he delivered in 330:

...I swear by your ancestors who bore the brunt at Marathon, by those drawn up for battle at Plataia, by those who fought from the ships at Salamis and Artemision, and by the many other courageous men lying in the public tombs [ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις μνήμασιν], all of whom the city buried, thinking them all worthy of the same honour, [...] not just the successful or victorious.  
(Dem. 18.208)

It is clear that what was acknowledged was not victory or any particularly virtuous behaviour of the soldiers; rather it was the fact that as citizens they had done their duty to the community, fought, and remained loyal, whatever the outcome of their efforts.<sup>289</sup> In this sense, the praise for the fallen is extended to those who survived; the dead become representatives for the entire army, and the achievement worthy of praise is not that they have conquered, nor that they have died, nor even that they

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<sup>286</sup> On social differentiation in funerary practices, see esp. chapters 4 and 5 in Morris 1992.

<sup>287</sup> Osborne 2010, 258-59.

<sup>288</sup> Such groups were at times included in the casualty lists, e.g. *IG I<sup>3</sup> 1180*, 26-27 or *IG I<sup>3</sup> 1192*, 152-53; Low 2012, 16-18, with n. 18 on the τοχσόται βάρβαροι.

<sup>289</sup> Cf. Low 2010, 353. For an account of the complexities surrounding a modern-day war memorial that is not overtly about victory, see Tritle 2012.

behaved courageously or honourably, but rather that they obeyed and did what was expected of them.<sup>290</sup> This ties together all the names we find on the Athenian casualty lists, and it was powerful enough to overcome any distinctions that might have been lurking underneath the marble façade of a unified citizen community.<sup>291</sup> At the heart of the matter, then, lay not victory, defeat, or death, but the willingness to risk one's life for the polis. And such willingness depended entirely on the compliance relationship, which in turn depended on the types of involvement present in a polis' armed forces, and the type of power that was being exercised over them.

In this case, there are clear indications of a normative-moral compliance relationship. The entire affair was highly symbolic, and replete with references to civic ideology, duty, family, and the shared community and history of the polis. Public burial by its very nature evoked the image of the polis as one large family, as 'the State takes upon itself the duties otherwise appertaining to the family'.<sup>292</sup> The exhortative character of the spectacle is equally obvious:

Those who remain may pray for a safer outcome, but they must not be less courageous in their attitude towards their enemies. [...] Strive now to be like these men, and believing happiness to lie in freedom and freedom in courage, never look to avoid the dangers of war. [...] those who have been buried here have been already honoured, and the polis will bring up their children until adulthood, at public expense: in this contest of courage, the polis thus provides a fitting crown as a prize for these men and those that remain.

(Thuc. 2.43-46)

Here we see the effective application of normative power – appeals to honour and freedom, coupled with promises of further honours for the fallen and that care will be taken of their bereaved children – to ensure the continued moral involvement,

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<sup>290</sup> As argued by Yoshitake 2010, cf. 376: 'any soldier who died in battle was regarded as most certainly qualified to be credited with *aretē*'.

<sup>291</sup> For elements of tension in the post-411 revolution monument of 409 (*IG* I<sup>3</sup> 1191), see Low 2012, 21.

<sup>292</sup> Jacoby 1944, 38; cf. Arrington 2015, 122, and 30-31 for a family's treatment of its dead.

and thus compliance and loyalty, of those members of the audience who will be called upon to fight for the city in the future.<sup>293</sup>

We should also discuss the physical aspect of the Athenians' public commemoration of their war dead, i.e. the *polyandria*, cenotaphs, and funerary casualty stelae. As part of the community's effort to honour and remember its dead, the Athenians erected marble stelae inscribed with the names of the fallen and set them up above the mass graves in the Kerameikos district.<sup>294</sup> The inscriptions only provided the names of the fallen, arranged by the ten Kleisthenic tribes; demotics and patronymics were conspicuously absent, which is most commonly interpreted as a way to enhance the identification of the dead with the (abstract) polis as a whole, not with their individual families or local backgrounds.<sup>295</sup> Some lists indicated the ranks of trierarch or *strategos*, and some included foreigners and slaves.<sup>296</sup> For the fifth century alone, some thirty to forty such monuments are attested; more than one stele would be set up as part of the monument if necessitated by the number of casualties or the decision to list each tribe on a separate stele.<sup>297</sup> The last evidence dates to 394, but it is unclear if the practice ceased completely or merely changed in form.<sup>298</sup>

The inscribed epigram for the fallen of Poteidaia of 432 provides an excellent example of how normative power can be applied to create, encourage, and respond to moral involvement.

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<sup>293</sup> Cf. Arrington 2015, 111: 'Repeatedly, Perikles underscores the choice that the dead faced and places this choice in the survivors' hands'. Cf. Pl. *Menex.* 236e, 247a.

<sup>294</sup> This is usually called the *dēmosion sēma* (sometimes capitalised) or 'public (military) cemetery' of Athens, but see Patterson 2006 for a critical view of the term and its meaning in antiquity.

<sup>295</sup> Osborne 2010, 248. For the varied physical dimensions of the lists, see Low 2012, 25-27 and Arrington 2015, 95-6: c. two meters tall and several meters wide if erected side by side. Some slabs stood on stepped bases. Pausanias (1.29.4) erroneously states that demotics were inscribed, when only the *phylai* were listed.

<sup>296</sup> Arrington 2015, 96; Low 2012, 16-17.

<sup>297</sup> Pritchett 1985, 139; Arrington 2015, 95.

<sup>298</sup> Cf. Low 2010, 343 n. 6, and 2012, 28 (citing S. Dow's suggestion that perhaps patronymics were added to the lists, which would make them a lot harder to differentiate from other lists).

ἄνδρας μὲμ πόλις ἡέδε ποθεῖ καὶ δῆ[μος] Ἐρεχθῶς], /  
 πρόσθε Ποτειδαίας ἡοὶ θάνον ἐμ προ[ο]μάχοις /  
 παῖδες Ἀθηναίων· ψυχὰς δ' ἀντίρρο[π]α θέντες /  
 ἐ[λλ]άχσαντ' ἀρετὴν καὶ πατρ[ι]δ' εὐκλ[έ]ϊσαν.

The city and *dēmos* of Erechtheus misses the men  
 who before Poteidaia died fighting in the front ranks,  
 children of the Athenians. Their souls they gave in exchange,  
 and they gained *aretē* and brought fame to their fatherland.  
 (GVI 20 = IG I<sup>2</sup> 945 = IG I<sup>3</sup> 1179, 10-13)

We see, firstly, how the community is emphasised repeatedly; the fallen were part of the 'city and *dēmos* of Erechtheus', which constitutes a three-layered entity: the physical city, the people living within it, and more particularly, the people who claim kinship with Erechtheus, spanning the arc from the present citizens to the Athenians who lived in the distant past. Secondly, that they will be missed establishes the emotional bond between those who will visit the tomb and those whom it commemorates. The image of a strong and unified citizen body is reinforced by addressing the dead as 'children of the Athenians': just as the public burial itself was a familial duty performed by the community on a grand scale, the Athenians, living and dead, chose to represent themselves as one large family. Finally, the soldiers in turn are portrayed as having chosen to risk their lives for the city, and as a reward for themselves they gained virtue, while for the city of their fathers they gained *kleos*, again stressing the connection between soldiers, city, and family.<sup>299</sup> Here the ideologies of autochthony, masculine warrior prowess, and the *demos* as a citizen's family converge to express a powerful message for those citizens that survive: loyal service to the state is at the same time natural (as it is one's family), honourable (fighting grants *aretē*), and rewarded (the dead are sorely missed, and honoured with public burial).<sup>300</sup>

<sup>299</sup> See also Arrington 2015, 99; he also highlights the epic connotations of the epigram.

<sup>300</sup> Low 2003, 99 points out that the 'rituals associated with the funeral itself, together with the scale, and iconography, of the monuments, are expensive privileges previously associated primarily with the city's rich elite'.

Another epitaph from the middle of the fifth century attests a similar approach. The Athenian soldiers who died on the Hellespontine Chersonese and at Byzantion are listed on a funeral stele with an epitaph:

hoíde par' hellésponton ápóλεσαν άγλαόν ήβεν /  
βαρνάμενοι, σφετέραν δ' εύκλείισαμ πατρίδα, /  
hόστ' έχθρός στενάχεμ πολέμο θέρος έκκομίσαντας, /  
αύτοϊς δ' άθάνατον μνῆμ' άρετῆς έθεσαν.

These men lost their shining youth at the Hellespont,  
fighting, and bringing honour to their fatherland,  
so that the enemy groans, harvesting the crop of war.  
They gave themselves an immortal memorial to their virtue.  
(GVI 18 = IG I<sup>2</sup> 943 = IG I<sup>3</sup> 1162, 45-48)

Again we can observe the close connection between military service and the polis: the fallen honoured their fatherland, and for themselves they achieved an undying *mnēma*.<sup>301</sup> Individual families are left out: what mattered was the family of the polis. The language itself supports the notion that the socio-political system of the polis was similar to a large family: most of the texts in this chapter include the word *πάτρα*, reinforcing the image of the land as father to its citizens. Hence, I use the translation 'fatherland', notwithstanding its modern connotations of nationalism and its connection to the Third Reich, because it captures the familial ties inherent in the ancient civic imagination of belonging to one's land in more than a physical way.

Compare the inscription honouring the Athenian cavalry who fought at Tanagra in 457; the date of the epitaph and the precise battle it commemorates have been debated, and it appears that it was only set up several years after the events, as indicated by the word *ποτε* in line three. It might also honour those who fought at the battle of Oinophyta later that year.<sup>302</sup>

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<sup>301</sup> Arrington 2015, 99.

<sup>302</sup> See Wade-Gery 1933 (who also has *χαίρετε* as 'farewell'), 78-79, and Petrovic 2007, 197-82 for a discussion of the date and a detailed commentary. According to Pl. *Menex.* 242a-c the dead from Tanagra and Oinophyta were the first to be honoured by public funeral, but see Arrington 2015, 39-49 for a much earlier dating of the practice. For another funerary monument seemingly exclusively

ἰχαίρετε ἀριστῆες πολέμο μέγα κῦδοις ἔχοντες, /  
 ἰκῶροι Ἀθηναίων, ἔχσοχοι ἡιππιοσύναι, /  
 ἰηοὶ ποτε καλλιχόρο περὶ πατρίδος ὀλέσασθ' ἡέβην, /  
 ἰπλείστοις ἑλλάνων ἀντία μαρνάμενοι.

Farewell, champions of war, who hold great glory,  
 young men of Athens, excellent horsemen!  
 Who once gave up your youth for the fatherland of fair choruses,  
 fighting against most of the Greeks.  
 (GVI 14 = IG I<sup>2</sup> 946 = IG I<sup>3</sup> 1181)<sup>303</sup>

Once more the stress is on collective sacrifice for the community, which in turn earned the fallen great fame: the men are said to have died specifically for the *πάτρα*, which portrays their actions as morally motivated by patriotism and honourable dedication to Athens. Such public efforts are particularly important for an assessment of the effects Athens as a socio-political system had upon its citizens' type of involvement: as opposed to private practices, which might be more or less representative of wider sentiments, these public and communal expressions of grief, honour, and memory reveal society's underlying motivation to infuse its citizens with certain values for certain ends.<sup>304</sup>

There is evidence that these monuments were not merely decorative: citizens (and foreigners) might have regularly visited them for various purposes, maybe in a similar fashion to the treatment of ancestral graves. Direct evidence for such personal interactions is rare, though; private mourning is not often talked about in our sources, and the potential diversity in forms and individual approaches to it

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for cavalry, cf. IG II<sup>2</sup> 5222, commemorating the dead of Corinth and Koroneia in 394/3; Pritchett 1985, 213 suggests these may belong only to the tribe Akamantis.

<sup>303</sup> Cf. *Anth. Pal.* 7.254, under the heading for Simonides.

<sup>304</sup> The intentionality of commemoration is highlighted by Low & Oliver 2012, 2. Other public burials: GVI 21, Plut. *Nic.* 17.4 (Sicilian Expedition); Paus. 1.29.4 (Eurymedon). Diodoros, in a confusing section, included what he took to be an inscription commemorating the double victory (11.61.3, cf. Paus. 10.15.4), but which almost certainly refers to two separate battles (Wade-Gery 1933, 82-86). A potential epigram for those who died at the Eurymedon, GVI 13 (*Anth. Pal.* 7.258) is discussed in Page 1981, 268-72. GVI 17 (= IG I<sup>3</sup> 1163) was thought to commemorate the battle of Koroneia in 447 (so Peek), but Arrington 2012 argues for a connection with the battle of Delion in 424. See Lycurg. *Leoc.* 142 for Chaironeia.



makes generalisations even more difficult.<sup>305</sup> Lykourgos in his speech *Against Leokrates* accused the latter of having selfishly deserted Athens after the defeat at Chaironeia in 338; when Leokrates finally returned to Athens seven years later, he is said to have gone via the road that led past the public graves, walking past those who had gathered there to mourn.<sup>306</sup> Even allowing for exaggeration to sway the judges, this argument would only have had traction if it was indeed the case that relatives and friends visited the public cemetery to read the epitaphs, mourn, and remember. In Demosthenes 57, the speaker refers to the public tomb commemorating the Sicilian Expedition as evidence for his uncle's civic status, implying that the tombs were accessible and the names legible.<sup>307</sup> Lastly, Isokrates mentions that non-citizens would attend the public funerals 'to gloat over our catastrophes'.<sup>308</sup> This brings us back to an important point we touched upon above: like the *logoi epitaphioi*, the funerary monuments did not commemorate victory or success. They recorded defeats more prominently than victories simply by the greater size of monuments inscribed with more names.<sup>309</sup> Again, it was loyal compliance that was remembered here, and it was loyal compliance that was encouraged in those who remained, whatever the outcome.

Private sepulchral inscriptions, too, exhibit similarities to the public monuments.<sup>310</sup> A late fifth century Attic epitaph found in Chalandri accompanied by a relief showing the deceased warrior, tells us of the many trophies he erected and the many enemies he killed; the potentially subversive nature of the monument, in that its focus is on the individual's achievements, not the community's, has been

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<sup>305</sup> Low 2012, 32-35. Chaniotis 2012, 48 mentions an honorific decree for Athenian ephebes, dated to 122/1, that attests a race in armour starting 'from the *polyandreion*' (IG II<sup>2</sup> 1006, 22: δρό[μο]ν ἐν ὅπλοις τὸν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ πολυανδρείου).

<sup>306</sup> Lycurg. *Leoc.* 142; Worthington, Cooper & Harris 2001, 159-61.

<sup>307</sup> Dem. 57.37; the speech is dated to 346/5.

<sup>308</sup> Isoc. 8.87.

<sup>309</sup> Arrington 2015, 104-8: 'The men did not die victorious, they died fighting' (108); he argues for a prominent element of struggle and danger inherent in the monuments' overall meaning. This is in stark contrast to Roman practice, where victory celebrations such as the triumph were central to the commemoration of wars and battles, and centred not on the soldiers, but on the individual general.

<sup>310</sup> According to Arrington 2015, 99 it was in the 430s that 'private funerary sculpture starts anew'. There had been a gap in elaborate private funerary sculpture since c. 500 (Morris 1992, 128-29).

discussed by Arrington.<sup>311</sup> It is worth noting, however, that the epitaph still calls on the fatherland (πατρίς) to witness the soldier's deeds: commemoration and individual fame derive their meaning from the context of the civic community, and are inextricably linked to it.

Funerary sculpture on its own is hard to interpret, as it involves a large degree of assumption about the intentions of the sculptor and the commissioner; it is safer to attempt to identify recurring themes. For fourth-century Attica, it has been argued that private funerary sculpture was united by its main theme of genealogy, followed by imagery from the *oikos*, athletics, or warfare.<sup>312</sup> One such example comes from Rhamnous: an elaborate family tomb of the latter half of the fourth century has been found, containing four generations; the most important theme next to the genealogy of the family itself is military service for the city. This focus on the military roles of the deceased was not restricted to Athens: similar motifs are present in a fourth century tomb from Pallene, which shows Hierokles and his son Hieron – equipped as a hoplite – on a stele with a large carved *aspis*, topped by a Corinthian helmet.<sup>313</sup>

It is important to note that warrior figures on sculpted funerary art do not necessarily have to depict the deceased themselves, nor do they have to mean that the deaths occurred in actual combat.<sup>314</sup> Combined with the fact that some reliefs blur the lines between citizen and soldier by showing men as soldiers in 'civilian' dress (i.e. without armour or in clothing unsuitable to combat), this expands the importance military service played in people's imagination: it was a core element of a citizen's expressive identity.<sup>315</sup> The importance of military iconography in Greek *poleis* had nevertheless declined by the second century. In a study of the grave stelae from Smyrna, almost exclusively belonging to the second and first centuries, it is the book-roll that features most prominently in male sculpture; the author connects this

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<sup>311</sup> Arrington 2015, 230-31.

<sup>312</sup> Bergemann 1997, 13.

<sup>313</sup> Bergemann 1997, 11 with plate 1.1 (Rhamnous), 12 with plate 12.4 (Pallene).

<sup>314</sup> Bergemann 1997, 63-64; he also adduces the epitaph for Aischylos (GVI 47, Ath. 14.627c-d, Plut. *Mor.* 604e-f), which mentions only his military service at Marathon.

<sup>315</sup> Bergemann 1997, 79-80.

to changing values in cultural and social terms. Learning and intellectual pursuits had gained in prominence at the cost of war, athletics, and heroic nudity.<sup>316</sup> A similar development had already been observed in epitaphs more generally, where the decline of the theme of the heroic dead and their glorious deaths in battle went hand in hand with the spread of Roman influence: 'It belongs to citizens, not to standing armies'.<sup>317</sup>

Another private Attic inscription, dated to the early fourth century, attests to the importance of the homeland in society's imagination: it belongs to Glaukiades, who is said to have died young, keeping the enemies out of his fatherland (πατρίς) before departing for the chamber of Persephone.<sup>318</sup> As this is the only detail that was included, it is reasonable to suggest that defence of his country did indeed play a central role in the soldier's motivation – or at least, that it was important enough to be presented as such on his gravestone. In terms of combat motivation and individual involvement, this goes a long way to explain why Polis armies did not suffer from the same levels of noncompliance as did their Royal counterparts. Moreover, the importance of fighting and dying for one's own land was not limited to Attica.

The general theme of glorious service and death for one's country that we have identified in the funerary expressions discussed above was already being advocated in the seventh century. The Spartan poet Tyrtaios encouraged the young men of his city to be brave and stand their ground next to their fellow citizens. A warrior falling among the front ranks

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<sup>316</sup> Zanker 1993, 218-20, 228. On the body-language of Hellenistic art more generally, see Masségli 2015 (of relevance to the present study esp. chapter 2 on male citizens), who concludes that 'Hellenistic stelai are dominated by the narratives of civic activity, [...] while the prevailing narrative is intellectual study and rhetorical training' (120).

<sup>317</sup> Lattimore 1942, 240.

<sup>318</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 10998 = *GVI* 1637 = *SEG* 58.230: τὸς ἀγαθὸς ἔστειρεν Ἄρης, ἐφίλησε δ' ἔπαινος, / καὶ γήραι νεότης οὐ παρέδωχ' ὑβρίσαι / ὦγ καὶ Γ[λ]αυκιάδης δῆιος ἀπὸ πατρίδος ἔργων / ἦλθ' ἐπ[ι] πάνδεκτον Φερσεφόνης θάλαμον. See Tsagalis 2008, 86-93 for an in-depth analysis of the epigram.

...brings glory to his city, to his people, and  
to his father. Young and old alike mourn him, all  
the city is distressed by the painful loss, and his  
tomb and children are pointed out among the  
people, and his children's children and his line after  
them. Never do his name and good fame perish  
[...] as he displays his  
prowess by standing fast and fighting for land and  
children.  
(Tyr. F 12, 23-34, transl. Gerber)

These lines combine many of the features of funerary epigrams, such as fame, memory, the importance of family, and the immortality of one's glory as it is preserved by the community. It should be stressed that what Tyrtaios is imagining here can only take place within a civic context: a permanent settlement and an established community where the tombs can be pointed out, families and neighbours who can mourn and remember, and above all a future worth fighting for: one's children and grandchildren. The same image is presented in the mid-seventh century poetry of Kallinos of Ephesos, who equally exhorts his fellow citizens to fight, succinctly summing up the reasons to do so: 'For it is a shining honour for a man to fight his enemies on behalf of his land, his children, and his wedded wife'.<sup>319</sup> It is possible to understand this tripartite structure as representing the past (the land and its history), the present (the wife), and the future (the children), all underlying the citizen-soldier's motivation for entering combat. However, Tyrtaios' mention of tombs to be admired by the rest of society has more to do with the lives of the heroes of epic poetry, whose glory after death was to be made manifest by a visible marker.<sup>320</sup> The reality of Sparta in the Classical period was markedly different.

It was Spartan custom to bury their war dead where they fell.<sup>321</sup> Only the bodies of kings were transferred back to Sparta for burial, which is described in detail

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<sup>319</sup> Callin. F 1 (= Stob. *Flor.* 4.14.12), 6-8: τιμῆν τε γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀγλὸν ἀνδρὶ μάχεσθαι γῆς πέρι καὶ παίδων κουριδῆς τ' ἀλόχου δυσμενέσιν.

<sup>320</sup> Cf. Hom. *Il.* 7.87-90, 23.331; also Nagy 1999, 341-42.

<sup>321</sup> Plut. *Ages.* 40.3; Pritchett 1985, 243, Dillon 2007, 150. See Low 2006, 92-101 for a discussion of Spartan burials outside Lakonia: while allowing for complexities and variations in Spartan burial customs, she argues that such extra-territorial burials might also have represented a claim to the territory they occupied.

by Herodotos: the death was announced throughout Lakonia by riders, upon which helots, *perioikoi*, and Spartiates had to attend the public funeral; there was ritual mourning, and it is possible that the numbers of attendees ran into the thousands. If the king had died in war, an image of him was created and carried on a bier; after the ceremony, business was suspended for a certain period.<sup>322</sup> In stark contrast to Athens, then, where the public funeral emphasised the collective rather than the single soldier, at Sparta there was a great public gathering honouring one individual. This would undoubtedly have served to reinforce the hierarchy of Spartan society, as part of which the cohesion among each group might have been strengthened. Communal solidarity and identity were expressed by praising the king and by ritual mourning. In its magnitude, the public funeral would also have created a clear contrast between royal burials and those of ordinary citizens, even those who died fighting for Sparta. According to Plutarch, only those men who died in war, and only those women who died while holding religious office, were entitled to a grave inscription.<sup>323</sup> For all others, funerals had to be simple and uniform, without any pomp or luxury: there were no casualty lists, while mourning was regulated and limited.<sup>324</sup>

The evidence from Plutarch, centuries later and from a historical context in which Sparta was being mythologised, might be suspect at first glance. However, it corresponds to the small number of military funerary inscriptions found in Lakonia that can be dated to the fifth, fourth and third centuries. And these are exclusively of the famous '[name] ἐν πολέμῳ' type.<sup>325</sup> In this case, a few examples suffice to illustrate the pattern, e.g. *IG* V.1 703 from the early fourth century: Αἰνηθίας / ἐν πολέμῳ; a small amount of variation is introduced by the inclusion of additional

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<sup>322</sup> Hdt. 6.58; see also the commentary in Scott 2005, 246-51, who suggests that the images for kings fallen in combat might have been introduced for Leonidas, whose severed head the Persians apparently kept (250, cf. Hdt. 7.238). See also Plut. *Ages.* 40.3 (with Diod. Sic. 15.93.6, Nep. *Ag.* 8.7), Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.19, 6.4.13 (with Diod. Sic. 15.56.1 and Paus. 9.13.10).

<sup>323</sup> Plut. *Lyc.* 27.2, Dillon 2007. Examples of inscriptions for women: *IG* V.1 713, 714 (both Hellenistic according to Dillon 2007, 152).

<sup>324</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 238D. Hence the order to the relatives of those who fell at Leuktra in 371 not to mourn publicly (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.16). See Pritchett 1985, 244-46 for an overview of the evidence.

<sup>325</sup> According to Low 2006, 86, there are a total of twenty-four known examples (see 85-92 for more detailed discussion).

detail, as in the case of the soldier and Olympic victor Euryades: Εὐρυάδης / ὀλυμπιονίκας / ἐμ πολέμῳ (IG V.1 708, third century), or of Eualkes who is said to have fallen at Mantinea (IG V.1 1124, possibly after 418).<sup>326</sup> It has been argued that this Eualkes was in fact not a Spartiate, but a *perioikos* from Geronthrai, where the inscription has originally been found, and that his death occurred in 385.<sup>327</sup> If this is correct, it would mean that the *perioikoi* who died fighting for Sparta were not categorically excluded from having their tombstones inscribed, which in turn would be congruent with the geographical distribution of the finds, which includes perioikic settlement areas.<sup>328</sup> This would fit well with the evidence from Athens and elsewhere for the inclusion of foreigners and slaves on war memorials. In a similar way, then, the overriding concern at Sparta could have been to reward and commemorate loyal military service, and not primarily to enforce socio-political or cultural hierarchies (the two are of course not mutually exclusive). On another level, these stones attest both to the communal control of commemorative customs (by conforming to the general custom or law), as well as to personal and individual acts of commemoration that express a sense of belonging to a community (as the stones were most likely set up by the soldier's relatives).<sup>329</sup>

If I am correct in arguing that funerary practices can have a positive impact on a socio-political system's ability to exercise normative power and to engender moral commitment in its members, it might seem surprising that by keeping sepulchral expressions to a minimum, the famously militaristic Spartans would forego such a chance to enhance their soldier's combat motivation and loyalty to the state.<sup>330</sup> As noted above, one of the reasons might have been to honour the kings by contrast, and thereby reinforce social stratification; another reason might be the

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<sup>326</sup> More examples: IG V.1.701-10, 918, 921, 1125, 1320, 1591; IG V.2 251 (second century), SEG 32.397, 49.390. There has been debate about what exactly these inscriptions signify: if we accept that Spartan dead were buried on the field of battle, the most natural assumption would be that these inscriptions were placed on cenotaphs. See further Dillon 2007, 157 with n. 11, and Low 2006, 90, who points out that we might not be dealing with burial at all, but with commemoration.

<sup>327</sup> Sekunda 2009, cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.1-7.

<sup>328</sup> Low 2006, 90.

<sup>329</sup> Low 2006, 91.

<sup>330</sup> For the argument against seeing Sparta in overly militaristic terms, see Hodkinson 2006.

desire to avoid unequal displays of wealth and mourning, preferring a more egalitarian approach that forcibly puts everyone who died in war on the same level. Interestingly, this is similar to the Athenian approach: sepulchral customs based on a non-individualistic, communal ethos of collective achievement, where loyal service for the polis, not the outcome of any such service, was at the heart of commemoration. But rather than having grand ceremonies with speeches and processions, the Spartans opted for a more subtle, but equally effective method: by treating all those citizens who died in war exactly the same, equality was maintained and cohesion reinforced, without the risk of causing resentment or envy, or a rift akin to that between Athens' land and naval forces.<sup>331</sup> Like so often, though, Sparta was an exception in her means, even if the ends were similar to those of other cities; the evidence pertaining to other *poleis* tends more towards Athenian practice, with a mixture of public and private commemoration of varying degrees of opulence.

Our starting point, again, is Athens: according to Thucydides, at the battle of Tanagra in 458/7 the Athenians were supported by 1,000 Argives, and afterwards the Athenians erected a funerary monument for the Argive soldiers who fell in the battle and set it up in their own city.<sup>332</sup> The inscription, *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 1149, has survived in several fragments, and recently a new one has been published, for a total of fifteen.<sup>333</sup> The monument appears to have listed the names of the dead arranged only by the four tribes of Argos, without patronymics or other information; it was accompanied by a (now lacunose) inscription, written not in the Attic but in the Argive alphabet, that had originally been reconstructed to say that they fought for their country – [τοι]δ' ἔθ[ανον Ταν]άγραι Λακ[εδαιμονίον] ὑπὸ χερσ[ί], | πένθο[ς] δ' ἔτλασαν γᾶς περὶ μαρνάμ[ενοι] – but the editors of the newest fragment have questioned this interpretation on the grounds of what they see as a 'major conceptual obstacle': the battle was fought hundreds of miles from the city of Argos, wherefore it makes no

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<sup>331</sup> For the danger of not giving proper credit, or causing resentment, envy, or disbelief, see Thuc. 2.35.2. The navy was conspicuously absent from Athens' public cemetery (Arrington 2011, 204).

<sup>332</sup> Thuc. 1.107.5, Paus. 1.29.7-9.

<sup>333</sup> For the new fragment's *editio princeps* and a general discussion and reconstruction of the monument, see Papazarkadas & Sourlas 2012.

sense for them to be described as having fought for their land.<sup>334</sup> There is no obvious reason, however, to assume that 'fighting for one's land' always has to mean that the fighting itself took place on that same land: it is entirely possible that the meaning is symbolic, i.e. wherever they fought, ultimately they did so to further the goals of their own polis. In this particular case, where the Argives were commemorated in a foreign city, it might have been an attempt to stress the fact that they died not simply for Athens, but for their own land, as a way to justify and give meaning to their participation in the battle. What is more, if we remember that the Argives were fighting their arch-enemies, the Spartans, it makes even more sense that they would elevate this battle to a struggle for their own land. At any rate, we can see that the monument embodies loyal service and once again highlights its importance over mere victory; the battle of Tanagra was a close defeat, but a defeat nonetheless.

The Argives set up their own casualty lists at home.<sup>335</sup> *SEG* 29.361 is a list dated to c. 400, and like the monument in Athens, it includes the names of the fallen soldiers arranged by the four tribes: Hylleis, Dymanes, Pamphyloi, and Hynathioi. Unlike the monument in Athens, however, this one also details the soldiers' phratries, and in lines 2-5 includes extra information about certain individuals, such as the seer or the general. This has prompted some commentators to conclude that the 'democratic egalitarianism of the Tanagra monument has been dissolved'.<sup>336</sup> This fits with a tendency to view funerary monuments primarily as political statements, as expressions of either democratic or oligarchic sentiments about citizenship, class, and status. This misses the point. These are not strictly mutually exclusive: democratic monuments, or oligarchic monuments. They are civic monuments, with the primary aim of encouraging loyalty to the polis by honouring those that died for it, and reinforcing cohesion and commitment among those that might have to do so in the future. There is certainly room for subtle ideological

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<sup>334</sup> Papazarkadas & Sourlas 2012, 599.

<sup>335</sup> For an overview of Argive burial practices in the Classical and Hellenistic periods, see Dimakis 2009, arguing that the importance of kinship that was prevalent in the Classical period gave way to displaying status and wealth.

<sup>336</sup> Papazarkadas & Sourlas 2012, 606.



messages, with the stress more on individuals or the collective achievement; but singling out a general, a seer, or an official on a casualty list does not alter its fundamental purpose. In its essence it is still about the collective effort on behalf of the polis: the important opposition here is not between democratic and oligarchic, but rather between individual and communal. Once we let go of the need to identify political elements, democratic or otherwise, we can see such monuments for what they are: commemorations of loyalty and celebrations of unity.

To reinforce this point, we need only turn to another casualty list, this time from oligarchic Thespiiai in Boiotia.<sup>337</sup> Thucydides tells us that the Athenians inflicted such heavy casualties on the Thespian contingent at the battle of Delion in 424 that the Thebans were later able to dismantle the Thespian city walls without much opposition.<sup>338</sup> Parts of a funerary monument commemorating this loss have been found, containing the names of 101 soldiers who fell at the battle. Originally there were nine stelae, inscribed in stoichedon and probably placed on an enclosure wall topped with a lion sculpture.<sup>339</sup> The names appear without patronymics or other personal information, with the exception of lines 9-10 on stele B, which list two soldiers, Tisimenes and Polynikos, as Pythian and Olympic victors, respectively (a detail we have already encountered on a Lakedaimonian funerary inscription).<sup>340</sup> The theme here is the same as in the public funerary monuments of Athens and Argos: public commemoration of citizen-warriors who died for the community, with a focus not on individual achievement or glory, but on the collective effort, regardless of the outcome.<sup>341</sup> In spite of the similarities shared with the Athenian lists (e.g. stoichedon, simple names, absence of patronymics), it is equally clear that this is not about democracy: Thespiiai was an oligarchic polis, and the battle itself was fought against democratic Athens. Thus, as Low has rightly pointed out, these features, and indeed the monument as a whole, are not a statement of democratic

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<sup>337</sup> There was an unsuccessful democratic uprising in 414 (Thuc. 6.95.2); cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.46.

<sup>338</sup> Thuc. 4.96.3, 133.1.

<sup>339</sup> For a discussion and reconstruction of the monument see Low 2003, 105-7, with figs. 2 and 3.

<sup>340</sup> *IG VII* 1888, B.9-10.

<sup>341</sup> Cf. Low 2003, 108: 'it is the whole – the *polis* – rather than the part – the individual (and individuated) citizen – which remains central to the memorial'.

ideology.<sup>342</sup> What ties these monuments together, and accounts for the similarities, is that *poleis*, as organisations operating on a normative-moral compliance relationship, continually needed to create moral involvement and to apply normative power, regardless of their political orientations. Public grave monuments that honour the fallen and exhort the living are one way of achieving such a projection of symbolic power, at the same time rewarding past and encouraging future compliance. We see, then, how the application of a theoretical model can help to explain the ways in which overtly different political organisations can exhibit similarities in the existence and expression of underlying patterns of behaviour. Greek city-state armies, unlike the Royal armies of the Hellenistic age, had to be able to rely on the moral commitment of their citizen-soldiers, whatever the community's political outlook. There are many more examples of public funerary monuments, casualty lists, and sepulchral epigrams that point towards the same conclusion, which we will discuss more briefly, arranged in a rough chronological order. This evidence reveals that we are dealing with a relatively widespread phenomenon that encompasses communities of varying political orientation.

A public funerary epigram from Tegea, probably part of a polyandron commemorating the battle against the Spartans, fought near the city around 473 (and/or the slightly later battle of Dipaia), honours the soldiers who fell there by proclaiming that they had preserved the city from being taken, and with their sacrifice had ensured its freedom for their children.<sup>343</sup> Again we see the close connection between military service and service for the community; the preservation of the polis and her future, i.e. children, is presented as the central motivating factor for the men's actions. We should also note that the Tegeans actually lost this battle, once more underlining the general feature that public commemoration of war dead was primarily about rewarding and encouraging loyal service, not about celebrating victory. Another funerary epigram, honouring Thessalian dead, is preserved in the *Greek Anthology* under Aischylos; if authentic, it

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<sup>342</sup> Low 2003, 108-9.

<sup>343</sup> *GVI* 11 = *Anth. Pal.* 7.512: οἱ βούλοντο πόλιν μὲν ἐλευθερίᾳ τεθαλυῖαν | παισὶ λιπεῖν (3-4). For the dating, see Weber 1917, 549-50, and Stecher 1981, 30; cf. *Hdt.* 9.35.2.

could have commemorated an otherwise unknown action belonging the Persian Wars. It, too, presents the dead as having gained glory fighting to defend their homeland: Κυανή καὶ τούσδε μενέγχεας ὤλεσεν ἄνδρας | Μοῖρα, πολύρρηνον πατρίδα ῥυομένους.<sup>344</sup>

To return to casualty lists, a late fifth-century example has been found in Megara, listing the names of fallen soldiers, from among citizens (arranged by tribe and patronymic), foreigners, and potentially slaves (suggested by the presence of the name 'Thracian' in line 22); it is possible that it once stood near the centre of the polis.<sup>345</sup> The inclusion of non-citizens on a public monument like this one has parallels in Athenian practice, and points yet again to the importance of the performance of (civic) duty over any political or ideological message; Low also observes that such lists were inclusive rather than exclusive in nature, and go against the typical polarising interpretation of Greek civic culture as being based on the opposition between citizens and non-citizens.<sup>346</sup> A similar casualty list is known from Tanagra, and dated generally to the battle of Delion in 424; it consists of four columns inscribed with sixty-four names without patronymics, but it includes two individuals, Phanodamos and Mynnios, who are marked out as Eretrians.<sup>347</sup> After the decisive defeat of the Athenians in the battle of Syracuse Harbour in 413, the Syracusans erected a public tomb for their own and their allies' dead, and embellished the monument at public expense.<sup>348</sup> Unfortunately we do not know what this monument looked like or whether it contained lists of names or epitaphs; but what matters more is the communal and public act of commemoration in honour of those who died in the fighting.

Moving into the fourth century, we have examples of casualty lists from Thespiiai from the beginning of the century, and from Mantinea, *IG* V.2 271 (mid-

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<sup>344</sup> 'Dark Moira destroyed also these staunch warriors, defending their fatherland rich in lambs' (*GVI* 10 = *Anth. Pal.* 7.255, 1-2). Cf. Weber 1917, 547-49 and Wade-Gery 1933, 75.

<sup>345</sup> The monument is discussed in Low 2003, 101-3; for the location, cf. Paus. 1.43.3: εἰσὶ δὲ τάφοι Μεγαρεῦσιν ἐν τῇ πόλει.

<sup>346</sup> Low 2003, 102.

<sup>347</sup> *IG* VII 585, col. I, 16-17 (with the city-ethnic Ἐρετριεύς); *SEG* 19.337. For a more detailed discussion see Low 2003, 103-4, and Vénencie 1960, 611-15 for a new edition.

<sup>348</sup> Diod. Sic. 13.17.5, 13.29.2.

fourth century), which lists the fallen arranged by tribes and with patronymics; Pritchett saw this as evidence for a 'public military cemetery comparable to the *Demosion Sema* at Athens' (144).<sup>349</sup> The Arkadian polis of Thelphousa is probably responsible for the inscription *IG* V.2 412, an epigram that honours fallen soldiers who fought for their country and died defending the *eunomia* of their fathers.<sup>350</sup> The men might have died in an engagement with the Thebans and their allies in 352, mentioned by Diodoros (16.39.6), which resulted in a Thelphousan defeat. If so, this would be another example of public commemoration centred on the performance, not the outcome, of military service as a civic right and duty. The inscription also fits the pattern we have seen in comparable material from elsewhere: as expressed and enacted by the community, the combat motivation of a polis' military is usually connected to the ancestral land, parents or children, and glory for the community and the fallen themselves.

More examples can be found in Pausanias' travel writings: he reported on many other public funerary monuments, sadly often without providing much detail. He mentioned a common grave for the Argive dead who died during the Sicilian Expedition in 415-13, and a polyandron at Thebes for those who died fighting Philip and Alexander, presumably before the city's destruction in 335.<sup>351</sup> Greek *poleis* of the third century, too, continued the practice of setting up public monuments for their citizens who died in war. Pausanias, for example, reports on a μνημα that stood on the road linking Gortys and Megalopolis, and commemorated those who had died fighting Kleomenes III.<sup>352</sup> He also mentions a tomb outside the city walls of Sikyon, for the polis' citizens who died at the battles of Dyme (226), Pellene (225), Megalopolis (224), and Sellasia (222).<sup>353</sup> Here we might mention a funerary epigram

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<sup>349</sup> Pritchett 1985, 141-44.

<sup>350</sup> *IG* V.2 412, 2 (μαρνάμενοι πάτρας οἶδε περὶ σφετέρας), 6 (εὐνομίαν ῥυσάμενοι πατέρων).

<sup>351</sup> Paus. 2.22.9, 9.10.1.

<sup>352</sup> Paus. 8.28.7: κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν ἐκ Γόρτυνος ἐς Μεγάλην πόλιν πεποιήται μνημα τοῖς ἀποθανοῦσιν ἐν τῇ πρὸς Κλεομένην μάχῃ.

<sup>353</sup> Paus. 2.7.4, 2.8.5, 2.9.1-2. He uses the singular of the word τάφος to describe these monuments; Pritchett 1985, 233 considers the possibilities of this being either a cenotaph or a cremation tomb, as the sizes of the monuments would have made it relatively easy to discern four distinct monuments, had all the bodies been brought back for burial.

preserved in the Greek Anthology that is ascribed to Mnasalkas of Sikyon, an elusive epigrammatist who is believed to have flourished in the third century BC.<sup>354</sup> The epigram describes men who won glory by dying in defence of their fatherland, and exhorts their fellow citizens to do the same: ἀλλὰ τις ἀστῶν | τούσδ' ἐσιδὼν θνάσκειν τλάττω ὑπὲρ πατρίδος.<sup>355</sup> It is tempting to connect the epigram to the funerary monument mentioned by Pausanias, but there is no evidence for such an interpretation. However, whether or not it was ever inscribed on a public funerary monument, the content fits perfectly well with what we have already learned about public commemoration of the dead: sacrifice for the community, glory, and the importance of their homeland. The last sentence in particular highlights the central element of exhortation to future generations, who are called upon to act in a similar way when the need arises. For an example from the second century, we can add a casualty list from Epidauros, which commemorated the men who died at the Isthmus of Corinth in 146, where L. Mummius inflicted the decisive defeat upon Corinth and the Achaian League.<sup>356</sup> It lists fifty-three Epidaurians with patronymics, arranged by four tribes (3-58), and one-hundred-and-three Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ σύνοικοι, also with patronymics (59-164). The inscription attests to the longevity of the practice of setting up communal funerary monuments.

We shall conclude this section on public funerary practices with an inscription from Megara, belonging to the fourth or fifth century AD. It is generally accepted that this is in fact a later re-inscription of an original dating to the fifth century BC: the epigram honours the Megarian soldiers who died in the Persian Wars, and mentions the battles of Artemision, Mykale, Salamis, and Plataia. It presents their actions as a struggle for the freedom of Megara and Greece as a whole.<sup>357</sup> There is uncertainty as to what the epigram was originally inscribed on, be it a polyandrion, a *heroon*, or a different type of memorial. The epigram is preceded by a few lines informing us that the re-inscription was organised by one Helladios, a priest of the

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<sup>354</sup> Fowler 1990, 334.

<sup>355</sup> 'But may any of the citizens who look upon them dare to die for the fatherland' (*GVI* 31 = *Anth. Pal.* 7.242, 3-4).

<sup>356</sup> *IG* IV<sup>2</sup>.1 28; Paus. 7.16.

<sup>357</sup> *IG* VII 53, 4-9.

city, that it was originally composed by Simonides, and that the community to that day had continued to sacrifice a bull to honour the dead.<sup>358</sup> The specific problems surrounding authorship, hero cult, and transmission can be ignored for our purposes, however: what matters is that the epigram publicly honoured the citizens who had died fighting for the polis, and that it could still be used, within the same civic context, as a symbolic expression several hundred years later.<sup>359</sup> We can only speculate about the exact circumstances and motivations behind the re-inscription, which might be connected to the rise of Christianity, or to a breakdown in civic unity, or simply to a desire to express solidarity or pride. Whatever the case, communal sacrifice at a memorial for the dead of the Persian Wars would have created, very much like the public funeral at Athens, a powerful source of normative power, as the citizens come together to remember, celebrate, and shape their past glories, present unity, and future successes.<sup>360</sup>

Let us now turn to private funerary inscriptions that also attest to the importance of the polis as a socio-political system in soldiers' combat motivations. The Greek Anthology includes a sepulchral epigram under the heading of the sixth century lyric poet Anakreon of Teos. The authenticity of this epigram as a funerary inscription, like that of so many from the Greek Anthology, is uncertain, but at least there is no obvious reason to deny it.<sup>361</sup> It commemorates a man called Agathon: 'The entire polis cried out for mighty Agathon, as he lay on the pyre, having died for Abdera'.<sup>362</sup> We can deduce his death in war from the last two lines, which inform us that Ares claimed his life in battle; it appears reasonable to assume he was meant to be a (prominent?) citizen of Abdera because of his death for, maybe in defence of, the city, and the indication that the entire community lamented his loss, which

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<sup>358</sup> *IG* VII 53, 1-3; Pritchett 1985, 176 assumes an annual sacrifice.

<sup>359</sup> For a full discussion of the inscription with detailed bibliography, see Petrovic 2007, 194-208. See also Lattimore 1942, 126 with n. 274, and Pritchett 1985, 176, who describes the original monument as a war memorial, not a tomb.

<sup>360</sup> For a discussion of the commemoration of the Persian Wars in Simonidean epigrams, see Higbie 2010.

<sup>361</sup> The authenticity is discussed in Page 1981, 133-34.

<sup>362</sup> *Anth. Pal.* 7.226, 1-2: Ἀβδήρων προθανόντα τὸν αἰνοβίην Ἀγάθωνα | πᾶσ' ἐπὶ πυρκαϊῆς ἥδ' ἐβόησε πόλις.

might have been more difficult to achieve for a mercenary or a foreigner. Epitaph or exercise, the epigram speaks of sacrifice for the polis, the glory of the warrior, and the impact his death had on the entire community. These are all themes we have also found in public funerary practices, and all are set within the context of the socio-political system of the polis, which in this case was what he fought for, where he was famous, and within which he was remembered.

One inscription that somewhat blurs the lines between an individual's hometown and the place of his commemoration is *IG I<sup>3</sup> 1353*, found in Athens, but honouring a soldier from Megara named Pythion; the funerary monument has been dated to the period 445-25.<sup>363</sup> It tells us that Pythion was an excellent warrior, having killed seven of his enemies and broken off seven spears in their bodies, which brought fame to his father among his *demos*; moreover, it boasts of his having saved three Athenian tribal units by guiding them back to Athens; the epigram closes with a seemingly remarkable statement: 'Having harmed none of the men on earth, he went down into Hades deemed blessed, for all to see'.<sup>364</sup> To a modern reader this judgement might seem incompatible with his proud claim of having taken the lives of at least seven enemy soldiers, but as Crowley points out in his analysis of the epigram, killing the enemies of one's polis was seen as something desirable, and clearly did not count as unduly harming anyone.<sup>365</sup> So strong was the ideological cohesion within a polis-based socio-political system that killing members of another polis during a war was encouraged and admired. This adds another layer to the exhortative nature of many funerary monuments: on one level, they might have encouraged violence against the enemies of the city-state. Pythion's bloodied spears, however, brought glory not only to their wielder, but also to his father, and this glory is once more tied to the citizen community. The family, then, could play a pivotal role in the commemoration of fallen warriors; as parents, they embody the community the men died for, and as children they represent the future and thereby

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<sup>363</sup> *GVI 630* = *IG I<sup>2</sup> 1085* = Fornara 101.

<sup>364</sup> *IG I<sup>3</sup> 1353*, 6-8: οὐδέ {δε} να πημάνας ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων | ἐς Αἴδα κατέβα πᾶσιν μακαριστὸς ἰδέσθαι.

<sup>365</sup> Crowley 2012, 94. The historical context is probably the revolt of Megara from Athenian rule in 446 (Thuc. 1.114.1, cf. Plut. *Per.* 22.1, Diod. Sic. 12.7).

give meaning to the soldiers' deaths – in short, everyone shares in the glory and responsibility that a fallen warrior brings.

This brings us to another benefit of being a citizen-soldier that would not have been as accessible for those serving in the Royal armies: having one's family to organise the burial and necessary rituals to honour one's memory. An early fifth-century inscription from Argos can illustrate this:

Φοσίνα ἡυσεμάταν θάψα [π] | έλας ἡιποδρόμοιο  
ἄνδρα ἄ | [γα]θ[ό]ν, πολλοῖς μνᾶμα καὶ | [έσ]ομένοις,  
έν πολέμοι [φθ]ίμενον νε | αρὰν ήέβαν όλέσαντα,  
σό | φρονα, ἄε(θ)λοφόρον καὶ σ | οφόν ἡαλικίαι.

Kosina buried Hysematas by the hippodrome,  
a brave man, as a memorial to many, and to those who will be;  
he perished in war and lost his youthful prime:  
a prudent man, victorious and wise among his comrades.  
(GVI 305)

Here the individual responsible for the burial is named; Kosina could have been a female relative of the deceased man, or his wife.<sup>366</sup> There are several noteworthy features in this inscription: Hysematas is glorified as a brave and wise man, and the last word, ἡλικία, carries connotations of a military nature, but might also simply refer to his fellow-citizens in general. It is not stated what he died for, but it is made clear that his tomb shall be a memorial to the present and to future generations, which embeds the act of commemoration deeply within the civic context of a stable socio-political system, and suggests that those who contemplated his death ought to have been inspired to exhibit equally brave and wise behaviour. It is easy to imagine that the knowledge of friends and family who would take good care of one's burial and memory after death in battle would have brought great comfort to anyone preparing to go out and fight for their polis.<sup>367</sup> We have already noted that in public funerals, the state temporarily took over the role of the family, but there are

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<sup>366</sup> For a fuller discussion of the inscription and the Doric capital it was inscribed on, see Daly 1939; he suggests the woman was the wife of Hysematas, and connects his death to Kleomenes I's invasion of the Argolid in 494 (168-69, cf. Hdt. 6.67-82).

<sup>367</sup> Lattimore 1942, 224.



also examples of private sepulchral inscriptions that express relief at proper burial by those left behind: parents might thank their son for a decent burial; a father, mother and sister might be buried by the surviving son; and burial by one's children might even be described as a gift from god.<sup>368</sup>

Being buried by one's family, however, was only the first step: the tombs had to be visited regularly, decorated, and various offerings had to be made. Post-burial attention to the grave was so important that some people were adopted for this very purpose; otherwise the immediate family would have performed these duties. Such behaviour was religious in nature, complex, and required preparation to be carried out correctly.<sup>369</sup> In his study of Greek attitudes towards death and burial, Garland devotes a whole chapter to tombs and the visits paid to them; he concludes that 'it mattered in a very real sense if the cult were neglected. [...] a stêlē was much more than a monument erected to preserve the memory of the dead. Oiled, perfumed, decorated, crowned and fed, it was a focus of devotion and an object of adoration'.<sup>370</sup> We find evidence for this kind of attention in the context of *IG VII 1888*, the Thespian casualty list we have discussed above: the remains of offerings made at the monument span several decades, with pottery dated to the period of construction, followed by a short gap, and then recommencing decades later. In her discussion of the monument, Low observes that such memorials are not only tombs, but rather 'symbols and sites with which the local community might actively engage over a more extended period'.<sup>371</sup> Just like the public tombs at Athens, these memorials formed a part of every-day life and had an impact on the polis as a whole; hence we find messages and expressions, both in public and private settings, that speak to the wider community's values and ideals, and call upon it to remember and emulate the deeds of the dead.

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<sup>368</sup> Friedländer & Hoffleit 1948, No. 79a (end of sixth century, Sicily); *SGO* 19/11/01 (c. 370, Soloi, Kilikia); Lattimore 1942, 53 (no date given, Hassaia, Egypt).

<sup>369</sup> Garland 1985, 104-5, 118-19.

<sup>370</sup> Garland 1985, 119; also chapter seven *passim*. A fourth or third century epigram from Choma in Lykia informs us that Osses had adorned the tomb of his grandfather Osses and his great-grandfather Manossas, both of whom died in battle in their old age, with representations of a shield, spear, sword, and helmet (*SGO* IV 17/17/01, cf. Barbantani 2014, 318-19).

<sup>371</sup> Low 2003, 107.

Returning to Attica, we find that remembrance and emulation are at the heart of a stele from Salamis carrying an inscription that honours a certain Leon, who died defending the island. The epigram closes with an appellation to the onlookers: 'Come, young men, emulate your comrade: for he fell remembering the virtue of his Mede-slaying fathers'.<sup>372</sup> As so often, the precise date of the inscription and the events it refers to are uncertain; it appears to belong to either the late fourth or the early or mid-third century.<sup>373</sup> Leon himself seems to have been a local, judging from the mention of his ancestors as those who fought in the Persian Wars. The epitaph is a clear illustration of the normative purpose funerary monuments were supposed to have: it exhorts his fellow youths to act in the same way in the future, while Leon's death is presented as a loss to his parents, and an honourable sacrifice for his community which he died defending.<sup>374</sup> The close connection between community, family, and soldier is once more underlined, and couched in a message to the rest of the polis. The mention of the Persian Wars and the forefathers who fought in them represents another way in which symbolic power can be applied, i.e. the creation of role-models and the accompanying pressure on their descendants to perform to certain standards. Such an approach derives its efficacy from the strength and cohesion of a socio-political system that can draw on collective memory and a shared history, and combine these with current ideology in order to produce a code of conduct that corresponds to society's values and ideals.

Another example, also from the third century and also aimed explicitly at the city's youth, is an inscribed epigram for Chairippos of Aphidna:

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<sup>372</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 11960 (= GVI 1466), 5-6: ζηλοῦτ' ἀλλὰ νέοι τὸν ὁμήλικα· κάθθανε γάρ που | μηδοφόνων ἀρετᾶς μνωόμενος πατέρων.

<sup>373</sup> For a discussion of the date, see Taylor 1997, 248-50. In *ISE* 24, Moretti prefers a later date, suggesting the attack under Aratos of Sikyon in 242 (Plut. *Arat.* 24.3).

<sup>374</sup> It is possible that he was an Athenian cleruch, thus Moretti 1967, 51: 'È chiaro che il giovane Leon, caduto in difesa di Salamina, era un cleruco ateniese: lo provano senza ombra di dubbio sia l'accenno ai κληροῖ (v. 3) che quello agli avi uccisori dei Persiani (v. 6)'; more caution in interpreting the word κληροισιν in verse 3 is urged by Taylor 1997, 249.

τλήτε νέοι, πόδα θέντες ἐναντία δυσμενέεσσιν  
 θνήσκειν, αἰδόμενοι πατρίδα καὶ γο[ν]έας·  
 καὶ γάρ σοι, Χαίριππε, καταφθιμένῳ μ[έ]γα κῦδος  
 εἰκόνα δημοσίαι τε εἴσατο σῆμα πόλις,  
 ἡνίκα Μουνυχίας ὑπὸ τείχεσι δούλιον ἦμαρ  
 [ῥ]υόμενος πρὸ φίλης πνεῦμα ἔλιπες πατρίδος.

Have courage young men, as you set foot against the enemy  
 to die, in awe of your fatherland and parents.  
 For to you, Chairippos, having fallen, belongs great fame  
 as the polis set up at public expense an image and a memorial:  
 when at the walls of Mounichia the day of slavery  
 you ward off, relinquishing your life for your beloved fatherland.  
 (IG II<sup>2</sup> 5227a)<sup>375</sup>

The context is an attack on Mounichia, but the precise date is uncertain; one possibility is the failed attempt in 287/6 to take advantage of the absence of Demetrios Poliorketes to recapture the city, which ended in betrayal and the deaths of probably hundreds of Athenians.<sup>376</sup> Be that as it may, the normative character of the monument is obvious: it calls upon the youth of Athens to emulate the behaviour of Chairippos, who lost his life fighting to liberate the community. Twice it mentions the importance of the πατρίς, the physical space inhabited by all Athenians; it also draws on the power of family and respect for one's parents to fuel the young men's motivation and readiness for combat. Moreover, the community had come together to set up a public memorial for the exemplar Chairippos, to serve as a reminder for those yet to come. It is here that a crucial merging takes place between tomb and honorific memorial: whatever the original setting and appearance of the monument (tomb, cenotaph, statue, etc.), epitaph and honorific inscription are synonymous in this context, and serve a singular purpose: generating compliance through the application of normative power, which in turn is based on the manipulation and allocation of symbolic rewards on the one hand, and on the values and ideology of the socio-political system on the other, in order to instil moral involvement with the polis as an organisation. The inscription itself acknowledged this duality inherent in

<sup>375</sup> For the demotic of the inscription, see Vanderpool, 1970, 45.

<sup>376</sup> Polyaeus, *Strat.* 5.17.1; for a discussion of the date of the attack, see Oliver 2007, 58-60.

the monument: as εἰκών it served as the reward for loyal sacrifice for all to see, as σῆμα it embodied, took meaning from, and reinforced society's values.

The theme of fighting and dying for one's homeland is present in many other third-century funerary inscriptions. A pertinent example comes from Thyreion in Akarnania. The epitaph for the soldier Timokritos tells us that for his fatherland he went to war against the Aitolians, choosing either to win or to die; his death brought much grief to his father, but at least he had always remained true to his good education, remembering to the last the words of Tyrtaios, preferring virtue to life.<sup>377</sup> Apart from indicating once more that, at least on the ideological level, fighting for the polis played a central role in the combat motivation of citizen-soldiers, the epitaph also evokes two aspects we have encountered earlier: the importance of family in the (post-)burial context, and the lasting impact exhortative poetry such as that of Tyrtaios could have on the expressive habits of Greek citizens. Next, we have an early third-century funerary epigram from Krannon in Thessaly, which tells us that Ason died fighting for his country and did not dishonour his fatherland or his parents.<sup>378</sup> Here the injunction to comply is framed in negative terms, viz. Ason died having managed not to fail his community. A funerary stele from Thessalian Pherai carries an inscription for Kallias, saying that he kept his good faith/loyalty (πίστις) and honoured his virtue, and naming Tegea as his home polis.<sup>379</sup> Notwithstanding the lack of context of Kallias' death, this short inscription highlights and connects three things: loyalty, virtue, and homeland – themes that we have seen lie at the heart of the commemoration of soldiers. He might have been a mercenary who died

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<sup>377</sup> IG IX.1<sup>2</sup> 2:298 (= GVI 749), 3-8: Αἰτωλῶν γὰρ παισὶ πάτρας ὕπερ εἰς ἔριν ἐλθὼν | ὠγαθὸς ἢ νικᾶν ἤθελε ἢ τεθνάναι. | πίπτει δ' ἐμ προμάχοισι λιπῶμ πατρὶ μυρίον ἄλγος, | ἀλλὰ τὰ παιδείας οὐκ ἀπέκρυπτε καλά· | Τυρταίου δὲ Λάκαιναν ἐνὶ στέρνοισι φυλάσσων | ῥῆσιν τὰν ἀρετὰν εἶλετο πρόσθε βίου. Friedländer 1942 attributed it to Damagetos and connected the episode to the Aitolian attack on Thyreion in 220 (Polyb. 4.6.2), but since then it has been ascribed to Poseidippos (Barbantani 2014, 322).

<sup>378</sup> IG IX.2 466 (= GVI 425): Ἄσων ἐνθάδε κεῖται ὁ Δημοκλέους περὶ πάτρας | μαρνάμενος, πρῶτος δ' ἐμ προμάχοισι θάνεν· | [ο]ὐχὶ [κ]αταισχύνας πατρίδ' οὐδὲ γ[ο]ν[ῆ]ας ἑαυτοῦ, | ῥώμην δ' οἰκείαν δεῖξεν ἐν ἡλικίαι.

<sup>379</sup> IG IX.2, 430 (= GVI 1460), third century: σῶιζων μὲν πίστιν, τιμῶν δὲ ἀρε[τὰν] θάνες ὧδε, Κ<α>λ>(λ)ία Σ<τ>ασαγόρα πατρίδος ἐκ Τεγέας.

abroad, in which case his proclamation of his hometown Tegea underscores once more the lasting ties to his home polis.

Lastly, we might mention two more sepulchral epigrams preserved in the *Greek Anthology*: the first commemorates a soldier called Chaironidas, and proclaims that his valour will be missed by his polis of Elis, as he fell in a foreign land.<sup>380</sup> We do not know how or for what he died; the fact that his death occurred abroad could point to his service as a mercenary, or he might have fallen during an attack on a neighbouring polis. At any rate, even if he was a mercenary, the epigram chose to emphasise the bond between the soldier and his polis. And finally, the second epigram serves to illustrate the ideal effect normative power could have had on the combat motivation of a polis' youth, as imagined by family and the wider community:

᾽Ωδ' ὑπὲρ Ἀμβρακίας ὁ βοαδρόμος ἀσπίδ' αἶρας  
τεθνάμεν ἢ φεύγειν εἴλετ' Ἀρισταγόρας,  
υἱὸς ὁ Θεοπόμπου. μὴ θαῦμ' ἔχε· Δωρικὸς ἀνὴρ  
πατρίδος, οὐχ ἥβας ὀλλυμένας ἀλέγει.

Thus for Ambrakia did the saviour lifting the shield  
choose to die rather than flee: Aristagoras,  
the son of Theopompos. Do not marvel: a Dorian man  
cares for his fatherland, not for the destruction of his youth.  
(*Anth. Pal.* 7.213 = *GVI* 1604, late third century?)

In these lines we find at work the most important components of the normative-moral compliance relationship that operated in a Greek polis: the young man fought not for riches, but for his polis; he chose death over flight, i.e. the ultimate result of compliance over noncompliance. His father is named, and the glory of Aristagoras' actions also shines on his family; and lastly, the reader is told that for a Dorian this is perfectly normal, as Dorians care more for their country than their own lives. In other words, so effective is the compliance relationship that the needs of the community

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<sup>380</sup> *Anth. Pal.* 7.541 (= *GVI* 1503), third century, attributed to Damagetos. Cf. *IG* IX.1 871 and 872 (= *GVI* 2017), third-century funerary inscriptions found on Corcyra, for two Amphiloichian soldiers who died fighting against the Illyrians, informing the reader that the city at home will mourn their loss (see also Stecher 1981, 46).

are presented as naturally overriding those of the individual, and there is a hint that the cohesion among the lower participants encompassed not only the Ambrakians, but could be claimed for all Dorians. It is important to note, however, that this image of combat motivation is an idealised one; as such it is an abstraction of reality and cannot account for the myriad of other factors that determine why or how an individual chooses to enter combat and fight to the last. Such factors could be any combination of social, religious, psychological, personal, or ethical considerations, and thus on an individual level they are beyond reach of the modern historian. Nevertheless, in our analysis of funerary customs and commemoration, we have seen that on the collective level, Greek *poleis* had recourse to a number of themes, and expressed a certain set of values and expectations that allow us to draw some more general conclusions about the foundation of citizen-soldiers' loyalties to their organisations.

The preceding discussion aimed at finding out how a polis' treatment of fallen soldiers might have impacted on the combat motivation of its citizens, in order to help explain the relatively high levels of loyalty and commitment present in Polis armies. It has emerged that there are certain factors that seem to play an important role in shaping society's ideas about what was worth fighting and dying for, and these were expressed in normative terms through the media of public funerals, public and private monuments, and the accompanying inscriptions for groups and individuals. As so often, a large part of the evidence pertained to Athenian practice, but there is enough material from the Greek world at large, spanning the Classical and early Hellenistic periods, to enable us to apply the findings to most socio-political organisations that we describe as *poleis*. In this regard, there was also no clear difference in the normative content between communities with different political outlooks: democratic and oligarchic societies seem to have drawn on the same symbols and values to inform their members' perceptions about warfare and society. These shared ideas could be inflected in democratic and aristocratic ways to fit the political outlook of each community, but at their heart was the citizen warrior

and his moral obligation to fight for his polis, reinforced by the exercise of normative power. Three main factors stand out: patriotism, honour, and exhortation.

Patriotism played a central role in sepulchral inscriptions: fighting for one's πατρά, whether in defence or for expansion, is presented as a natural and common reason behind the deceased soldiers' willingness to fight. Usually this was phrased in abstract ways, simply stating that so-and-so died 'for' the fatherland. I have already pointed out the familial elements in the word πατρά: it is a collective term that encompasses not only the physical landscape of the polis, the political community that inhabited it, and the personal bonds that existed between the soldier and the society he left behind. The term also pertained to a shared history and purpose, a feeling of obligation to live up to the achievements of one's ancestors, and a commitment to the community that was rooted in its past, and oriented towards its future. We might call this complex the civic continuum. To die 'for' everything the term πατρά entails, then, is ultimately about ensuring its perpetuation: citizen-soldiers had to be morally involved with their polis to let the goals of the wider organisation override or replace their own. Compliance and loyalty to the state were of the utmost importance if the community wished to survive, let alone prosper. It appears that the Greek city-states understood this dynamic, and in response created an ideology and a system of honour and rewards that was based on, and conducive to, the moral involvement of their citizens. The many expressions of patriotism as the foundation of soldiers' loyalties, and of the notion that the land, the polis, and its people formed one family attest to the success of this approach.

The second factor, honours, pertains to honouring the fallen on the one hand, and to the honour inherent in military service on the other. It was especially in the realm of public commemoration of fallen soldiers that we were able to appreciate society's need to acknowledge the service rendered by its fighting members. Public funerals, the setting up of stone monuments, the inscribing of the names of the dead, and the communal nature of such acts drive home the point that loyal service was deemed worthy of recognition and reward. The rewards, however, were not primarily material: military service did not make citizens rich, and the relatives of a

fallen soldier could not expect much financial benefit. The rewards were symbolic: public honours organised and paid for by the state, eulogies, and monuments; hence Plato wrote of fallen warriors as members of the Golden Race who deserved heroic honours, while Aristotle included public burial in his list of rewards for honour.<sup>381</sup> Here we need to remind ourselves that such rewards were not handed out for success – they were bestowed for loyal service. Compliance lay at the heart of the honorific nature of public burial. Many of the texts and monuments discussed above are defiant memorials to defeat, yet this does not lessen their efficacy as creators of moral involvement, as those looking upon them would have understood that it was the fighting itself, not its outcome, that was remembered and honoured. In their entirety, the honours awarded to those who died in war must have contributed greatly to the central role military service played in a polis. This in turn impacted on the value attached to the figure of the warrior, and made compliance even more desirable. Thus, a polis possessed a potent circular system honours and compliance that rested on the soldier's underlying loyalty to the socio-political system.

Lastly, let us turn to exhortation. In many of the inscriptions dealt with above, there was an unmistakeable message to those who read them: encouragement to act in a similar way to those who had died. This was essential, as the community depended on the continuous loyalty and military service of its citizens. Hence the dead were not only honoured, but also held up as exemplars of behaviour that benefited themselves, their families, and the rest of society. Ideally, the morally committed soldier would have drawn upon these role models to influence his own actions, and funerary practices were a prime way of disseminating exhortative ideology among the citizen population, as they were public and emotionally and symbolically charged. In her analysis of the Athenian casualty lists, Low has noted that they served an important honorific function, just like the other lists the Athenians set up (e.g. for benefactors or magistrates); as such their purpose was to encourage the same commitment in the future.<sup>382</sup> This is precisely what

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<sup>381</sup> Pl. *Resp.* 468e-69b, Arist. *Rh.* 1.5.9.

<sup>382</sup> Low 2010, 344-45: 'Lists function as a means by which the proper performance of civic duties can be recognised and by which further services can be encouraged. [...] It is the fact of service to the city



Demosthenes was referring to when he concluded one of his speeches with a mention of the trophies (τὰ τρόπαια) set up by the Athenians: 'Reflect, then, that your ancestors set up those trophies, not that you may gaze at them in wonder, but that you may also imitate the virtues of the men who set them up'.<sup>383</sup> This is equally true in a funerary context, where the message can be distilled even further: 'Once upon a time these young men did something you should look up to. Given the chance, you should do the same'.<sup>384</sup> The normative character of (public and private) exhortation is clear: the members of society were given instructions as to how to behave, couched in terms of adherence to past glories, honourable and masculine behaviour, and responsibility for future generations. Again we see the normative-moral compliance relationship firmly embedded into the civic continuum.

### **3.3 A Far Cry from Home: Funerary Practices and Commemoration in Hellenistic Royal Armies**

A natural point of departure for a discussion of the funerary practices of early Hellenistic Royal armies lies in the campaigns of Alexander himself. How fallen soldiers were treated and remembered in the army of Alexander will have set certain precedents and expectations for both the generals and the soldiers in the wars that were to follow the king's premature demise; moreover, owing to the long shadow the figure of Alexander casts in our extant ancient historiography, we are in fact slightly better informed as to how he treated those who died fighting for him when compared to the Successors and the early Hellenistic kings. While there is very little evidence that pertains to the soldiers' feelings and actions in terms of burial and commemoration – mainly because the literary sources focus on the persons of Alexander and his generals – the view from the top allows us to analyse the type of

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which is essential and worthy of record; the manner in which that service was performed is of secondary importance' (344).

<sup>383</sup> Dem. 15.35. He delivered the speech in 351 (Badian 2000, 29).

<sup>384</sup> Petrovic 2010, 214.

power that was exercised over the army by the organisational elites, which in turn enables us to draw parallels with the application of power in a polis setting. This is important as it suggests not only what type of motivation might have been predominant among the troops, but also what type those in power sought to cultivate. It will become apparent that aside from the similarities to polis practices, one element in Alexander's funerary customs loomed comparatively large: material rewards.

Arrian tells us that after the battle of the Granikos in 334, Alexander saw to it that his own dead were buried with due honours, including – highly unusually – burial with their arms and armour and other ornaments; in addition, their parents and children were exempt from all taxes.<sup>385</sup> We learn nothing more from Arrian, but Diodoros adds the motive that Alexander did this to heighten his men's willingness to face the dangers of combat.<sup>386</sup> While this is probably nothing more than speculation on Diodoros' part, we will see that the manipulations of material rewards played a central role in Alexander's funerary practices. While the burial after the Granikos might have been unusual in certain ways, such as the burial with armour, in its major elements it follows a certain pattern, one that becomes clearer as we look at other examples.

Arrian, Curtius, and Diodoros all inform us about the burial of the fallen after the battle of Issos in 333. We are told that the day after the battle, Alexander conducted a splendid funeral, with the whole army arrayed for the occasion and to act as an audience for a speech, in which the king reportedly cited individually all those who distinguished themselves during the battle. Arrian states explicitly that to show his appreciation for their good service, he honoured each man with a sum of money matching his achievement.<sup>387</sup> Similarly, Alexander held a magnificent funeral and games after the completion of the siege of Tyre in 332, and again handed out

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<sup>385</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.5: καὶ τούτους τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἔθαψεν Ἀλέξανδρος ξὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις τε καὶ ἄλλῳ κόσμῳ. What exactly these 'other ornaments' were is unclear; according to Pritchett 1985, 226 this is the only known instance of burial with armour during this period.

<sup>386</sup> Diod. Sic. 17.21.6.

<sup>387</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 2.12.1: καὶ χρημάτων ἐπιδόσει ὥς ἐκάστους ξὺν τῇ ἀξίᾳ ἐτίμησεν; cf. Curt. 3.12.13 and Diod. Sic. 17.40.1.

monetary rewards to his men according to their achievements.<sup>388</sup> After defeating the Indian king Poros in battle, burial of the dead went hand in hand with material rewards for the survivors.<sup>389</sup> Justin's *Epitome* informs us that after the pursuit of Dareios has been concluded, Alexander gave burial to those who had perished in it, and distributed the vast sum of 13,000 talents to his remaining men.<sup>390</sup> It appears that the public burials organised by Alexander combined the funerary rites and honours for the fallen with the handing out of rewards for those who survived. In part, this was surely done for practical reasons, as the army was assembled in one place already; nevertheless, it established a direct link between military service, public burial, and rewards for compliance: if you died, you would receive a splendid funeral; if you lived and performed well, you would receive money. Arrian makes this explicit when he has Alexander remind his men of this very connection during the mutiny at Opis in 324: he had rewarded them with riches and paid off their debts without question, while the dead he had rewarded with honourable burial.<sup>391</sup>

These post-battle public burials are the closest we get to the public burials we find in many *poleis*: there were large crowds of people, the atmosphere was symbolically and emotionally charged, speeches were delivered and honours accorded; in the process, the communities in question would have reinforced their cohesion and solidarity, expressed and reaffirmed the fundamental motivations for their actions.<sup>392</sup> In a polis setting, these occasions were replete with civic symbolism, the rhetoric of civic ideology, and normative expressions aimed at maintaining and strengthening the socio-political system of the polis. In the case of Alexander's campaigns, which took his troops thousands of miles into unknown territory over the course of more than a decade, any socio-political system that could govern the

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<sup>388</sup> Diod. Sic. 17.46.6; the victory celebrations described in Arr. *Anab.* 2.24.6 probably included the funeral and games.

<sup>389</sup> Diod. Sic. 17.89.3, Arr. *Anab.* 5.20.1.

<sup>390</sup> Just. *Epit.* 12.1.1.

<sup>391</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.9-10.4. See Curt. 8.2.33-40 for the example of Philip, brother of Lysimachos, who was rewarded with a grand funeral for his extraordinary resilience and combat performance. For a detailed discussion of the royal funeral practices of the Argeads and the warlords of the Successor period, see Alonso 2009.

<sup>392</sup> Cf. Roisman 2003b, 311.

parameters for symbolic expressions of power was extremely far-removed, both geographically and psychologically. We find that our sources have reduced it to burial for the dead, and monetary rewards for the living. For the present discussion and the purposes of this chapter, it will suffice to point out that a distinct element of remunerative power was woven into the proceedings, one that was absent in a polis environment. It is also worthwhile to note that we are not dealing with mercenaries, where the application of remunerative power might seem more appropriate; Alexander's focus is on his Macedonians, whose compliance, like that of citizen-soldiers, could also be secured by other means. What follows in the rest of this chapter will seek to analyse how, and if, the experiences of Alexander's campaigns have left any mark on the behaviour of the Hellenistic warlords and their soldiers.

The evidence pertaining to the burial of war dead, and to the commemoration and post-burial treatment of the deceased is relatively slim; our sources often simply record that magnificent burial followed an engagement, but we learn very little about the exact rituals involved, the logistic processes behind mass cremation or burial, and precisely what happened to the remains. We are also left in the dark about acts of commemoration, the setting up of permanent markers, or the effect such public burials might have had on the assembled soldiers and their leaders. In the case of polis warfare, the most common procedure would have been cremation of the dead at the site of the battle followed by public burial back at the home polis, although burial on the actual battlefield also occurred.<sup>393</sup> The nature of a polis meant that there was a permanent and fixed location in which burial could take place, and where the community could come together to commemorate the dead with rituals and monuments. For the armies of the Successors, however, the situation was markedly different.

After Perdikkas' abortive crossing of the Nile in 320, which cost the lives of some 2,000 men and followed a series of other setbacks, we are told that it was his adversary Ptolemy who collected the bodies that were washed ashore, provided a

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<sup>393</sup> Boulay 2014, 476: 'Après un combat, les morts étaient rassemblés et subissaient souvent une crémation sur le lieu même de la bataille'.

funeral and sent the remains back to Perdikkas' camp.<sup>394</sup> This would have highlighted Perdikkas' own failure to provide proper burial for his fallen.<sup>395</sup> There is no information as to what happened to the remains once they reached their destination. Similarly, we are only told that after Eumenes inflicted a decisive defeat on the army of Krateros and Neoptolemos (both of whom perished in the battle) earlier in 320, he buried the dead.<sup>396</sup> A few years later, in 317, the battle of Paraitakene between Eumenes and Antigonos effectively ended in a draw; Antigonos, in an attempt to hide his much higher losses from the enemy, quickly cremated and buried his dead and departed; Eumenes then arrived and provided a magnificent burial for his own fallen (Diod. Sic. 19.32.3: ἐπεμελήθη τῆς ταφῆς μεγαλοπρεπῶς).<sup>397</sup> And lastly, after the battle of Gaza in 312, we learn merely that the defeated Demetrios Poliorketes obtained the bodies of his fallen for burial, some 500 men including many members of the cavalry and personal friends. The victorious Ptolemy, in turn, held a splendid funeral for his own dead.<sup>398</sup> According to Polybios, a century later, the battle of Raphia in 217 left thousands of dead on both sides; we are simply told that Ptolemy IV retrieved and buried his own dead and stripped those of the enemy, while Antiochos III had to ask for his dead and bury them under truce.<sup>399</sup> We can suppose that the (mass) burials, at least on the victorious Ptolemaic side, included handing out the rewards that were promised before the battle commenced.<sup>400</sup>

We see that burial of the dead was an important duty that had to be carried out by both sides after a battle (just as in polis warfare), and that at times, it appears, great effort went into organising and staging these events. What exactly we have to imagine when we hear that a funeral was 'magnificent' is unclear; it is likely,

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<sup>394</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.36.1.

<sup>395</sup> Roisman 2014, 465-66 for the importance of this duty.

<sup>396</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.32.2.

<sup>397</sup> Cf. Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.6.10, with Diod. Sic. 19.33-34.

<sup>398</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.85.1-4.

<sup>399</sup> Polyb. 5.86.2-6.

<sup>400</sup> Polybios (5.83.5-6) tells us that as they had no achievements of their own, Antiochos and Ptolemy laid greatest stress on the rewards for their men. There is also a tradition that Arsinoe III rode among the troops and promised donatives for good service (3 Macc. 1.4, cf. Fischer-Bovet 2014, 89 with n. 136).

however, that these would have been similar affairs to what we have already seen during Alexander's campaigns. Thus, they probably included speeches, parts or the whole of the army drawn up as an audience, and the distribution of rewards. If we follow Diodoros and Polyainos and accept that after Paraitakene, Antigonos desired to hide the greater number of slain on his side, we have to assume he would not have made their graves conspicuous in any way, and probably carried out mass burial rather than by groups or individuals. There were no parents or other relatives on hand to carry out the funerary rites or to set up a tombstone. Presumably, those who could organise it had their ashes conveyed to their homeland, but we have very little evidence for the practicalities of such an arrangement.

Two pieces of evidence shed some light on these issues, although both relate to mercenary service. The first, from Isaios, concerns an Athenian citizen, Nikostratos, who died abroad during service as a mercenary, probably in the mid-fourth century; we learn that Nikostratos died, was cremated, and most likely his ashes were returned to Athens for burial.<sup>401</sup> The other, more substantial piece, comes from Menander's play *Aspis*: it preserves a description of the post-battle burial procedure following the conclusion of a fictional raiding campaign in Asia Minor, in which Kleostratos, an Athenian citizen, had taken part. The dramatic date of the play is set in the late fourth or early third century, and as such it might well provide a glimpse of the realities of life and death as a (mercenary) soldier in a non-Polis army during the early Hellenistic period.<sup>402</sup> Kleostratos' slave Daos returns home weighed down by plunder (a fact to which we will return below in Chapter 5) and disheartening news: he reports that his master was slain in an attack on their camp while he, Daos, was absent, and the enemy prevented him from returning to the camp for three days. Eventually the enemy dispersed, allowing access to the camp and the site of the battle; the bodies were unrecognisable and bloated, so Daos had to identify his master by his battered shield. The campaign's commander, owing

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<sup>401</sup> Isae. 4.19, 26; for the date, see Edwards 2007, 68.

<sup>402</sup> Menander's plays were traditionally seen as realistic and representative of every-day life (Arnott 1979, xxi). In the *Aspis*, the military background of the story had to be at least believable and relatively familiar to strike a chord with his audience.

to the fact that they were in enemy territory and had no time to lose, prohibited individual cremation as it would take too long to collect all the ashes; instead, he ordered all the bodies heaped up, burned, and buried together, allowing for a prompt departure.<sup>403</sup>

This detailed description contains many points of interest: barring the plotline requiring Kleostratos' miraculous survival, his body or ashes would not have made it back to Athens at all; moreover, there is no indication that the burial site was marked in any way, certainly not permanently with a stele or an inscription; no mention is made of a ceremony, speeches, awarding of honours, or acts of commemoration; even news of his death ultimately depended on the return of his slave. It is, ultimately, an example of the meeting and intertwining of the worlds of Polis and Royal armies: Kleostratos' identity as an Athenian citizen is at risk of being obscured and forgotten because he died fighting for some warlord in a far-flung corner of the world; had he fallen closer to home, fighting for his own polis, his status and memory could have been properly honoured and preserved, and integrated into the fabric of the civic continuum. As Lape as pointed out, the bloated corpses of the men who died are a physical manifestation of this erosion of civic identity: 'That the body of the dead soldier, the thing that should have secured his identity, is disfigured beyond recognition concretely renders comic anxieties concerning the displacement and dissolution of identity in Hellenistic warfare'.<sup>404</sup> The episode also implies that, under less rushed circumstances, the commander would have allowed time-consuming individual cremation and collection of the ashes (presumably so they could be sent home for burial).<sup>405</sup> The fate Kleostratos escaped might have been in store for many a soldier who died on campaign under one of the many warlords of the early Hellenistic period (we might think of the soldiers who died at Perdikkas' crossing of the Nile), be he a mercenary or Macedonian veteran. For a positive example, we can turn to the honorific inscription for the Athenian poet Philippides,

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<sup>403</sup> Men. *Aspis*, 70-79.

<sup>404</sup> Lape 2004, 238.

<sup>405</sup> Pritchett 1985, 229. If the body had been lost, a cenotaph might have been set up at home (Pritchett 1985, 258-59).

who financed the burial for the Athenian citizens who fell in the battle of Ipsos in 301.<sup>406</sup> Not every family, however, could rely on the intercession of a wealthy benefactor to organise the burial of relatives who died on distant battlefields.

So far, then, we can see that the burial of soldiers who served in the armies of Alexander and his Successors appears to have been markedly different from that of soldiers who served in a citizen militia: no lasting commemoration, and a centrifugal force that connected many or most men to their original homeland, where they might hope their remains would come to rest. The absence of a stable socio-political system framing the burial of Royal army soldiers is apparent, and with it the absence of the ability to infuse such burial with common norms and values. The only notable element we could identify was that of material reward, usually for conspicuous service, which points to the importance of remunerative power, an element that was lacking in polis burials. As we now turn to examine individual funerary expressions, we will see that there was a wide range of themes, defying straightforward classification; unlike the funerary practices belonging to the world of Polis armies, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the expressive motivations of Royal army soldiers based on the funerary material.

Writing about the commemoration of war in different time periods, Low and Oliver state that in contrast to modernity and the Romans, 'Hellenistic Greece, for example, was interested above all in commemorating its victories'.<sup>407</sup> We have already seen that such a view has to be qualified by the existence of casualty lists in *poleis* of the Hellenistic period, such as *IG IV<sup>2</sup>.1 28* from Epidauros; arguably, casualty lists are not war or victory monuments in our modern sense, but for the Greek world it seems that the lines between funerary monument and war or victory memorial tended to blur.<sup>408</sup> This is also true on the private level, where a tombstone or a sculpture proclaimed the glory but also the death of the deceased. Epitaphs and funerary reliefs were two common ways in which individuals or families

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<sup>406</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup> 657* (= Austin 54), 16-20.

<sup>407</sup> Low & Oliver 2012, 9.

<sup>408</sup> Even public and private memory tended to overlap; city-states might provide a public burial, but families could still set up their own cenotaphs (Boulay 2014, 476).



commemorated soldiers. However, given the prevalence of war in the Hellenistic period, both on the polis level and the sphere of large-scale warfare between rival kingdoms, it might come as a surprise that military themes are rather rare in Hellenistic funerary art. In general, family scenes are much more prominent, along with themes such as communal life and civic values.<sup>409</sup> This might reflect overall preferences for certain aspects of life, and the relative importance of the civic and military roles in people's imaginations, but it casts only faint light on what motivated soldiers to go to war in the first place. For example, a funerary relief dated to c. 300 and showing Macedonian-style cavalry fighting Persian enemies tells us that combat scenes were certainly part of the repertoire of sepulchral artists; the motif here might recall the campaigns of Alexander or another engagement under the command of one of his generals, and it might have belonged to one of the soldiers involved in these campaigns.<sup>410</sup> We can infer that in death, glorious battle was what he chose to associate himself with in his communication through his tombstone, but it reveals little enough about his underlying motivations or ideals.<sup>411</sup> Once more it is to funerary epitaphs that we must turn in an attempt to glean insights into individual soldiers' values and motivations.

The main difficulty lies in identifying epitaphs that belong to soldiers who fought in the armies of the early Hellenistic warlords and kings, and not to mercenaries employed by *poleis*, or indeed to citizen army soldiers. This is compounded by the fact that we do not always learn the provenance of a deceased warrior, or their employer, or the conflict they died in: this makes it problematic to say with any confidence that a certain epitaph belonged to the army of e.g. Seleukos

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<sup>409</sup> Pfuhl & Möbius 1979, 306: 'Der fortwährende Kampf und Sturm der hellenistischen Welt kommt in den Grabreliefs auffallend wenig zum Ausdruck – wohl hauptsächlich deshalb, weil die Kriege vorwiegend mit fremden Söldnern geführt wurden'; they also suggest that reliefs would have been rare for those who fell far away from their homeland, and that if at all, friends of the deceased might opt for a cheaper painted stele. For the *poleis* of western Asia Minor, cf. Pfuhl & Möbius 1977, 44 (point out the focus on individuals and families, 'neben welchen Tätigkeitsbilder in Beruf und Kampf stark zurücktreten'); Morris 1994, 82 ('Relatively few fourth-century reliefs have military themes, however. [...] they tend to show family scenes'); and Osborne 2010, 252.

<sup>410</sup> Pfuhl-Möbius 1271, of unknown provenance.

<sup>411</sup> More examples of Greek warrior funerary reliefs of the Hellenistic and Imperial periods can be found in Pfuhl & Möbius 1977, 113-16; relevant Hellenistic items are rare: Pfuhl-Möbius 287, 289, 1273, 1274, 1275, 1276, 1277, 1278, 1393, 1429, 1445.

Nikator or Ptolemy IV. Military epitaphs in general became more widespread, but also more complex and varied in the third century, making classification even more hazardous.<sup>412</sup> In addition, there is the danger of dealing with literary epitaphs as opposed to 'real', i.e. inscribed ones, esp. when using anthologies.<sup>413</sup>

One such epitaph from the *Palatine Anthology* that might have been inscribed is *Anth. Pal.* 7.232. It was attributed to Antipater of Sidon, but it is more likely that it belongs to Anyte of Tegea; hence the date of the epitaph could either be dated to the second/first century (Antipater), or to the third century (Anyte).<sup>414</sup> The epigram informs us of the death of Amyntor, son of Philip, who lies buried in Lydia; he died in battle, protecting his comrade with his shield.<sup>415</sup> It is entirely possible that, if this is a real epitaph, Amyntor was a Macedonian soldier in the service of Alexander or one of his Successors (or one of the later Hellenistic kings). The last bit of information, that Amyntor died defending his comrade, suggests that in this particular case, it was not defence of his native land, or the glory of the ancestors that the deceased wanted to underline. The trappings of a socio-political system that we have observed repeatedly in many epitaphs for citizen-soldiers are absent, and in their stead we find the personal bond between two soldiers. Compare a second-century epitaph for two Milesian officers: in this instance, we know who their employer was – the second-century Seleukid Demetrios I.<sup>416</sup> But all we learn from their epitaph is their father's name Menestheus and their military rank of *hegemones* (line 4). This corresponds to the general impression we get of Royal army burials, that there was a distinct lack of a socio-political framework. Comradeship was possibly given greater value when there was no unifying civic identity to hold together groups of soldiers.

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<sup>412</sup> Barbantani 2017 (forthcoming), discussing also the identity of the authors and the process of choosing, collecting, and inscribing them.

<sup>413</sup> Authentic epitaphs for individual soldiers in the *Palatine Anthology* are relatively rare: Barbantani 2017 (forthcoming).

<sup>414</sup> For the date and brief discussion, see Barbantani 2017 (forthcoming), who doubts the authenticity of a real epitaph in Lydia based on Anyte's connection to the Peloponnese.

<sup>415</sup> *Anth. Pal.* 7.232 (= *SGO* I, 490), verse 4: ἀλλ' ὄλετ' ἀμφ' ἐτάρῳ σχῶν κυκλόεσσιν ἵππιν.

<sup>416</sup> *GVI* 1286 = *SGO* I 01/20/35; cf. Barbantani 2014, 311.

In a third-century epitaph, Meletos, a Messenian who was buried in Priene, proclaims his homeland, boasts of his prowess in battle, and states that he died worthy of his ancestors (προγόνων δ' ἄλξια δρῶν ἔθανον).<sup>417</sup> Most likely Meletos was a mercenary, recruited either by the Prienians or by one of the many warlords of the third century.<sup>418</sup> He was buried far from home, yet his focus is firmly on his origins: the opening line mentions his homeland Messene, and the last line his ancestors, framing his military achievements in between. In contrast to the epitaphs for militia soldiers, however, he does not claim to have fought for anything, neither family nor country, probably because such claims would not have had much traction for a mercenary who fought and died so far from home. We might wonder who, in cases such as these, carried out the post-burial rites, paid visits to the tomb, or indeed who set it up in the first place. In a polis setting these issues can all be resolved relatively easily, but for a soldier of a Royal army, there was little certainty beyond death. As the example of Menander suggests, there might not even be individual burial in the first place, not to mention any form of permanent marker. Hence, we can detect in Meletos' epitaph a thread connecting him to his homeland and his ancestors, an echo of the stable and communal environment a polis could provide for its fallen. Below we will encounter an epitaph for Lykos, a citizen of Priene buried in Egypt: clearly, there were incoming and outgoing (mercenary) soldiers from Priene, which might have influenced how they treated mercenaries that died in their service or territory.

In this context, a second-century epitaph can be adduced, which points out many of the elements that were missing in a burial outside the polis. An inscription from Elaia, near Pergamon, was set up for Sotas, a soldier who died fighting against the Galatians, and laments that he was buried so far from his parents, his wife, and his fatherland.<sup>419</sup> As usual we do not know whether Sotas was fighting as part of a citizen army, or as a mercenary for a local leader, or a king; that the distance between his homeland and his place of death was far enough for him not to be buried at home

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<sup>417</sup> GVI 799 = SEG 30.1363, line 6; cf. Barbantani 2014, 322 and Boulay 2014, 108.

<sup>418</sup> Boulay 2014, 476.

<sup>419</sup> GVI 754 = SGO I 06/01/01, lines 7-10.

could suggest that he was part of a larger expedition, making his employment as a mercenary more likely. The last two cases involved soldiers who died far from their home polis, but we have an epitaph in which the benefits of a polis' socio-political system come together with military service in a Royal army: *GVI* 943, an epitaph for Antigenes son of Sotimos (dated to after 217), preserves many details regarding his death: he was from Demetrias in Magnesia (6-7), and died fighting the Aitolians (4-5); we also learn that he died near Thebes (13), and the name of his mother, Soso (8). It has been argued that Antigenes' death occurred during the campaign of Philip V against Phthiotic Thebes, which is only a short distance south of Demetrias.<sup>420</sup> The epitaph asserts that neither his fatherland, nor his household, nor his mother wept for his death, as he died bravely and gloriously.<sup>421</sup> It appears, then, that his death occurred while serving in a Royal army, and that he died close enough to Demetrias for burial at home, enabling the setting up of a tombstone with an inscription. The epitaph mentions several of the elements we find in those of citizen soldiers: the importance of family, his ancestral land, and the glory of his death, but just like with Meletos, no claim is made to have fought for anything in particular. There are no elements of any normative influence on his actions, such as fighting and dying for one's country; only the glory of his death is underlined. This is a rare case where we might be able to say with relative certainty how and where a Royal army soldier was buried. Antigenes fell close enough to his home polis so that his family could take care of his funeral, but the other examples we discussed remind us that many, if not most, soldiers who fought in the wars of the Successors and the Hellenistic kings did not enjoy such a luxury, their place of death being on one of the many far-flung battlefields of the period, which could have meant mass burial and/or cremation, and little chance of individual epitaphs to commemorate their sacrifice.

Another funerary inscription that bridges the gap between polis and Royal army soldiers is that commemorating the death of the Bithynian officer Menas.<sup>422</sup>

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<sup>420</sup> For text and commentary, see Cairon 2009, 233-38; cf. Polyb. 5.99-100.

<sup>421</sup> *GVI* 943, 6-9: Μάγνης δὲ δόμος καὶ πατρίς ἔπολβος / ἢ Δημητρίων οὐ με κατωικτίσατο, / υἱὸν Σωτίμου τὸν γνήσιον· οὐδέ με Σωσῶ / μήτηρ.

<sup>422</sup> *GVI* 1965; *SGO* I 09/05/16; Pfuhl-Möbius 1269.

He was commemorated with a relief showing him in combat, and with two epitaphs on the same stone. We learn that he fell fighting valiantly at Kouropedion (lines 2, 6, 16), and the inscription states explicitly that he fought for his fatherland and his parents (lines 11-13). The exact date of his death, or the engagement he fought in are unknown, and the suggestions range from 281 to the 150s.<sup>423</sup> That the epitaph claims he fought for his ancestral land and parents implies he was no mercenary; Barbantani characterises Menas as 'a representative of the wealthy Bithynian Hellenized ruling class'.<sup>424</sup> I have included his example here as it reveals the importance of the socio-political system in shaping people's perceptions concerning what is worth fighting for: just as in polis epitaphs, the stress on the fatherland and the assertion that his death was in service of it and his family points to some form of normative influence on the expressive motivations of Bithynian soldiers. This influence would most likely have its origins in Menas' identity as a Bithynian and a member and defender of his homeland's independence and status.<sup>425</sup> The soldiers of the Successors, operating in a form of socio-political limbo, lacked this influence, and were thus more amenable to other types of power and involvement.

Next, we will discuss several epitaphs in connection to Egypt, some of which are rather late, but still provide useful information for assessing the burial practices of Royal army soldiers; moreover, they allow a glimpse of the effects that settling soldiers as *kleruchs* might have had on the way the fallen were portrayed in sepulchral inscriptions. First, a short inscribed epitaph in two elegiac distichs, found in modern Abu Qir (ancient Herakleion-Thonis) and dated to the early or middle Ptolemaic period in its newest edition, tells us of the death of the soldier Lykos, son

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<sup>423</sup> That Menas died in the famous last battle of the Successors in 281 is very unlikely; see Dumitru 2011, 467-72, who suggests an unknown battle in the third century, possibly part of Bithynia's ongoing conflicts with its neighbours: 'Ménas n'était pas un mercenaire, car il combattait «pour sa patrie et ses illustres parents», et donc l'unité d'infanterie légère qu'il commandait a dû participer a une bataille qui aurait pu décider du sort de la Bithynie'. For an image of the stele and translations of the epitaphs, see Chaniotis 2005, 204-6; Bar-Kochva 1974 argues for a smaller skirmish in the mid-second century.

<sup>424</sup> Barbantani 2017 (forthcoming).

<sup>425</sup> For a short overview of the many attempts to conquer and control Bithynia, see *EAH* s. v. 'Bithynia', 1138-40; for the identity of Hellenistic Bithynia, see Scholten 2008 and Michels 2009. For the region under Rome, see Bekker-Nielsen 2008 (esp. 21-29 for pre-Roman Bithynia).

of Lykiskos, naming his homeland as Priene and boasting of his courage.<sup>426</sup> It is possible that Lykos was a mercenary in the service of the Ptolemies, or one of the soldiers who was offered land and settled in Egypt. At any rate, it appears that he died too far from home for burial in Priene; notwithstanding his settlement and burial in Egypt, he still chose to name Priene as his *πάτρᾳ*. Again, we find no trace of a cause or other elements of belonging to a wider community; the end of the first line is lost, but among the editors' suggestions is *συνέταιρος* (comrade), which raises the possibility that Lykos was buried by one of his fellow soldiers. If so, it would emphasise the absence of the polis network of friends and family, and set in its place the military organisation that Lykos was a member of.

The second example dates to the early second century, and was found in Koptos (modern Qift): the inscription proclaims the deaths of Ptolemy and his son Menodoros, both of whom died in the same battle.<sup>427</sup> The epitaph further states that they died bestowing gifts on their fatherland (*πάτρᾳ*), and that Ptolemy had been *gymnasiarchos* during his lifetime (lines 9-10). We do not know who exactly these two men were; according to Fischer-Bovet, no kleruchs are attested for Koptos, although at least in the second century there were kleruchs and garrisons in neighbouring settlements.<sup>428</sup> Their names, the fact that Ptolemy was a *hegemon* of the 'Macedonian' troops (lines 1, 5), and his lifetime role as *gymnasiarch* point to the conclusion that they were of Greco-Macedonian origin, but this cannot be said with certainty: Egyptians adopted Greek names, and by the second century it appears that the *gymnasia*, the socio-military organisations originally imported by Greco-Macedonian immigrants, also adopted Egyptian and Greco-Egyptian members.<sup>429</sup> If Ptolemy and Menodoros were indeed non-Egyptians, it is noteworthy that they identified themselves with Egypt, called it their fatherland, described their sacrifice as gifts for it, and were seemingly well integrated into the socio-cultural world of

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<sup>426</sup> The epitaph is discussed in detail in Clarysse & Huys 2003.

<sup>427</sup> GVI 1149; text and translation in Barbantani 2007, 111-12.

<sup>428</sup> Fischer-Bovet 2014, xxiii: kleruchs are attested for Diospolis Parva and Hermonthis, both within fifty km of Koptos.

<sup>429</sup> Although this might have been extremely rare; on the *gymnasia* and other military associations, see Fischer-Bovet 2014, 280-90, and generally chapter 5 on the ethnic composition of the Ptolemaic army.

their homeland. This recalls the expressions of loyalty we observed in the epitaphs of citizen soldiers, and that we find it in this example might have its reasons in the very fact that through settlement in Egypt, Ptolemy and his son were over time, or over generations, integrated into the socio-political system of their new home, providing a social, religious, cultural, and political framework similar to that of a polis community; in other words, something worth fighting for.

Two other late examples from Egypt show how powerful the effect of a stable socio-political system could be: *GVI 1151* is an epitaph for an aristocratic soldier, Apollonios, son of Ptolemy, from Apollinopolis Magna (Edfu), who probably died around 103-101, in the so-called War of the Sceptres. His epitaph, composed by a local poet called Herodes, is long and elaborate, and was inscribed in Greek verse and Egyptian prose, pointing to the dual identity of the deceased.<sup>430</sup> The inscription mentions his illustrious father, and how Apollonios wanted to emulate his achievements by going to war for his 'beautiful fatherland' (line 9: πατρίδος καλῆς); unfortunately he died fighting bravely, 'keeping his sweet loyalty' (line 13: γλυκερὰν τηρῶν ἄμα πίστιν) – he further laments that he was unable to attain his homecoming and see his children again, whom he had left behind, and was ultimately buried by his father. This epitaph is replete with familiar expressions: fighting and dying for the glory of one's family and fatherland, the importance of family, military prowess, the connection to children, burial by a close relative – all of these themes we have encountered before, in the sepulchral customs of militia soldiers. For this study it is particularly noteworthy that the text explicitly states that Apollonios maintained his loyalty, as if there were any reason for doubting it. After two hundred years, the relative stability of the Ptolemaic kingdom seems to have had a positive effect on the loyalty of at least some of its troops and commanders, who were able to express their allegiance and bonds not only to the friends and family they left behind, but also their (father)land itself.

Our last inscription from Egypt is even later, dating to the first century (possibly the year 31), and belongs to Diazelmis, a mercenary captain from Apamea

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<sup>430</sup> Barbantani 2014, 303-4, with text and translation.

in Bithynia.<sup>431</sup> He proclaims his strong loyalty to the rulers of Egypt (line 8: ζαμενῆ πίστιν), and asserts that while Apamea was his πατῆρ, Egypt was the land that nurtured him (13-14), and where his grandchildren cared for him in his old age. In terms of military loyalty, this is an ideal scenario: a mercenary captain comes to settle in Egypt, develops ties of loyalty to the land and its rulers, and has a family in the third generation; in this case, the ties to his new home, that also became the home of his descendants, are portrayed as strong enough to override the connection to his birthplace.

In contrast, we have an epitaph for another mercenary captain, Praxagoras from Crete, who served the Ptolemies in the third century: his short epitaph tells us his fatherland, the names of his parents, his own name, the name of his employer (an unknown member of the Lagid house), and his military rank.<sup>432</sup> He was buried not in his homeland, but in Kition on the southern coast of Cyprus (modern Larnaka), possibly because this is where he served during his employment. Here the bond between Praxagoras and Egypt is markedly weaker, and at the heart of the epitaph are his own background and the honour of his service under the Ptolemies. We may note that again, there is no indication as to what or whom he fought for, or any expression of loyalty or allegiance to a wider community.

### 3.4 Conclusion

One aim of this chapter was to explore what the funerary practices of Polis armies on the one hand, and of Royal armies on the other can tell us about the types of power and involvement that were present in these organisations. Another was to demonstrate the importance of a stable and pervasive socio-political system for the maintenance of an effective normative-moral compliance relationship, and to show that ultimately, its absence both weakened the bond between lower participants

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<sup>431</sup> *GVI* 1153, cf. *SEG* 54.1759; see also Barbantani 2014, 309-10 for text and translation.

<sup>432</sup> *GVI* 1076.



and organisational elites and allowed for the establishment of other types of compliance relationships, in our case a remunerative-calculative one.

Regarding the first aim, we can conclude that for Polis armies, there was a prominent and powerful normative element interwoven with public burials and public commemoration of the war dead. Civic ideology infused the proceedings, and revolved around the themes of sacrifice for the polis and glorification of the community's past, present, and future. To this end, *poleis* often prioritised communal achievement over individual glory, and promoted a spirit of willing compliance with society's demands: public ceremonies contained a distinct exhortative component, couched in normative directives encouraging future service by promising symbolic rewards. In the analysis of private funerary expressions, it became apparent that they often corresponded to such normative power, and exhibited many elements suggesting the presence of moral involvement. Love for the land of one's fathers, sacrifice for one's friends and relatives, but also for the abstract notion of the community's past and future glories, and a conscious commitment to one's ancestors and descendants all played a central part. For the soldiers of the Hellenistic Royal armies, the situation was less clear: we noted that beginning with the public burials of Alexander's campaigns, there was a much closer association between burial, commemoration, compliance, and remuneration. Private burial practices of Royal army soldiers were more difficult to assess, owing to the varied nature of the evidence and the general lack of context for most of the material – what was present was just as significant as what was absent, especially when compared to the evidence pertaining to citizen-soldiers. Proclamations of love for a homeland, sacrifice for others, or the glory of one's ancestors were largely lacking; in their stead, we found expressions of longing for home, prowess in battle, and personal honour. To argue from this for a calculative involvement would be too much, but it is possible to posit the weakening, if not the absence, of moral elements.<sup>433</sup>

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<sup>433</sup> There are in fact epitaphs that mention the financial benefits of soldiering; one example, from the very late Hellenistic or early Imperial period, is preserved in *Anth. Pal.* 7. 678, an epitaph for one

But we should not insist on too strong a division between the two models, as there were several interesting links between them: the public burials of Alexander's army mirrored those of polis communities, and played equally on the soldiers' personal affection for their king and on their desire to acquire material rewards. We also saw how Menander could dramatise some of the fundamental tensions and fears that accompanied citizen-soldier who enrolled with a Hellenistic warlord, as their civic identity was at risk of being lost, physically and metaphorically. Citizen soldiers enlisting as mercenaries to fight in the wars of the Hellenistic kings also revealed other shared values and motivations between Polis and Royal armies: a calculative mindset was, to a degree, present in both organisations, tempered or fuelled in each case by the existence or absence of other normative influences, such as the socio-political system of the polis.

As for the second aim, it is notable that most factors that contributed to the normative-moral elements in polis burial customs were related to the socio-political system of the polis itself: the permanent framework provided by the city-state surrounded its soldiers from birth until death, and it is not surprising that we find it represented in the funerary and commemorative practices of a polis community. The civic continuum – in the form of a shared history; common religious, socio-cultural, and political norms and values; a clearly defined ethnic and geographic identity; and a responsibility for the future survival of the society as a socio-political unit – made moral involvement much more likely, and much more sustainable when compared to the situation in a Royal army, where these elements were weaker, if not absent. It was only slowly, as the Hellenistic kingdoms grew more stable and could look back on a continuum of their own, that we find expressions like those that reflect the normative structure of a polis. As I will show in Chapter 5, this lack of a strong socio-political system was partly made up for by the application of a different type of power: remuneration. First, however, we need to turn to the third type of power that Royal and Polis armies might have used to generate compliance, i.e.

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Soterichos; the short poem (five lines), describes how he completed his military service and left his children great wealth (he also points out that he never gained wealth unjustly).

coercion. The next chapter will demonstrate that neither army possessed a coercive apparatus effective enough to maintain high levels of compliance; consequently, the predominant type of power that was applied had to be either normative or remunerative. By now it should hopefully be clear that Polis armies tended towards the former, and Royal armies towards the latter.

# Chapter Four

## *The Limits of Power: Punishments in Polis and Royal Armies*



### 4.1 Introduction

Before discussing the reward systems in Polis and Royal armies, and analysing them for what they can tell us about the predominant type of power that was applied, it is necessary to deal with the third type of power that might sustain a compliance relationship: coercion, or the use of punishments and force to secure obedience.

By way of setting the scene, we may turn to a report submitted to the British House of Parliament in 1836 regarding the use of corporal punishment in the military, entitled *Report from His Majesty's Commissioners for Inquiring into the System of Military Punishments in the Army*. The investigation included interviewing dozens of soldiers, from Privates to Major-Generals, and among those questioned was Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington. He was asked whether he believed abolishing corporal punishment would 'have the effect of producing a better class of persons in the Army'; his answers are highly revealing:

A. I do not think it would. I do not see how you can have an Army at all unless you preserve it in a state of discipline, nor how you can have a state of discipline unless you have some punishment. [...] There is no punishment which makes an impression upon any body except corporal punishment.

Q. Supposing the power of corporal punishment had not been in your hands at that time, could you by any other means have established that discipline in the Army?

A. No, it is out of the question.  
(Archibald et al. 1836, 324-25)

The causal connection here is simple: physical punishment is required to maintain army discipline, and Wellington seems unable to imagine an army that can operate in the field without it. For him, punishment equalled discipline. His statement that no army could be disciplined without physical coercion makes most sense if we assume that the majority of the soldiers under his command are more or less hostile towards their superiors, and that conditions of service were such as to make unquestioning obedience to the organisational elites (the officers) something to be actively or passively resisted. In other words, Wellington presided over an organisation where the predominant type of involvement from the lower participants (the soldiers) was alienative. In this light, his insistence on coercion makes perfect sense: as we have seen in Chapter 1, coercive power is the only type that creates a congruent compliance relationship when paired with alienative involvement. But what about the alternatives? What if the lower participants in an army were in fact predominantly morally involved, or calculatively? In those cases, coercion should quickly lead to a breakdown of compliance. It is the task of the present chapter to investigate this dynamic in Polis and Royal armies.

We will examine if and how Polis and Royal armies used coercion to generate compliance; it should quickly become clear that neither army could rely on an effective coercive apparatus to keep its soldiers under control. As a consequence, compliance had to be secured predominantly by other means, which will be explored in the next chapter: normative power for *poleis*, and remuneration for Royal armies.

## 4.2 Compliance and Coercion in Ancient Greek Armies

Before turning to the armies of Greek *poleis* and Hellenistic kingdoms, it might be useful to have a brief look at other armies to see how coercion could be used as an effective means of control over an organisation's lower participants. From comparatively recent history, the widespread mutinies in the French army during the First World War can serve as a good example. After the failed Nivelle Offensive in April/May 1917, more than half of all front line infantry divisions experienced mutiny and incidents of noncompliance. Philippe Pétain was given special powers from the government to put down the rebellions: the government and civic institutions would completely remove themselves from the military sphere, allowing for quick trials and executions. In one instance, some 700 men from a battalion mutinied, but were eventually convinced to surrender; as punishment, and to prevent any future refusal of service, five men from each company were selected for execution.<sup>434</sup> The harsh reprisals were an attempt to combat the lax approach that had prevailed previously: a contributing factor to the quick spread of the mutinies appears to have been the knowledge among soldiers that there was no real threat of punishment, as court martials were only very rarely held and allowed for easy appeals.<sup>435</sup> Pétain combined the coercive approach to discipline and obedience with improvements of service conditions, such as extended and more frequent furloughs and recovery periods; relying on coercion alone might have aggravated the precarious situation.

The successful suppression of the mutinies reveals how coercive power can be effectively applied to ensure compliance, but it also suggests that a recourse to harsh treatment is suitable only in the short term, hence the changes to the men's routines. We may also note that the reprisals went hand in hand with a strict separation between the civic and military spheres, giving Pétain full control over the situation. This implies that there are certain coercive methods which require the army to possess its own legal system without interference from civic officials, or that

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<sup>434</sup> Watson 1997, 59-61.

<sup>435</sup> Watson 1997, 61.

certain methods might be unacceptable in a civic setting. Later on it will be shown that in a polis, where there was no meaningful distinction between the military and the civic realms to begin with, there was correspondingly less room for effective coercion. This link between a strong overlap of 'army' and 'society' and the relative absence of coercion ultimately has its roots in the normative values of a given socio-political system: as we will see, a polis managed to do largely without coercion precisely because there was no clear separation between the military and the civic.

Looking at armies closer in time to those of the ancient Greeks, the Persians offered a ready model that the Greeks themselves viewed as overly coercive. How accurate such claims were is highly debatable, but at the very least they might offer a glimpse into how some Greeks saw themselves.<sup>436</sup> The contrast is a clear one: while the Persians apparently had to be forced into combat with a whip and harsh punishments, Greek soldiers were free citizens who chose to fight of their own will, in obedience to their community and laws, not to a single commander or king. Herodotos emphasised this dynamic in his description of the Persian Wars: at Thermopylai, the Persians are described as being driven forward with whips, while after the defeat at Salamis, some of the unsuccessful captains were beheaded for accusing others of incompetence.<sup>437</sup> Contrast this with the picture Herodotos has the exiled Spartan king Demaratos paint for Xerxes: the Spartans fight as free men, and they fear their laws more than Xerxes' soldiers fear their Great King.<sup>438</sup> Rhetoric aside, the implication is clear: Xerxes' coercive power cannot create the same level of commitment as that created by the normative influence of Spartan law and tradition. This is of course an idealised picture and reality was certainly more complex: out of all the Greeks, the Spartans might have had the strongest coercive elements embedded into their compliance relationship. But on an ideological level, the contrast still points towards the secondary roles that punishment and fear played in Greek armies, compared to personal freedom and choice.

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<sup>436</sup> On this theme generally see Hall 1989 (esp. chapter 2), and Harrison 2011.

<sup>437</sup> Hdt. 7.223, 8.90.

<sup>438</sup> Hdt. 7.102-104.

The Roman military offers another point of comparison. Today, the punishments meted out to offending soldiers are usually seen as excessively brutal.<sup>439</sup> The *decimatio*, or execution of one in ten men from a unit who had disgraced itself in combat, has taken on a modern meaning that has inverted its actual effect: to 'decimate' something is more likely to mean destroying nine parts out of ten, rather than one. Another famous example is the *fustuarium*, the clubbing or stoning to death of a soldier who was caught absent or sleeping on guard duty.<sup>440</sup> Deserters, too, were dealt with swiftly and routinely executed – the same fate could await those who fled the standard, as the power over life and death lay with the general.<sup>441</sup> However, while the existence of such punishments is widely known, it is unclear how often they were enforced in practice, and the recorded instances of such harsh treatment of Roman soldiers are relatively few and far between. Livy himself asserted that mild punishments were in fact a hallmark of Roman military discipline.<sup>442</sup>

Usually the Roman army is presented as a stark contrast to Greek armies: the legions were highly disciplined and enforced harsh punishments, which led to high levels of professionalism; the Greeks, on the other hand, adopted a hands-off approach, where punishments were lenient and rare, leading to correspondingly lower levels of professionalism, so that Greek armies are most often called 'amateur armies'.<sup>443</sup> While to some extent the contrast is justified, there is a danger here of equating the concepts of discipline and punishments, or to assume that punishments

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<sup>439</sup> Pickford 2005, 123-28 argues that the severity of the punishments was designed to instil fear, and consequently compliance.

<sup>440</sup> Polybios (6.37-38) preserved a detailed description of these methods. For punishments in the Roman army generally, see chapter 4 in Phang 2008. Cf. Frontin. *Str.* 4.1.16.

<sup>441</sup> Phang 2008, 118-21.

<sup>442</sup> Livy 1.28.11, cf. Cic. *Clu.* 128. For an argument in favour of a more balanced view of Roman discipline and punitive measures, see Kiesling 2006, 233-45; for an overview of the historical development of military discipline from Homeric to Roman armies, see Chrissantos 2013. For the rarity of the *decimatio*, see Pickford 2005, 128-33, and for its uses during the Roman Republic, see Goldberg 2015.

<sup>443</sup> Thus part three in van Wees 2004 is called 'Amateur Armies'; for the 'amateur' view of hoplite warfare in general, see Anderson 1970, 90; Pritchett 1974, 175; Hanson 2000, 203 and 212; van Wees 2004, 87; Lendon 2005, 100, and Hunt 2007, 128-9. For the contrast between Roman 'professionalism' and Greek 'amateurism', see Kiesling 2006, 226.



are inherently necessary to maintain discipline.<sup>444</sup> In this chapter's introduction we observed how the causal link between corporal punishment and discipline was seen as implicit by Wellington – but his viewpoint was firmly that of a member of an organisational elite confronted with widespread alienative involvement from the lower participants. From an analytical perspective it is important that we separate discipline and punishment, to create space for alternative ways of generating compliance. Coercion can certainly be a tool to secure compliance, but it is by no means the only, and certainly not the most effective one. The crucial point is that coercion is by nature reactionary – it is a response to a real or perceived transgression committed by an organisation's lower participant.<sup>445</sup> Transgressions are of course more likely if those over whom power is exercised display a calculative (primary concern for personal welfare) or alienative (hostile towards superiors) orientation towards their organisational elites. Hence, high levels of coercion point to precisely those two types of involvement, whereas low levels suggest the presence of a predominantly moral involvement in the lower participants. Discipline, then, can be achieved through various methods besides punishment, including the allocation of rewards, which is why this chapter focuses on both to determine the causes of transgressions and how organisations reacted to them.<sup>446</sup> We will now examine how important a role coercion played in the citizen armies of Greek city-states.

As noted above, Sparta was somewhat notorious for its harsh military discipline, compared to the rest of the Greek *poleis* – but clear evidence for Spartan coercive measures is surprisingly hard to come by.<sup>447</sup> The very few recorded instances mostly involve Spartan commanders and soldiers from foreign armies or mercenaries. Thus, in 411, some Syracusan and Thurian sailors serving in the Peloponnesian fleet demanded their pay from their Spartan commander Astyochos, but were sharply rebuffed; Astyochos was about to strike the captain of the Thurian contingent when he was assailed by the sailors and had to seek refuge at an altar.

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<sup>444</sup> Kiesling 2006, 233.

<sup>445</sup> This is true even if coercion is applied as a preventative measure or a deterrent, as it requires an earlier transgression in order to be effective – otherwise it would be viewed as gratuitous.

<sup>446</sup> Chrissantos 2013, 313.

<sup>447</sup> Hornblower 2000, 59, cf. the examples collected in Pritchett 1974, 239-43.

We hear nothing of any reprisals against the men who wanted to attack their commander-in-chief, but Thucydides does stress that most of the sailors were free citizens.<sup>448</sup> In a similar episode preserved in Xenophon's *Anabasis*, we are told that the Spartan commander Klearchos broke up a dispute between his own men and a soldier belonging to another company, whom he struck as a punishment, believing him to have been in the wrong. Soon after, Klearchos was attacked by the comrades of the man he struck, being pelted with stones and even an axe. Only the arrival of Cyrus prevented the dispute from escalating further.<sup>449</sup>

This same Klearchos was using his *bakteria* – the Spartan officer's staff – to strike those whom he deemed slacking in their efforts when building bridges or filling in ditches, but this caused little resentment as he himself set an example by lending a hand and working hard.<sup>450</sup> Towards the beginning of the march up-country, however, Klearchos had tried to force his men to continue following Cyrus against their will, and again ended up almost losing his life to stones thrown by his men. Realising that coercion would not work, he turned to normative arguments: he regained their goodwill by invoking their past exploits and bonds of kinship and brotherhood, even calling the army his πατρίς.<sup>451</sup> This is a striking example of an attempt at invoking the normative bonds of family, fatherland, and a shared past, the power of which we have discussed in Chapter 3, to generate compliance and loyalty: Klearchos is effectively trying to motivate a Royal army (albeit one serving a non-Greek monarch) by appealing to the very factors that made Polis armies so loyal. Here, then, the two models intersect: stranded and directionless, it is the ad-hoc creation, however short-lived, of a socio-political system and a civic continuum that serves to unite the Greeks in Asia.

There is also the potentially apocryphal story of Kallibios, made harmost of Athens after the city's surrender to Lysander: he struck an Athenian, who decided to

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<sup>448</sup> Thuc. 8.84.1-3 (τῶν γὰρ Συρακοσίων καὶ Θουρίων ὅσῳ μάλιστα καὶ ἐλεύθεροι ἦσαν τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ναῦται), cf. 8.35.1. The attack was not necessarily an attempted stoning, as pointed out by Hornblower 2000, 57.

<sup>449</sup> Xen. *An.* 1.5.11-17.

<sup>450</sup> Xen. *An.* 2.3.10-11. On the background of the *bakteria* in general, see Hornblower 2000, 58-68.

<sup>451</sup> Xen. *An.* 1.3.1-6: νομίζω γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἐμοὶ εἶναι καὶ πατρίδα καὶ φίλους καὶ συμμάχους.

fight back, but Kallibios received no support from Lysander in the matter, and was censured by him for not understanding how to govern free men (φήσας αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐπίστασθαι ἐλευθέρων ἄρχειν).<sup>452</sup> Like the evidence for Greek attitudes towards Persian military discipline, this statement in Plutarch might be invented or exaggerated, but it nevertheless fits with other, more contemporary material. Finally, in 372, we learn that the Spartan Mnasippos, in charge of the siege of Corcyra and in command of a mercenary force, used his staff and his spear to strike two *lochagoi* to coerce them into sending their men into battle; Xenophon's own comment on this incident is illuminating: such actions were bad for morale and led soldiers to resent their commander, which was highly detrimental to combat effectiveness.<sup>453</sup>

A few points are worth noting here: all these examples involved the use of coercion in order to generate compliance, and in all but one case, those on the receiving end reacted with violence of their own, leading to life-threatening situations for the Spartans in charge. Furthermore, in each case it was the commander himself who had to administer the punishment: there appears to have been no clear procedure, let alone special personnel, for carrying out disciplinary action beyond on-the-spot beatings or reprimands.<sup>454</sup> These two points suggest that there was a deeply rooted objection to the use of force by Greek commanders, especially if he was not of one's own polis. Thucydides and the story preserved in Plutarch also lay special emphasis on the free status of those soldiers who resisted punishment, which hints at an ideological component in this objection: using force on a free citizen might have been unacceptable because it went against the very foundation of the compliance relationship that was in place in civic armies.<sup>455</sup> After all, a morally committed soldier was not supposed to be beaten to motivate him to comply. In the case of Astyochos, as Hornblower has argued, the violent reaction of

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<sup>452</sup> Plut. *Lys.* 15.5.

<sup>453</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.19: οὕτω μὲν δὴ ἀθύμως ἔχοντες καὶ μισοῦντες αὐτὸν συνεξῆλθον πάντες: ὅπερ ἥκιστα εἰς μάχην συμφέρει.

<sup>454</sup> Kiesling 2006, 230.

<sup>455</sup> Kiesling 2006, 233: 'Corporal punishment was almost unheard of in classical Greece because it was antithetical to the Greek's self-image as a free man'.

the soldiers probably had less to do with their being sailors, and more with the fact that they were outraged at being treated like helots.<sup>456</sup> We might object to this preliminary conclusion, however, by pointing out that all the above cases involved Spartan commanders chastising foreign soldiers and mercenaries: it is therefore possible that punishments were acceptable in Greek armies if administered by one's own general belonging to the same polis. What evidence, then, is there for the punishment of citizen soldiers by their own military authorities?

Once more, Spartan evidence is illuminating, and serves to highlight the complex nature of combat motivation: there is more than one way to apply coercive power, and choosing the right one depends on the nature of the respective compliance relationship. Therefore, it might come as no surprise that physical coercion is only rarely attested: one possible case is preserved by Frontinus, who tells us that Lysander once punished a soldier who left the ranks without permission while on the march; the man protested that he had not left with the intention to pillage, to which Lysander retorted that he would not even tolerate him to *appear* to be pillaging.<sup>457</sup> We are not informed who the soldier was – he could have been a Spartiate or a *perioikos*, as his protest makes it less likely he was a helot. The Latin word Frontinus used is *castigabat*, which the Loeb translation renders as 'flogged', but it could just as easily be translated as 'chastised' or 'reprimanded': this would make more sense given the impromptu context and the immediate verbal defence by the soldier. At any rate, this is no reliable evidence for corporal punishment in the Spartan army.<sup>458</sup> What evidence we have suggests that those who broke ranks without permission were not beaten, but publicly shamed; Xenophon tells us as much when he relates the punishment of the harmost Derkylidas (we are not told his offence), who was forced to stand holding his shield. Such a chastisement, he claims, was normally reserved for those guilty of *ataxia*, hence it was deemed highly dishonourable among the Spartan elite, who naturally prided themselves on their

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<sup>456</sup> Hornblower 2000, 72.

<sup>457</sup> Front. *Str.* 4.1.9.

<sup>458</sup> Interpreted as such by Kiesling 2006, 232, although more as an exception to the rule that even Spartan military discipline was not as harsh as is usually assumed.

military discipline.<sup>459</sup> It is noteworthy that Xenophon stresses not the brutality or any physical ordeal imposed by this sentence, but the shame that came with it. Rather than focusing on physical punishments in Greek civic armies, then, we should take our cue from the normative power structures that have been outlined in previous chapters: punishments were more likely to be primarily symbolic in nature. And nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of the so-called 'tremblers'.<sup>460</sup>

Those Spartiates who displayed cowardice in battle were subjected to a wide range of punishments. They were debarred from holding office, had to give up their seats even to juniors, make way for others in the streets, and wear shabby clothes to signal their inferior status, in addition to having to cut off half their beards and go about unkempt. They were shunned in society, given the least honourable place in the chorus, and fellow citizens were tainted by association with such individuals and their families. We are also told that others were entitled to strike them if they refused to comply with these regulations, and that they could not legally buy or sell anything.<sup>461</sup> The exact scope of these degradations is unknown, and it is equally uncertain which ones were in force at any one time, and for how long; but taken together, there are several striking features that stand out.

Firstly, these are all obviously symbolic, not physical, punishments: the two are of course not mutually exclusive (e.g. standing with one's shield might also have been a physical ordeal), but the predominant element in this case is clearly the symbolic one.<sup>462</sup> The intention was not primarily to cause harm or to coerce physically, but rather to inflict extreme dishonour, or ἀτιμία. In addition, there are some very real legal penalties, such as restriction to hold office and curtailed rights of sale. As Kamen has pointed out, the word itself (τιμή) encapsulated the double meaning of being deprived of honour as well as offices.<sup>463</sup> It is important to bear

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<sup>459</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.9: ὁ δοκεῖ κηλὶς εἶναι τοῖς σπουδαίοις Λακεδαιμονίων: ἀταξίας γὰρ ζημίωμά ἐστι.

<sup>460</sup> For an in-depth analysis of these 'tremblers' (Plut. *Ages.* 30.2: τοῖς ἐν τῇ μάχῃ καταδειλιάσασιν, οὓς αὐτοὶ τρέσαντας ὀνομάζουσιν), see Ducat 2006, who examines both the origins of the practice and the exact terminology surrounding it.

<sup>461</sup> See Hdt. 7.231-32; Thuc. 5.34.2; Xen. *Lac.* 9.4-6; Plut. *Ages.* 30.2-3. On the penalties for cowardice more generally, see MacDowell 1986, 44-46.

<sup>462</sup> Cf. Ducat 2006, 26, who calls these punishments 'actual and symbolic'.

<sup>463</sup> Kamen 2013, 78.

these two dimensions in mind – the symbolic and the practical – when assessing coercion in Greek armies: while corporal punishment was largely absent, Greek laws and customs found several ways of inflicting real harm, financial, personal, and political, on those that did not live up to prevailing military standards. Yet the overarching theme seems to have been social exclusion and public humiliation. It was this very dishonour that according to Herodotos caused the two Spartiate survivors of Thermopylai to commit suicide: one by a hurling himself into the enemy lines at Plataia, the other by hanging himself out of shame.<sup>464</sup> We cannot be certain as to the historical accuracy of Herodotos' report about these two individuals, but it highlights the crucial roles that shame and dishonour played in punishing misbehaviour. A comparable case comes from Sicily: Diodoros informs us that in Katana, there once was a law that forced deserters or those who shunned military service to sit in the agora for three days, dressed as women.<sup>465</sup> He elaborates that this was more effective than death penalties elsewhere, because of the shame it brought the transgressors.

Secondly, the efficacy of such punishments is predicated directly on the degree to which each individual has internalised and accepted Spartan society's norms and values. The symbolic power inherent in dishonouring someone, for example by making him give up his seat for a junior, is derived from everyone's belief that to do so is shameful: the act is a symbol for one man's inferiority and humiliation; what is more – and this is crucial – this punishment is partly self-inflicted. In stark contrast to the classic case of a nineteenth-century soldier being forcibly tied to a post and flogged, a Spartan soldier became complicit in carrying out his own sentence.<sup>466</sup> The intense socialisation that took place within the socio-political system of the polis ensured that most members accepted and reinforced its core normative content; hence the relative absence of physical punishment when compared to symbolic methods and more formal legal restrictions of civic rights.

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<sup>464</sup> Hdt. 7.233-32.

<sup>465</sup> Diod. Sic. 12.16.1-2. For public shaming in Greek *poleis*, see Dickenson 2017, 27-28.

<sup>466</sup> Ducat 2006, 26: '[...] he shows that he subscribes to the very standard that excludes him from society, and collaborates in administering his own punishment'.

This brings us to the last observation: the power of the socio-political system is further highlighted when we consider more closely the evidence from Xenophon, who tells us that a κακός, or coward, had to explain to his female relatives why they could not find husbands.<sup>467</sup> The dishonour attached to the individual who committed a 'military' offence spilled over onto his relatives: this is a powerful reminder that we should not be too eager to classify organisational or institutional elements of Greek *poleis* as either 'military' or 'civic'. There was no clear distinction between these two concepts, and separating them like Pétain did in 1917, when the French government withdrew civic norms and institutions from the military sphere to allow him to deal with the mutinies as he saw fit, would have been unnatural and counterproductive in a polis. To be sure, Greek political imagination was clearly able to separate them where necessary, as shown, for example, by the Athenian custom of appointing their generals by election rather than lot; but this is more akin to the exception that proves the rule. Generally, it was alignment of civic and military that was sought after: Sparta's coercive measures relied on the convergence of military and civic norms and values, and the more the two were aligned, the more effective the symbolic means that could be used to enforce them.<sup>468</sup> Like physical punishments, however, even the ἀτιμία imposed upon 'tremblers' appears to have been extremely rare, as was concluded after Ducat's comprehensive analysis of the evidence: 'One of the most striking features of this *atimia* is the *very scanty extent of its historical reality*'.<sup>469</sup>

Ultimately, the evidence for physical coercion to secure compliance from Spartan soldiers is thin, which fits with Hornblower's more general suggestion that violence between Spartiates was indeed rare and unusual.<sup>470</sup> Spartan society found other ways to achieve this goal – the efficacy of which depended on the degree to which each member was morally involved with the socio-political system of the polis. In other words, Sparta's compliance model was based on normative power and depended on the moral commitment of its lower participants.

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<sup>467</sup> Xen. *Lac.* 9.5.

<sup>468</sup> Cf. Pritchett 1974, 245: 'Discipline in the army [...] differed little from that of a citizen'.

<sup>469</sup> Ducat 2006, 47.

<sup>470</sup> Hornblower 2000, 73.

Before we turn to the situation in Athens – which is the only other polis for which we have a meaningful amount of evidence – we might briefly consider the views of one military man who had experience of both the Athenian and the Spartan systems: Xenophon. The *Anabasis* provides evidence that coercive measures in terms of physical punishment were certainly part of a Greek soldier's life: in the army of the Ten Thousand, men were beaten for indiscipline and dereliction of duty – by Xenophon himself, as we will see. This might lead us to conclude that coercive power was applied across the board in other Greek armies, or that the rhetoric of civic freedom and equality was merely a veneer for more or less harsh disciplinary methods. However, once we take into account the fact that the Ten Thousand were not an army of a single polis under the influence of one socio-political system, but mercenaries, and combine this with a close examination of how such coercive measures were framed and justified, it will become apparent that even in a mercenary army deep in enemy territory, coercion was not the norm.

Xenophon preserved an example of a truly coercive general, who appears to have relied primarily on physical coercion to motivate and discipline his soldiers. In his short biography of Klearchos, we learn that he was keen to punish his men severely and in anger, and believed that force was necessary to maintain an effective army: a man had to fear his general more than the enemy. Xenophon explains that those under Klearchos' command followed him unwillingly, either because a polis had assigned them to him, or because of personal constraints and desperation; in fact, their alienation went so far that apparently many would desert him once an immediate danger was overcome. Klearchos, then, was seen as an effective commander, but his soldiers complied out of a mix of fear and compulsion.<sup>471</sup> Xenophon presents this image of his colleague as exceptional: it was precisely his use of coercion that set him apart from other generals. Unsurprisingly, Klearchos' approach created a calculative and alienative orientation in his soldiers, leading them to follow his orders while resenting his person and weighing up the benefits and drawbacks of serving under him.

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<sup>471</sup> Xen. *An.* 2.6.6-15. For Xenophon's views on acting in anger, see *Hell.* 5.3.5-7.



As for Xenophon's personal views on physical coercion, we are lucky to have his own statements on the matter. After their generals had been murdered, Xenophon spoke at an assembly of the army to strengthen the men's resolve for the long march home. Towards the end of his speech, he impressed upon them the gravity of their situation and the importance of obedience, and called for everyone to subscribe to a more rigorous approach to discipline and punishment – invoking the example of Klearchos:

If someone refuses to comply, we have to pass a vote that whoever of you happens to be present punishes him with the general; in this way the enemy will be deceived the most: for on that day they will see not one Klearchos, but one thousand, who will not suffer anyone to be a κακός.  
(Xen. *An.* 3.2.31)

His appeal confirms what we have observed elsewhere: there was no clear procedure for punishments, and the general had to rely on others to back him up in administering any coercive measures. It speaks volumes about the generally normative orientation of the majority of his audience – who came from a Polis army background – that Xenophon and the generals had to call a vote on punishments for noncompliance in the first place. At any rate, Xenophon believed that extraordinary circumstances justified extraordinary measures, hence his resort to more coercive methods. Later in his narrative, he reports a speech he himself gave in defence of his behaviour while in command, which had included striking soldiers who disobeyed. Again he invoked the extreme situation they found themselves in, and his justification for his violent behaviour was not that as a general he had the right to administer punishments as he saw fit: rather, he portrayed his actions as those of a well-meaning parent who punishes his son for his own good. What is more, Xenophon explicitly makes the point that he would not use violence under normal circumstances.<sup>472</sup> It is thus abundantly clear from the attitudes preserved in the *Anabasis* that Xenophon viewed physical coercion as a last resort, that it was not the

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<sup>472</sup> Xen. *An.* 5.8; cf. Kiesling 2006, 231: 'Xenophon neither claimed the authority of rank nor insisted that an officers' blows lacked the insolence inherent in *hubris*' – a clear indication that there was no institutional framework for coercive measures that he could rely on for his defence.

norm in a Greek mercenary army, and that every act of violence had to be justified on its own merit, and not against the backdrop of any institutional framework: coercion was not supposed to be a central element in an army's compliance relationship. This conclusion might be somewhat surprising, considering that Greek mercenary armies in particular have been presented as more disciplined, more professional, and consequently more prone to harsh punishments than citizen armies.<sup>473</sup> Once more we see the dangers of equating punishment and discipline without establishing the precise causal link between the two.

What, then, about other civic armies? Spartan and mercenary forces are hardly representative of the various Greek militaries at large; nor is Athens, for that matter, but here at least there exists evidence of a more structured way of dealing with noncompliance by coercive means, in the form of the Athenian judicial system. What evidence there is, however, confirms our earlier findings: coercive power existed, but was only rarely applied.

The exact legal situation in Athens is unclear, and it is far beyond the scope and purpose of this chapter to disentangle the various complexities and contradictions. Nevertheless, we know of several legal actions to prosecute acts of military noncompliance: the λιποταξίου γραφή for desertion of the ranks, and the δειλίας γραφή for cowardice; in addition, there were procedures for avoidance of draft (ἀστρατείας γραφή), for desertion of the army (λιποστρατίου γραφή), and for throwing away one's shield (γραφὴ τοῦ ἀποβληκέναι τὴν ἀσπίδα). The exact scope and dividing lines between each of these procedures are uncertain, and there seems to have been a degree of overlap for some offences.<sup>474</sup> At any rate,

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<sup>473</sup> 'Exemplary punishments to enforce orders and obedience were rarely imposed, except perhaps in the case of mercenaries' (Chrissantos 2013, 316).

<sup>474</sup> The law for cowardice (δειλία) encompassed ἀστράτεια, λίποτάξιον, and abandoning one's shield (MacDowell 1978, 160). On the λιποστρατίου γραφή in general, and its exact meaning and scope, see Hamel 1998b: she argues that ἀστράτεια and λίποτάξιον were probably not interchangeable (362-85), and – based on Lysias 14.5 – that λίποτάξιον meant specifically to retreat from your *taxis* during battle because of cowardice (376); the passage from Lysias states explicitly that the procedure applies to desertion while others are still fighting (μαχομένων τῶν ἄλλων), which would distinguish it from fleeing the battlefield in a rout. Hence Hamel further suggests that λίποτάξιον did not refer to desertion from the army (385-97), which would have been prosecuted with a λιποστρατίου γραφή.

prosecutions had to be initiated by private individuals, the judges were those who had served on the respective campaign, and the court was convened by the board of generals – the penalty on conviction was a temporary or permanent imposition of total *atimia* (loss of citizen rights), which included 'being deprived of the rights to take part in the Assembly or Council; to serve as juror, act as prosecutor in public and private suits, and give evidence; to hold magistracies; to enter sanctuaries; and to enter the Agora'.<sup>475</sup> Failure to secure one fifth of the votes, however, resulted in *atimia* and a fine for the prosecutor. Because these charges had to be privately brought, and because of the difficulties in securing a conviction (the potential bias of the judges, the problem of proof), actual cases were rare: Christ concluded that there was little risk of being prosecuted for cowardly behaviour.<sup>476</sup> It is possible that these private actions were used mainly for prosecuting powerful political players and their associates, and not the average citizen-soldier.<sup>477</sup> Still, even the threat of disenfranchisement for noncompliance could exert a certain amount of pressure to obey: rhetoric, at least, would have us believe that the laws against indiscipline and cowardice made Athenian soldiers fear the punishment more than the enemy, pushing them to fight harder for their πατρίς.<sup>478</sup> We see, then, that coercive power could take on a normative tint: the punishment was exclusion from the benefits the polis' socio-political system brought, and it was the very belief in the values of the polis that was supposed to drive a soldier to avoid being deprived of them. These benefits, of course, also had a material dimension, such as the right to trade, to own property, and more generally to partake in the economic prosperity of one's home polis; citizens valued these, hence some penalties brought restricted access or complete exclusion from this sphere of material gain. Nevertheless, according to Andokides, those convicted of military offences in Athens were not deprived of any of their property; this indicates that the overriding concern was not economic harm,

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<sup>475</sup> Kamen 2013, 71; Christ 2006, 118-19, cf. Lys. 14.5, 15.1-4, see also Hamel 1998a, 63.

<sup>476</sup> Christ 2006, 119-21.

<sup>477</sup> Crowley 2012, 107.

<sup>478</sup> Aeschin. 3.175: ἵν' ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τὰς ἐκ τῶν νόμων ζημίας φοβούμενος μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους, ἀμείνων ἀγωνιστῆς ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ὑπάρχη.

but religious and socio-political exclusion.<sup>479</sup> Just as in Sparta, the effectiveness of punishments as deterrents depended on the extent to which the individual members of the polis subscribed to its core norms. Relying on the moral commitment of its citizens, Athens had no need for physical coercion: *atimia* – the loss of civic rights – as a punishment for military offences underscores once more the immediate connection between the ‘military’ and the ‘civic’, and the ways in which normative power could increase levels of loyalty without relying predominantly on compulsion.

Going beyond the legal apparatus for ensuring compliance, there is very little to suggest that physical coercion – in the form of corporal punishment – ever played a significant role in Athenian armies. Aristotle listed the coercive powers an Athenian *strategos* possessed in the field: he could punish ἀταξία with imprisonment, a fine, or a dishonourable dismissal from the army.<sup>480</sup> The exact procedure for each of these options is unknown. There is only one example for such a dismissal, preserved in a court speech; the defendant recalled how the prosecutor, Simon, once suffered this penalty for beating up his taxiarch after arriving late for a campaign, probably the battle of the Nemea River in 394 – the defendant adds that Simon was the only soldier in the entire army to be dishonoured like this.<sup>481</sup> As far as we can tell he received no punishment beyond being publicly censured by the generals as an insubordinate criminal (Lys. 3.45: δόξας ἀκοσμότατος εἶναι καὶ πονηρότατος); we have to infer that he was also sent home.

In his commentary on the passage in question, Todd expressed disbelief that ‘a system of military discipline could credibly operate on the premise that the offender was simply sent home without further penalty’.<sup>482</sup> Similarly, while acknowledging the intense shame attached to such a dishonourable discharge, van Wees remarked that ‘shame does seem a comparatively mild penalty for such extreme insubordination’, and wonders how it was possible that the generals had to resort to this measure only once, even though they commanded thousands of

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<sup>479</sup> Andoc. 1.74. For *atimia* in Athens, see chapter seven in Kamen 2013.

<sup>480</sup> [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.2: κύριοι δέ εἰσιν ὅταν ἡγῶνται καὶ δῆσαι τὸν ἀτακτοῦντα καὶ ἐκκηρῦσαι καὶ ἐπιβολὴν ἐπιβάλλειν: οὐκ εἰώθασι δὲ ἐπιβάλλειν.

<sup>481</sup> Lys. 3.45; for the battle see Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.14–23.

<sup>482</sup> Todd (2007), 342.

men.<sup>483</sup> These scholars make two assumptions that we have already shown to be problematic: firstly, Todd equates discipline with punishment without first demonstrating that the former is contingent on the latter. His statement rests on the implicit belief that the Athenian citizen army maintained compliance through coercive means – indeed, if that were the case, we would surely expect Simon to suffer much harsher treatment for assaulting a superior officer. What Crowley has demonstrated for Athens, however, and what this thesis hopes to show for the rest of the Greek *poleis*, is that civic armies did not rely predominantly on coercive power and instead mainly exerted normative power.<sup>484</sup> Hence, Todd’s disbelief rests on a false premise, and disappears once the parameters of power and involvement are analysed more closely – which brings us to the second assumption, implicit in Todd, but explicit in van Wees: judging the severity of ancient punishments by modern standards. It is impossible to quantify the measure of shame felt by an ancient Greek individual who suffered from social exclusion and stigmatisation for committing a military offence – but it would be unwise to dismiss such sanctions as ‘mild’ simply because they did not involve corporal or capital punishment, or because they are a far cry from more recent examples of military discipline, such as flogging soldiers for not marching correctly, or routinely executing deserters. We should not underestimate the impact of social degradation on ancient soldiers – bearing in mind that Greek culture was a shame culture, which would have amplified any impact beyond what we might expect nowadays (recall the suicides of the survivors of Thermopylai).<sup>485</sup> In addition, moral commitment on the lower participant’s part – expressed as a firm belief in the intrinsic worth and righteousness of the socio-political system that the military organisation embodies – would further enhance this impact, as the individual was being punished not by something hostile (which

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<sup>483</sup> Van Wees 2004, 109.

<sup>484</sup> Cf. Crowley 2012, 105-7.

<sup>485</sup> Chrissantos 2013, 315; cf. Eckstein 2005, 484: ‘[...] for a Greek male, the loss of citizen rights may well have seemed a penalty worse than death’. He goes on to describe accurately the essence of moral commitment and the vital connection between military service and civic rights: ‘The *polis* – the political community of free men – meant all to them; they were soldiers of the *polis*, and their defence of the political community lay at the heart of their legitimate right to vote in the assembly’.

might be more easily dismissed or rebelled against), but by the very standards of behaviour he is committed to and has pledged to uphold.

This is not to say that there was no physical coercion or punishment whatsoever in an Athenian army. Hamel has suggested that in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, the *strategoi* might have been empowered to impose the death penalty on certain acts of noncompliance.<sup>486</sup> The most commonly cited cases to support this argument, however, are not entirely compelling. Xenophon tells us that in 410, before the battle of Kyzikos, Alkibiades proclaimed that anyone caught sailing across from Prokonnesos to Kyzikos would be punished by death.<sup>487</sup> No such punishment was recorded, and rather than reflecting actual law or custom at the time, it is more likely that Alkibiades was issuing an informal threat to prevent desertion by foreign sailors and slaves. What is more, the power of the threat would have been magnified precisely because this would have been perceived as an extreme and unusual measure, at least by the free members of the army. We know from a court speech that a slave could indeed be executed for military offences: in Lysias 13, the speaker recalls that during the Sicilian Expedition, a brother of the defendant Agoratos had been executed by Lamachos for fire-signalling to the enemy.<sup>488</sup> At the time, both Agoratos and his brother were slaves, so the incident only shows that slaves could be executed for treason – this is what Alkibiades might have had in mind in the previous episode.<sup>489</sup> Lastly, there is the infamous story preserved in Frontinus, who recorded that Iphikrates once speared (*transfixit cuspide*) a sleeping sentry.<sup>490</sup> Whether or not he meant to imply that he actually killed the soldier, this behaviour was obviously extraordinary: Frontinus continued that Iphikrates had to justify his act to others who rebuked him for such cruelty. Moreover, the incident might be apocryphal (the same story was told about Epameinondas, see Front. *Str.* 3.12.3), and if accurate, the sentry in question might

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<sup>486</sup> Hamel, 1998a, 60.

<sup>487</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.15.

<sup>488</sup> Lys. 13.64-67.

<sup>489</sup> Agoratos was awarded citizenship several years after the event; the speech might have been delivered around 399 (Todd 2000, 138-40). See also Hornblower 2004, 255 and Crowley 2012, 106 with n. 13. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.33 for a probable use of fire signals to announce the arrival of an enemy fleet.

<sup>490</sup> Front. *Str.* 3.12.2.

have been a mercenary serving under conditions different to those of a citizen soldier. There is certainly nothing in these examples that allows us to conclude that Athenian citizen soldiers had to fear the death penalty for indiscipline, or even corporal punishment in general for acts of noncompliance.

What evidence we possess points strongly in the opposite direction: coercion appears not to have been a significant factor in ensuring the compliance and loyalty of Athenian soldiers.<sup>491</sup> The same holds true for Sparta, and for the mercenary experience as portrayed by Xenophon. Detailed evidence on other *poleis*' mechanisms for dealing with disobedience is hard to come by; Polybios might be offering a criticism of the general Greek lack in effective punishments when he describes at length how efficiently the Roman army dealt with noncompliance – just as he extols the Roman way of making camp when compared to the haphazard methods of his fellow Greeks.<sup>492</sup> We might also mention that the Argives had a designated location for military trials, which suggests that they adopted a similar approach to that of Athens, based not so much on physical punishment as on legal procedures resulting in fines, disenfranchisement, or exile.<sup>493</sup> Furthermore, it is evident from such legal proceedings involving large parts of the citizen population that *poleis* viewed military punishments as a responsibility of the community, not of individual generals.<sup>494</sup> Noncompliance was a breach of trust between one's fellow citizens, and not between a commander and his men: this makes it easy to understand the limited coercive powers of Athenian *strategoi*, who acted as mere representatives of the will of the body politic, where the real authority lay. This in turn might lead us to expect that in Royal armies, where power was highly concentrated in the hands of the king or one of his generals, coercion played a much

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<sup>491</sup> On punishments for indiscipline cf. Hornblower 2004, 254: '[...] my point is that the precise mechanisms are elusive and do not seem to have included corporal punishment', and Kiesling 2006, 229: 'Indeed, the evidence for summary punishment of any kind by commanders, let alone corporal punishment, is thin'.

<sup>492</sup> Polyb. 6.37-42; on this contrast see also Eckstein 2005, 489-90 (he also includes an overview of military discipline in ancient Chinese and Indian armies, 492-96).

<sup>493</sup> Thuc. 5.60.6; as noted by Hornblower (*CT ad loc.*), the impromptu stoning of Thrasylos at the place for public trial only underscores the irregularity of the act.

<sup>494</sup> Kiesling 2006, 228-29.

greater role; as we will see, this was not the case. From what we can tell, coercion was equally insignificant in Royal armies – although there is evidence that by the end of the third century at the latest, the types of punishments were of an entirely different character.

If the evidence for enforcing military discipline in Greek Polis armies is patchy, the situation for Hellenistic Royal armies in general is even worse: there is no detailed information as to laws and customs imposed by the various organisations, and we lack significant literary descriptions that might shed light on any systematic approach to punishing noncompliance, or on any socio-cultural reasons underpinning such approaches.<sup>495</sup> To a degree, this might simply reflect reality: physical coercion and harsh discipline seem not to have been at the heart of Hellenistic compliance models, hence they do not surface much in our sources. Furthermore, the intense competition among the Hellenistic warlords might have been a limiting factor: kings wanted to attract soldiers, not alienate them.<sup>496</sup> Nevertheless, the topic has to be treated with care: based only on a few examples, it is extremely difficult to draw wide-ranging conclusions about armies that operated in a vast geographical context over the course of several centuries. To avoid fruitless speculations and a host of inferences, I will limit the discussion to the only substantial piece of evidence available: the Macedonian army regulations of Amphipolis.

The fragmentary inscription in question is a military code of behaviour found in Amphipolis, and dated to around 200, to the reign of Philip V of Macedon (r. 221-179).<sup>497</sup> It allows us a glimpse of how an established Hellenistic kingdom attempted to secure compliance from its soldiers by prescribing expected behaviour and – most importantly for our purposes – the accompanying penalties for noncompliance. This point is worth stressing: we are not dealing with a historian's personal views, or relying on reported incidents that might or might not be representative of actual

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<sup>495</sup> For the dearth of knowledge about the workings of Greek military discipline when compared to the Roman army, see Pritchett 1974, 232-33.

<sup>496</sup> Compare an assessment of coercion during the Roman Civil War: 'Not surprisingly the period of the Civil Wars provides little evidence of severe discipline; generals competing for the loyalty of their soldiers were more likely to offer rewards than threaten punishment' (Kiesling 2006, 241).

<sup>497</sup> *ISE* II 114 = *SEG* 40.524 = Austin 90. The arrangement of Austin is followed here. For the date, see Juhel 2002, 401-2.



practice; the Amphipolis regulations offer a direct insight into the power dynamic between the organisational elites and the lower participants of the Macedonian Royal army, and as such are of the utmost importance for analysing its compliance relationship. How long before the date of the inscription these regulations were in place is unknown, as is the degree to which they are representative of the other Royal armies of the Hellenistic period.<sup>498</sup> Nevertheless, the regulations point in a clear direction, one that is congruent with the conclusions of the preceding chapters: Royal armies ensured loyalty and obedience predominantly by remunerative means.

The surviving sections of the code can be roughly divided into two parts: one regarding punishments for misbehaviour, and the other regarding the correct distribution of war booty. We will discuss the regulations for booty in Chapter 5; for now, it is the punishments that concern us. The code is more or less straightforward: a sentry caught sitting or sleeping by the tetrarch, or company commander, shall be fined one drachma for his offence, whereas not reporting the offence also incurred a monetary fine. Furthermore, soldiers and officers who are caught without certain items of equipment shall be fined a certain amount of money for each missing item: for example, three obols for a sarisa. All offences had to be reported directly to the king, and the code refers to written regulations (κατὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα) that had to be adhered to.<sup>499</sup> In addition, monetary rewards appear to have been promised to those who reported individuals who forage or destroy crops without permission – the relevant fragment (B2) is heavily restored, but the idea of monetary incentives for denunciation would certainly fit well with the rest of the extant regulations.

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<sup>498</sup> Chrissantos 2013, 318-19 suggests that the regulations were in place before the date of the inscription. Livy, in his short summary of the reforms enacted by Philip V, does not mention any reforms of the army, which suggests that the code was already in use (Livy 39.24.1-4).

<sup>499</sup> The relevant section of the code are as follows. Fine for sitting or sleeping sentry, and for failure to report: Fragments A1 (τὸν συγκαθήμενον ἢ καὶ [θεύδον] τὰ φύλακα {ι} ζημιούτωσαν οἱ τετράρχαι καθ' ἐκάστην | ἀτάξι[α]ν δραχμῇι) and A2 ([- -] ἐὰν μὴ παραδείξωσι τῶι βασι|λεῖ τοὺς ἀτακτοῦν)τας, ζημιούσθωσ{θ}αν δωδεκαίοις); fines for missing equipment: B1 ([- -] γεῖν τοὺς μὴ φέ[ρο]ντάς τι τῶν καθηκόντων αὐτοῖς ὅ|πλων ζημιούτωσαν κατὰ γεγραμμένα· κοτθ[ύ]βου | ὀβολοὺς δύο, κώνου τὸ ἴσον, σαρίσης ὀβολοῦς) τρεῖς, μα|χαίρας τὸ ἴσον, κνημίδων ὀβολοὺς δύο, ἀσπίδος δρα|χμήν· | Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἡγεμόνων, τῶν τε δεδηλωμένων ὀπλων | τὸ διπλοῦν, καὶ θώρακος δραχμὰς δύο, ἡμιθωρακίου δραχμήν).

The picture that emerges from the Amphipolis military code is a clear one: the Macedonian Royal army took no recourse to corporal punishment – not even in cases such as dereliction of sentry duty – which as we have seen could incur the severest punishments in other ancient militaries. What is more, the penalties that are imposed, on regular soldiers as well as on officers (ἡγεμόνες), are entirely monetary in nature. Soldiers are fined for sleeping on duty, for losing equipment, and for disobeying commands from their officers. Instead of coercion, then, the Macedonian kings relied on the allocation and manipulation of material rewards to generate compliance in their men: fines for noncompliance were coupled with monetary rewards for denunciations. In other words, the predominant power exercised over the lower participants in the Hellenistic Macedonian Royal army appears to have been remunerative. Contrast this with the situation in Athens, where military offences were punished with *atimia*, but the property of those convicted was left untouched. This reflects differences in the primary purpose of punishments in Royal and Polis armies: material penalties in the former, symbolic ones in the latter.

Evidence for physical punishment of regular Macedonian soldiers is rare; corporal and capital punishment existed, but we hear of them mostly in the context of court politics: to take an example from Philip V's reign, dealing with the conspiracy around Apelles eventually led to a summary execution of Leontios, one of the conspirators, but began with imposing a hefty fine on two others, Megaleas and Krinon (who were imprisoned until payment).<sup>500</sup> The summary execution did not reflect usual practice, however: it was prompted by fears of a mutiny, which required quick and decisive action.<sup>501</sup> Inasmuch as the Macedonian army is at all representative of the military organisations of the other Hellenistic kingdoms, the evidence for Royal armies follows the pattern of Polis armies: corporal punishment was not the norm, and appears to have been at odds with the prevailing compliance

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<sup>500</sup> Chrissantos 2013, 318. For the entire affair see Polyb. 5.4.8-13, 5.15-16; also *HCP* I, 550-52 and Hatzopoulos 1996, 299-300.

<sup>501</sup> Polyb. 5.27.8.

model: if Royal army soldiers were predominantly calculatively involved, coercion would lead to alienation and eventually to the disintegration of discipline.

#### 4.3 Conclusion

To sum up: the overall impression we get of ancient Greek military discipline is that coercion never served as the predominant type of power that was applied to ensure compliance. Here we need to emphasise that coercion can take several forms, such as physical, economic, or social coercion. Corporal punishment clearly falls into the first of these categories, and it is evident that Greek *poleis* lacked – or better, chose not to employ – a sophisticated coercive apparatus. Pritchett concluded his study of Greek military discipline with the following statement: 'A more or less rough-and-ready system of summary justice was resorted to by the Greek hegemon'.<sup>502</sup> From the preceding analysis it appears that any such system was neither rough nor ready: generals had extremely limited recourse to corporal punishment of any sort; nor was it summary: quite the opposite, as the most elaborate means of punishing military offences were subject to court proceedings overseen by the general, but again the results were not physical coercion. Instead they relied on symbolic punishments, the efficacy of which depended on the power of each particular socio-political system (and shame culture more generally). These punishments generally shared the elements of social, political, and economic exclusion and stigmatisation, targeting the core areas of interaction between individual and community. As such they were coercive measures of sorts, but they drew their strength not from physical violence, but from the offender's personal connection with the polis. The difference is important, as physical coercion can be applied to great effect regardless of the victim's type of involvement with his or her organisation, whereas symbolic coercion depends on the moral commitment of those that are punished to be truly effective.

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<sup>502</sup> Pritchett 1974, 245.

Royal armies also seem to have preferred the exercise of remunerative over coercive power, using material rewards and fines instead of the whip. This use of largely economic sanctions suggests that the lower participants in Royal armies were motivated primarily by personal benefit, hence their organisational elites targeted this area to punish noncompliance. As with Polis forces, the type of punishment is revealing as to the underlying motivating forces of those in charge and those over whom power is exercised.

Having established that coercion was not the predominant type of power exercised in Royal and Polis armies, it remains to show how the ways in which these armies chose to punish transgressors can help us understand the motivations of the soldiers who fought for them. For the power that punishes may also reward, and it is in this context that we gain valuable insights into the workings of the compliance relationships of Royal and Polis armies: punishments and rewards and intrinsically linked, and together they represent one of the best access points for assessing the basic power structures of military organisations. The next chapter will explore this aspect in more detail: if not primarily through coercive power, then how did Polis and Royal armies secure the lasting loyalty of their troops?



# Chapter Five

## *Just Desserts? Rewards in Polis and Royal Armies*



### 5.1 Introduction

One particular difficulty for studying the individual combat motivations of soldiers who lived and fought thousands of years ago is the lack of direct evidence. What material we have often comes from historiography, courtroom speeches, and private or public inscriptions, all of which have their own genre-specific limitations, conventions, and agendas. The soldier's own voice is almost impossible to hear. One way of getting closer to the everyday realities of ancient life is through comedy: rather than gods, kings, and heroes, the genre, especially New Comedy, often revolved around the more mundane struggles of ordinary citizens, offering glimpses into the day-to-day lives of ancient Greeks.<sup>503</sup> Of special interest for the purposes of this chapter is a fragmentary comedy by the Athenian New Comedy playwright Menander, from the second half of the fourth century, as it appears to shed some light onto the combat motivations of a few private individuals, set in a period where most other sources concern themselves only with the level of grand international politics.

The play in question is the *Aspis*; at its heart is Daos, a slave of the Athenian citizen Kleostratos. The latter had enrolled in a mercenary expedition to Asia Minor,

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<sup>503</sup> On the uses of comedy for social history generally, see Lape & Moreno 2014 (pages 349-52 on Menander specifically; see also Arnott 1979, xxi).

and the play opens with Daos' lamentations over the death of his master in the aftermath of a successful raid in Lykia:

I thought you'd come back safe and rich in honour  
 From your campaign, and afterwards you'd live 5  
 Your future years in style. You'd have the title  
 Of General or Counsellor of State,  
 And see your sister, for whose sake you went  
 Campaigning, married to a man you felt  
 Was right, upon your glad arrival home. 10  
 (Men. *Aspis* 4-10, transl. Arnott)

We learn what had prompted Kleostratos to risk his life abroad: the prospect of honour and money, which he had apparently planned to use primarily in order to furnish his sister with a respectable dowry, but also to support himself in his old age. Daos had managed to escort back his master's plunder: two talents in coin from the sale of his booty, plus a large quantity of precious cups and a group of slaves.<sup>504</sup> This is an impressive haul, and more so for a seemingly ordinary citizen who went to war to make his fortune. And while we have to allow for dramatic exaggeration on Menander's part, it still reveals audience expectations: service with a Hellenistic warlord was a shortcut to riches. The exact date or location of the plundering raid are unknown; inconclusive attempts have been made to connect the events of the play with a specific historical incursion.<sup>505</sup> What seems accepted, however, is that the details are representative of the wars of the Successors of the late fourth century.

It seems that for a Greek citizen it was necessary to serve in the armies of the Hellenistic warlords to gain wealth – service in a citizen army did not provide the same opportunities. This in turn might be connected to the different compliance relationships at work: remuneration played a central role in Royal armies, and the prospect of profit was a credible one even for an ordinary infantryman. A citizen army, on the other hand, did not present the chance to gain wealth on the same scale as a Royal army. As I shall show, this goes hand in hand with the predominant type

<sup>504</sup> Men. *Aspis* 34-37.

<sup>505</sup> E.g. Treu 1976, who suggests the very similar events of Athenaios' campaign against the Nabataians in 312 BC (under orders from Antigonos), reported in Diod. Sic. 19.94-95.

of power that was applied in Polis armies, i.e. normative power: rewards tended to be symbolic rather than material, while the bulk of the spoils of war were placed at the disposal of the community, not individual soldiers or generals.

Finally, we will analyse an aspect of material rewards handed out by Hellenistic warlords that bridged the gap between normative and remunerative power: settling soldiers. The ultimate aim of this chapter is to highlight the structural differences in the reward systems of both types of army, while at the same time to trace the efforts made by generals and kings to combine the most effective elements of each type of power in order to secure the lasting loyalty of their soldiers.<sup>506</sup>

## 5.2 The Fruits of Loyalty: Rewards in Civic Armies

If the preceding discussion has shown that the loyalty and compliance of citizen-soldiers was not secured by coercive means, it remains to show that remuneration, too, played no central part in a polis' compliance relationship. Once we can exclude coercive and remunerative power, the argument that Polis armies relied primarily on normative power will be significantly more compelling. Remuneration, in the context of ancient Greek warfare, usually fell into one of two categories: direct payment for military service in the form of a wage, or indirect payment in the form of booty. A wage would normally consist of a ration allowance (σιτηρέσιον) and a daily payment (μισθός), combined into gross pay.<sup>507</sup> Booty was naturally less predictable, and by no means guaranteed: it was contingent on success, and the exact amount would vary in each case. As we shall see, neither of these two types of remuneration was sufficient by itself to generate loyalty and compliance in citizen-soldiers: pay tended to be low and irregular, whereas booty became the common property of the polis. There was little real wealth to be gained by the ordinary soldier.

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<sup>506</sup> The importance of public recognition and rewards, material and non-material, in more modern armies is discussed in Kellett 1982, 201-13.

<sup>507</sup> The exact terminology for military pay is somewhat unclear and can vary from polis to polis. Pritchett 1971, 3-29 has collected a substantial amount of evidence and discusses the various usages.



To begin with direct payment: the exact levels of military pay varied with each city-state and according to the specific circumstances of the time. While detailed information for individual *poleis* is rare, a clear general picture emerges. Pritchett, in his comprehensive analysis of military pay in the fifth and fourth centuries, is straightforward in his conclusions: in the fifth century, a citizen-soldier would not expect remuneration for military service beyond sustenance – bearing the bulk of the cost himself. Payment beyond sustenance, he claims, is a development of the fourth century and connected to the increased use of mercenaries and longer campaigns from home.<sup>508</sup> Pritchett explains this by referring to the citizen's commitment to the polis; military service was as much a duty as it was a right and a privilege: 'The citizen identified his own interest with that of the state. His patriotism was shown no less in devotion on the battlefield than in financial sacrifice'.<sup>509</sup> We might think of the vast private outlay in preparation of the Athenian Sicilian expedition (Thuc. 6.31.3), or the simple fact that citizen-soldiers usually paid for their own equipment.<sup>510</sup> In terms of compliance theory, the citizens' moral commitment to the polis meant that remuneration was not essential to their willingness to comply with its demands.

For Athens, we have good evidence for wage levels. Thucydides wrote that the hoplites besieging Potidaia were paid a drachma per day, plus a drachma for one servant.<sup>511</sup> That soldier and slave were paid the same strongly suggests that the payment was primarily for subsistence, not compensation for services rendered. While there appears to have been no minimum or standard wage, the gross pay (*misthos* plus *siteresion*) for soldiers averaged around one drachma per day for the fifth and fourth centuries.<sup>512</sup> Considering that this would have been paid only for

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<sup>508</sup> Pritchett 1971, 27-28.

<sup>509</sup> Pritchett 1971, 27; see also Pritchett 1974, 110-12.

<sup>510</sup> Trundle 2004, 61, and van Wees 2007, 276-8, who speaks of a 'moral obligation' to buy hoplite equipment.

<sup>511</sup> Thuc. 3.17.4, which according to Loomis 1998, 40 is 'earliest explicit evidence for a daily wage for soldiers and sailors'.

<sup>512</sup> According to Loomis 1998, 55-58: he suggests that before 433, gross pay would have been roughly four obols to one drachma per diem; for 433-412 he sees the standard rate as one drachma per diem; from 412 to the end of the war, it had apparently fallen to three obols per diem; for the fourth century, he postulates a gross pay of at least one drachma per diem.

days of active duty, which would be largely restricted to the summer months, the scope for amassing any form of wealth was small, especially as the gross pay included a ration allowance. For comparison, average slave prices in the Classical period ranged from 200 to 500 drachmas – based on military income alone, it would take a soldier years to save up enough to buy a slave at the lower range.<sup>513</sup> No wonder, then, that Kleostratos enlisted with a Hellenistic warlord to secure his fortune: serving in the citizen army would never have allowed him to acquire several slaves in so short a time.<sup>514</sup>

The fictional case of Kleostratos brings us to the second category of remuneration: indirect payment through the spoils of war. Our sources contain so many references to citizen-armies ravaging their enemies' countryside<sup>515</sup> and sacking their cities<sup>516</sup> that we could be tempted to view the acquisition of plunder as one of the main aims of inter-polis warfare, enabling individual soldiers to acquire significant levels of private wealth. To begin with, we should not underestimate the desire to cause economic damage to one's enemy, but there are other factors to be considered: firstly, the quantity of plunder obtained in raids and sieges varied greatly, and only rarely amounted to huge sums; secondly, any plunder usually became public property; and thirdly, unless individual soldiers were able to acquire private plunder by deceit, their share of the booty normally was nothing more than their gross pay. We will discuss these three factors in turn.

Unlike the Royal armies of the Hellenistic period, which were often accompanied by a large camp following that included the wealth and possessions of thousands of individuals, accumulated over years of campaigning, Polis armies tended to operate on a much smaller scale, both in terms of numbers of combatants and campaign length. They were not normally on the move with great amounts of valuable property that could be captured by an enemy, unless of course an army was

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<sup>513</sup> For slave prices, see Scheidel 2005, 11.

<sup>514</sup> See Crowley 2012, 107-9 for a more detailed discussion of the Athenian case, with a clear conclusion: 'Athens, quite simply, did not pay her troops enough to secure their compliance'.

<sup>515</sup> Examples: Thuc. 1.108.2, 2.55.1, 2.93.4-94.3, 3.26.3, 4.87.2-88.1, 5.115.2, 6.7.1, 6.95.1, 7.49.2, 8.3.1; Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.5-6.

<sup>516</sup> Examples: Thuc. 2.56.5, 2.80.7, 3.102.2, 4.130.6, 5.54.3-55.2, 5.83.3, 8.28.3-4 (cf. 8.36.1), 8.41.2; Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.13-15, 2.1.19 (cf. 2.1.25); Diod. Sic. 14.15.2-3, 14.53.1-3, 15.46.5-6, 15.79.3-6.

intercepted on a return march after having acquired significant plunder.<sup>517</sup> It is the poliorcetic context that provided the greatest prospects: capturing a city with its property and inhabitants could mean a windfall after a successful sale of the plunder and enslavement of the captives. In 415 the Athenians under Nikias captured the small town of Hykkara, and managed to sell its inhabitants (around 7,500 people) into slavery for 120 talents, a welcome addition to their war chest.<sup>518</sup> But the limitations in siege technology meant that most *poleis* were relatively safe behind their walls; in addition, maintaining a siege was expensive and unpopular owing to the protracted and dangerous nature of the undertaking.<sup>519</sup> Hence the normal reaction to an invading army was to gather all moveable property inside the city walls, leaving the attacker with little choice beyond burning crops, cutting down trees, and destroying farm buildings – there was rarely an opportunity to acquire large amounts of booty.<sup>520</sup>

At least not in typical inter-polis warfare: it is no coincidence that the character Kleostratos enlisted for a campaign in Asia Minor. There are several references to Polis armies acquiring plunder when operating within the Persian Empire, but this was hardly a frequent occurrence, and the normal rules still applied: the spoils of war would become public property, and were often sold to pay the troops' wages. Thus, in 395 when Herippidas managed to capture the camp of Pharnabazos, he brought the plunder back to camp, and forced his allies to hand over their spoils too, so that it could be sold by the officials in charge of the booty (the λαφυροπώλαι).<sup>521</sup> Indeed, there was a long tradition of Greek soldiers

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<sup>517</sup> Aineias Taktikos advised to ambush a retreating army that had managed to capture plunder in a surprise attack, as it would be slowed down because of it (16.11-12).

<sup>518</sup> Thuc. 6.62.3-4 (Gabrielsen 2003, 393 for the number of inhabitants); see also Diod. Sic. 11.81.4-5, 82.5, Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.21. See Rawlings 2007, 151 for the sale of captives.

<sup>519</sup> Van Wees 2004, 144-45, who also points out the lack of central organisation and specialist engineers necessary for maintaining long sieges. However, there are examples that might suggest a more balanced picture, such as the Peloponnesian siege of Plataia in 429 (Thuc. 2.75-8, 3.20-3).

<sup>520</sup> Van Wees 2004, 122: 'Invaders were thus largely reduced to vandalising immovable property, rather than taking booty'. On small-scale raiding of Classical *poleis*, see van Wees 2004, 123-26.

<sup>521</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.22-25; for more examples, see Hdt. 9.80-81, Diod. Sic. 11.33.1-2; Diod. Sic. 13.64.4 (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.4-5 and 1.2.17). According to Diodoros, at the outset of Agesilaos II's campaign into Persia, a large crowd eager for plunder gathered to follow the army (Diod. Sic. 14.79.2, see Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.22 for the dangers of individual plundering); for plundering during the campaign itself see Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.12, 3.4.24. For other large crowds of camp followers intent on plundering, see Polyb. 3.82.8;

marvelling at Persian wealth, going back to the Persian Wars, and continuing into the campaigns of Alexander that saw the prolonged exposure of his troops to the fabulous treasures of the Achaimenids: as we will see, this affected the men's expectations and motivations, and thereby their involvement with their organisation. For now, suffice it to say that the ten to twenty thousand talents of debt accumulated by Alexander's army has no parallel whatsoever in the warfare between Greek city-states.<sup>522</sup>

More importantly for the soldiers of these city-states, any plunder that individuals acquired would normally become public property, to be used either at the discretion of the generals or the public authorities at home. There appears to have been no standard procedure regarding the immediate disposal of booty; apart from dedications (usually a tithe), some or all of it might be sold while still on campaign, to pay for supplies and military wages, or it might be transported back to the home polis and sold there, the proceeds being used for public works or to cover other communal expenses.<sup>523</sup> The Athenian case is reasonably clear: booty eventually became the property of the state, but the generals appeared to have had the options of using it to pay their men's wages or to award prizes for acts of valour.<sup>524</sup>

In the fourth century and beyond, when mercenary service became more widespread and distant theatres of operation required longer campaigns and thus more money, using plunder to pay the troops became more common – especially when commanders were sent out with insufficient funds to begin with, requiring them to obtain plunder to pay and feed their men.<sup>525</sup> The Athenians sent out Timotheos with a fleet of fifty or sixty triremes, but furnished only thirteen talents, relying on him to levy money from allies and sell any spoils to pay his troops.<sup>526</sup> While this process represents a shift of power from the public authorities to the individual generals, at its heart this is still public control of plunder: the general, as a

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the Seleukid army was particularly known for this (e.g. Justin *Epit.* 38.10 with Bar-Kochva 1976, 11; see also Polyaeus, *Strat.* 8.61, Athen. 13.593e, I *Macc.* 3.41, and Bar-Kochva 1976, 100).

<sup>522</sup> Roisman 2012, 40; cf. Arr. 7.5.3, Just. *Epit.* 12.11.1, Diod. Sic. 17 *Contents*, 17.109.3

<sup>523</sup> For the tithe on war booty, see Pritchett 1971, 93-100.

<sup>524</sup> Crowley 2012, 108-9; Hamel 1998a, 44-45; cf. Pritchett 1971, 85 with n. 6.

<sup>525</sup> Pritchett 1971, 87, and Hamel 1998a, 46.

<sup>526</sup> Isoc. 15.109-11, Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.63, Diod. Sic. 15.47.2-7.

representative of the community, is responsible for providing his men's gross pay, but nothing more. There is no indication that citizen soldiers had greater chances of acquiring private wealth than before, but some states developed more sophisticated ways of controlling and distributing the spoils of war.

We know that the Athenians kept written records of the booty that was brought back by their generals, and that *strategoí* could be made to render an account of the plunder they took while in command.<sup>527</sup> There are numerous examples of generals conforming to this rule and delivering their plunder to the Athenian *demos* for inspection, and indications that noncompliance could lead to imprisonment.<sup>528</sup> The Spartans had similar laws, requiring their commanders to surrender all captured spoils to the community; generals were usually accompanied by at least one λαφυροπώλης, a dedicated officer charged with overseeing the distribution and sale of any booty.<sup>529</sup> According to Xenophon it was to him, and not to the king, that all captured plunder was to be delivered.<sup>530</sup> This was another feature of public control over plunder: it was not for the king to distribute as he wished, akin to a Homeric *basileus* or a Hellenistic monarch, but rather the community took charge of the spoils and ensured they could not be used to create personal links between general and soldier – such bonds were based on remunerative power and might undermine the normative elements in the Spartan compliance relationship.<sup>531</sup> And just as in Athens, the Spartans severely punished any attempt to gain private wealth from the spoils: after the victory at Aigospotamoi in 405, Gylippos was sent by Lysander to deliver the plunder to Sparta; he stole some of it, but was found out by the ephors, fled into exile, and was condemned to death *in absentia*.<sup>532</sup> Lysander

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<sup>527</sup> Dem. 20.77-80: ἀναγνώσεται γεγραμμένας ὑμῖν τάς τε ναῦς ὅσας ἔλαβεν καὶ οὐ ἐκάστην, καὶ τῶν πόλεων τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τὸ πλῆθος; to Hamel 1998a, 45 n. 11, this passage 'suggests that, at least in the fourth century, the Athenians kept careful records of the booty which Athenian generals brought to Athens'. See also Lys. 28.5, 19.50-51.

<sup>528</sup> Pritchett 1971, 85-87. See e.g. Dem. 20.77, 24.11-13; Plut. *Cim.* 9.2-4; Diod. Sic. 12.44.3, 12.73.3, 13.68.3, 15.35.2; Thuc. 5.3.4; Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.13-14. In 406 the general Erasinides was accused of withholding funds that rightly belonged to the *demos*, leading to his imprisonment (Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.2).

<sup>529</sup> Pritchett 1971, 90-92, who points out that sales of captives in Sparta are extremely rare, owing to the helot system and the resulting low demand for slaves.

<sup>530</sup> Xen. *Lac.* 13.11; cf. *Hell.* 4.1.26, *Ages.* 1.18, *An.* 7.7.56, and Plut. *Ages.* 9.5.

<sup>531</sup> Harris 2015, 87 sees this dynamic as a measure to prevent tyranny.

<sup>532</sup> Diod. Sic. 13.106.8-9, Plut. *Lys.* 16-17.1, cf. *Mor.* 217b.

himself might have had this example in mind when he delivered all the remaining funds (almost five hundred talents) and booty he had acquired to Sparta after the ultimate capitulation of Athens.<sup>533</sup>

As plunder captured by citizen armies became public property, the uses it was put to were also of a public nature: the spoils from the victory at the Eurymedon were used to finance public buildings in Athens, while the Thebans built a grand *stoa* in their marketplace, complete with bronze statues, from the proceeds of selling the booty captured after the battle of Delion; after defeating the Athenians on Sicily, the Syracusans spent the money from their spoils on their temples; we also have a fourth-century inscription from Tegea regarding the construction of public works, stipulating that any interruption or destruction caused by war will be paid for after the generals have held a sale of booty.<sup>534</sup> Overall, then, it should be evident that war booty belonged to the community, not the general or the individual, and that it was the community that decided how to use any wealth gained from war. Polis armies provided little scope for (lawful) personal enrichment.

This is not to say, however, that ancient warfare offered no prospect of private looting at all. Taking a city, pillaging a countryside, or looting a battlefield naturally offered opportunities for individual soldiers to secret away personal loot. Aineias Taktikos advised attacking armies that had taken to looting one's countryside, as the soldiers would be isolated and vulnerable.<sup>535</sup> This was of course known to ancient generals, who had to keep their men from becoming too dispersed in their quest for loot.<sup>536</sup> But when Aineias wrote of armies 'weighed down with plunder', it is more likely that he is thinking of captured livestock, wagons of supplies, and of course captive slaves and citizens, rather than of individual soldiers so burdened with personal loot as to slow down their march.<sup>537</sup> And the more cumbersome – and more valuable – type of booty would of course become public

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<sup>533</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.8-9.

<sup>534</sup> Diod. Sic. 11.62.1-3, Plut. *Cim.* 13.6 (Athens); Diod. Sic. 12.70.5 (Thebes); Diod. Sic. 13.34.4-5 (Syracuse); *IG* V.2 6, 9-12 (Tegea).

<sup>535</sup> Aen. *Tact.* 16.5-8.

<sup>536</sup> Diod. Sic. 11.61.6-7.

<sup>537</sup> Armies accompanied by large numbers of livestock: e.g. Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.26, cf. 4.5.5-8 and 4.6.4-6.

property. Crowley correctly identified the dilemma facing a citizen-hoplite: if he plundered on his own, he was vulnerable to attacks, but if he plundered with the army, the loot would go to the state.<sup>538</sup> This explains why, after the destruction of the Athenian expeditionary force on Sicily in 413, so many Athenians were secretly taken prisoner: their captors wanted to keep them for themselves rather than surrender them to the state, which they knew was expected of them.<sup>539</sup> Warfare invariably provides unscrupulous individuals with a chance at self-aggrandisement at the expense of the common good, and the ancient world was no different in this regard. The more power a citizen wielded, the greater the potential for personal gain from military activity – hence generals and politicians were often those who profited the most from war.<sup>540</sup> But the crucial point remains: such behaviour was perceived as unfair, and it was not the normal expectation of the average citizen-soldier to acquire wealth by fighting for his polis: the spoils of war belonged to the community.

Nevertheless, Polis army soldiers certainly benefited from successful military operations and official sales of booty: on the one hand, the proceeds paid for public projects and allowed the state to spend more lavishly on the welfare of its citizens, and on the other, the soldiers often received their pay as a result of selling plunder.<sup>541</sup> An example of this dynamic is preserved in Thucydides' description of the Athenian soldiers' expectations on the eve of the expedition to Sicily: the mass of the citizen-soldiers hoped not for a mountain of plunder, but to gain payment for the present, and an everlasting supply of wages for the future; the word he uses for 'wages' is *μισθοφορά*, which refers strictly to military payments, not to booty or other forms of remuneration.<sup>542</sup> The implication is that the spoils of war would go to the

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<sup>538</sup> Crowley 2012, 108-9: 'Clearly, for the Athenian hoplite, there was little prospect of acquiring wealth while on campaign'. Compare Hdt. 9.80 for a similar story, and Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.23 for the temptations of taking captives.

<sup>539</sup> Thuc. 7.85.2-4; Crowley 2012, 108 n. 32 calls this outright 'peculation'.

<sup>540</sup> E.g. Lys. 19.28-29; Thuc. 2.65.7 (cf. 6.15.2); Ar. *Vesp.* 684-85.

<sup>541</sup> A few examples: Diod. Sic. 13.64.4, 13.69.5, 15.47.7, (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.36 and Polyaeus, *Strat.* 3.9.55), 16.57.2 (cf. Hamel 1998a, 45); Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.28, 3.2.26, 5.1.24; Isoc. 15.111 (cf. [Arist.] *Oec.* 1350b). For more examples see, Dreyer 1999, 51.

<sup>542</sup> Thuc. 6.24.3: ὁ δὲ πολὺς ὄμιλος καὶ στρατιώτης ἐν τε τῷ παρόντι ἀργύριον οἴσειν καὶ προσκτήσεσθαι δύναμιν ὅθεν αἰδίον μισθοφορὰν ὑπάρξειν. See CT ad loc.: 'The profit motive for ancient wars is rarely stated as frankly as this [...]', and Pritchett 1971, 23-24.

community, which in turn would ensure a steady flow of payments for the soldiers. In other words, the benefit of the state (or organisational elites) was perfectly aligned with the benefit of the individual citizens (or lower participants) – as we have seen, this is a hallmark of any effective normative-moral compliance relationship.

Military wages naturally represented a form of remunerative power, but they did not constitute the predominant element in a Polis army's compliance model. Remuneration, especially on the low level that we find in citizen armies, was not a prerequisite for loyal military service, but a result of it: citizens received pay because they fought – they did not fight because they received pay. It might even make more sense to view military pay as recompense rather than reward. This is a crucial distinction between a predominantly morally involved individual and one whose involvement is predominantly calculative: the latter's compliance is contingent on the likelihood of being rewarded, while the former's compliance rests on the commitment to the organisation and the belief that acting in accord with its demands is the right thing to do in and of itself. In the context of Polis armies, we can illustrate this point by taking a closer look at how communities went about rewarding their soldiers in real terms, i.e. beyond daily wages and ration money.

The most salient feature of civic rewards for loyal military service is their predominantly symbolic nature. There was a large spectrum: respect and approval from one's family and fellow citizens, a sense of self-worth and validation of one's own place in society, proof of one's manliness and courage (which were equated in ancient Greek: ἀνδρεία), prestige for oneself and one's relatives, public eulogies and perks, awards for ἀριστεῖα, and of course public funerals for the fallen, along with monuments, memorials, and honour for one's family and public care for any war orphans.<sup>543</sup> Some of these rewards were of more overtly material character, such as bringing up one's children at public expense or receiving a crown for acts of valour; others were entirely symbolic, such as eulogies or seats of honour at festivals. But all of them shared an intrinsic symbolic element, derived from the personal connection between citizen and polis. This relationship has already been explored in our

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<sup>543</sup> Crowley 2012, 119-21.



discussion of funerary practices, which highlighted the prominent role of the socio-political system in generating combat motivation, compliance, and loyalty to the state. Over the next pages we will discuss another aspect of this relationship: how did polis communities reward and encourage military loyalty? This subject is vast and complex, as it touches upon most of the intersections between concepts like private and public, citizen and state, military and civic, history and memory, and the past, present, and future of the civic continuum. We will therefore limit ourselves to analysing significant examples from the Classical and Hellenistic periods that illustrate some of the central elements of the normative-moral compliance relationship of citizen armies.

In Chapter 2 we recalled how the Samians fractured at the Battle of Lade in 494: most of the fleet sailed away, leaving only eleven ships loyal to the Ionian cause.<sup>544</sup> The Samians later decided to reward and commemorate their loyalty by setting up a stele in the *agora*, inscribed with the eleven trierarchs' names and patronymics.<sup>545</sup> This recalls the funerary practices we observed in Chapter 3, but as Pritchett has pointed out, this was not a funerary monument, but a war memorial.<sup>546</sup> The act is closer to the commemoration of Harmodios and Aristogeiton in the Athenian marketplace; as such it was intended to reward and immortalise the loyal and courageous actions of the eleven trierarchs and their crews. There was no doubt a political dimension to the erection of the stele, but nevertheless, we may note that the reward for loyalty was public symbolic recognition.

A similar case involves Thasos, where we find another example of public recognition that combines sepulchral customs with commemoration and reward: by around 360, the Thasians had set up a public honorific list to be inscribed with the names and patronymics of those who died fighting for the city. The inscription that mentions this list also contains details regarding the public funeral that accompanied this act of commemoration: individual private burial is prohibited (4); the names and patronymics of the deceased warriors will be inscribed (7-8); their fathers and sons

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<sup>544</sup> Hdt. 6.13-14.

<sup>545</sup> Hdt. 6.14.3.

<sup>546</sup> Pritchett 1985, 165.

are invited to a public sacrifice in honour of the dead and receive seats of honour at the funeral games (9-14); war orphans who are of age are awarded greaves, a breastplate, a dagger, a helmet, a shield, and a spear (17-20); finally, poor war orphans will be supported by the public until they come of age (28-31).<sup>547</sup> The significance of the funerary elements in such proceedings has already been discussed in Chapter 3, so here we can focus on the other features: the rewards for sacrificing their lives for the polis were a mix of two components, one symbolic (public funeral and recognition, honorific inscriptions, prestige for relatives), the other material (panoplies and financial support for orphans).

The Rhodian *demos* used a similar combination to motivate its citizen-soldiers to fight when the city was under siege by Demetrios in 305. According to Diodoros, the citizens passed a decree promising public burial for all those who died during the siege, financial support for their parents and orphans, dowries for any unmarried daughters, and crowns and panoplies for any sons upon reaching adulthood.<sup>548</sup> Two points are worth noting here. Firstly, neither the Thasians nor the Rhodians promised any monetary rewards to their soldiers, or at the least, neither the inscription nor Diodoros make any mention of cash payments or donatives. This suggests that material rewards for fighting men were not seen as necessary for generating compliance and combat motivation. Secondly, the material rewards that were being promised were not for those who actually did the fighting, and they were triggered by death in battle, not by courageous or successful actions. Any material benefit a soldier might derive from serving in the civic army was indirect: his parents and any orphaned children were financially supported, but only if the soldier died fighting.<sup>549</sup> Like the honorific casualty lists discussed in Chapter 3, the polis rewarded loyalty over success – fighting over prevailing.

The symbolic and material rewards, then, can be divided between those who fought and died for the city (who received the symbolic rewards), and those who

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<sup>547</sup> SEG 57.820. For the most recent edition, see Fournier & Hamon 2007, who include a French translation, a commentary on the newest fragment, and a discussion of the historical background.

<sup>548</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.84.3-4.

<sup>549</sup> Aristophanes reminds us of the difficulties faced by war widows with children to support (*Thesm.* 46-48).

were left alone and vulnerable by the deaths of their relatives (who received the material rewards). And at the heart of this system lay the community, not any individual: it was the state treasury that paid for the expenses of a public funeral and financial support for the elderly and any orphans. Thus, loyalty was at the same diffused and focused: diffused as there was no one person – certainly no one general – who was responsible for rewarding the soldiers, and focused because the polis itself became the centre of gravity for loyalty, by embodying everything a citizen might fight for and acting as the source for any rewards he might receive. This stands in stark contrast to Royal armies, where the focal point for loyalty was the individual warlord, who had near absolute power over the allocation of rewards, a theme we will explore further in section 5.3 below.

A core function of these civic rewards was exhortation. The focus on the glorious memory of the dead, in combination with the material rewards for their relatives and, most importantly, their descendants, was not wholly altruistic. They served a clear normative purpose: to inspire loyalty and compliance in future generations by pointing to the honour that accompanied loyal military service, and allaying existential fears of those with limited means, assuring them that their dependents will be taken care of should they die fighting for the city. A powerful example of this effect is preserved in a speech by Aeschines, who described the process of awarding panoplies to war orphans in the theatre:

The herald would step forward and present the orphans whose fathers had fallen in war, young men adorned in full armour, and he would proclaim that most noble proclamation and the one most exhortative of virtue: that these young men, whose fathers had fallen in war and had become courageous men, have been raised by the *demos* from youth, and now, clad in full armour and going each their own way, with good fortune, the *demos* invites them to seats of honour.  
(Aeschin. 3.154)

The passage encapsulates the material and symbolic nature of civic rewards by stressing both the public expense of bringing up these orphans, and the public honour awarded to them by the spectacle and special seats for the theatrical

performances.<sup>550</sup> Aischines also captured the normative spirit of the proceedings, pointing out that the proclamation was supposed to inspire the audience as well as the recipients of the armour. Lastly, the ceremony created and strengthened societal cohesion by drawing on the civic continuum: the actions of those who had fallen in the past were celebrated and rewarded, while those who received the rewards in the present were supposed to gain inspiration for the future, ideally behaving in ways similar to those of their fathers, perpetuating the cycle of exhortation and emulation that underpinned a polis' compliance relationship.

Similarly, Thucydides had Perikles remark on the nature of civic rewards. At the end of his funeral oration, he points out that the dead have received their public burial, while the living will be brought up at public expense – this in turn leads to better citizens: ἄθλα γὰρ οἷς κείται ἀρετῆς μέγιστα, τοῖς δὲ καὶ ἄνδρες ἄριστοι πολιτεύουσιν.<sup>551</sup> Aristotle suggested that awarding panoplies and bringing up orphans at state expense was relatively normal and occurred in many other cities.<sup>552</sup> In its essence, the custom is similar to that of public funerals, which we also found in many Greek city-states: by discharging the familial duties of burial for the fallen soldiers and taking care of their parents and children, the state took on the role of the family.<sup>553</sup> As a related example, we might mention that throughout the Classical and Hellenistic periods, *poleis* (or rich benefactors) often ransomed back citizens that had been captured in war or by pirates, a well-known custom among the Greeks and something that was normally done by their relatives.<sup>554</sup> These represent important ways in which the internal cohesion of the citizen body, at times approximating familial levels, reinforced the effects a normative-moral compliance relationship: loyalty was directed not to a paymaster, but to one's family and fellow-citizens.

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<sup>550</sup> In Athens, the orphans were awarded their panoply at the Greater Dionysia, which drew its audience from the entire Greek world (Papillon 2004, 153 n. 46) – this would certainly have added to the symbolic nature of the proceedings; cf. Isoc. 8.82.

<sup>551</sup> Thuc. 2.46.1: 'For where the prizes for virtue are greatest, there also the best men are citizens'.

<sup>552</sup> Arist. *Pol.* 1268a. See also [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 24.3, and Diog. Laert. 1.55, who ascribed the custom to Solon.

<sup>553</sup> This same idea is expressed in Pl. *Menex.* 248e-49c.

<sup>554</sup> Cf. Polyb. 9.42.5-8. On the ransom aspect of piracy, see Gabrielsen 2003, 392-95.

Another method of rewarding citizens for fighting was the erection of honorific monuments or inscriptions. Just as with the examples discussed above, and the funerary material analysed in Chapter 3, exhortation played an important part in such forms of recognition.<sup>555</sup> We are fortunate to have an example that not only encapsulates many of the crucial features of civic rewards for loyal service, illustrates the complex relationship between polis and individual, but also stems from the Hellenistic period and sheds some light on practices of communities beyond the usual suspects like Athens and Sparta. The polis in question is Akraiphia, east of Lake Kopais in Boiotia, and the citizen in question is the cavalry commander Eugnotos. He was honoured with a bronze equestrian statue and an inscription on its base that has luckily survived more or less intact. John Ma has dealt with the inscription and its historical and socio-cultural background in great detail, wherefore I shall limit myself to providing the necessary context and some comments on how the monument as a whole reflects a polis' reward structure and, by extension, its compliance relationship.<sup>556</sup> The monument honoured Eugnotos, who died commanding the cavalry during one of the battles that occurred as a consequence of Demetrios Poliorketes' conquest of Boiotia in 293.<sup>557</sup> Most likely it was set up on the acropolis or in the agora, after a decree had been passed in the assembly.<sup>558</sup> The inscription reveals that the statue was dedicated by the community but paid for by two of Eugnotos' female relatives, his wife and daughter.<sup>559</sup> It also relates how Eugnotos fought bravely against the armies of the king (i.e. Demetrios), fell in battle as was becoming a leader, and was eventually returned ἀσκήλευτον, that is without his armour being stripped as a trophy – a recognition of his valour by the enemy. The inscription closes with a clear exhortation to the youth of Akraiphia:

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<sup>555</sup> Check internal reference.

<sup>556</sup> See Ma 2005, with text and translation.

<sup>557</sup> Ma 2005, 144-45 places it in the context of the two subsequent revolts against Demetrios (Plut. *Demetr.* 39-40, 46.1, cf. Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.7.11); for Eugnotos' death he suggests the battle against Antigonos Gonatas in 291, and further that Eugnotos might have been federal hipparch (153); he dates the monument itself to c. 285-75 (169).

<sup>558</sup> Hardie 2003, 29.

<sup>559</sup> *GVI* 1603, 13-14. See Perdrizet 1900 for the *editio princeps*.

ἀλλά, νέοι, γί[ν]εσθε κατὰ κλέος ὥδε μαχηταί,  
ὥδ' ἀγαθοί, πατέρων ἄιστεα [ρ]υόμενοι.

Now, young men, become glorious fighters,  
Become brave men, guarding the city of your fathers.  
(GV 1603, 15-16)

While this may sound like some of the funerary material we encountered previously, it is important to bear in mind that Eugnotos' monument was not a tomb, and his inscription not an epitaph. This was a public statue to honour, commemorate, and reward the loyal service of a citizen-soldier. More than that, it is a call to arms for the following generations of Akraiphians, in the hope they emulate the deeds of Eugnotos and bring further glory to their city and their families. Once again we see how polis communities managed to weave together rewards for military service with exhortative expressions of patriotism and civic ideology to form a normative framework for the behaviour of its soldiers.<sup>560</sup> What is more, the intricate relationship between state and individual is here presented as a co-operation: the *demos* ratified and dedicated the monument, but it was paid for by Eugnotos' relatives. It is at the same time a celebration of Eugnotos as a citizen and of the Akraiphians as a community, and as an act of public policy it constitutes a clear expression of normative power.<sup>561</sup> The monument also reminds us of the immediate context of Eugnotos' glory: the civic continuum and the socio-political system of the polis. The efficacy of the reward is predicated on the existence of a shared past and future, and on communal belief in civic ideology. Hence the inscription mentions the 'burial mounds of his ancestors' (προγόνων ἥρια, 12) and encourages the future citizens to live up to Eugnotos' example; furthermore, it portrays his death as a sacrifice for the common good of the polis, his actions as those of a lone saviour acting in defiance of the 'numberless army of the king' (βασιλῆος χεῖρας

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<sup>560</sup> Cf. Ma 2005, 151, who characterises the inscription as 'ideological and political in effect. [It imposes] the high standards of Eugnotos' heroism as normative'. Stecher 1981, 41 argues that the main purpose is praise of Eugnotos, but exhortation appears as an equally strong motif, especially as it forms the last verses of the epigram.

<sup>561</sup> Ma 2005, 153 argues that this is not Hellenistic familial encroachment on prerogatives of the civic community, or a glorification of private evergetism, but 'a collaboration between great house and polis'.

ἀνηρίθμους, 1-2). The contrast between the individual citizen and the mighty army of a Hellenistic warlord is intentional, and served to define and unite the polis community in opposition to the faceless horde of a Royal army. The actions of Eugnotos – and those of the citizen cavalry he was leading – were informed by their moral commitment to the polis, and were commemorated and rewarded by permanently integrating them into the polis' own narrative of resistance and sacrifice.<sup>562</sup> The ideological significance of such public rewards for loyal service is underlined by the fact that more than a century after the statue was erected, when all those involved were long dead, conscription lists were added to the monument, emphasising the longevity of such normative acts of public recognition: Eugnotos and his cavalry were still part of the military culture of Akraiphia.<sup>563</sup>

In this context, we should mention the second-century BC honorary decree for Apollonios, son of Attalos, a citizen of Metropolis who died fighting for the Romans (*SEG* 53.1312). He led a detachment of young soldiers during the so-called War of Aristonikos (133-129). The *demos* voted him a bronze statue in the *agora* along with the inscription (lines 37-40), and the names of others who fell during this war were also added (47-56). The inscription frames Apollonios' efforts in highly patriotic terms: he fought for his fatherland, his fellow citizens, and for their freedom – his reward was a glorious death, and he and his men proved themselves worthy of the ancestral glory.<sup>564</sup> It also mentions explicitly to arrange the return of his remains so they could be properly buried at home (42-45). The many parallels to the case of Eugnotos are striking, which might seem remarkable considering that the two incidents are separated by more than one hundred and fifty years. They suggest, however, a structural similarity in the methods of rewarding loyal military service in a civic army, regardless of the fact that Apollonios and his men had fought for – and might have been directly commanded by – the Romans.

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<sup>562</sup> Ma 2005 notes that the monument as a whole has to be read within the history and culture of Boiotia: 'This culture taken as a continuum, is the context in which the epigram embeds the statue: the military history of Boiotia rather than royal narratives of victory' (168-69).

<sup>563</sup> Ma 2005, 173.

<sup>564</sup> *SEG* 53.1312, 32-33. See Boulay 2014, 481-84 for further discussion, and for the text with German translation and historical commentary, see Dreyer & Engelmann 2003.

In fact, such rewards were common across the rest of the world of the Greek city-states: individuals, and sometimes the soldiers they led, were publicly honoured for their military service, whether they survived or not. Thus the Larisians honoured their cavalry and its commander who fought against Perseus in 171 with a festival and games; the contest was interrupted in the first century but re-established under Augustus.<sup>565</sup> Like the monument for Eugnotos, the festival apparently played an important role in civic life long after it had been created.<sup>566</sup> Another cavalry commander who was honoured with an equestrian statue was Nikasichoros of Opous in Eastern Lokris, whose πίστις was singled out for praise in the last verse of the honorific epigram: πίστις ἐπεὶ πάντων κοίρανος ἀγνωτάτα.<sup>567</sup> Looking to the fourth century, we can add Chabrias, Iphikrates, and Timotheos, who were rewarded with public statues by the Athenian *demos* for their military achievements.<sup>568</sup> The first general to be honoured in this way, however, was Konon, for his victory at Knidos 394 – indeed, he was the first individual to receive a bronze statue since Harmodios and Aristogeiton.<sup>569</sup> Civic honours for military service could even be awarded to non-citizens: around 322 the Samians honoured Naosinikos of Sestos with citizenship for aiding them in their war against the Athenian cleruchs on their island while they were in exile, while in 318 the Athenians rewarded Euphron of Sikyon and his descendants with citizenship for supporting Athens in the Lamian War.<sup>570</sup> This habit continued well into the Hellenistic period: in the first half of the

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<sup>565</sup> Chaniotis 2012, 47; cf. *IG* IX.2 531-33, *SEG* 53.550.

<sup>566</sup> Chaniotis 2012, 47: 'The military overtones and the exclusive participation of citizens of Larisa suggest that this celebration was aimed at forging local identity and transmitting the values of the citizen-warrior to the young men'.

<sup>567</sup> *IG* IX.1 270, 10: 'for loyalty is the purest leader of all things'; dated to 265/45 or after 229. See commentary in *ISE* 84 for more detail. Barbantani 2014, 311 categorised the epigram as an epitaph, but Geffcken 1916, 69 (no. 175) listed it under 'Ehreninschriften'.

<sup>568</sup> Aeschin. 3.243: Chabrias for the victory at Naxos in 476 (*Xen. Hell.* 5.4.61, *Diod. Sic.* 15.34.3-35), Iphikrates for destroying a Spartan μόρα at Lechaion in 390 (*Xen. Hell.* 4.5.11-18), and Timotheos for his naval successes (*Xen. Hell.* 5.4.63-66). See also Paus. 1.3.2.

<sup>569</sup> Dem. 20.69-70, Pritchett 1974, 12-14; according to Lycurg. 1.51, setting up statues of generals was a distinctly Athenian habit.

<sup>570</sup> *IG* XII.6 1.43; *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 317, *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 448, Harding 123A (see Chaniotis 2002, 102 for historical background). For more examples, see Ma 2005, 154, who rightfully calls the 'civic epigram commemorating locally important military events' an 'understudied genre'.



second century, Apollonia Pontike honoured an allied general with a golden crown and a bronze statue for leading her citizen army against a hostile neighbour.<sup>571</sup>

The above examples are all explicit about whom they honour and why, which seems to reflect the changing attitudes surrounding the relationship between states and individuals over the course of the fourth and third centuries, of which the rise of *evergetism* is but one facet.<sup>572</sup> Earlier, however, some *poleis* appeared more reluctant to publicly reward individuals for their military service, for reasons that were similar to those of the Spartans for not allowing their kings to control the distribution of plunder: the aim was to avoid elevating one individual's power or prestige over that of the community. One example are the so-called Eion epigrams from Athens.<sup>573</sup> They commemorate the capture of the Persian fortress of Eion by the Athenian forces under Kimon in 476/5 after a difficult siege.<sup>574</sup> Returning to Athens, the leading men of the army asked for a reward, and were given the special honour of being allowed to set up three herms, each bearing an inscription commemorating their victory – on the condition that they did not inscribe their own names. The explicit reason for this, we are told by Aischines, was that the *demos* wanted to prevent the victory, which rightly belonged to all Athenians, from being appropriated by the generals.<sup>575</sup> And so it happened – the second of the three inscriptions is of particular interest for our purposes:

ἡγεμόνεσσι δὲ μισθὸν Ἀθηναῖοι τὰδ' ἔδωκαν  
ἀντ' εὐεργεσίας καὶ μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν.  
μᾶλλον τις τὰδ' ἰδὼν καὶ ἐπεσσομένων ἐθέλησει  
ἀμφὶ περὶ ξυνοῖς πράγμασι δῆριν ἔχειν.

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<sup>571</sup> *IGBulg* I<sup>2</sup> 388(2), 34-37.

<sup>572</sup> On the reluctance of the *demos* to honour individuals too conspicuously, see Domingo Gygax 2016, 175-79.

<sup>573</sup> Aischines mentions the Stoa Poikile and the absence of the name of Miltiades as another example (3.186), claiming that the *demos* declined his request of having his name added. As Carey 2000, 228 n. 213 points out, however, Miltiades would not have been alive to make any such request.

<sup>574</sup> Hdt. 7.107, cf. Thuc. 1.98.1.

<sup>575</sup> Aeschin. 3.183.

The Athenians gave to the generals this reward,  
for their service and great courage.  
Someone seeing this in times to come will be the more willing  
to fight for the common good.  
(Plut. *Cim.* 7.4)<sup>576</sup>

We see the same combination of normative and exhortative elements that we observed in other types of civic rewards and in the public funerary material discussed in Chapter 3. Sacrifice for the community is presented as a worthy cause, and the reward for loyal service is public recognition by that same community – the rewards are thus ensconced by the socio-political system of the polis itself, which not only grants them, but also imbues them with meaning. It is equally telling that the generals had to specifically ask for a reward in the first place – presumably there would not have been any herms at all had they not pushed for public recognition; these inscriptions should be seen as an exceptional honour for Kimon and his generals. Plutarch confirmed this, and added for comparison that when Miltiades had asked for an olive crown, he was rebuffed and reminded that the victory at Marathon did not belong to him alone.<sup>577</sup> At any rate, we hear nothing about any monetary rewards for the generals or their soldiers: instead, the polis offered exclusively normative and symbolic honours, with a clear desire to highlight the communal achievement over any individual glory, and to subsume the success of the army under that of society at large.<sup>578</sup>

This development, from a reluctance to honour individual generals by name and with special prizes in the fifth century, to a habit of voting certain commanders bronze statues for their exceptional achievements, is remarkable, but it is important to note that the type of rewards remained the same: it is still a non-monetary rewards largely concerned with civic honour. What changed was the probability of a

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<sup>576</sup> Quoting here the text from Plutarch, which according to Page 1981, 257 is considered better than that found in Aischines (3.184, cf. Dem. 20.112). For further discussion see Page 1981, 255-59, who follows Jacoby in changing the order of the three epigrams, placing the mythological content at the beginning; also Petrovic 2013, 201-8 for a discussion of the wider context of this and other epigrams found in Greek orators.

<sup>577</sup> Plut. *Cim.* 8.1.

<sup>578</sup> Christ 2006, 113.

general being singled out for personal rewards, but these were still of a predominantly symbolic nature. Together with the other rewards we have discussed, such as public burials, care for orphans, or honorific inscriptions, they constitute a significant part of the repertoire of civic rewards for loyal military service. Nevertheless, *poleis* also awarded other, more overtly monetary prizes to their soldiers, which will be discussed next.

So far we have often dealt with rewards for generals and soldiers who had died during active service, but of course there were also times when ordinary soldiers, having survived an encounter with the enemy, received rewards beyond their daily wage and ration money. As we will see, however, this often happened under extraordinary circumstances, does not seem to have followed any clear regulations, and ultimately did not play a crucial part in generating compliance from citizen-soldiers. This type of remuneration actually shared the relative weakness of coercive elements in a Polis army's compliance relationship, as argued by Eckstein: 'And if Greek systems of enforcing military discipline through punishment appear somewhat lax by our standards, so, too, their systems of military rewards for acts of special valour appear lackadaisical and haphazard'.<sup>579</sup> While he is correct in his overall assessment, we may note again the explicit comparison to modern standards of rewards and punishments, which as we have seen carry little analytical weight when applied to the ancient evidence. The same careful approach must be taken when assessing rewards: it does not matter if a reward seems trifling to us today – what matters is the socio-cultural context in which it was bestowed, and from which it gained its meaning.

Probably the most common, and the most elusive, type of reward for military service was the so-called *aristeion* award. The terminology is not entirely clear, as the terms ἀριστεῖα and ἀνδραγαθία are both closely connected to awards for conspicuous valour in battle. Pritchett has collected most of the evidence pertaining to their usage, and included a list of references to the historical instances of such

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<sup>579</sup> Eckstein 2005, 484.

awards in Herodotos, where they appear most frequently.<sup>580</sup> Still, the overall picture remains incomplete, and many details are obscure, such as the exact role of the generals in deciding who won the award, how similar the custom was across different city-states, or how the award changed over time. Here we will mention a few cases that illustrate the general nature of such rewards – focusing on awards for individual soldiers rather than for entire cities.<sup>581</sup> Broadly speaking, Greek *poleis* sometimes awarded soldiers who had shown exceptional courage on the battlefield special prizes: these could be crowns of precious metal, public honours such as a eulogy, or a private share in the booty.<sup>582</sup>

In Athens, it appears that the usual reward for valour was a crown and a panoply. Alkibiades received this prize for his behaviour during the siege of Potidaia.<sup>583</sup> According to Eckstein, this had to be voted by the assembly and the wreath was not of precious metal, but of laurel: 'Not much, one would think. Once again, as with punishments for cowardice, it appears that what counted for the Classical Greeks in the rewarding of acts of extraordinary valour was mostly the good opinion of one's fellow citizens'.<sup>584</sup> In other words, not the monetary value was important – hence his feigned disappointment at the laurel – but the symbolic value that the crown conferred, marking the recipient out as worthy of admiration and honour among his fellow citizens. This effect would be intensified if the assembly was directly involved in voting on the crown for military valour – exposing the recipient to a wider audience than those present after a battle. Plato advised to honour extraordinary valour on the battlefield with an olive wreath, to be dedicated to a martial divinity along with an inscription, serving as proof of the recipient's bravery.<sup>585</sup> It seems that originally, crowns for military valour were not of precious metal, and thus entirely of symbolic value; this stems from their origin in the

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<sup>580</sup> Pritchett 1974, 276-90, after noting our 'profound ignorance about such a matter as the *aristeion*' (276).

<sup>581</sup> As was done after during the Persian Wars (e.g. Hdt. 8.93).

<sup>582</sup> Pritchett 1974, 289.

<sup>583</sup> Plut. *Alc.* 7.3: στεφανοῦν ἐκεῖνον καὶ διδόναι τὴν πανοπλίαν. See Verdegem 2010, 156-58 for an analysis of the Plutarch's sources for this passage.

<sup>584</sup> Eckstein 2005, 484.

<sup>585</sup> Pl. *Leg.* 943c.

stephanitic contests, where athletes received such vegetal wreaths, which could be kept by them, but were usually dedicated to a divinity.<sup>586</sup> Just as in the sphere of military discipline, Herodotos was keen to paint a stark contrast between Greek and Persian also on the topic of military rewards: thus the Persians were shocked that the Greek athletes competed for olive wreaths, and not for money.<sup>587</sup> However, by the end of the fourth century there seems to have been a shift towards granting crowns of gold, which thus carried a significant material value in addition to any symbolic elements: in a speech delivered in 330, Aischines laments that a century earlier, olive crowns were highly prized, whereas in his day, even the golden ones were commonplace.<sup>588</sup> Both Herodotos and Aischines likely exaggerated the contrast in order to awe their audiences, but there might have been a kernel of truth in each of their statements. According to Blech, there is no evidence for Athenian awards of gold crowns in the period from c. 408-340, and only a few instances of vegetal variants; he explains this by the *demos*' reluctance to single out individuals for special honours.<sup>589</sup>

Other evidence, however, suggests that not the assembly, but the generals were responsible for deciding who received the crown and panoply: Isocrates tells us that Alcibiades received the award directly from the generals, whereas Plato relates that the generals were urged to award the prize to this person or that, implying that they possessed at least a considerable influence on the final decision, if not sole authority in the matter.<sup>590</sup> Indeed, Aischines suggests that both were possible: he relates that for his gallant conduct in the battle of Tamynai in 348 he received a crown on the spot, and another from the *demos* on his return to Athens.<sup>591</sup> Whether or not there was a fast rule, then, it seems that both the generals and the assembly

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<sup>586</sup> Blech 1982, 114.

<sup>587</sup> Hdt. 8.26, cf. Blech 1982, 151.

<sup>588</sup> Aeschin. 3.187.

<sup>589</sup> Blech 1982, 155-56.

<sup>590</sup> Isoc. 16.29, Pl. *Symp.* 220e, Ath. 215c-16c. See Hamel 1998a, 67-70 for more detail: she suggests the decision lay with the generals, but it is unclear whether they also nominated the candidates, or merely judged those who nominated themselves (or were nominated by others).

<sup>591</sup> Aeschin. 2.169: καὶ τὴν ἐν Ταμύναις μάχην ἐν τοῖς ἐπιλέκτοις οὕτως ἐκινδύνευσας, ὥστε κακεῖ στεφανωθῆναι καὶ δεῦρο ἤκων πάλιν ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου.

could reward their soldiers for outstanding achievements on campaign. And some of these rewards were of a more obviously monetary nature than the public honours we discussed earlier: the taxiarchs who defended Athens against Kassander in 304 received golden crowns for their bravery – κατὰ τὸν νόμον – while a sailor was granted a crown of olive leaves and tax benefits for serving courageously on a trireme.<sup>592</sup> Another case involves olive wreaths only.<sup>593</sup> How common such awards were in Athens or elsewhere is extremely difficult to estimate, but as they were bestowed for acts of conspicuous valour only, they must have been rare. Whether or not the monetary value eventually outweighed the symbolic one is difficult to decide, as we do not know if they were usually sold, or had to be dedicated, or were simply kept at home. Nevertheless, the shift from plant to gold still speaks of an increased importance of the material aspect, and points to the complexity inherent in such rewards.

The practice of rewarding acts of bravery with special prizes was customary throughout Greek armies.<sup>594</sup> One example from Tegea, dating to 218, honours two soldiers for their efforts in the successful defence against the Spartans with a public honorific inscription to be set up in the *agora*, in the hope of inspiring others to fight equally bravely.<sup>595</sup> We even have an example of the outright promise of cash rewards by a general before a battle, something that was exceedingly rare in Polis armies: in 424/3, the Spartan Brasidas offered a reward of thirty *minai* to the first man to scale the walls of the Lekythos fort near Torone.<sup>596</sup> Pritchett mentions this as an award of an *aristeion*, but there are several features that make this case unrepresentative.<sup>597</sup> Firstly, the sum itself: three thousand *drachmai* is a substantial amount, which has prompted attempts at emending the text; secondly, this is the only time Thucydides mentions any such awards in his history; lastly, Brasidas was leading a force of

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<sup>592</sup> See *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 500, 27-31 (taxiarchs): τοὺς ταξιάρχους τοὺς ἐπ' Εὐξενίππου ἄρχοντος καὶ στεφανῶσαι αὐτοὺς χρυσῶι στεφάνωι κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας τῆς εἰς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων; and *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 276, 9-13 (sailor, dated to before 336).

<sup>593</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 238, fragment B, 2-5.

<sup>594</sup> Hamel 1998a, 64.

<sup>595</sup> *IG* V.2 16, cf. Polyb. 5.17.1 and Walbank 1957, 552.

<sup>596</sup> Thuc. 4.116.2.

<sup>597</sup> Pritchett 1974, 289.

Peloponnesian mercenaries and armed helots, not a citizen army.<sup>598</sup> Promising a cash incentive to mercenaries is understandable, as the compliance relationship in a mercenary force was predominantly remunerative-calculative – it is not surprising that Thucydides' only mention of monetary incentives occurs in the context of hired troops serving with a general from a different polis.<sup>599</sup> The inscription from Tegea seems to be much more in line with usual civic rewards.

Xenophon preserves an example similar to that found in Thucydides: in 379/8, the Thebans and Athenians proclaimed some form of prize for the first to scale the Theban acropolis, which was being held by Spartan forces.<sup>600</sup> The word he used for these prizes is κήρυγμα, which does not allow us to specify what the awards consisted of, but judging on the context of other uses of the word, a crown of some kind is more likely than a cash reward.<sup>601</sup> Cases of ἀριστεῖα awards for ἀνδραγαθία are also found in Syracuse after the defeat of the Athenians in 413, and in Rhodes after the siege by Demetrios Poliorketes in 304.<sup>602</sup>

Our sources also refer to distributions of plunder after a battle without providing any details as to why this occurred, what the plunder was, or how much each individual received. According to Diodoros, the Athenian general Myronides led a citizen force and captured Tanagra in 457, after which he plundered the countryside 'and divided the booty among his soldiers, providing them with abundant plunder'.<sup>603</sup> Similarly, Diodoros tell us that Alkibiades in 411 sacked Kos and acquired a significant amount of booty, which he distributed among his men, quickly causing him to rise in their esteem.<sup>604</sup> Comparing both these episodes to their portrayal in Thucydides, we find no mention at all of any distribution of

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<sup>598</sup> On the amount see Pritchett 1974, 289 n. 55, citing Gomme's commentary for the suggested emendation. For the composition of Brasidas' force, see Thuc. 4.80.5, with *CT* ad loc.

<sup>599</sup> Cf. Diod. Sic. 11.76.2 for an equally large amount of money handed out to six hundred soldiers by the Syracusans in c. 461; Green 2010, 77 n. 96 suggests these might have been mercenaries. Another general who promised prizes before battle was Iphikrates (Polyaenus, *Strat.* 3.9.31, cf. 3.9.35, 51).

<sup>600</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.11.

<sup>601</sup> E.g. *Aeschin.* 3.33-36.

<sup>602</sup> Diod. Sic. 13.34.4-5 (Syracuse) and 20.100.1 (Rhodes).

<sup>603</sup> Diod. Sic. 11.82.5: καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις διελὼν τὰ λάφυρα πάντας ὠφελείαις ἀδραῖς ἐκόσμησεν.

<sup>604</sup> Diod. Sic. 13.42.3: πολλῶν δὲ συναχθέντων λαφύρων, τοῖς τ' ἐν Σάμῳ στρατιώταις καὶ τοῖς μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ διελόμενος τὰς ὠφελείας ταχὺ τοὺς εὖ παθόντας εὖνους ἑαυτῷ κατεσκεύασεν.

plunder.<sup>605</sup> Diodoros displays a clear tendency for making explicit that soldiers received plunder after battles, by making generic mention of a distribution of spoils.<sup>606</sup> It is of course possible that he is retrojecting something that was more common in his own time and the earlier Hellenistic period – warlords rewarding soldiers, often mercenaries, for military service with monetary incentives and donatives – into the fifth century, supposing that generals behaved the same regardless of what army they led. Alternatively, his sources might simply have been more willing to mention rewards than Thucydides: as we noted above, his mentioning Brasidas’ promise of extra reward is the only such occurrence in his history. Assuming that the information in Diodoros is correct, however, these instances represent clear cases of remunerative power being applied in Polis armies, and can be supplemented with a reference from Xenophon. He relates that in 406, Kallikratidas took Methymna on Lesbos, after which his soldiers divided up all the χρήματα among themselves, while Kallikratidas collected all the captives.<sup>607</sup> These three cases all occurred after a city had been sacked, which naturally meant that booty was widely available. Moreover, Alkibiades had obvious reasons to ingratiate himself with the Athenians in 411, whereas Kallikratidas was still waiting for funds to pay his crews and allied troops, for which reason allowing his soldiers to divide among themselves all the moveable property might have been a way to alleviate his lack of money.<sup>608</sup>

It appears, then, that there were certainly (special?) circumstances under which citizen-soldiers were able to obtain private booty, either by plundering themselves or after a distribution of spoils ordered by the general. As so often, we cannot be certain as to how common this was, or if the amounts obtained thereby were significant enough to affect the nature of a civic army’s compliance

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<sup>605</sup> Thuc. 1.108.2-3, 8.108.1-2.

<sup>606</sup> E.g. Diod. Sic. 11.33.1-2 (cf. Hdt. 9.80-81), 13.64.4, 15.21.2.

<sup>607</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.14. It is not entirely clear how the soldiers would monetise large amounts of non-cash plunder; one option would be to try and sell it. A sacred regulation from Samos (*IG* XII.6.1 169, dated to 245/4) mentions masterless mercenaries trading in the precinct of the Heraion (see Koenen 1977).

<sup>608</sup> Compare with the soldiers of Eteonikos lodged on Chios in 406, who in the absence of payment and ration money lived off the land and even performed paid labour to survive – only when starvation and winter were threatening did they contemplate taking Chios by force (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.1).



relationship. Overall, the impression is that they were not: we have observed that *poleis* kept a careful guard over the collection and distribution of spoils to make sure the community remained in control, and the instances we know of potentially involved unusual situations. We should not imagine a perfectly static environment though, as the general developments in Greek warfare over the course of the fourth century, most prominently the increasing use of mercenaries, had an impact on the behaviour of commanders and soldiers, and thus also on the types of power and involvement that existed in citizen armies. The innovative approach of Iphikrates, for example, involved a stronger element of remunerative power, as he promised prizes before battle and offered each individual who distinguished themselves a special part of any plunder. On top of that, he also honoured such soldiers with seats of honour at festivals and assemblies.<sup>609</sup> He seems to have preferred a more balanced reward system, combining his experience as a mercenary commander with that of leading citizens.

We opened this chapter with the figure of Kleostratos, the fictional Athenian citizen who enlisted with a Hellenistic warlord to make his fortune serving as a mercenary in Asia. Ultimately, he achieved his goal, amassing a small fortune and managing to return alive. The aim of the current section was to show that Polis army warfare offered very little scope for gaining personal wealth, as campaigns were short and limited, armies did not usually carry large quantities of belongings and plunder, and because any spoils would normally become public property. This left the ordinary soldier with his daily wage and ration money only, plus anything of value he managed to secret away, and any extra rewards handed out by the general. Apart from monetary rewards, however, *poleis* recognised loyal military service, regardless of the outcome, with a variety of public honours and rewards that were predominantly of symbolic value: honorific inscriptions, public funerals, public care and prestige for orphans, awards for outstanding behaviour on the battlefield, eulogies, or seats of honour at public events. This reflects the overall structure of the compliance model of Polis armies: a normative-moral compliance relationship does

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<sup>609</sup> Polyaeus, *Strat.* 3.9.31.

not require monetary incentives to motivate the lower participants to follow their organisation's directives. This is not to say that money played no important part in motivating citizen-soldiers: the promise of profit lured the Athenians to Sicily, and many soldiers risked their lives plundering on their own to increase their financial gain from campaigning.<sup>610</sup> The main point is rather that in Polis armies, the predominant type of power exercised was normative, not remunerative: this explains the powerful exhortative elements we identified in most of the civic rewards for military service, and the ideological emphasis on sacrifice for the common good. That there was overlap between some of the material discussed in this chapter, as in the case of Eugnotos of Akraiphia, and the funerary material from Chapter 3, illustrates the strong connection between rewards, commemoration, and exhortation in civic power structures.

Kleostratos, then, seems to fit in well with the wider evidence for polis based warfare and the dynamics of plunder and rewards for service in a civic army: citizen-soldiers did not fight to gain wealth, nor even to earn a living – the campaigning season was too short, and the amounts of private plunder too small. The main beneficiary of polis warfare was the polis itself, as the majority of spoils became public property and thus allowed the state to finance itself. In less abstract terms, the benefit of the polis was also the benefit of the individual, which is a cornerstone of a normative-moral compliance relationship, as it helps to align the goals of the organisational elites with those of the lower participants. The benefits for army loyalty are equally obvious: Polis armies had much less of a problem with disloyalty than Royal armies precisely because their soldiers' compliance was not based on a calculative orientation: the rewards were a consequence, not a precondition, of loyal service. In the next section, we will explore in more detail the nature of the compliance relationship in Royal armies by looking at their reward structures and the ways in which they promoted – or compromised – army loyalty.

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<sup>610</sup> E.g. Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.4-5, 3.4.22.

### 5.3 The Spoils of War: Rewards in Royal Armies

In Chapter 4 we demonstrated that coercion did not play a significant role in generating compliance either in Polis or in Royal armies. It remains to be shown that the predominant type of power exercised in Royal armies was remunerative, by analysing the structure of incentives and rewards for loyal military service. While the focus will be on the armies of the Successors and the Hellenistic kings of the third century, we will begin with the army of Alexander III, because the soldiers' and commanders' experiences under Alexander influenced their behaviour in the subsequent decades.

Alexander employed an effective mix of symbolic and monetary rewards to motivate his troops. We have seen in Chapter 3 how public burials in his army went hand in hand with the distribution of money to those who had distinguished themselves in combat. Arrian tells us that after Issos, the funeral of the fallen was accompanied by a speech in which the king mentioned by name each individual who had performed extraordinarily in the battle.<sup>611</sup> For the king to mention a soldier by name in front of the assembled army, recounting his deeds of valour, must have been an exceptional honour all by itself, deriving most of its effect from the symbolic value of royal public recognition of one's ἀνδρεία.<sup>612</sup> In a similar symbolic vein, Plutarch records that Alexander rewarded his veterans with seats of honour at the theatre, and the right to wear crowns, akin to civic honours.<sup>613</sup> He also awarded valuable golden crowns to those who distinguished themselves in battle and to those who simply were of higher rank.<sup>614</sup> But he usually topped these rewards off with gifts of money, apparently varying the amount to fit each achievement.<sup>615</sup> Another good example of the combination of symbolic and monetary elements are the so-called Elephant Medallions, which were struck in small quantities after the battle of the

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<sup>611</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 2.12.1, cf. Curt. 3.12.13, Diod. Sic. 17.40.1.

<sup>612</sup> See Carney 1996, 25, with n. 39 for more examples.

<sup>613</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 71.8.

<sup>614</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 7.5.4.

<sup>615</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 2.12.1: καὶ χρημάτων ἐπιδόσει ὡς ἑκάστους ξὺν τῇ ἀξίᾳ ἐτίμησεν.

Hydaspes river and probably awarded to some veterans as *aristeia* prizes.<sup>616</sup> The medallions were at the same time symbolic commemoration and mark of honour, but also a decadrachm's worth of silver (plus added value for being rare). Alexander also handed out pure cash rewards at many occasions, e.g. after the siege of Tyre, the defeat of Poros, and the conclusion of the hunt for Dareios, at which he apparently distributed the fabulous sum of 13,000 talents to his army.<sup>617</sup>

Already we observe an overtly monetary element in Alexander's reward structure, one that was generally absent in Polis armies, and one that over the course of his campaigns became firmly embedded in his army's compliance relationship. This was no innovation: Philip II had also handed out gifts to his men for exceptional service, such as after the siege of Olynthos in 348.<sup>618</sup> By definition, such gifts did not apply to the entire army, and by themselves might not be powerful enough to have a significant impact on the men's motivations and expectations. But there were other royally sanctioned ways in which the soldiers of Alexander's army could acquire personal wealth: he would often let his men plunder cities and territory at will to gain their good opinion and whet their appetite for further riches, a practice that was enthusiastically adopted by his Successors.<sup>619</sup> He also offered cash prizes to his men before battle. Twelve talents were promised to the first to scale the Sogdian Rock – everyone would receive money as well, down to three hundred gold darics for the last to make it to the top.<sup>620</sup> These sums tower above the half talent offered to the mercenaries of Brasidas. The episode conveys the difference in sheer scale of money involved in Royal warfare when compared to Polis warfare. But while Brasidas was offering money to mercenaries, Alexander was motivating his own Macedonians, men who, like citizen-soldiers of Greek *poleis*, already received wages

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<sup>616</sup> See Holt 2003 for an in-depth treatment of these medallions, and esp. 146-48: he dates their striking to 326/5 and calls them 'rare commemorative medallions, or *aristeia* – valuable rewards for distinguished military service' (147).

<sup>617</sup> Diod. Sic. 17.46.6, Arr. *Anab.* 2.24.6 (Tyre, cf. 2.18.4 for rewards for zeal in constructing the mole); Diod. Sic. 17.89.3, Arr. *Anab.* 5.20.1 (Poros); Just. *Epit.* 12.1.1 (pursuit of Dareios).

<sup>618</sup> Diod. Sic. 16.53.3: τοὺς δὲ ἀνδραγαθήσαντας τῶν στρατιωτῶν κατὰ τὴν μάχην ἀξίαις δωρεαῖς τιμήσας.

<sup>619</sup> Roisman 2012, 33; e.g. Diod. Sic. 17.70.1 (330/29), 17.94.1-4 (326/5), 17.104.6 (326/5).

<sup>620</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 4.18.7; in Curtius' version (7.11.12), Alexander offers ten talents to the first man, and one talent less for the following nine, for a total of fifty-five talents.

for their military service – this is a significant intrusion of purely remunerative power into the compliance relationship between king and soldier.

The importance of payment in the Macedonian royal army can also be gleaned from the nomenclature in the rank and file: the man in the ninth rank in each file was called a διμοιρίτης or 'double-pay man', while the soldiers at the rear of each half-file of eight men were called δεκάστᾶταιροι, or 'ten-stater men'.<sup>621</sup> This trend held true for the mercenaries fielded in Hellenistic Royal armies more generally: the average daily pay of c. four Attic obols that was given to citizen infantry had doubled by the time of the Successors (pay for cavalry also doubled to sixteen obols).<sup>622</sup> Pay for regular soldiers in Royal armies also appears to have been higher than that for citizen troops. Although precise numbers are very difficult to arrive at, Griffith concluded that the hypaspists in Alexander's army received *misthos* of one drachma per day, while Aperghis argues for an average of about one drachma in the period of Antiochos III – this is significantly more than the one drachma of Polis army troops, which covered both *misthos* (wage) and *siteresion* (ration allowance).<sup>623</sup> These dimensions support the notion that military pay was of higher importance for the compliance relationship in Royal armies than it was in Polis armies. But in the absence of reliable figures, and of evidence for wage levels over the centuries, we should not make too much of them.

The version of Alexander we meet in Curtius' account outright encourages his troops to follow him into India by proclaiming that the campaign is a hunt for riches and plunder – evidence of the tradition that the Macedonian army eventually turned into a force of predominantly calculative orientation.<sup>624</sup> Indeed, Plutarch, Curtius, and Polyainos all preserve that Alexander was forced to burn some of his army's plunder on its way into India, as the baggage train and the men themselves

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<sup>621</sup> Sekunda 2007, 330-31.

<sup>622</sup> Serrati 2007, 465.

<sup>623</sup> Griffith 1935, 297-98. Note that this was *before* the influx of large amount of coinage in the wake of Alexander's campaign caused a rise in general wage levels: in 303, it is probable that a citizen hoplite received at least two drachmas per day; composite pay fell again to six to eight Attic obols a day by the end of the third century (Griffith 1995, 300-305). See Aperghis 2004, 201-3 for military pay in the Seleukid army.

<sup>624</sup> Curt. 9.2.27.

had grown so burdened with booty as to slow down the campaign.<sup>625</sup> The king also abandoned some of his own possessions – but there was of course hope of acquiring more wealth in the future.

Alexander's Macedonians managed to ramp up the colossal amount of twenty thousand talents of debt by the time they returned to Susa in 324.<sup>626</sup> In yet another powerful demonstration of remunerative power, the king paid off his men's debts.<sup>627</sup> So well-known was the chance of acquiring wealth on Alexander's campaigns that Theophrastos had one of his stock characters, the boastful man, brag about the many gem-encrusted cups he brought back from his campaigns in the east.<sup>628</sup> We should note that Theophrastos is not primarily accusing him of being a liar – only that he was boasting of things he did not in fact achieve: a real veteran, it is implied, would indeed have returned with plentiful booty. In a day-to-day context, clearly, serving with Alexander was synonymous with acquiring personal wealth – something that we have seen was not at all common in Polis armies. The literary example of Kleostratos, whose expedition is placed in the late fourth century, suggests that at least during the period of the *diadochoi*, the perception had not changed: successful military service in a Royal army was rewarded with personal wealth.

One obstacle remains before we can move on to the discussion of rewards in Hellenistic Royal armies. We have already shown that coercion appears not to have been a cornerstone in the compliance models of Royal armies; and just as we have shown that remuneration played no significant part in Polis armies, so now do we have to demonstrate that normative power, and its corresponding moral involvement, were of relatively limited importance for generating loyalty in the armies of the Hellenistic warlords. One obvious objection to the argument of this chapter is the existence of personal bonds between Hellenistic soldiers and their

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<sup>625</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 57.1-2, Curt. 6.6.14-17, Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.3.10.

<sup>626</sup> Ten thousand according to Curtius (10.2.8-11).

<sup>627</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 7.5.1-3, Roisman 2012, 40-42; cf. Just. *Epit.* 12.11.1, Diod. Sic. 17 *Contents*, 17.109.3. A similar situation arose with the soldiers of Sulla, who racked up a lot of debt on their Asian campaigns, which was later exploited by Catilina (Phang 2008, 156).

<sup>628</sup> Theophr. *Char.* 23.3: ὥς μετ' Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐστρατεύσατο, καὶ ὥς αὐτῷ εἶχε, καὶ ὅσα λιθοκόλλητα ποτήρια ἐκόμισε.

kings: after all, in the immediate aftermath of Alexander's death, it was not the individual with the deepest pockets who was placed on the throne, but the legitimate successors of the Argead line, Philip III Arrhidaios and eventually the young Alexander IV. It seems that the men's loyalty was governed by moral concerns about legitimate authority and personal affection for the memory of Alexander, and not by calculative considerations of immediate and future risks and rewards.

The issue of how loyal the Macedonian veterans were to the Argead line has recently been addressed in detail by Roisman, who ultimately expressed the view that 'the troops' loyalty to the Argead house was above reproach'.<sup>629</sup> If he is correct, the soldiers' attitude would imply a strong moral involvement, based on the personal attachment to the Macedonian royal line. This attachment would be mainly symbolic because the majority of the soldiers would have little personal interaction with the various members of the Argead house, which in turn would suggest an effective use of normative power, strong enough to directly influence the decisions of thousands of individuals. However, Roisman does not adequately scrutinise the underlying reasons for this supposed universal loyalty to the Argeads. There is strong evidence against any predominantly moral reasons for the alleged loyalty of the Macedonian veterans.

The question of Alexander's succession touched upon above naturally involved decisions about what to do with his material legacy: a large quantity of booty was stored in Babylon, and exerted a powerful influence over the proceedings in the royal chamber.<sup>630</sup> Upon Perdikkas' hesitation to pick up Alexander's ring as a sign of accepting the succession, Meleager seized the initiative and urged the soldiers to take matters into their own hands:

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<sup>629</sup> Roisman 2012, 156.

<sup>630</sup> The vast sum of 50,000 talents given in Just. *Epit.* 13.1.8-9 might not be entirely unrealistic, cf. YWH 56.

'By God, if Alexander left us this man as king in his stead, then I think that this one alone of his instructions should not be carried out. Why then are you not running to loot the treasure chests? For surely it is the people who are heirs to these riches of the king.' So saying he burst through the soldiers, and the men who had made way for him as he left proceeded to follow him to the plunder they had been promised.  
(Curt. 10.6.22-23, transl. Yardley, adapted)

This speech, like the others Curtius wrote, has of course to be read with some caution.<sup>631</sup> We do not know for certain what source he was using for this episode, but Kleitarchos, who apparently drew on eye-witness accounts, is a reasonable suggestion.<sup>632</sup> The much shorter accounts in Diodoros and Justin (probably based on Hieronymos of Kardia) make no mention of it, but Justin's version does describe the troops as being solely bent on riches and plunder, which might hint at this incident in Hieronymos or indeed a different source shared with Curtius.<sup>633</sup> I would therefore follow Roisman in accepting the essentials as reported by Curtius. What matters most for our purposes, however, is the way Meleager went about securing the allegiance of the infantry: with promises of money.

The troops' response is easily explained within the framework of a calculative orientation. The looting appears plausible if the soldiers feared that the rewards to which they had become accustomed during Alexander's reign, and to which they felt entitled in the future, were in danger of being withheld, or diminished. The situation in Babylon was after all an unusual one, the premature death of Alexander leaving the empire and the army without clear leadership; in addition, Alexander's role had transcended that of the traditional Macedonian monarch, so in cultural, constitutional, and traditional terms the position to be filled was a novel one. It is thus easy to understand how in this vacuum the soldiers responded most readily to remunerative power: with the question of the succession still unresolved, there was

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<sup>631</sup> Roisman 2012, 62: 'For Curtius' speeches, the prudent scholar will accept as historically valid only the speaker's identity and his core argument'. For speeches in Curtius generally, see Baynham 1998, 46-56, arguing for their overall artistic purpose. For an exploration of the various layers of meaning in Curtius' text, encapsulating Roman, Greek, and Oriental experiences, see Spencer 2005.

<sup>632</sup> Heckel 2006, 318 n. 417; Roisman 2012, 67.

<sup>633</sup> Just. *Epit.* 13.1.8; Diod. Sic. 18.2.1-3; cf. Roisman 2012, 66-68 for a discussion of this episode's credibility. Elsewhere Meleager is presented as jealous of the lavish gifts Alexander bestowed upon others (Curt. 8.12.15-17, Plut. *Alex.* 59.5).



as of yet no organised legitimate authority that could – at least in the eyes of most of the infantry – effectively apply either normative or coercive power.<sup>634</sup>

What we do see, however, are attempts – more or less sincere – by the soldiers to present their motivations and behaviour in moral terms: hence the invocation of the honour and legitimacy of the Argead house and Arrhidaios' right to rule simply by virtue of his being a son of Philip II. Such efforts shed some light on the complicated situation the men found themselves in, and indicate the existence of moral elements in their predominantly calculative involvement. Curtius and Justin present the decision of the troops to support Arrhidaios as resting mainly on the fact that he was an Argead and, naturally, the next in line.<sup>635</sup> But they had been just as ready to enjoin Perdikkas to pick up Alexander's ring moments before; it was only with the proposals of Meleager that they switched their support to Arrhidaios and became actively engaged in the proceedings, which culminated in a brawl and even bloodshed.<sup>636</sup> The importance of this veneer of legitimacy should not be underestimated, however: it shows that the Macedonian soldiers were not solely concerned with material rewards, but also with a concern about tradition, justice, and loyalty to the Argead house. Nevertheless, other episodes reveal that this attachment to the Argeads was certainly not 'beyond reproach' – it was situational and, ultimately, calculative.

At some point in 322/1, Alexander's half-sister Kynane journeyed from Europe to Asia in defiance of Antipater, accompanied by her daughter Adeia, whom she planned to marry to Philip III Arrhidaios.<sup>637</sup> She was met and opposed by Perdikkas' brother Alketas who commanded an unknown force of Macedonian soldiers; in a confused series of events that might have involved armed conflict between Kynane's retinue and Alketas' soldiers, Kynane was killed.<sup>638</sup> We are told by

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<sup>634</sup> This can also be seen in the soldier's ignoring the herald's order not to attend the meeting in the first place (Curt. 10.6.2).

<sup>635</sup> Curt. 10.7.2-3, 5-7, 10, 12-15; Just. *Epit.* 13.3.1. Arr. *Succ.* 1.1, as summarised by Photios, is too compressed to tell whether Arrian made the troops' attachment to Arrhidaios explicit, and only mentions that he was proclaimed as Philip, as does Diodoros (18.2.2).

<sup>636</sup> Curt. 10.7.16-21.

<sup>637</sup> Arr. *Succ.* 1.23; Heckel 2006, 101. Her mother was the Illyrian princess Audata-Eurydike.

<sup>638</sup> Arr. *Succ.* 1.22.

Arrian that eventually the indignation of the army forced Perdikkas' hand and he had to allow the marriage between Adeia and Arrhidaios to placate the soldiers' anger at Kynane's death.<sup>639</sup> Our accounts of this episode are sparing with details, but Polyainos strongly implies that even though the Macedonians under Alketas were at first hesitant in the face of a relative of Alexander, in the end there was a battle between Kynane, who was badly outnumbered, and Alketas.<sup>640</sup> We certainly know that Kynane was not averse to fighting, having had military training and experience of commanding armies; according to Polyainos she once engaged in single combat with an Illyrian queen.<sup>641</sup> It is therefore entirely possible that she was killed in a battle as she tried to force her way past Alketas' army, having already successfully outmanoeuvred Antipater.<sup>642</sup> This would make the loyalty that Alketas' Macedonians felt towards the Argead royalty appear in a different light. The subsequent anger at her death is not incompatible with such a scenario: most likely as the news of her death spread, the mood in the majority of the army turned sour, but this does not mean that Alketas' Macedonians had no hand in her killing.

A related later episode involved Kynane's daughter Adeia, now married to Philip III Arrhidaios and called Eurydike. At the meeting of Triparadeisos in 320, she used her position to stir up the assembled soldiers and direct their discontent against the guardians of the kings, Peithon and Arrhidaios. She might have forced them to resign, upon which the soldiers elected Antipater sole guardian *in absentia*; another version has the frustrated guardians oppose her until the arrival of Antigonos and Antipater.<sup>643</sup> Adeia continued to cause trouble even after the arrival of Antipater, and Arrian reveals the cause for the discontent among the army: they demanded their pay. Being disappointed by Antipater the soldiers turned riotous, fired up by a speech given by Adeia. Antipater, Antigonos, and Seleukos all tried to calm them,

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<sup>639</sup> Arr. *Succ.* 1.23.

<sup>640</sup> Polyainos, *Strat.* 8.60. Based on this passage Carney 1987, 498 wrote that Kynane 'won the army over by reminding them of her relationship to Philip and Alexander and of Alketas' failure to honor it'. In fact Polyainos makes no mention of her winning anyone over, he reports only that Alketas' men hesitated briefly out of shame or awe (αἰδεσθέντες τὴν γνῶμην μετεβάλλοντο).

<sup>641</sup> Cf. Ath. 13.560 f.

<sup>642</sup> Roisman 2012, 91.

<sup>643</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.39.1-3; Arr. *Succ.* 1.31..

but were set upon and only barely escaped with their lives; eventually the rebellion was put down with the aid of the cavalry.<sup>644</sup>

Here we see how an effective application of symbolic normative power by Adeia, who most likely invoked her Argead descent and her marriage to Alexander's brother to win over the restless soldiers, could cause severe disruption to an organisation that relied predominantly on remunerative power, which in this instance could not be applied because there was no cash to hand. The Macedonians' loyalty to Adeia and Philip III filled the gap temporarily and served to put pressure on Antipater, but ultimately it was short-lived and self-serving: Antipater and Antigonos were confirmed in their command, a large group of mutinous soldiers was sent to Susa to obtain more funds, and Adeia is not heard of again until she resurfaces in Europe.<sup>645</sup> Parallel to the behaviour of the men at Babylon in 323, the Argead line proved a powerful ally for as long as the remunerative power of the organisational elites remained weak, but in the end it was not a moral involvement that carried the day, but the men's utilitarian approach to obtaining their pay: whoever could provide it would receive their loyalty and compliance.

The case for the Macedonian veterans' unswerving loyalty to the Argeads is further weakened by that fact that some of them actively fought against them: before Perdikkas was assassinated at the Nile, he had sent Alketas and Neoptolemos north to serve under the command of Eumenes; Neoptolemos, who commanded a sizeable number of Macedonian veterans, refused, and secretly plotted to defect with his army and join Krateros and Antipater.<sup>646</sup> Eumenes detected this treachery and subsequently defeated him in battle, upon which the Macedonians took an oath to serve Eumenes and joined his side.<sup>647</sup>

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<sup>644</sup> Arr. *Succ.* 1.32-33; Diod. Sic. 18.39.3-4; cf. Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.6.4. For this episode and for Adeia's career in general, see Carney 1987.

<sup>645</sup> Arr. *Succ.* 1.38.

<sup>646</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.29.4; Plut. *Eum.* 5.1-2; Arr. *Succ.* 1.26. Exactly how many Macedonians were under Neoptolemos' command is uncertain, but it is likely that they numbered several thousands. Diodoros wrote that the force was noteworthy (18.29.4: ἔχων Μακεδονικὴν δύναμιν ἀξιόλογον), and as Neoptolemos was operating in embattled Armenia this seems reasonable (Roisman 2012, 120).

<sup>647</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.29.4-5; Plut. *Eum.* 5.3.

The veterans here knowingly opposed the authority of the regent Perdikkas and the two Argead kings Alexander IV and Phillip III. It is improbable that they were unaware of whose side they were joining by fighting Eumenes, or that Neoptolemos somehow misled them. Most likely Neoptolemos convinced them to join his defection to Krateros and Antipater in opposition to Perdikkas and the kings. The fact that they defeated the opposing phalanx in combat testifies to their commitment to this new policy, and it was only when being surrounded by Eumenes' cavalry and the capture of their baggage that they laid down their arms and joined the side of Eumenes. In keeping with our earlier findings, the veterans' loyalty to the Argead line was not based on a moral involvement with the royal house. Rather we should see it as a situational response where support for the Argeads coincided with the men's personal motivations, which were largely calculative and based on the accumulation and retention of material rewards. This is nicely illustrated by the fact that once the baggage was captured, the men changed sides, which was the safest option (protecting their belongings and dependents), and also the most lucrative one, as there was hope of future plunder. The Macedonians could present their defection as a return to the legitimate authority of the regent and the kings. This would satisfy both of the elements that we have identified in their compliance patterns: the predominant calculative one because it secured payment and potential rewards, and the weaker moral one because it meant they were once more fighting for their Macedonian royal family and the legacy of Alexander.

A few years later, the veterans again revealed the double nature of their attachment to the Argead line. In 317, the aforementioned Adeia-Eurydike, now based in Macedon with her husband, made a bid for power and opposed the return of Olympias, who in turn was supported by Polyperchon's troops and the army of the Molossian king. Waiting in vain for her ally Kassander, Adeia confronted the enemy army on her own, at which point her Macedonians promptly deserted and joined Olympias, 'respecting the honour of Olympias and remembering the benefits they had received from Alexander'.<sup>648</sup> Justin reports a similar outburst of emotions and

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<sup>648</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.11.2; Arr. *Succ.* 1.27; cf. Ath. 13.56of.

guilt on the part of the Macedonians, which led the commentators on his text to describe the veterans as 'changing sides at decisive moments for emotive reasons'.<sup>649</sup> This is certainly part of the explanation, especially once we note that according to Diodoros, Adeia resorted to bribes, payments, and promises of future rewards to convince the Macedonians to fight for her in the first place; in this case, then, the attachment to Olympias as a higher-ranking Argead made Adeia's soldiers forgo these rewards. But the military reality has to be taken into account as well: we lack numbers for either army, but Polyperchon's forces combined with the royal Molossian army probably considerably outnumbered Adeia's troops, who lacked the support of Kassander (whose army was occupied in the Peloponnese). This might be another case where loyalty to the Argead house served as a moral mantle for essentially calculative behaviour, as once more the safer option aligned with following the wife of Philip II and mother of Alexander, who was also at the head of a powerful army; this would fit well with the behaviour of the Macedonians at other times.

Based on this brief analysis, then, it should be reasonable to call into question assertions of the veterans' unswerving loyalty to the Argead house: the application of compliance theory reveals a different picture, where the tension between moral and utilitarian considerations has to be viewed in the context of a primarily remunerative organisational environment. More often than not, the soldiers' calculative involvement carried more weight. This in turn suggests that the predominant compliance model was in fact a remunerative-calculative one, which we will explore in more detail in the rest of this section.

Just like citizen-soldiers, those fighting in Royal armies received direct and indirect payment for their service, i.e. military pay, and plunder, respectively. In terms of military pay, however, we can discern different attitudes: unlike Polis armies, where gross pay was generally a consequence of military service, in Royal armies it played a more central role in motivating men to comply. Whereas we know of no instances of largescale violent mutinies by citizen soldiers over military pay,

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<sup>649</sup> Just. *Epit.* 14.5.8-10; YWH 204.

such cases are clearly attested for the Royal armies of the Hellenistic period.<sup>650</sup> We have already mentioned what happened at Triparadeisos in 320, where the Macedonian army erupted into rioting over arrears of payment, and even threatened the lives of their commanders, Antipater, Antigonos, and Seleukos.<sup>651</sup> The revolt could only be put down with force and immediate action to procure funds for the army: Antigenes and some three thousand mutinous soldiers were dispatched to Susa to obtain the required cash.<sup>652</sup> Evidently, remuneration acted more as a precondition for compliance and loyalty, and the absence of effective remunerative power quickly led to the complete disintegration of the army's compliance relationship: the troops refused to obey, rioted, and threatened their organisational elites with violence unless they could re-establish effective power structures, which they did by promising to procure the money post-haste. It was in this moment of weakened organisational compliance structures, as we have noted, that Adeia-Eurydike chose to make her bid for the loyalty of the troops, presumably by combining promises of money with invocations of her Argead descent and the memory of Alexander. Arrian recorded another incident the following year, but our summary is too reductive to be certain of the details; we only know that Antipater's army rebelled once more because of non-payment. He resorted to false promises to pay them in order to convince the soldiers to continue their march to Abydos. Once there, he was forced to secretly cross the Hellespont by night, together with the two kings, leaving the army behind, stranded and unpaid. The next day, the army crossed as well, perhaps accepting that for now, the only hope of payment lay in patience.<sup>653</sup>

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<sup>650</sup> Polyaeus, *Strat.* 3.9.59 preserves that the troops of Iphikrates – possibly mercenaries – refused service and called a meeting over non-payment: a very different response to that of the Macedonian veterans.

<sup>651</sup> Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.6.4 records that Antipater was nearly stoned to death, but was saved by Antigonos, who assuaged the phalanx troops with a speech supporting Antipater. Diod. Sic. 18.39.1-4 mentions only the revolt, but not the explicit cause. For a detailed reconstruction of the episode, see Roisman 2012, 136-44; for a source-critical analysis of Diodoros and a comparison to Arrian, see Landucci Gattinoni 2014.

<sup>652</sup> Arr. *Succ.* 1.32-33, 38. These soldiers were almost certainly the *argyraspides* (Roisman 2012, 141-42, with n. 57, Waterfield 2011, 103).

<sup>653</sup> Arr. *Succ.* 1.44-45.

The absence of minted gold and silver that sparked these rebellions underlines the immense importance of coinage for the compliance structures of Royal armies. Already under Alexander, most of the bullion he captured was melted down and minted into coins, causing such a proliferation of his coinage that local currencies quickly lost importance.<sup>654</sup> This trend continued under the Successors, resulting in a 'colossal influx of large denomination silver coinage into the local economies of Asia Minor, as a direct result of expenditure by demobbed mercenaries and veterans flush with cash'.<sup>655</sup> Beyond providing a warlord with the necessary upkeep for his army, however, these coins served another purpose: to proclaim the extent of the remunerative power of whosoever issued the coins, and to remind those who received them of the source of their livelihoods. Hence we find the head of practically everyone who aspired to be anyone among the Hellenistic warlords and kings on the coins they minted. This would act as a symbol of power on several levels: in dynastic terms, it would reinforce a sense of continuity and thus provide a soldier with the sense of being part of a greater socio-political system. This might have a normative influence on the compliance relationship, as it helped to cultivate a kingdom's identity, and thus also the identity of those who fought for it. On a related note, it would also heighten the legitimacy of whoever minted the coins, either because they might want to be seen as a reliable source of payment, or because they claimed legitimacy from the past, as did Ptolemy, the first to place the image of Alexander on his coinage.<sup>656</sup>

Additionally, the warlord's remunerative power was advertised via the circulation of the coins as they were being spent by his army – potentially attracting new soldiers, but at the very least proclaiming his access to money and his willingness to spend it on his troops. Indeed, preparing for war and paying troops appear to have been the primary occasions for minting large quantities of coins in the first place, emphasising the importance of the images on them: if soldiers were among the first to handle a new series of coins, it seems reasonable that they were

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<sup>654</sup> Serrati 2007, 464.

<sup>655</sup> Thonemann 2016, 531.

<sup>656</sup> Waterfield 2011, 49. For the image of Alexander on ancient coins, see Dahmen 2007.

also the main target audience for any political, dynastic, or ideological messages that appeared on them.<sup>657</sup> Coinage, then, could be used to enhance both the remunerative and normative power of the issuing authority: it was the physical representation of the organisational elites' ability to fulfil their end of the bargain by providing payment, while at the same time it could act as a vehicle for other, more subtle messages of ideological or political nature, for which the lower participants were a captive audience. Nevertheless, it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess any direct normative impact coins might have had on the loyalty of Royal army troops; our sources simply do not record how individual series were received. Instead, they focus on those instances where compliance broke down because coinage could not fulfil its primary purpose: to exert remunerative power.

Cases of noncompliance over payment were not confined to the aftermath Alexander's death, nor were they restricted to mercenaries; Philip II had to deal with the malcontent of his unpaid Macedonians, and the armies of the Hellenistic kingdoms were equally prone to payment-related breakdowns of their compliance relationships.<sup>658</sup> Early in his reign, Antiochos III found himself unable to confront the revolt of Molon, as the army he had gathered in Apamea, both mercenaries and military settlers, refused to serve because of arrears of pay. Only the financial intervention of Hermeias, a powerful courtier, resolved the situation, but the young king was forced to accept certain conditions in order to obtain the money, including the dismissal of his trusted advisor Epigenes.<sup>659</sup> Polybios adds that Hermeias' standing with the majority of the troops rose sharply as a consequence. This illustrates the inherent weaknesses of any predominantly remunerative power structure: it is perpetually at the risk of failure unless a sufficient supply of money can be guaranteed, and in its absence is left wide open to exploitation and destabilisation. Another example might be connected to the betrayal of Ptolemy IV

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<sup>657</sup> De Callataÿ 2000, 355-62, demonstrating a spike in minting coins whenever Mithridates VI of Pontus prepared for war; similarly, the money coined by the Seleukids was spent nearly exclusively on their military, with a spike in coinage in the course of the campaigns of Antiochos III (Reger 2003, 346, Aperghis 2004, 189, 236-42). Cf. Diod. Sic. 16.56.5-6 for a Classical example. For the religious symbolism of the images, see Smith 1988, 39-41.

<sup>658</sup> Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.2.6.

<sup>659</sup> Polyb. 5.50.1-7.



by some of his troops after the battle of Raphia in 217. The details are obscure, but the so-called Raphia decree mentions a short-lived rebellion that Fischer-Bovet has connected to difficulties in paying the troops in the wake of the immense expenditure incurred in the preparation for the Raphia campaign.<sup>660</sup> This rebellion came after a series of betrayals before the battle, which suggests that Ptolemy was facing a crisis of loyalty. In this context, the payment to his soldiers of 300,000 gold coins (roughly a thousand silver talents) mentioned in the decree can be viewed as an attempt to reinforce the waning loyalty of his army.<sup>661</sup>

Hellenistic warlords and kings were certainly aware of the pitfalls of relying on remunerative power to generate compliance in their soldiers. In Chapter 2, we explored the frequent use of bribery to cause defections among enemy armies. Ensuring a steady flow of income, and thus a steady flow of payment for one's troops, was paramount. Antigonos seems to have internalised this lesson quickly: before his march into Cappadocia in 302, he paid his troops three months' wages in advance, and carried an extra three thousand talents for emergencies.<sup>662</sup> His foresight was rewarded: soon a large contingent of Lysimachos' troops defected to Antigonos – precisely because they had not been adequately paid. We are told that Antigonos not only covered their arrears, but also honoured them with gifts, proclaiming to everyone the extent of his remunerative power, while at the same time destabilising the compliance relationships of his enemies.<sup>663</sup> In the long term, of course, he was also negatively affecting the loyalty of his own men, who, once his money had run out, might equally join the side of another competitor. The dangers of not paying one's troops are further highlighted by a treaty between Eupolemos, a

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<sup>660</sup> Fischer-Bovet 2014, 88-89. For a discussion of the decree and the consequences of the betrayal, see Winnicki 2001, who suggests that the revolt prevented Ptolemy from capitalising on his victory, hence the terms after Raphia were relatively favourable for Antiochos III (139-45).

<sup>661</sup> Fischer-Bovet 2014, 88. She further argues (89-92) that the mutiny after 217 was not primarily an Egyptian uprising caused by arming them (cf. Polyb. 5.107), but more likely 'the result of a military mob looking for more rewards and encouraged by the military officers and the elite who saw in them an opportunity to bargain with the king'. Polybios seems to have conflated the immediate uprising after Raphia with the 'Great Revolt' of 206-186, possibly for dramatic purposes. For the decree itself, see Austin 276. The payment is mentioned in lines 29 (demotic) and 20-22 (Greek).

<sup>662</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.108.2-3.

<sup>663</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.113.3.

Macedonian local dynast in Karia, and the city of Theangela, following its capitulation after a siege: Eupolemos promised to pay the troops of Philippos, Demagathos and Aristodemos – almost certainly mercenary captains – the four months' wages they were owed by their former employers, plus a donative for Aristodemos and any soldiers who joined Eupolemos' service.<sup>664</sup> The treaty of course makes no mention of any betrayal, but as Chaniotis has suggested, it is entirely possible that Eupolemos was paying the men's wages and a donative to Aristodemos in return for them forcing the city to surrender in the first place.<sup>665</sup>

Eumenes of Kardia, too, knew of the importance of keeping his troops, Macedonians and mercenaries, well supplied with military pay: Plutarch preserves how he furnished his troops with ample pay by selling to them property that had yet to be acquired (by force) from various places within reach of his army.<sup>666</sup> He adds that this created so much goodwill among his men that soon after, when leaflets appeared in his camp promising a reward of one hundred talents and other honours for the assassination of Eumenes, his Macedonians formed a personal guard around him.<sup>667</sup> Apart from fitting well with the general picture of betrayal and disloyalty that characterises the period of the Successors, this episode also reveals that at its best, remunerative power was indeed able to foster personal bonds between the elites and the lower participants. At the same time, the ultimate fate of Eumenes is an equally suitable illustration of the unreliable and short-lived nature of the bonds created in this way. Faced with the same problem of how to provide his troops with wages, Demetrios Poliorketes, according to an anecdote preserved by Polyainos, simply hired more troops, for the plain reason that a larger army is more capable of acquiring plunder, and thus the means to pay its soldiers (thereby anticipating Tilly's and Wallenstein's destructive maxim of war feeding itself by almost two thousand years).<sup>668</sup>

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<sup>664</sup> See Austin 40 for the treaty. Eupolemos appears as a subordinate of Asander, satrap of Karia, in 314 (Diod. Sic. 19.68.5).

<sup>665</sup> Chaniotis 2005, 84.

<sup>666</sup> Plut. *Eum.* 8.5-7. See Dreyer 1999, 52-53 for a discussion of this episode; he suggests a form of auction to the highest bidding captain.

<sup>667</sup> Cf. Just. *Epit.* 14.1.9-11, who is alone in adding that Eumenes wrote the leaflets himself.

<sup>668</sup> Cf. Livy 34.9.12: *bellum se ipsum alet*.

The upshot of all this is that military pay in Royal armies was more than simply a wage plus ration money: it played a central role in motivating large parts of a warlord's army to comply, and this effect was not limited to mercenaries, where we might expect it the most. The Macedonian contingents, too, began to view payment as a precondition for service. The consequences of non-payment, as we have seen, were desertion, betrayal, and violent mutiny. Viewed in the light of a remunerative-calculative compliance relationship, this behaviour is perfectly understandable: compliance was contingent on payment, and once a lower participant felt that his services were no longer adequately compensated, he could simply withhold them. He might feel particularly justified when payment was owed to him for services already rendered, practically putting the commander in debt to his men.<sup>669</sup> Military pay, then, became a crucial tool in generating compliance, if not loyalty: especially in the context of frequent cases of defection and betrayal, remunerative power grew into the primary method of binding soldiers to their military organisations.<sup>670</sup> Moreover, the importance of payment affected all echelons of an army, from the ordinary infantryman to high-ranking officers; thus, a reason to fight for Ptolemy II was his reputation as a good paymaster for free men, while officers could expect higher pay during conflicts to convince them to remain loyal.<sup>671</sup> In extreme cases, military pay could even be used to placate disgruntled soldiers who were threatening noncompliance for moral reasons, such as after the death of Ptolemy IV and the murder of his wife Arsinoë III: one of the conspirators,

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<sup>669</sup> Cf. Dreyer 1999, 52: 'Wenn nun aber gegenüber den Soldaten und Söldnern, die loyal zu sein hatten, der Feldherr/König seine Verpflichtung nicht einhielt, dann entfiel die ihrige. Sie konnten ihre Dienste anbieten: nahm [er] diese in Anspruch, hatte er für den ausstehenden Sold und ihre Vorleistung (an Loyalität) aufzukommen'.

<sup>670</sup> Fischer-Bovet 2014, 167: the constant danger of betrayal meant that 'rulers were ready to offer the best deals they could in order to obtain loyal soldiers and immigrants'.

<sup>671</sup> Theoc. *Id.* 14.58-59: εἰ δ' οὕτως ἄρα τοι δοκεῖ ὥστ' ἀποδαμεῖν, / μισθοδότας Πτολεμαῖος ἐλευθέρω οἷος ἄριστος. Griffith 1935, 281-82 argued that the Ptolemies were usually particularly efficient in paying their soldiers. For high pay for officers, e.g. Polyb. 13.2.3, and Fischer-Bovet 2014, 72: payment to high-ranking individuals 'could be very high during conflicts to prevent them from joining the enemy'.

Sosibios, ordered the troops, who were personally attached to Arsinoë and outraged at her murder, to be given two months' pay in advance to keep them quiet.<sup>672</sup>

Direct payment, then, in the form of military wages and donatives, was a key component in the compliance model of Royal armies. What about indirect payment? The above-mentioned examples of Eumenes and Demetrios, who used plunder to pay their troops, already showed that the lines between payment and plunder could at times be blurred. But to appreciate fully the role played by the spoils of war in Royal armies, and to understand how the fictional character of Kleostratos knew he would acquire personal wealth by serving with a Hellenistic warlord, we need to look in more detail at how plunder was used as a reward and incentive to generate compliance and loyalty in Royal armies.

The episode we discussed in the introduction to this thesis, regarding the Greek settlers' rebellion of 323, already revealed some of the importance of plunder for the relationships between the Successors and their soldiers. It suggested both that the elites were aware of the positive effects of remunerative power (hence Perdikkas' orders to distribute the booty among the Macedonians), and that the lower participants responded decisively to the incentive of material gain (hence the killing of the Greeks). In this light it appears understandable that our sources repeatedly reference occasions where commanders explicitly promised plunder to their soldiers to motivate them for battle. Krateros, facing the army of Eumenes in 321/0, fired up his Macedonian phalanx by promising them free reign to plunder the enemy's baggage should they be victorious.<sup>673</sup> This being the only detail of Krateros' pre-battle exhortation that Diodoros chose to record, we might wonder why he (or his source?) was being so selective, but there is no apparent reason for rejecting it. Roisman suggested that Krateros might have intended to exempt the belongings of Eumenes' Macedonians from the general looting, in the hope of easing their integration into his own army; he adds that the promise of plunder 'demonstrated

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<sup>672</sup> Polyb. 15.25.11. It is telling of Polybios' bias against the soldiers that he does not comment much on their personal attachment to Arsinoë, but instead points out their greed (τὸ λυσιτελὲς ὁρμηῖς αὐτῶν).

<sup>673</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.30.2-4.

Craterus' concern for his soldiers' welfare'.<sup>674</sup> The first point seems reasonable: it corresponds to their behaviour at other times, and underlines once again that changing sides after a battle was unremarkable for Macedonians, contributing to their reputation of being fair-weather fighters.<sup>675</sup> Roisman's second point, however, might be a little naïve: while it seems probable that Krateros cared for the personal wellbeing of his men, the promise of plunder might not have been an act of altruism. More likely, it was a calculated exercise of remunerative power, designed to act as incentive and reward for loyalty and dedication in the upcoming struggle. In a similar fashion, before the battle of Gaza in 312, Demetrios Poliorketes promised to yield the plunder (τὰ λάφυρα συγχωρήσειν) to his soldiers, which included mercenaries and two thousand Macedonians.<sup>676</sup> As it turned out, Demetrios' army was beaten, and the retreat towards Gaza turned into a chaotic scramble as members of his cavalry deserted the army to recover their own property which was stored in the city, ultimately allowing the pursuing Ptolemy to take the city by surprise.<sup>677</sup> This episode emphasises once more the immense importance soldiers ascribed to their 'baggage', and that it played a central role in motivating their actions. Generals could promise it as valuable loot, and it could cause men to abandon their commander if it was threatened. In the case of Eumenes, famously, it led them to betray him to his death.

The practice of offering plunder as incentives and rewards for loyal military service continued well into the third century: according to Polybios, Antiochos III promised his officers and soldiers δωρεὰς μεγάλας καὶ στεφάνους before launching his attack on Seleukeia in Pieria around 220.<sup>678</sup> At the battle of Raphia, too, money played a significant role in motivating the armies to combat: both sides, it seems, promised abundant material rewards to their soldiers should they win the battle.<sup>679</sup> Polybios remains vague on the content of their speeches, and it is unlikely that he, or his source, knew exactly what was said. Nevertheless, the most prominent

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<sup>674</sup> Roisman 2012, 128.

<sup>675</sup> Cf. Diod. Sic. 20.28.1-3.

<sup>676</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.82.4.

<sup>677</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.84.7-8.

<sup>678</sup> Polyb. 5.60.3.

<sup>679</sup> Polyb. 5.83.5-6: μάλιστα δὲ τὰς ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς τὸ μέλλον ἐλπίδας ἐπιδεικνύντες.

element is clearly that of material reward for loyal service, which corresponds perfectly with what we know of the behaviour of the Hellenistic warlords of the preceding century. The hazy picture in Polybios, therefore, might represent a very clear and real focus on remunerative power that prevailed in the armies of the Ptolemies and Seleukids at the time. Moreover, his claim is strongly supported by a passage in 3 Maccabees, which makes the use of monetary rewards at Raphia explicit: we are told that queen Arsinoë III enthused the Ptolemaic army by promising a reward of two *minai* to each soldier should they win the day for the king.<sup>680</sup> Such behaviour might easily be the origin of Polybios' imprecise statement, as it manifestly reveals how material rewards were used to motivate troops to combat and to remain loyal. It is perhaps no coincidence that almost a century earlier, the same amount was promised by Ptolemy I as he bribed the soldiers of Antigonos to join his side.<sup>681</sup>

Promising payments after battles, then, appears to have been a common method of generating compliance and encouraging loyalty in one's army. As larger battles were comparatively rare, however, and military payment only went so far, warlords and kings had to look for other ways of maintaining loyalty. Invariably they turned to plundering enemy territory and sacking enemy settlements. The latter in particular became an attractive option, especially as the advances in poliorcetics allowed the sieging and storming even of heavily defended walled cities, something that was only rarely achieved in preceding centuries. In comparison to Classical Polis armies, Hellenistic Royal armies thus had access to a potent source of revenue to support their remunerative power structures. A few examples will suffice to illustrate the general picture.

In 322, after a short but bloody siege of a fortified city in Isauria in southern Asia Minor, Perdikkas gave the captured city over to his Macedonians for looting. According to Diodoros, the inhabitants chose self-immolation rather than surrender, but nevertheless Perdikkas' troops found πολλὴν ἄργυρόν τε καὶ χρυσὸν in their

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<sup>680</sup> 3 Macc. 1.4; also Fischer-Bovet 2014, 89.

<sup>681</sup> Winnicki 1992, 440 with n. 20. For the bribes, see Diod. Sic. 20.75.1-3.

sack of the city.<sup>682</sup> There is no indication that the soldiers had to turn in their plunder or that an official distribution of the spoils took place.

Eumenes, too, used plunder to reinforce the loyalty of his men, especially after setbacks.<sup>683</sup> In the aftermath of Perdikkas' murder, Eumenes was declared an outlaw by the Macedonian assembly in Egypt; Justin tells us that to test his men's loyalty, he allowed those who wished to leave, and then went on a long plundering campaign in Aiolia.<sup>684</sup> Considering his precarious situation, it is understandable that he would have doubts as to the loyalty of his troops, especially regarding his Macedonians. Providing the army with plunder was thus an effective way to reassure his men that he was still able to provide remuneration and success in return for their compliance. Similarly, after his negotiations with Kleopatra ended in failure and Eumenes was asked to leave Sardis, he launched a series of surprise attacks, collecting booty for distribution among his men.<sup>685</sup> Once more, it seems that plunder was employed as a means to legitimise his command in the face of a potential crisis of loyalty. However, the constant use of plunder to motivate and reward Royal army soldiers meant that at times, their calculative involvement might lead them to refuse compliance if it meant losing out on a chance to acquire more wealth. After his defeat in Orkynia in 319, Eumenes in his retreat came upon the exposed baggage train of Antigonos' army; fearing that his men would start plundering and be slowed down for the march, he secretly sent a message to his enemy informing him of the imperilled baggage, while ordering his men to prepare for an attack. When it became clear upon advancing that the enemy had retreated to a more secure position, Eumenes feigned disappointment and continued his march.<sup>686</sup> As Roisman has pointed out, the decision not to capture the baggage might have been a mistake in

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<sup>682</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.22. On this episode see also Roisman 2012, 88-89; he suggests that Perdikkas might have been moved to generosity by the arrival of Peithon and his booty-laden troops. For a similar act of self-immolation under siege, see Hdt. 1.176.

<sup>683</sup> Roisman 2012, 146-47.

<sup>684</sup> Just. *Epit.* 14.1.1-6.

<sup>685</sup> Arr. *Succ.* 1.40-41, Plut. *Eum.* 8.4.

<sup>686</sup> Plut. *Eum.* 9.3-5, Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.8.5. Cf. Aen. *Tact.* 16.4-8, and Polyb. 2.26.5-8 for armies weighed down with plunder. For a more detailed discussion of the incident, see Roisman 2012, 1-2 and 164-68.

the long run, but the incident reveals that Eumenes could not be certain of his men's compliance should he order them to ignore the opportunity for plunder – hence he had to resort to trickery.<sup>687</sup> This is the direct result of the predominantly calculative orientation of his troops: compliance was contingent on material rewards, and could be withheld if these rewards were not handed out.

As a consequence, plundering countryside and sacking cities to maintain the loyalty of one's troops became a necessity for leaders of Royal armies, which is why we encounter this behaviour in nearly every Hellenistic warlord we know of. In 313 Ptolemy I went on a plundering campaign on Cyprus, and in upper Syria and Kilikia.<sup>688</sup> Diodoros, perhaps retrospectively, adds the motive that Ptolemy intended to fire up his army for the upcoming struggle with Demetrios. On another occasion Ptolemy appears to have distributed prisoners to his army as a reward for their participation, to be used as slaves. Our source, the so-called letter of Aristeas (§14), claims that Ptolemy was forced into this by his soldiers, who outright demanded the prisoners as a reward. While the exact circumstances are obscure, and the overall reliability of the letter is questionable, Winnicki accepts the distribution of the slaves as probable, and points to other occasions where the Ptolemies had handed out rewards at the successful conclusion of a campaign, such as the large amount of gold after Raphia.<sup>689</sup> It is easy to imagine a situation where the absence of ready coin might have forced Ptolemy to hand out prisoners instead. Another example is furnished by Demetrios Poliorketes, who allowed his army, including some five thousand Macedonians, to plunder the citadel of Babylon after its capture in 312.<sup>690</sup>

Such acts of remunerative power by commanders and kings were not limited to the turbulent years of the *diadochoi*, where the absence of a clearly defined centre of authority might have moved the various warlords to garner favour with their troops by any means possible. A century later, when the larger kingdoms were more

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<sup>687</sup> Roisman 2012, 167.

<sup>688</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.79.4-7. It is likely that this army included his Macedonian contingent, as they were present in the subsequent campaign into Koile Syria (19.80.4). On this plundering campaign see also Winnicki 1991, 151-52.

<sup>689</sup> Winnicki 1991, 153 with n. 19.

<sup>690</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.100.4-7.



or less established, plunder still played a central role in the compliance models of Royal armies. The usurper Achaïos faced a mutiny of his army in 220, as the soldiers realised that their newly-styled *basileus* was actually leading them against Antiochos III, τὸν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπάρχοντα βασιλέα.<sup>691</sup> Fearing a wide-spread revolt, Achaïos led them backwards and raided Pisidia, handing out the plunder to his men to regain their loyalty. This episode is remarkable for several reasons: firstly, material gain appears yet again at the heart of a Royal army's compliance relationship, as Achaïos was eager to reinforce his position by exercising remunerative power in the hope of tipping his army's calculative involvement back in his favour. Secondly, the reason why compliance broke down in the first place seems to have involved concerns of a moral nature on the side of the soldiers: they had misgivings about fighting their 'original and natural king', as if this somehow contravened a law of nature. If Polybios is correct in identifying this as the cause of their mutiny, it would appear that by 220, the Seleukids had managed to exert sufficient normative power over their armies to make them see Antiochos as the 'real' king, by law and nature.

The positive effects of such a normative-moral element are immediately obvious: the men refused to fight directly against their rightful king. We might question why they followed Achaïos in the first place, if they really had no intention of supporting his revolt against the king; the simplest answer would be that their still predominant calculative orientation led them to seek short-term gain under Achaïos, as long as this did not conflict with their moral orientation towards Antiochos. This incident suggests that the structural stability brought about by the establishment of the various Hellenistic kingdoms helped to combat the volatile climate of loyalty that prevailed a century earlier by strengthening the moral and normative elements of the kingdoms' compliance relationships. That Achaïos was able to gather his rebel army in the first place, however, reveals that ultimately, loyalty was still not guaranteed; that he then secured the continued allegiance of his

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<sup>691</sup> Polyb. 5.57.6-8.

men by distributing plunder reminds us that the remunerative and calculative components in the compliance relationship of his army were still firmly in place.

Antiochos too offered his men the opportunity to plunder. After the lengthy siege of Sardis in 214, the town was thoroughly sacked and many of its inhabitants put to the sword. Like Perdikkas' sack of Isauria, the loot might have been intended as a reward for enduring the arduous conditions of the siege.<sup>692</sup> At the battle of Thermopylai in 191, Antiochos' army began to fall apart as its baggage train came under attack from the rear, causing the lines to falter and retreat to defend their possessions.<sup>693</sup> This indicates that the troops' compliance hinged on the safety of their belongings, which illustrates the tension that lies at the core of a remunerative-calculative compliance relationship: the goals of the individual lower participants were not wholly aligned with those of the organisational elites, and when the two came into conflict, the soldiers followed their own agenda.

Philip V of Macedon was another Hellenistic king who used material rewards to create and maintain the loyalty of his troops. Towards the end of 219, after successfully campaigning and plundering in the Peloponnese, Philip gathered all his forces at Heraia for a distribution of the spoils of war, and Polybios records several occasions where large sales of booty were held under his auspices and the authority of official booty collectors.<sup>694</sup> It is perhaps telling that the only official regulations regarding the handling and distribution of plunder in a Royal army most likely stem from the reign of Philip V. We have already discussed the Amphipolis regulations in the context of coercive power, and noted that the prescribed punishments were all of monetary nature – a strong indicator that the predominant type of power exercised in this army was remunerative, and that the predominant involvement of the troops was calculative. But the regulations go much further in their attention to remunerative power, under the heading Εὐταξίας τῆς ἐκ τῶν ὠφελιῶν:

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<sup>692</sup> Polyb. 7.18.9-10.

<sup>693</sup> App. Syr. 4.19.

<sup>694</sup> Polyb. 4.80.16, 4.77.5, 5.16.5 (τοῖς μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν λαφύρων οἰκονομίας τεταγμένοις), 5.24.10.

(B1) [If] anyone brings booty to the camp, [the] generals taking with them the speirarchs and tetrarchs [and] the other officers, and together with these the [attendants] in sufficient numbers shall go to meet them at a distance of three stades in front of the camp, [and they shall not allow] those who captured the booty to keep it. And should any insubordination [of this kind] take place, the [generals], speirarchs, tetrarchs and chief attendants shall pay a sum equivalent [to what each of them owes?]

(ISE II 114 = SEG 40.524, transl. Austin 90)

Despite the fragmentary state of the inscription, it is clear that booty – and the remunerative power it embodied – was of the utmost importance to the proper functioning of the army: the regulation covers both private plundering and large-scale raiding operations, and makes it abundantly clear that all booty had to be surrendered and accounted for.<sup>695</sup> Ultimately, this booty would become the property of the king, who would then hold a sale and distribute the proceeds to his army.<sup>696</sup> It is this fact that explains the strict approach to plunder: in an organisation that relies predominantly on remuneration to generate compliance in its members, money is the single most important manifestation of organisational control. Without it, the compliance relationship collapses. Hence the Amphipolis code includes punitive measures should the officials fail to deliver everything that the soldiers brought in. There is a clear economic reason for such sanctions, as pointed out by Juhel: 'For the king, war, through plundering expeditions, was obviously an essential economic activity'.<sup>697</sup> Simply put, if his subordinates embezzled funds, the king lacked the means to maintain his rule.<sup>698</sup> But there is another dimension to these sanctions: plunder was at the heart of a Royal army's compliance relationship because it represented the most direct form of remunerative power. A king had to maintain his position as the exclusive source of this power, otherwise the loyalties of those under his command would be diverted to whoever could provide an equal or greater source of remuneration. Worse still, if the soldiers were left entirely to their own devices in securing their share of the plunder, without depending on a greater

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<sup>695</sup> Juhel 2002, 405.

<sup>696</sup> Juhel 2002, 405-8.

<sup>697</sup> Juhel 2002, 411.

<sup>698</sup> Chaniotis 2005, 65.

authority for its distribution, the bonds between them and their king would be severely weakened. Taking control of all booty was therefore an attempt to monopolise the ability to exercise remunerative power, because this monopoly was the foundation of a king's ability to create and maintain the loyalties of his armies.<sup>699</sup>

After all, Philip V himself knew how important it was to ensure that his soldiers received their fair share of plunder. In 218, Leontios and his supporters, as part of their attempts to destabilise the rule of the king, stirred up resentment among the peltasts and the Royal *agema* by claiming that they were not getting their rightful share of plunder. This seems to have worked, for we are told that the troops began rioting and threatened to loot the tents of the king's close friends, and even the Royal apartments. Philip had to intervene personally to put an end to the disturbances.<sup>700</sup> Whether or not the king's opponents were right in their claims, the events that followed reveal once again the crucial role that remunerative power played in the compliance model between the men and their king: the mere intimation that some of them were not being adequately rewarded led to an immediate breakdown of the compliance structure. Loyalty, it appears, had to be bought.

It would be naïve to think that commanders at the time were unaware of the inherent problems of a compliance relationship that was based predominantly on remuneration; the frequent cases of disloyalty and noncompliance would have made this more than apparent. Measures were taken, therefore, to ensure that symbolic rewards were allocated as well, as a recognition of acts of valour of otherwise conspicuous behaviour on the battlefield. Like the *aristeia* awards in Polis armies, these could be entirely symbolic, such as an honorific title, or they could be a

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<sup>699</sup> This system was certainly not perfect: Polybios' description of the fair and orderly looting routine of the Roman army (Polyb. 10.16) carries with it not only admiration of Roman efficiency, but also a hint of censure of Greek practice. Compare Erskine's assessment of Polybios' book 6: 'Polybios is concerned to explain Roman success, but more than this he is explaining to Greeks and to himself why the Greeks failed' (Erskine 2013b, 231); he suggests that Polybios is contrasting Roman efficiency with the 'basic laziness' of the Greeks (241).

<sup>700</sup> Polyb. 5.25. It is possible that this episode is connected to the establishment of the Amphipolis code, perhaps to ensure a more regulated and transparent approach to the distribution of plunder in order to prevent such riots in the future (see Juhel 2002, 401-2 for more detail; also Loreto 1990, who suggest a date between 241-200).

combination of both symbolic and material rewards, such as a crown of precious metal. Once more, the Amphipolis code sheds some light on the matter: a fragmentary sentence seems to stipulate that those soldiers who had received a crown shall also receive twice the share of the plunder.<sup>701</sup> It is likely that the crown here refers to an award for bravery or something similar, and in the light of the preceding discussion it makes perfect sense that the Antigonid army would combine such a symbolic reward – unless the wreath itself was of precious metal – with a more obviously material element, i.e. an extra share of the booty. Loyal service, in other words, led to even higher monetary rewards. Antiochos III, too, handed out crowns for conspicuous martial prowess.<sup>702</sup>

In other cases, the symbolic component was clearly dominant. An inscription honouring a late second-century garrison commander (phrourarch) in the service of Ptolemy IX Lathyros mentions the honorific acclamation (ἐπισημασία) he received from the king.<sup>703</sup> The details of this award are unknown, but it shows that the Ptolemies found ways of rewarding their soldiers for exceptional behaviour that went beyond simply paying them more. In this context we might mention the honorific titles bestowed on deserving members of the Ptolemaic army. For the cavalrymen of the Ptolemaic military settlers two such titles have been attested for the second century: οἱ συγγενεῖς/ἄδελφοὶ τῶν κατοίκων ἱππέων; the honorific positions of 'brothers' or 'relatives' (of the king) express a privileged status and might have been awarded for exemplary actions during military service.<sup>704</sup> Unfortunately, the origins of these titles are obscure, as are the preconditions for their award, or even when exactly they were introduced; the fact that they do not appear to have been hereditary makes them more exclusive.<sup>705</sup> One Glaukias was among those

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<sup>701</sup> SEG 40.525, frg. A, col 3.1-3: χετο στέφανος διπλὴν λαμβάνειν τὴν μερίδ[α τῆς ὥ]|φελίας. As Chaniotis 2005, 94 has pointed out: 'Such distinctions presuppose a close observation of the behavior of soldiers by their officers'.

<sup>702</sup> E.g. Polyb. 5.60.3.

<sup>703</sup> SEG 28.1479, line 9 (115 BC); see Scheuble 2009, 43-45 for a brief discussion, who notes that the inscription is unusual in primarily honouring the phrourarch himself, and not the king.

<sup>704</sup> Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 76: "[E]s scheint sich um Ehrentitel zu handeln, die der König für besondere Verdienste an einzelne Katökenreiter verlieh und die ein besonderes Nahverhältnis zum König zum Ausdruck bringen sollten'.

<sup>705</sup> For further discussion see Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 76-79.

bearing this title, but we do not know how he gained this distinction.<sup>706</sup> It is possible that beyond the symbolic value of the title, a crown or headband was awarded as well: a second-century epitaph we discussed in Chapter 3 mentions Apollonios, whose father Ptolemy received a *μίτρα*, his prerogative as a *συγγενής* of the king.<sup>707</sup> This is uncertain, however, as we simply do not know enough about the exact procedure that governed these titles.

The evidence pertaining to the Egyptian *katoikoi hippeis* brings us to the end of this section on the rewards for serving in a Royal army. We have seen that Hellenistic warlords used remunerative power at every corner to establish and maintain an effective compliance relationship with their soldiers. In contrast to Polis armies, payment, plunder, and special rewards were all designed to motivate Royal army soldiers to combat, and in the case of the Antigonids, monetary fines were even prescribed as punishments for noncompliance – a clear indicator that the orientation of the lower participants was predominantly calculative, for only then would such sanctions be truly effective. The case of the Egyptian *katoikoi hippeis*, however, reminds us that the Hellenistic world was far from static: change was a constant factor, and the evidence from second-century Egypt reveals that the Ptolemaic compliance relationship might have undergone change, too. The men in question were members of the cavalry arm of the Ptolemaic military settlers. As such they were somewhat different from the more or less vagabond Macedonian contingents who fought for the early Hellenistic rulers, and from the hosts of mercenaries adrift in the sea of conflict that surrounded the Hellenistic political landscape. In terms of their compliance relationship, military settlers might have had more in common with members of a Polis army. In her study of the epigraphic evidence left behind by the Ptolemaic military settlers who served in the cavalry, Scheuble-Reiter concludes that their overriding purpose was to profess one's loyalty to the Royal house.<sup>708</sup> That these expressions of loyalty occur in the context of

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<sup>706</sup> Cf. Legras 2011, 204: 'Glaukias appartient à un groupe qui a obtenu cette distinction soit à titre collectif lors d'un fait d'armes exceptionnel'.

<sup>707</sup> GVI 1151, 3-5, see Barbantani 2014, 303-6 for a more detailed discussion.

<sup>708</sup> Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 291: 'Als Angehöriger des ptolemäischen Heeres sah man es offenbar als seine oberste Pflicht an, seiner Königstreue öffentlich Ausdruck zu verleihen'. See 288-89 for an

military settlements might be significant: it is possible that one of the desired effects of settling soldiers was to cause a shift in the compliance relationship from remunerative-calculative in the direction of normative-moral. Before we conclude this chapter, therefore, we will look at the settling of soldiers in the various Hellenistic kingdoms in more detail.

#### 5.4 The Missing Link: Settling Soldiers

Earlier in this chapter we mentioned the revolt of Achaïos against the rule of Antiochos III, and how his troops refused to comply and forced him to turn back once it became evident that he was intending to fight the king, whom the soldiers saw as their 'natural and original' king.<sup>709</sup> This display of loyalty is somewhat surprising, especially as so far, the men had been seemingly content to follow Achaïos on plundering raids and help him establish a dominion of his own: they witnessed his assumption of the diadem, which even the least politically astute must have recognised as a challenge to the authority of Antiochos III. Why, then, this sudden refusal to fight their 'rightful' king? Polybios, our only source for this event, does not provide any details, but the answer might lie in the fact that Achaïos' troops included a large proportion of soldiers from the *katoikiai* of Asia Minor: Seleukid military settlers.<sup>710</sup> Similarly, the earlier revolt of Molon in 221/1 was eventually foiled by the mass desertion of Molon's troops once they came face to face with Antiochos III.<sup>711</sup> This is supported by earlier reports that loyalty to Molon was dwindling and that many were ready to abandon him.<sup>712</sup> Once again, we might ask ourselves how this display of loyalty to Antiochos is to be reconciled with the original betrayal of

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example of a monumental dedication by a group of *katoikoi hippeis*, probably dating to mid-third-century Hermopolis.

<sup>709</sup> Polyb. 5.57.6-8, Chaniotis 2005, 64.

<sup>710</sup> According to Bar-Kochva 1976, 41, the total of manpower of the military settlers in Asia Minor was around 6,000, and he argues that Achaïos included most of them in his army.

<sup>711</sup> Polyb. 5.54.1-2.

<sup>712</sup> Polyb. 5.46.8. On the revolt see above, Chapter 2.

following a usurper. And, once again, we might note that the majority of Molon's troops were drawn from the eastern military settlements.<sup>713</sup> It appears, then, that there was a connection between loyalty to the Seleukid house and being a military settler.

Indeed, this connection has been noted before: in his study of the Seleukids' use of mercenary soldiers, Griffith noted that the 'Macedonians' in the Seleukid army generally remained loyal to the rightful heir to the royal house, and specifically that the men who followed Achaïos but would not fight Antiochos '*must* be the Graeco-Macedonian *κάτοικοι*'.<sup>714</sup> Bar-Kochva suggests that at the Battle of Magnesia in 189, the Thracians were chosen to guard the important baggage because of their firm loyalty as military settlers.<sup>715</sup> Fingerson sums up the Seleucid settlement program as follows: 'In short, the *κάτοικοι* provided a loyal source of troops that served in the campaigns against prospective rivals and garrisoned strategic locations of the Seleucid Empire'.<sup>716</sup> Equally, Mittag, referring to the soldiers under Molon, explains the 'high degree of loyalty of these troops to Antiochos III' by pointing to their origins as being military settlers.<sup>717</sup> Yet none of these authors actually demonstrate how being a military settler might make a soldier more loyal to the Royal house that nominally controlled the territory on which he was settled, or why it should make him more open to believing in a 'natural' king as opposed to a usurper. Rather than taking the causal link between *katoikiai* and loyalty for granted, we should seek to understand it, and also test it against evidence to the contrary.

It does not appear that the primary reason for this is of an ethnic dimension: while we might expect that the Macedonian elements of the Seleukid kingdom found it easier to accept and show loyalty to a Macedonian ruler, the vast majority of military settlers of Asia Minor were not Macedonians, but Greeks, Jews, and Persians – these were the troops who refused to fight for Achaïos.<sup>718</sup> For the military

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<sup>713</sup> Mittag 2008, 49.

<sup>714</sup> Griffith 1935, 168 n. 2 (*italics in the original*).

<sup>715</sup> Bar-Kochva 1976, 51.

<sup>716</sup> Fingerson 2007, 110.

<sup>717</sup> Mittag 2008, 49.

<sup>718</sup> Cf. Bar-Kochva 1976, 45. See also Fingerson 2007, 115-20 for the inclusion of Persian troops in the Seleukid military settlement structure.



settlers in the east, it appears that the predominant element was indeed of Graeco-Macedonian origin, which was certainly part of the reason for their loyalty to the Seleukids (and for ultimately abandoning Molon).<sup>719</sup> Military settlers of Thracian origin, however, do not have any obvious ethnic reason for supporting the Seleukids. The ethnicity argument, then, only goes so far, and only applies to some of the *katoikoi*. What all these soldiers have in common, however, is their status as military settlers. Thus a more rewarding approach, I believe, lies in analysing these soldiers' compliance relationships, and in particular how being a military settler might impact a soldier's type of involvement.

Before doing so, however, the larger question of the military nature of the Seleukid foundations has to be briefly addressed. In simple terms, the Seleukids offered land, *kleroi*, to settlers in return for military service, and tended to settle groups of such military settlers together, possibly preferring ethnic homogeneity to avoid friction within the communities.<sup>720</sup> These *kleroi* were usually passed on to the sons of the settlers, who also had to perform military service.<sup>721</sup> Land was used as a reward and an incentive for loyal military service, and generally fits the remunerative power model we have observed in Royal armies. Bar-Kochva identified four types of military settlement: the *katoikiai* of Lydia and Phrygia; the *komai*, Iranian villages in western Media; *phrouria* or garrison fortresses; and lastly the *poleis* of northern Syria, Mesopotamia, and eastern Media.<sup>722</sup> To what extent each of these were purely military in nature, and how exactly any military duties of such settlers were defined, has caused a long debate that cannot be dealt with here.<sup>723</sup> Moreover, the exact

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<sup>719</sup> Bar-Kochva 1976, 44-45: 'The Greco-Macedonian element was dominant among the settlers in northern Syria and Mesopotamia, which provided more than half of the phalanx force [...]. The settlers of the Greek cities in eastern Media, who probably served in the Seleucid phalanx, were of Macedonian descent as well. [...] the majority of the settlers in the cities remained virtually Greco-Macedonians'.

<sup>720</sup> Fingerson 2007, 111; Cohen 1972, 88-89 (his article describes the founding of a military settlement in the first century, which might provide glimpses into earlier practice). For the many city foundations of Seleukos I Nikator, see App. Syr. 57.

<sup>721</sup> Bar-Kochva 1976, 41, 46-47. He suggests that at least one son had to serve, as long as the land and family was looked after in his absence. Upon the father's death the son would return to his *kleros* and join the reserve force.

<sup>722</sup> Bar-Kochva 1976, 37.

<sup>723</sup> Bar-Kochva 1976, 7-53 argues for a strong military nature for these settlements and suggests the Seleukids took up the practice after Ipsos in 301 (72), against which generally see Cohen 1978 (esp.

proportion of military settlers to 'regular' soldiers, the economic dimension of colonisation, their role in spreading Hellenism, or the legal processes of transferring *kleroi* all have little direct bearing on our current purpose: it is sufficient to acknowledge that military settlers existed, that the Seleukids at times employed them in their armies, and that somehow these men gained a reputation, in modern scholarship at least, for being particularly loyal to the Seleukid royal house.

As we have seen, Royal armies generally relied on remunerative power to keep their soldiers loyal, and at first glance granting land as an incentive or a reward for military service seems to fit well with this model. The prospect of being rewarded with a parcel of fertile land to farm and to pass on to one's heirs probably motivated many individuals to enlist with a Hellenistic warlord, especially if there was a shortage of good quality land at one's home polis.<sup>724</sup> In these terms, it is a relatively straightforward remunerative-calculative agreement which ensures that the army of a warlord or king has access to a pool of settled soldiers. But there is a further dimension to this exchange: the act of settling down in a distinct location, with a view of living there permanently with one's family (or intending to start one there), could have a profound impact on a Royal army's compliance relationship. It provided the settler with something that he lacked in comparison to his Polis army counterpart: a relatively stable socio-political system. In Chapter 3 we explored how a strong socio-political system could translate into public displays of patriotism, and professions of loyalty to one's polis, family, and communal history and ideology. This in turn went hand in hand with the predominantly normative-moral compliance model we observed in Polis armies, and the concurrently high levels of loyalty in civic armies. Settling soldiers, then, could have been an attempt to provide one's troops

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51-52) and 1991, who argues that there is not enough evidence for the military obligations of the *katoikoi*, also pointing to the later date of many of the colonies' first attestations. However, he seems to be mainly concerned with the issue of any legal obligation to serve in the army tied to the *kleroi* themselves; what matters more for our purposes is that he accepts that military settlers regularly fought in the Seleukid army: 'Undoubtedly, a military colonist was required to serve, if called' (1978, 51). Aperghis 2004, 96 points out that *katoikiai* are only attested in Asia Minor, and thus doubts their empire-wide importance in military terms (although he does not take into account other types of potential military settlements). Fischer-Bovet 2014, 82 with notes 15 and 16 provides a brief overview of the debate and points to further literature.

<sup>724</sup> Chaniotis 2005, 81-82.

with a supporting framework similar to that of polis communities: a permanent home, a sense of belonging, and a communal identity. In other words, something worth fighting for, resulting in a combat motivation that transcended calculative considerations in favour of moral ones.

John Ma has argued that the Hellenistic kingdoms were not simply unrooted political entities sustained mainly by the person of each individual monarch, but rather that each of them possessed a distinct socio-political identity that the inhabitants could subscribe to. As examples he names the close affiliation of Pergamon with the Attalids, of the Macedonian *poleis* with the Antigonids, or of the cities in northern Syria with the Seleukids.<sup>725</sup> It is no coincidence that settlements play a large role in his assessment: the concepts of nationality and communal identity are closely tied to the idea of home.<sup>726</sup> We have already seen how central a role the *πάτρα* played in the sepulchral customs of Greek *poleis*, and how the civic continuum, i.e. the notion of a shared past, present, and future, was related to a distinct physical space. All these elements helped to shape civic cohesion, and ultimately, contributed to the high levels of loyalty in Polis armies.<sup>727</sup>

Consequently, founding (military) settlements can be viewed as attempts by the Seleukids (and other Hellenistic rulers) to create a stronger socio-political system of their own, including a shared history and form of communal identity. This in turn could lead to a stronger bond between their soldiers and the kingdom they were fighting for; it could also strengthen feelings of loyalty to the individuals who represented that kingdom – the royal family and high-ranking officials.<sup>728</sup>

A strong indication of the Seleukids' awareness of this dynamic is the fact that they did not establish any military settlements in Palestine, but rather chose

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<sup>725</sup> Ma 2013, 74-75.

<sup>726</sup> Pye 1971a, 113: 'Yet in all versions of patriotism there are expressions of deep felt ties to one's homeland. Associations with childhood haunts and memories of natural surroundings are apparently universally important in contributing to the most elementary feeling of national identity'.

<sup>727</sup> The connections between politics, loyalty, and physical space appear to be relatively resilient, cf. Pye 1971a, 114: 'Loyalty to a location is fundamental to modern politics, and while certain forms of social and economic modernization may seem to lead to ever more universalistic commitment this is not the pattern for political development'.

<sup>728</sup> Fingerson 2007, 110.

only to install garrisons in strategic locations. The area was close to the Ptolemaic sphere of influence and consequently changed hands several times during the wars that were waged to control it. As Bar-Kochva has suggested, any military settlements would also change sides, and with them the vital sources of military manpower they represented.<sup>729</sup> Garrisons, on the other hand, could be retreated back to Seleukid territory, as they had no intrinsic connection to the land they were defending. The underlying assumption is that once soldiers were settled, they would refuse to leave their lives, lands, and families behind in order to continue serving their nominal king. This strong connection to one's home and the unwillingness to abandon it was one of the main sources for the moral commitment in Polis army soldiers. Royal armies able to harness it effectively would benefit from a stronger moral element in their own troops' involvement, which is generally superior to the prevailing calculative orientation: it was less open to corruption and required fewer incentives to generate compliance. However, there was a flip side to this model. Just as with primary groups who turned into defensive groups and placed their own benefit over that of their organisation, a military settlement with too strong a sense of identity and cohesion might end up looking to its own advantage rather than that of the kingdom it was part of.

A good example is the case of the military settlers of Magnesia by Sipylon, a polis nominally under Seleukid rule. During the Laodikeian (or Third Syrian) War in the middle of the third century, the *katoikoi* of Magnesia revolted and supported Ptolemy III. Hostilities ensued with neighbouring Smyrna, which had remained loyal to Seleukos II, and eventually the affair ended with Smyrna effectively annexing Magnesia through a *sympoliteia* treaty, which survives in the epigraphic record.<sup>730</sup> From the inscription it is clear that some of the *katoikoi* had received their land from Antiochos I several decades before, yet still they decided to betray their king and join Ptolemy III.<sup>731</sup> Military settlers appear not to have shown unshakeable loyalty, then:

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<sup>729</sup> Bar-Kochva 1976, 36.

<sup>730</sup> For the inscription, see *OGIS* 229 (= Bagnall & Derow 29). For further discussion see Ma 1999, 49-50, Chaniotis 2002, 104 and Fingerson 2007, who also discusses the inclusion of Persian troops in the treaty.

<sup>731</sup> *OGIS* 229 III, 100-1.

given the chance, it seems, they exhibited the same independent spirit that was characteristic of polis communities. The polis of Smyrna, incidentally, was no different: according to Ma's analysis of the treaty with Magnesia, the Smyrnaians had acted independently and entirely out of self-interest, 'to carry out the take-over of a royal military colony, to extend the city's territory into Lydia', all the while veiling this power grab in language that evoked their constant loyalty to Seleukos II.<sup>732</sup> In fact, Smyrna later resisted Antiochos III in the hope of preserving its independence.<sup>733</sup> In the face of such self-interest and disloyalty, it is no wonder that the Seleukids were wary of conferring polis status to their military foundations, as the socio-political system that would then grow around them might also encourage the civic community to use this cohesion in order to further its own goals rather than those of the royal house.<sup>734</sup> The Seleukids, once more, seem to have been aware of this potentially problematic issue, and generally refrained from granting full civic rights if possible: the *katoikiai* of Lydia and Phrygia were relatively small and not given polis status.<sup>735</sup>

The level of trust the Seleukids placed in their military settlers can be gleaned from the composition of the phalanx, arguably the core of their army and the most important tactical element on the battlefield: according to Bar-Kochva, the phalanx was recruited exclusively from the settlers, as were other important units.<sup>736</sup> Yet the record of the settlers' loyalty is somewhat mixed: we have seen how the *katoikoi* from Magnesia revolted from Seleukos II, and how the soldiers of the usurpers Molon and Achaïos included many military settlers, even though they eventually refused to

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<sup>732</sup> Ma 1999, 50 and 235. He also points out that we should not misunderstand such an exploitation of the 'language of loyalty' for abject submission on the part of Hellenistic *poleis*, as the ideology of civic autonomy still held sway (50).

<sup>733</sup> Livy 33.38, cf. Ma 1999, 50.

<sup>734</sup> Bar-Kochva 1976, 43: 'The reluctance of the Seleucid kings to grant polis status to the military settlements may account for their relatively small size: the larger they were the more courage they would have had to press for and develop municipal institutions, with all the attendant implications regarding their loyalty'.

<sup>735</sup> Bar-Kochva 1976, 38-39. He also argues that in contrast to the *katoikiai*, the military settlements east of the Tauros were organised as *poleis*, to spread Hellenism and stabilise Seleucid rule. Nevertheless, the administrative distinction between *poleis* at *katoikiai* was not always clear-cut (Musti 1984, 199-200).

<sup>736</sup> Bar-Kochva 1976, 40.

fight against their 'rightful' king. This points to a successful attempt of instilling loyalty to the royal house, but at the same time it reveals that calculative considerations were still powerful enough to outweigh any moral commitment to the ruling monarch. Another interesting case is that of the Kyrrhestai. The region of Kyrrhestike was in northern Syria and named after Kyrrhos, almost certainly an early Seleukid foundation.<sup>737</sup> The territory also contained military settlements, and some 6,000 *katoikoi* were stationed there, many of them of Macedonian descent.<sup>738</sup> Polybios tells us that before Antiochos III could face the revolt of Molon, he had to deal with a widespread mutiny among his assembled troops over arrears of pay (another reminder of the dangers of a remunerative power structure). The influential courtier Hermeias offered to provide the money from his own funds, on the condition that his rival Epigenes be dismissed; Antiochos accepted, which apparently caused the troops to favour Hermeias as their new paymaster, but also triggered a mass defection of the military settlers from Kyrrhestike, who apparently had supported Epigenes.<sup>739</sup> Their sedition lasted long enough for the usurper Achaïos to place his hopes in them joining his side after his invasion of Syria – ironically, his plans of using these settlers' disloyalty were foiled by the eleventh-hour loyalty of the *katoikoi* in his own army. Eventually, the rebel Kyrrhestai were defeated and surrendered.<sup>740</sup>

The details of this episode are slightly obscure, as Polybios characteristically does not provide much information on the motivations of the common soldiers. The reaction of the 6,000 Kyrrhestai to the elevation of Hermeias seems a little extreme, even more so in the light of the aforementioned assertions about the steadfast loyalty of the Seleukid military settlers to the person of the king, whom they were also abandoning. Mittag has pointed out that Antiochos could not have had many military settlers in his army: Molon was controlling those from the east, and Achaïos

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<sup>737</sup> Although Bar-Kochva 1976, 112 suggests it might have been founded by Antigonos Monophtalmos.

<sup>738</sup> *HCP* I, 581.

<sup>739</sup> Mittag 2008, 49 n. 17 and 18.

<sup>740</sup> For the whole episode, see Polyb. 5.50 and 57.4. For their status of military settlers, see Mittag 2008, 49 and Bar-Kochva 1976, 30-31.

those of Asia Minor; with the defection of the Kyrrhestai, only a few could have been left.<sup>741</sup> It might be a possibility that the Kyrrhestai refused compliance in the face of what they might have perceived as a veiled coup by Hermeias, who had now gained the goodwill of Antiochos' mercenaries by providing their pay, and had removed his prime political opponent (he had Epigenes falsely accused and executed soon after). Polybios also adds that most of the king's councillors now feared Hermeias.<sup>742</sup> In this light, the defection of the *katoikoi* might have been an act of support for Antiochos, and a move to distance themselves from the mercenaries. Apart from this largely conjectural explanation, all we can say is that the *katoikoi* from Kyrrhestike, like those from the other parts of the Seleukid dominion, appear to have had a somewhat ambivalent attitude when it came to loyalty to the Seleukid royal house. More often than not, however, it seems that the practice of rewarding soldiers with land in return for faithful service paid off; and the Seleukids were of course not the only ones who desired to strengthen the loyalty of their soldiers. The Ptolemies, too, settled many of their troops in the hopes of securing their lasting allegiance.

While the first secure documentary evidence of military settlers in Ptolemaic Egypt, in the form of a loan contract papyrus, dates to the reign of Ptolemy II (specifically 274/3), the practice of granting land to soldiers was not a Ptolemaic innovation, but might go as far back as the third millennium.<sup>743</sup> Much later, it might already have been the first Lagid who saw the long-term benefits of settling soldiers, or *kleruchs*, in his territory. After the battle of Gaza in 312, where Ptolemy captured some 8,000 of Demetrios Poliorketes' men, we are told that he 'sent the captured soldiers to Egypt with the orders to distribute them among the nomes'.<sup>744</sup> They could have been used as state slaves, but as Scheuble-Reiter has pointed out, the prisoners were relatively experienced infantrymen who formed the Antigonid phalanx at the battle, and were thus a valuable military asset; moreover, many of them would have been mercenaries (around 8,000 of Demetrius' 11,000-strong phalanx were

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<sup>741</sup> Mittag 2008, 49.

<sup>742</sup> Polyb. 5.50.9-14.

<sup>743</sup> Scheuble-Reiter 2014, 496, and 2012, 18-24; Fischer-Bovet 2014, 199-200.

<sup>744</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.85.4: ὁ δὲ Πτολεμαῖος τοὺς μὲν ἀλόντας στρατιώτας ἀποστείλας εἰς Αἴγυπτον προσέταξεν ἐπὶ τὰς νομαρχίας διελεῖν.

mercenaries), and thus probably not too unwilling to find a new paymaster, especially if a plot of land was involved in the bargain.<sup>745</sup> In Chapter 2 we have seen that it was perfectly normal for defeated soldiers, be they Macedonians or mercenaries, to change sides after a battle. This is precisely what Demetrios expected to happen in 306 when he wrested Cyprus from Ptolemaic control: in the early stages of the campaign, he took captive some 3,000 men. As usual he incorporated them into his own army, but then something unexpected occurred: many of them escaped to re-join the Ptolemaic forces on the island, 'because their possessions (τὰς ἀποσκευὰς) had been left in Egypt with Ptolemy'.<sup>746</sup> Demetrios was unable to stop them from running and had to forcibly ship the remainder off to his father in Syria. That 'baggage' is not an entirely adequate translation of ἀποσκευή has been pointed out already: it also included a soldier's household, i.e. family, slaves, and all material wealth. Scheuble-Reiter has argued that these soldiers probably were those whom Ptolemy dispatched to Cyprus in 314, which makes it very likely that their 'baggage' that was left behind in Egypt was their families and homes.<sup>747</sup> This suggests the possibility that Ptolemy I granted *kleroi* for soldiers to settle on relatively early in his rule of Egypt, even if it was not yet as systematic as under his successors Ptolemy II and Ptolemy III.<sup>748</sup>

Whether or not we can identify these soldiers as some of the first *kleruchs* of Ptolemaic Egypt, the incident nevertheless reveals the powerful effect of a connection to land and family: the captive soldiers escaped, almost certainly at the risk of their own lives, to rejoin their former army and ultimately, to return to their households. For Ptolemy, who himself had bribed many of his enemies' troops and was no stranger to being betrayed by those under his command, the voluntary return

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<sup>745</sup> Scheuble-Reiter 2014, 495, with n. 94.

<sup>746</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.47.4: διὰ τὸ τὰς ἀποσκευὰς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καταλελοιπέναι παρὰ Πτολεμαίῳ.

<sup>747</sup> Scheuble-Reiter 2014, 494-95. We know that later there were military settlers on Cyprus itself, possibly to safeguard the important timber and metal production that provided revenue for the Ptolemies (for more details on the military administration of Cyprus, see Mehl 1996, 223-34, and 247-48, where he points out that Cyprus was a relatively stable possession with loyal governors).

<sup>748</sup> Fischer-Bovet 2014, 120 and 201. It is also important to note the extremely uneven distribution of evidence from the first century of Ptolemaic rule: some nomes are abundant with material, while others entirely elusive (Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 11-16, cf. Fischer-Bovet 2014, 121).



of soldiers could have highlighted the positive effects of providing his men with something to fight for beyond simple remuneration, which could after all easily be provided by any of his rivals. In other words, a shift from a calculative mindset based on the receipt of plunder and payment, towards a moral commitment to something akin to 'home', could be effected by providing his troops with land to settle on. What is more, the land would fulfil both remunerative and normative functions: it was a form of reward for loyal service, and also encouraged the same through the creation of a rudimentary socio-political system similar to that of polis communities.

As with the military settlers of the Seleukid kingdom, modern scholars have readily posited that one of the main reasons for the Ptolemies' efforts in handing out *kleroi* to their soldiers was to strengthen their loyalty.<sup>749</sup> Scheuble-Reiter stated explicitly that being a military settler made you less open to bribery than someone who was not settled: 'Im Gegensatz zu den rastlosen, oftmals von einem Kriegsherrn zum anderen wechselnden Söldners war ein Soldat, der in Ägypten mit seiner Familie von den Erträgen seines Landes lebte, für Bestechungen des Kriegsgegners weniger empfänglich'.<sup>750</sup> Against the background of the constant betrayals that plagued the Hellenistic military organisations, especially in the decades after Alexander's death, this would have been a significant advantage, and might support the idea that rulers started early on to grant land to their troops in the hopes of securing their lasting allegiance. But again, none of these authors explain exactly why or how being a military settler made one more loyal – perhaps because the causal connection is assumed to be obvious: if a soldier had land and a family at a fixed location, he would be less willing to abandon them to join another army. But this is only a partial answer.

We have already seen that thousands of the Seleukid *katoikoi* could be brought to serve a usurper's purpose or revolt outright against royal rule. All by itself, being settled does not automatically make a soldier loyal, because the basic

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<sup>749</sup> Bar-Kochva 1976, 47; Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 25: 'Durch das ihnen zugewiesene Stück Land bauten die Soldaten aber auch eine Bindung zu ihrer neuen Heimat und somit zum ptolemäischen König als obersten Feldherrn auf'; Fischer-Bovet 2014, 199.

<sup>750</sup> Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 25.

compliance model – remunerative-calculative – that caused the frequent cases of disloyalty in the past was still in place, farm or no farm. An effective increase in loyalty could only be achieved by transforming the compliance relationship to a normative-moral one, and it is in this context that being settled provides its greatest benefit. Our analysis of Polis armies has shown that a powerful socio-political system was one of the primary factors in creating and maintaining the predominantly moral involvement of citizen-soldiers. For a soldier in a Royal army, being given land to live on was among the first steps towards the establishment of a socio-political system of any kind, and formed the beginnings of a moral commitment built around a communal identity, a shared history, and a personal connection to the physical land one was inhabiting. Combined with normative elements such as the growth of ruler-cult, a sense of 'national' identity as part of a distinctive kingdom, and the increased political and economic sophistication of some of the military colonies, it becomes possible to see the underlying processes that could lead to the strengthening of the moral and normative elements in a Royal army's compliance relationship, and thus to increased levels of loyalty. These processes and their various interactions are naturally highly complex, but they share as their nucleus the socio-political unit of the military settlement.

Given the potential benefits to be derived from settled soldiers and their increased sense of belonging, it is understandable that the Ptolemaic administration took care to ensure the stability and longevity of their military foundations, as well as reinforce the bond between the recipients and the king who granted the land. Kleruchs had to swear an oath after taking up their plots, administered by officials in the name of the king. The exact contents of this oath are unknown, but as these were military settlers, it might have been similar to the oath sworn by the army upon the accession of a new king, and thus designed to strengthen the sense of obligation and loyalty to the royal house.<sup>751</sup> Another step towards a strong social structure was to make the plots effectively hereditary, encouraging long-term settlement and

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<sup>751</sup> The oath for the kleruchs is mentioned in a letter between two Ptolemaic officials, dated to the middle of the third century (P.Cair.Zen. II 59254, see Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 45 for the date). For the oath upon the accession of a new king, see Polyb. 15.25.11 and Fischer-Bovet 2014, 168 with n. 46.

providing an additional stimulus for remaining loyal: a father could pass his land on to his son, which gave him a strong stake in the continuous wellbeing of his community, and, by extension, of the Ptolemaic kingdom.<sup>752</sup>

Most importantly, however, retention was linked to military service: '*klēroi* remained in the hands of cleruchs and their heirs on the condition that one of them was related to the army'.<sup>753</sup> This, together with the fact that before c. 218/7, the royal administration could confiscate kleruchic land while the settler was on campaign or otherwise absent, reminds us of the remunerative-calculative relationship that underpinned this arrangement; the *kleroi* were a form of remunerative power, and naturally influenced soldiers' considerations as to where and for whom they should fight. Just as with booty, the remunerative power that land represented was a well-guarded resource: officially each military *kleros* remained property of the king, who thus maintained at least nominal control over it.<sup>754</sup> On top of these efforts to ensure the settlements' permanence, their internal unity was to be maintained by settling soldiers in ethnically homogenous groups, where possible; and homogeneity of any kind, as we have seen in Chapter 1, is vital for the development of high levels of cohesion. This seems to have been done especially in the third century, so that the non-Egyptian background of the *katoikoi hippeis* contributed to their own cohesion and group identity.<sup>755</sup>

Not only ethnicity, but military function also was taken into account when settling groups of soldiers, as settlement names such as Thraikôn or Hippos suggest. From her study of the papyrological evidence pertaining to the military settlements, which very often features individuals of the same ethnicity, military unit, or geographic location on one document, Scheuble-Reiter has concluded that the

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<sup>752</sup> Fischer-Bovet 2014, 229-30, who also mentions cessions of *kleroi* to other soldiers, or a split between brothers. When exactly the plots became hereditary is uncertain; Stefanou 2013, 121-123 suggests the second century, for the second half of which she also has identified a decrease in new kleruchs. For a letter mentioning both the hereditary nature of *kleroi* and their transmissibility, see Bagnall & Derow 123 (dated to 142).

<sup>753</sup> Fischer-Bovet 2014, 232.

<sup>754</sup> Müller 2006, 133.

<sup>755</sup> Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 326-28. Against the idea of ethnic differentiation in Ptolemaic settlements generally, see Müller 2006, 136.

majority appear to have been close-knit communities who were relatively distinct in social, economic, and military terms.<sup>756</sup> This corresponds to the existence of *gymnasia* in many of the settlements in the Fayyum and the Herakleopolite nome, participation in which would require the settlers to live close by to come together for socio-cultural exchange and military exercises.<sup>757</sup> Taken together, all the above factors would enhance the cohesion of a military settlement, and strengthen the ties that bound the settler to his land, his family, his king, and, crucially, his army.

As always, there was a flip side to this effect: creating a strong socio-political system in the form of military settlements would also lead to stronger local identities and eventually a desire for more independence, as was the case with some of the Seleukid settlements. The Ptolemies, it appears, were similarly reluctant to create fully independent *poleis*, and instead opted for a more diverse approach, founding communities with various administrative structures that all depended on a central authority.<sup>758</sup> There was tension between the military settlers and the rulers that granted their *kleroi*: as an expression of remunerative power, the offer of land was designed to bind the recipient to the king and his army; but as an attempt to create the right circumstances for the growth of moral commitment in their men, it could lead to the development of a desire for more autonomy in social, political, and economic terms. For an example of this tension we might mention the series of letters from Tyriaion, a military settlement under the rule of the Attalids, which record the answers of Eumenes II to the settlers' request for full polis rights, complete with a gymnasium, a council, and their own laws: dated to the first half of the second century, the king's reply grants the creation of polis structures, but is replete with reminders of the *do ut des*-character of this agreement, and leaves no doubt that the polis will owe lasting gratitude and loyalty to Eumenes in return for his benefaction.<sup>759</sup> It seems that in this case at least, the loyalty of his subjects still

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<sup>756</sup> Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 27-32.

<sup>757</sup> Fischer-Bovet 2014, 242; see 280-90 for more detail on the social interaction centred on the *gymnasia*, where she argues that its integrating effects were extended, at least from the middle of the second century, also to those of mixed, and of non-Egyptian background.

<sup>758</sup> Müller (2006), 139-40.

<sup>759</sup> SEG 47.1745 (= Bagnall & Derow 43).

depended to a large degree on the predominantly remunerative-calculative power structures we have observed in the military organisations of the Hellenistic kingdoms: 'an unstable mixture of legality and power, benefactions and expectations, threat and trust'.<sup>760</sup>

From the perspective of military loyalty and compliance theory, the act of granting land to one's troops in return for continuous service in the army resembles a relatively straightforward application of remunerative power, intended to trigger a positive response based on the calculative involvement of the lower participants. The short-term benefits appear to have been real and apparent: military settlers had a much stronger incentive to remain loyal to their original employer, who was now also their landlord, and had virtual possession of their belongings and families to boot. In this light, the decision of the captured Ptolemaic soldiers who deserted Demetrios to return to their 'baggage' in Egypt can be readily compared to the decision of the Silver Shields to betray Eumenes in return for their 'baggage': in both cases, their families and possessions were in effect being held hostage, to be redeemed in the first case by loyalty, in the other, by treachery. Military settlers, in a sense, were given a permanent location for their 'baggage', and thus a permanent connection to the power that controlled that location. Over time, the cultural, social, political, and economic development of their settlement could lead to the creation of a socio-political system akin to that of a more typical Greek polis, which in turn favoured the growth of moral involvement with the settlers' military organisations. The Hellenistic military settlement, then, could be viewed as a quasi-polis, designed to recreate the environment that sustained the powerful normative-moral compliance relationship of citizen-armies. A quasi-polis only, though, because a king did not want his settlements to develop the fierce spirit of independence and autonomy that generally characterised the *poleis* of Greece, lest they forgot the ultimate source of their safety and prosperity.

Overall, the evidence reviewed here supports the general picture that has emerged in the previous chapters: against the backdrop of frequent betrayals and

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<sup>760</sup> Chaniotis 2005, 68.

uncertain loyalties, it is not surprising that Hellenistic warlords looked for ways to ensure their men's allegiance beyond payment and plunder. A personal stake in the welfare of their kingdom, it appears, is what they saw as the missing link in their compliance model: hence the task was to align the benefit of the lower participant with that of his organisation, which as we have seen was a hallmark of Polis armies. Settling soldiers served this purpose well, as it created a permanent physical home, a socio-political system with which to identify himself, and, finally, a motivation to combat that was perhaps based on more than short-term gain.

## 5.5 Conclusion

This chapter set out to analyse the respective reward structures in Polis and Royal armies. What we have found generally corresponds to and reinforces the conclusions from the previous chapters: allowing for certain areas of overlap, the two types of military organisation utilised different ways to motivate their men to combat and to generate lasting loyalty in their troops. These differences derive primarily from the predominant compliance structure that was in place in each organisation.

For Polis armies, we have seen that the rewards for loyalty and compliance were largely symbolic in nature, and that the warfare carried out by *poleis* offered relatively few opportunities to the regular soldier for personal enrichment. Moreover, what material wealth there was to be had usually became public property, underlining once more the powerful effect of a cohesive socio-political system that placed the community at the heart of loyalty. This effect was enhanced by ensuring that any rewards that were handed out were given by the polis community, not by individual generals. The focal point for loyalty was always in the abstract: not individual commanders, not individual governments, but the citizen body as a whole. We may recall the granting of weapons and armour to war orphans, set in a public and highly symbolic context, where the community took on the role of the orphans' families. This act was equally an honour and reward for the fallen as it was for the

survivors, who were to be inspired by the example of the dead. The symbolic element in these proceedings would be further highlighted by the notion that not all war orphans would have been destitute, unable to support themselves or to buy their own equipment. More important than the material aspect of gifting weapons, clearly, was the symbolic one: the polis came together to reward those who fell in the past, honour those who were entering adulthood in the present, and inspire those who were to fight in the future.

In contrast to this model, the analysis of Royal armies revealed that the predominant element in their power structure was the remunerative one, and that this was met primarily with calculative involvement from the lower participants. This was reinforced again and again, whether by official regulations as in the case of the Antigonids, or by repeated distributions of plunder as rewards and incentives for compliance. Loyalty was largely bought, and whereas *poleis* usually strove to prevent strong bonds between individual commanders and their men for fear they might threaten the political equilibrium at home, Hellenistic kings and warlords were eager to be seen as the only source of such remunerative power – precisely because of the bonds it fostered between troops and paymaster.

There was a related way in which these personal bonds were created and reinforced: ruler cult. This topic is too complex to be dealt with adequately within the scope of this thesis, but it is easy to see that the concept of divine kingship could have an important impact on a Royal army's compliance model.<sup>761</sup> It added another layer to the already highly personalised relationship between the king and his soldiers: he was not only their king, general, and paymaster, but also their divinely sanctioned ruler upon which their continued wellbeing depended. Personal loyalty to the king was to be strengthened by worshipping not only him, but also his family, as divinities, underlining the concept that there was a continuum of divine rule to which the soldiers were subjected. This is a clear addition of a normative element to the otherwise predominantly remunerative power structures in Royal armies; just as

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<sup>761</sup> On ruler cult generally, see Small 1996, Chaniotis 2003, part two in Iossif, Chankowski & Lorber 2011, and Erskine 2014. On ruler cult and cities, see Habicht 1970. On the Ptolemaic cult, see Pfeiffer 2008 and Müller 2009.

the king's image on coins was designed to remind his army where their remuneration came from, so the proliferation of ruler cult was designed to make the military more loyal by turning compliance into more than a commodity.<sup>762</sup> On a symbolic level, acts of disloyalty were elevated to transgressions against a divine power, and thus acquired a normative dimension that transcended any contract of service. For examples of the positive effects of this approach we can turn to Egypt: the epigraphic evidence pertaining to garrison commanders reveals that their expressions of loyalty to the king were almost exclusively made through dedications to the ruler.<sup>763</sup> Military settlers, too used ruler cult to profess their loyalty: a group of *katoikoi hippeis* from Hermopolis dedicated a sanctuary to Ptolemy III and his wife Berenike, and most of the dedications of the *katoikoi hippeis* open with proclamations of allegiance to the royal house.<sup>764</sup> Such close ties between the army and the king were supposed to cement the position of the king as the sole focal point for the loyalty of his troops.

Plunder, however, was still the most valuable resource, and whoever controlled it held considerable sway over the loyalties of the troops. This explains the strict regulations of the Macedonian army regarding the surrender of plunder to the general, and also helps to understand why the courtier Hermeias was able to turn the opinion of the troops in his favour simply by providing their pay. It also explains why Philip V would often personally oversee the distribution of plunder to his men, and show particular largesse to his officers.<sup>765</sup> It was perhaps partly in response to the uncertainties such a compliance model imposed on the loyalties of the troops that settling soldiers became a common strategy.<sup>766</sup> Military settlements could

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<sup>762</sup> *EAH*, s. v. 'Ruler cult, Greek and Hellenistic': 'The main purpose of these cults was to ensure the loyalty of their subject peoples and soldiery and to unify the kingdom'.

<sup>763</sup> Scheuble 2009, 43-45: 'Es hat fast den Anschein, dass die Kommandanten der oftmals vorgeblich nicht allzu treuen Söldner damit ein Loyalitätsdefizit zu füllen und sich von den ihnen untergebenen Soldaten abzusetzen suchten. Und das entscheidende Medium, dessen sie sich hierfür bedienten, war der Herrscherkult bzw. die Herrscherverehrung'.

<sup>764</sup> See Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 288-91.

<sup>765</sup> E.g. Polyb. 4.77.5, 4.80.16, 5.14.8, 5.24.10.

<sup>766</sup> Economic factors played their part too: the Ptolemaic settlers had to pay a tax that might have been unique to them (Fischer-Bovet 2014, 221-25), while Ma 2013, 69-70 argues that the Attalid military settlements served to create additional tax revenues and to limit the need for expensive mercenaries.



provide the stability that roving armies lacked, and the nascent socio-political systems they embodied might provide the soldier with a real stake in the welfare of his king and kingdom, and consequently make him less likely to betray or abandon them. That the Seleukid military settlers at times rose in revolt against their king, but ultimately refused to fight against him directly, reminds us of the complex nature of compliance relationships: different types of power operated simultaneously, as did conflicting types of involvement. Thus Alexander's extremely charismatic style of leadership was coupled with generosity and abundant material rewards, while his veterans could express sincere loyalty to the Argead line as well as oppose it directly. What wider conclusions we may draw from this dynamic will be the subject of the following, and final, part of this study.

# Conclusion

## *The Dynamics of Loyalty*



### 1. General Conclusions

In this thesis I set out to investigate the dynamics of loyalty in ancient armies generally, and in particular to explain the reasons behind the differing levels of loyalty we find in the citizen forces of the Greek *poleis* and the large armies led by Alexander's successors and the leaders of the developing Hellenistic kingdoms.

In Chapter 2 we observed that acts of disloyalty were rare in Polis armies, while Royal armies were seen to have suffered from frequent cases of treachery and noncompliance. I suggested that this was a consequence of two fundamentally different ways of generating compliance: Polis armies predominantly applied normative power to their members, who in turn were predominantly morally involved. Royal armies, on the other hand, relied primarily on remunerative power, and their members were primarily calculatively involved. One of the main reasons for this was the integration of Polis armies into a powerful socio-political system that infused their compliance relationships with intense social and political interaction, high levels of personal involvement with their state and their society, and a strong and comprehensive civic ideology that framed military service as a moral right and obligation. As an example of the effects of this integration, Chapter 3 presented the evidence for funerary practices in both types of armies. For Polis armies it was evident that the core themes found in soldiers' epitaphs and public burials and commemoration were love of the ancestral land, sacrifice for the common good, and

the glory that attended death in battle. Often there was a strong exhortative element to these expressions of civic ideology, and an explicit sense of belonging to a wider past, present, and future, which I called the civic continuum.<sup>767</sup> This socio-political immersion, based on a clearly defined socio-political identity, facilitated the application of normative power and reinforced the moral involvement of citizen soldiers, resulting in high levels of compliance and loyalty. Royal armies did not enjoy the same benefits, and the central themes found in civic funerary material are absent: nor do we find in their stead expressions of sacrifice for, or belonging to, other abstract socio-political entities, such as a kingdom or an army. Rather, the bonds in Royal armies existed between the army and the general, who sat at the head of the remunerative power structures that prevailed in Royal armies.

Having indicated the two main types of power used in Polis and Royal armies, i.e. normative and remunerative, Chapter 4 demonstrated that the third type, coercion, did not play a significant part in either organisation. This has previously been identified as a shortcoming, as it was seen as a cause of indiscipline, especially in the case of Polis armies, who exhibited rather lax standards by comparison with modern armies, or indeed the Roman military.<sup>768</sup> I have stressed the problems with this approach: discipline and punishment are not causally linked. The absence of harsh discipline and physical coercion in Polis and Royal armies is a direct result of their compliance relationships, which did not rely on coercive power. Simply put, they had no need for it.<sup>769</sup> In the final chapter, I then argued that the reward systems in both types of army were a strong reflection of their respective compliance relationships: Polis armies did not make much use of remunerative power, relying instead on the symbolic value of the rewards they bestowed for loyal service. The public and communal context of these rewards, such as public burials and ceremonies, emphasised once more the importance of the socio-political system in shaping the type of power and involvement. In Royal armies, remuneration was shown to have been at the heart of the compliance structure: kings took steps to

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<sup>767</sup> Chaniotis 2012, 44, Boulay 2014, 484.

<sup>768</sup> Kiesling 2006, 233.

<sup>769</sup> Drummond 1993, 12.

control the distribution of plunder, and manipulated the allocation of material wealth as incentive and rewards for compliance. This led to a volatile military climate, as remuneration was concerned mainly with compliance, not loyalty. Hence the many cases of betrayal and noncompliance that characterised the warfare of the Successors and the Hellenistic kingdoms. In his influential article, 'Hellenistic Kings, War, and the Economy', Austin outlined the central importance of money and plunder for the maintenance of the Hellenistic monarchies, but noted that works on Hellenistic armies said little about it.<sup>770</sup> I hope that this thesis has made this picture much clearer: remunerative power, in the form of money, military pay, and plunder, lay at the core of the compliance structures of Hellenistic Royal armies – without it, both the army and the monarchy would have disintegrated.

## 2. Conflict and Convergence

There are, however, several areas of overlap between the compliance models of Royal and Polis armies. It is worth repeating that the predominant types of power and involvement that characterised these armies are just that: predominant. Most organisations work with elements of all three types of congruent compliance relationships, and we witness this in the case of ancient armies.<sup>771</sup>

Citizen soldiers were of course also motivated by prospects of plunder and personal gain, and even if the yields were generally on a small scale, we should not underestimate their value. Similarly, the strength of the socio-political system in generating moral involvement from its members could also have coercive effects: peer supervision, shame culture, and various legal penalties were soft forms of forcing compliance. Moreover, we should not assume too romantic an image of civic cohesion and loyalty to the state: the frequent eruptions of *stasis* demonstrate that citizens were more than able to kill each other in the intense struggles for power

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<sup>770</sup> Austin 1986, 464-65.

<sup>771</sup> Etzioni 1975, 6-8, 23.

within the polis. Public and private expressions of unity and exhortation to sacrifice personal interest for the common good, then, can be seen to mask the deep divisions underneath the façade of citizen solidarity. This highlights the effectiveness of a polis' compliance relationship: that citizen communities could send out thousands of soldiers who would not betray each other in the field or join their enemies' enemies speaks volumes about the levels of task cohesion a normative-moral compliance structure could create. The same point can be made about the absence of physical coercion. Hornblower concluded his article on the 'army as polis' in Xenophon's *Anabasis* with asking how Greek civic armies managed to fight or win battles at all, considering their 'informal and even anarchic attitudes'; his own suggestion points in the right direction: 'It would have to do with civically generated cohesiveness and determination not to let one's fellow fighters down, as attested by the Athenian ephebic oath and other evidence, not just Athenian but Spartan too, and Greek generally'.<sup>772</sup> I hope to have provided this 'other evidence', and to have revealed that we are, indeed, not dealing with an exclusively Athenian or Spartan phenomenon, but one that pertains to all civic armies that operated within the socio-political framework of the polis.

Royal armies, too, exhibited elements of other compliance relationships that should caution us to posit a simplistic 'Royal vs. Polis army' dichotomy. Beyond simply paying their men to maintain compliance, Hellenistic warlords and kings sought ways to innovate and create new forms of identity that would bind their soldiers to them more permanently. In the system of military settlements we can see an approximation of polis structures, a royal attempt at providing the trappings of polis life – ideally without the elements of autonomy and independence – in order to place the loyalties of their troops on a firmer footing. On a larger scale, the use of cult to elevate the power and legitimacy of the ruler, and the forging of kingdom-wide identities that emphasised stability and success, helped provide a Royal army with some of the normative benefits that the socio-political system of the polis bestowed on civic armies. Erskine has shown how the grand processions of Ptolemy

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<sup>772</sup> Hornblower 2004, 263.

II (in the early third century) and Antiochos IV (c. 166) emphasised the legitimacy and universal power of these monarchs, and how they evoked 'a tradition going back to the civic processions (*pompai*) of the classical *poleis*, now transferred to the new world of the Hellenistic monarchy'.<sup>773</sup> The figure of the legitimate king himself acquired enough normative force as to command the loyalties of entire armies, an example of which we saw in the revolt of Achaïos. Combined with the remunerative power kings wielded, and the personal charisma some of them possessed, the scale and effectiveness of Royal armies becomes readily understandable.<sup>774</sup>

### 3. Future Directions

The findings of this thesis could be enhanced and supported by investigating in more detail some of the larger topics that informed the present analysis. The phenomenon of *stasis* needs to be better understood, especially its relationship to military history more generally. As we have seen, treating civil war in purely political terms ignores the fact that the citizens who killed each other in a coup also stood their ground next to each other while on campaign. The close connection between the civic and military realms of polis life might have been an important underlying cause for the fierce internal violence that *stasis* entailed.<sup>775</sup> Another area that needs further study is that of funerary epitaphs for soldiers: the evidence collected here is by no means exhaustive, and a systematic analysis of the epigraphic material, particularly in the case of the more dispersed material for Hellenistic soldiers, might lead to more refined results. Other Royal armies, too, such as the Macedonian army of the Archaic and Classical periods, or the Achaimenid military system, could be discussed in terms of their compliance structures, potentially revealing yet more complexities in the combinations of different types of power and involvement. Finally, modern theories

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<sup>773</sup> Erskine 2013a, 45. For the processions, see Ath. 5.196a–203b (Ptolemy), and Ath. 5.194c–196a, Polyb. 30.25–26, Diod. Sic. 31.16 (Antiochos).

<sup>774</sup> For the importance of charisma in remunerative organisations, see Etzioni 1975, 309–11.

<sup>775</sup> McLauchlin 2010, 335.

of military organisation and combat motivation should not be dismissed out of hand: the present work, I hope, shows how beneficial they can be to aid us in better understanding the structural causes behind certain phenomena that our sources might simply put down to soldiers' greed or the personality of an individual leader.<sup>776</sup>

The dynamics of loyalty in Polis and Royal armies were determined by a complex combination of social, political, economic, and personal factors. It would be impossible to understand every single one of them in its entirety, but having discussed several of them in detail, we can say that citizen armies displayed remarkably high levels of loyalty, whereas Royal armies suffered frequent noncompliance. The one single most important cause of this difference was the socio-political system that enveloped a Polis army and allowed a normative-moral compliance relationship to flourish. Royal armies had to find other, more pragmatic ways of generating compliance and fostering loyalty. Both armies, however, shared one feature: at the heart of loyalty, ultimately, lay the personal emotions, beliefs, and actions of the individual soldier. Inasmuch as the deepest personal motivations of these men lie beyond the grasp of modern historiography, this study will always be incomplete.

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<sup>776</sup> Pace Wheeler 2007, 213, who rejects the utility of modern theories of combat motivation (especially primary group theory) by claiming that ancient evidence does not support them.

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